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Reasoning behind the study 
This study sought to overcome a dearth in understanding regarding knowledge required 
to be taught by institutions of higher learning, and mastered by professionals for 
security to move along the professionalisation path. The research evolved from a series 
of questions I had considered after commencing a teaching role within an Australian 
university. I had worked in both the military and civilian security environments for 
many years, and I had completed a Masters by Research degree in the area of security 
science. When I commenced teaching I asked myself what do I need to teach, what is 
essential and what is desirable, and what is the best way to teach security to 
undergraduate students? The reality is that there was no easy answer, as clouding the 
issue was the depth and breadth of security education.  
Topics include criminology, terrorism, intelligence, management along with technology 
based units in intrusion detection, access control and closed circuit television (CCTV). 
Such depth and breadth in many security courses stems from significant diversity in the 
security domain’s employment options for graduates. In addition, much of the security 
domain within the law and order paradigm (non-traditional) sits at the operational end 
of security’s occupational stratum, with diminutive recognition for the professional 
category membership. Central to security’s emergence and acceptance by both the 
public and legal arenas at the higher end of the stratum as a profession is its evidence of 
a valid body of knowledge that requires formal education through institutions of higher 
learning. Such knowledge must demonstrate how it brings about consistent and 
predictable changes in the environment to provide a state of being secure.  
Consequently, I recognised the need to explore how the professional stratum of the 
security domain is jurisdictionally divided, each with its relevant knowledge requisites. 
Very quickly this exploration uncovered a project of significant scope. This led me to 
focus on physical security only, to map graduates’ jurisdictional domain knowledge 
requisites, setting a framework for further sub-domain investigations. Accordingly, the 
study is not about technical details of locks or specific barriers, nor is it about alarm 
specifications and response personnel. The focus of this study was about the role 
physical security professionals play in the protection of assets and their requisite core 
and supporting knowledge in terms of a desirable curriculum model.   
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Abstract 
Many new professions are emerging across contemporary society and as part of this 
societal transformation debate on the professional status of higher strata security 
personnel is intensifying. This debate is steered by the notion of the modern day 
security professional along with his or her claim of specialised occupational skills. 
Furthermore, many modern day professionals in security apply expertise in a specific 
jurisdictional field. Within the broad security domain, one specialised practising area is 
physical security which requires both general and specialised knowledge. However, a 
criterion of professionalism argues that physical security cannot be considered a 
profession, or progress along its professionalisation path, until its practice is based on an 
explicit body of knowledge and consistent educational standards. The study undertook a 
cultural domain analysis to articulate the physical security professionals’ knowledge 
system, thereby isolating fundamental units and building a structure of knowledge.  
The study applied a multiphase approach, (a) a literature critique to detect and localise 
repeated themes within the sub-domain, (b) expert interviews to enrich explicitly 
extracted knowledge concept categories, (c) quantitative validation to understand macro 
structure, and (d) focus group analysis for understanding the relationship between 
knowledge content and structure and educational goals. The study’s findings 
demonstrate that a physical security body of knowledge comprises a matrix of task 
related knowledge categories. Such knowledge is broad and ranges from understanding 
the contextual threats, to using security theories and principles, to engineering 
knowledge of technical components which is supported by professional enabling 
knowledge. Furthermore, such knowledge has a hierarchical structure, organised based 
on the professional tasks of diagnosing the security problem, inference to reach the 
optimal resolution among many options, and finally, treatment. Such structure informs 
the teaching order of learning units to constructively build knowledge in a logical 
manner. 
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Abstract 
Security Science education at university levels is still in its infancy, with little 
agreement towards knowledge, curriculum and competency. Therefore it is essential 
that educators draw on relevant literature highlighting means of efficient and effective 
knowledge transfer for tertiary students within the security science domain. Such 
knowledge transfer will reduce the gap between academic knowledge (explicit) and 
professional competency (tacit knowledge) at the tertiary level. This paper presents 
phase one of a multiphase study. 
A qualitative systems based knowledge structure of security domain categories has been 
conceptually mapped as a domain heuristic. The heuristic drew on research highlighting 
that experts have both richer depths of domain knowledge and superior cross referenced 
organizational structure than novices. The conceptual map takes a top-down approach 
bounded by routine activity, rational choice, situational crime prevention, defence in 
depth, security decay and management theories within the elements of prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery. Results indicate that within a systems approach, 
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Coole, M., Brooks, D.J., Treagust, D. (2015). The Physical Security Professional: 
Formulating a Novel Body of Knowledge. Journal of Applied Security Research, 
10(3).  
Abstract 
Debate on the professional status and what constitutes the security domain is 
intensifying. One practising area of security is physical security, which requires both 
general and specialised knowledge. However, physical security cannot be considered a 
profession until their practice is based on an explicit body of knowledge and consistent 
educational standards. Therefore, the study undertook a cultural domain analysis to 
articulate a physical security professionals’ knowledge system, isolating fundamental 
units and structure of knowledge. The study applied a multiphase approach; conducting 
a literature critique, expert interviews, quantitative validation and focus group analysis. 
Study findings demonstrate that the physical security body of knowledge is a matrix of 
knowledge categories. Knowledge is broad and range from facility contextualization to 
movement control to explicit aspects such as locks. Nevertheless, this knowledge has a 
hierarchical structure, organised based on the professional tasks of diagnosing the 
security problem, inference to reach the optimal resolution among many and finally, 
treatment. 
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Chapter 1: Study introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Many new professions are emerging across contemporary society. However, for these 
professions their embryonic development is challenging, with clear argument that unless 
their underpinning knowledge base can be explicitly articulated no case exists for 
professional recognition. Emerging professional domains must therefore through 
evidentiary means uncover their knowledge base and convince the public of its 
complexity and necessity to be recognised in the group phenomenon. One such 
emerging domain is that of the security professional. However, security as an 
occupational endeavour is divided into two prominent domain streams; one denoted as 
traditional security and the other non-traditional security. Traditional security focuses 
towards concerns of sovereignty and the stability of nation states in the face of foreign 
national threats; this is pursued politically and militarily. The non-traditional stream of 
security considers other threat typologies across a vast array of societal concerns 
throughout the international community, or within the functioning of nation states.  
Sitting within a nation’s non-traditional domain stream is its security industry or sector. 
This stream is divided into a diverse range of distinct occupational category roles 
providing specific client centred protective services. It includes the broader practice area 
of physical security, and is what many citizens perceive when they consider or pursue 
day-to-day security. Within this embodiment are a strata of roles and activities and 
occupational services ranging from operational guard force and electronic security 
installers and integrators to security managers, and those persons providing highly 
complex protective advice across a broad range of corporate sectors.  
However, indistinct understandings exist across non-traditional security’s higher strata 
occupational categories relating to the services provided and their respective educational 
underpinnings. For instance, persons working in the upper sphere of the non-traditional 
stratum are referring to themselves as security professionals. Yet there is limited 
understanding of what constitutes a security professional, what their knowledge and 
jurisdictional basis is, and formal educational requirements supporting their services. As 
such, this study investigated the emerging sub-domain professional stream of physical 
security. Chapter One presents the background discussion framing this exploration. The 
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chapter draws on the Australian security professionals’ discourse to seat a broader in-
depth analysis of the professional knowledge required by practitioners in what is a pan-
cultural practice stream.  
Section 1.2 of the chapter presents the study’s backgrounding pronouncing the context 
of the study. Section 1.3 conveys the significance of the study accordant with this 
discussion. This discourse is considered in the Australian context in Section 1.4 
providing a folk basis for the study. Then Section 1.5 presents the study’s seating as a 
pan-cultural domain analysis (cultural domain analysis). Section 1.6 introduces 
cognitive constructivism as the underlying theoretical frame of the study, and Section 
1.7 introduces the study’s research objectives and supporting research questions 
(Section 1.7.1). This discussion is summarised in Section 1.8 via a reflection and 
concludes in Section 1.9.   
1.2 Background 
A domain is defined as a particular area of activity or life, a field of knowledge or 
activity area (1981, p. 246); the scope of a subject, or an area of activity over which 
somebody has influence, or is controlled by a particular person or group. Extending on 
this is the notion of a cultural domain where culture is expressed as “the accumulated 
store of symbols, ideas, and material products associated with a social system, be it an 
entire society or a family unit” (Johnson, 1995, p. 68). In other words, it is a shared 
system of meaning (Spradley, 1979, p. 4), and a cultural domain refers to the 
fundamental units of cultural knowledge (symbols) for a specific domain  organized 
accordant with a single semantic relationship, in terms of similarity and differences 
(Bernard & Ryan, 2010). The security domain within the context of this study is 
considered a distinct yet broad occupational cultural domain.  
For the security domain, debate embodying the professional status of individuals within 
it is intensifying. Steering this debate is literature drawn from other domains, 
emphasising that a profession and its professionals are defined according to the status of 
their agreed body of knowledge, education standards linked to competencies aligned 
with such bodies of knowledge and the public’s confidence as a result of such standards 
(Wilensky, 1964; Eraut, 1994; Abbott, 1998; Smith & Brooks, 2013). Yet to date there 
has been limited success in defining educational standards and course content across the 
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significantly diverse security domain. Such a lack in agreed body of knowledge and 
educational standards arguably leaves the security domain and specific practice areas 
within it lacking in public confidence and professional standing.    
1.3 Significance of the problem 
A review of the broad literature highlights the current debate recognising or rebuffing 
the notion of the security professional, or security as a profession will continue for some 
time (Nalla & Morash, 2002; Garcia, 2000; Rogers, 2000; Rogers et al, 2007; Borodzicz 
& Gibson, 2006; Anderson, 2007; Australian Interim Security Taskforce, 2008; Brooks, 
2007; 2011; Coole & Brooks, 2011). At this time, identifying who or what delineates a 
security professional remains unclear (Horrocks, 2001, p. 226; Smith & Brooks, 2013, 
p. 243). The future development of professionalism in the security industry is dependent 
on the improvement of formal, structured programs that meet the needs of the security 
industry (Horrocks, 2001, p. 226; Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 244) and society at the 
professional level. Johnston and Warner’s (2014, p. 15) works call for more emphasis 
on physical security research, expressing that we need to start thinking about physical 
security as something that can be a highly scholastic research subject, pointing out that 
with more rigour we may actually achieve more effective physical security.   
It is acknowledged within the literature on professionalism that before an occupation 
can be considered a profession, it must develop a clear and more solidified academic 
basis (Horrocks, 2001, p. 220; Axt, 2002, p. 142). This basis must include a well-
defined and inclusive body of knowledge (Horrocks, 2001, p. 226) along with internal 
structure (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 245); as academic knowledge underpins and 
therefore legitimizes professional work (Abbott, 1988, p. 54), and this is so for the 
security domain (Horrocks, 2001, p. 220). Central to this discourse is the argument put 
forward by authors including Martin and Guerin (2005, p. 16) that a formal body of 
knowledge defines a professions’ jurisdictional practice. A view also expressed by 
Morris, Crawford, Hodgson, Shepherd and Thomas (2006, p. 710) who stress that 
ownership of a distinctive body of knowledge is a vitally important element of any 
profession; this needs to be an inclusive body of knowledge containing concepts, 
principles and theories (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 1). Smith and Brooks (2013, p. 1) 
P a g e  | 4 
 
highlight that this includes an internal structure of knowledge achieved through internal 
relationships between concepts so that consistency and logic prevail. 
Smith and Brooks (2013, p. 245) considered that evidence based research will play an 
important role in the professionalisation of security. Within this examination is a focus 
on higher education in providing the necessary abstract knowledge for future security 
professionals, denoted by Phinney and Smith (2009, p. 1), Coole and Brooks (2011, p. 
1) and Smith and Brooks (2013, p. 1) as security science. As the writings of Gillespie 
(1981, p. 371) highlight, university is the focal point of professionalism and this needs 
to be taught through the existence of a recognised academic base (Horrocks, 2001, p. 
220). Within this context, the Collins Dictionary (Krebs, 1981) defines science as: 1. 
“The systematic study of the nature and behaviour of the material and physical universe 
based on: observation, experiment, and measurement. 2. The knowledge so obtained or 
the practice of obtaining it. 3. Any particular branch of this knowledge: the applied 
sciences. 4. Any body of knowledge organised in a systematic manner. 5. Skill or 
technique. 6. Arch. Knowledge” (p. 1163). The Collins Dictionary further defines a 
profession as 1. “An occupation requiring special training in the liberal arts or sciences, 
or, 2. The body of people in such an occupation (p. 1029)”.  
These combined definitions highlight that for the security domain or individuals within 
it at a group level to be considered professionals, they must have organised knowledge, 
learned through training in the arts or sciences, or both, commensurate with their areas 
of foci. Thus, accordant with the writings of Axt (2002, p. 142), such knowledge needs 
to be communicated to higher education towards establishing standards upon which to 
base their qualifications programs. Both prospective professionals and the broader 
public rely on uniform standards of education to develop dependable expectations 
regarding any profession and its competencies (Fox, 1994, p. 202). Although, deferring 
here to the writings of Allan (1996, p. 1), educational objectives are multifaceted, where 
the design of learning experiences for higher education has shifted towards more 
outcomes led objectives. Both Tyler (1949) and Allan (1996, p. 94) emphasise the 
importance of supporting learning objectives, stating: 
If an educational programme is to be planned and efforts for continued 
improvements are to be made, it is very necessary to have some conception 
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of the goals that are being aimed at. These educational objectives (goals) 
become the criteria by which content is outlined, materials are selected, 
instructional procedures are developed and tests and examinations are 
prepared (Tyler, 1949, p. 3).  
To date, there are no agreed on or research supported educational objectives for security 
professionals including those physical security practitioners. As the Hallcrest report 
(Cunningham & Taylor, 1985) acknowledged, the field of security itself constitutes a 
specialized knowledge, but it is questionable whether in the traditional academic sense 
security can be considered a body of knowledge that is girded with a strong academic 
basis. Expounding the lack of research supported basis for the security industry, the role 
of education is premised to be looking at the field from a distance, from an objective 
position, to conduct research, analyse, be critical, develop theory and support change 
and innovation (Cunningham & Taylor, 1985, p. 227). This view still stands today.  
The paucity of validated security curriculum highlights that changes are needed; 
changes which must be made on the basis of validated information. As Criscuoli (1988, 
p. 99) points out, up-to-date knowledge of physical security devices and controls along 
with their uses are the obvious knowledge requirements for physical security 
professionals; what is not obvious is the scope and breadth of the subject. Thus, a 
cultural domain analysis focusing on taxonomic structure can provide professional 
comprehension in terms of informing the development of higher educational curriculum 
for future physical security professionals. As such, the outcomes of the study included; 
 A consensual map representing the organisational structure of knowledge 
concepts within the domain of physical security; 
 A domain heuristic for articulating the occupational role knowledge areas and 
supporting knowledge concept categories within physical security’s knowledge base; 
 Visual clarity for security professionals to understand where their particular 
expertise fits into the physical security domain within a systems approach; 
 A means of explicitly presenting (reception learning) the hierarchical knowledge 
areas and their subordinate concepts of physical security to tertiary students as a richly 
cross-referenced organised structure enhancing their efficiency of learning;  
 The development of a learning objective for physical security professionals; 
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 Guidance for integrating physical security theory with best practice principles; 
and 
 Contributing towards developing the consensual knowledge and professional 
competencies for physical security educators in institutions of higher learning. 
The significance of this study lies in its symbolic outcomes, as it is argued that the 
concept of the security professional will be better understood through research driven 
domain exploration. Such an outcome would enhance the professional status of security 
through validated higher education curriculum and associated competency measures, 
thus increasing the broader public’s understanding and confidence in their services. 
Consequently it is argued that the professional status for the domain will not advance 
until the necessary research, such as this, is undertaken to provide the underpinning 
articulation and relevant body of professional knowledge. Such an outcome is essential 
towards increasing the public’s confidence in the security profession and facilitating the 
pronunciation of the security professional underpinned by validated instructional 
process (Phinney & Smith, 2009, p. 2).  
Nevertheless, the task of identifying and analysing a cultural domain is considered 
difficult, as many participants within do not visibly divide their field into clear, discrete 
words in categories based on relationships of inclusion. In addition, for many within a 
professional area (domain), their knowledge is tacit, outside everyday awareness 
(Spradley, 1979, p. 102). Yet, all cultural domains demonstrate a formal structure 
represented by a cover term, defined as the name of the domain or category which 
includes smaller categories; this represents a broader name for a category of cultural 
knowledge. Second, all domains have two or more included terms, which are folk terms 
that belong to a category of knowledge encompassed by the cover term. Then, a single 
semantic relationship exists which links the cover term to all the included terms in its 
set (Spradley, 1979, p. 101).  
Furthermore, all domains have boundaries, where some terms belong inside the 
boundary, and others belong outside the domain set (Spradley, 1979, p. 102). A cultural 
domain analysis is based on three broader elements of the research enquiry, which 
includes setting the professional boundary, and identifying and isolating the 
fundamental units of cultural knowledge within this boundary. Establishing a taxonomy 
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shows their relations, which highlights subsets, which further highlights how these 
subsets are related to the domain as a whole. Then an interpretation of these subsets is 
undertaken in relation to the goal of the enquiry (Spradley, 1979).  
1.4 The security domain 
Security is well recognised as an occupational domain discipline within contemporary 
society. However, as an emerging profession, security, and specifically security 
education, as a contemporary discourse is a complex issue discussed by a broad range of 
authors (Manunta, 1999; Rogers, 2000; Kicinger, 2004; McCrie, 2004; Wang, 2005; 
Borodzicz & Gibson, 2006; Brooks, 2007; Rogers, Palmgren, Giever & Garcia, 2007; 
Zietek, 2008; Stone, 2009; Brooks, 2010; Griffiths, Brooks & Corkill, 2011; Coole & 
Brooks, 2009; 2011) as it encompasses concerns involving traditional (threats to 
sovereignty) and non-traditional (threats to law and order) endangerments rendered 
across many organisations including government operations, military, law enforcement, 
emergency services and private security operations (McCrie, 2004, p. 12; Wang, 2005, 
pp. 1-3). Within the non-traditional domain Manunta (1999, p. 60) associates the 
discourse’s focus towards managing those threats which pose a risk accordant with the 
functioning within a nation state, with roots spreading from natural disasters to crime 
prevention within the concept of law and order.  
Talbot and Jakeman (2009, p. 55) noted that threats encompassed within the crime 
prevention paradigm are faced by governments at national, state and territory levels, 
commercial enterprises, individual groups and persons. They explain that in this 
paradigm context, physical and procedural measures are designed and implemented to 
protect intangible assets or capabilities from defined threats. It is further acknowledged 
that these measures are used by both government agencies and the corporate sector to 
mitigate contextual threats that pose a risk to objectives (Borodzicz & Gibson, 2006). 
Such measures stem from the physical security sub-domain (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, 
p. 55; Smith & Brooks, 2013). Within this sub-domain, Nalla and Morash (2002) 
emphasised there are many complex tasks requiring high level decision making, 
however they acknowledge a public perception that much of the security domain is a 
simple occupational enterprise. They argue that the public sees security primarily 
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consisting of security guards or barriers, resulting in a misunderstood domain at the 
higher end of the professional continuum.  
The complexity of the professionalism discourse is recognised by Manunta (1999, p. 
57), who outlined the 21st century’s academic challenges for the emerging profession of 
security, stating: 
We security professionals and scholars are entering the millennium from a 
very flimsy position: We lack a robust and workable definition of security; 
Our positions are questionable from the viewpoints of understanding, 
judgement, methodology and ethics…arguably, no professional in any other 
field is so vulnerable to malicious attacks-and this weakness is perhaps the 
best evidence that security management is still not a profession. (Manunta, 
1999, p. 57) 
Manunta’s view is supported in the later work of Borodzicz and Gibson (2006) who 
express that the mere concept of security can have different meanings depending on 
context. Such a variegated domain has resulted in diverse and multi-disciplinary 
occupational strata, concerning a wide spectrum of activities and skills (Brooks, 2007, 
p. 1). Such diversity results in a significant breadth of topics with which domain 
professionals need to be familiar (Nalla & Morash, 2002) due to a lack of jurisdictional 
boundary. Coole and Brooks (2011, p. 1) believe this very issue drives security’s lack of 
professional consensus in both definition and professional standing. Nevertheless, 
Anderson’s work (2007, p. 1) highlights that the current profile of the security 
profession (non-traditional) is undergoing significant change. It is acknowledged that in 
contemporary times professionals have become essential to the very functioning of 
society, as in the words of Donald (1983, pp. 3-4), “we look to professionals for the 
definition and solution of society’s problems”.  
Part of the security domain’s change encompasses discourse towards clearly defining 
the concept of the security professional and identifying core professional competencies, 
declared by Griffiths, Brooks and Corkill (2011, p. 3) to include both “academic and 
practical” aspects. This is a view supported earlier in the writings of Abbott’s (1988, pp. 
7-8) who articulated that professionals competently apply abstract knowledge to 
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particular cases to solve society’s problems, which requires special abstract skills 
developed through specialized training. An Australian government sponsored body in 
the current discourse, the Australian Interim Security Professionals Task Force (2008, p. 
6; ) identified contemporary security professionals as those groups of people working at 
the senior end of the operational sector and in the strategic sector of the security 
industry. However, this definition is vague, and the Task Force did not articulate 
professional practice areas linked to competency measures within this definition.  
Nonetheless, the Task Force acknowledged that security professionals as a group are 
critical in supporting the protection of government, commercial organisations, non-
government organisations and the community against threats to the functioning of 
society. The Task Force conceded that security professionals have not been able to 
contribute their full potential to the nation’s security and safety primarily due a lack of 
clear understanding of either security professionals or the profession. Nevertheless, the 
Task Force emphasized the point that security professionals still have a responsibility 
for ensuring that all aspects of their work are soundly based in theory and established 
practices (2008, p. 9). This leaves the question that Wang (2005, p. 7) asks in the 
traditional domain...How do we combine theory with practice? To such a statement, the 
Task Force did not provide the basis for such an approach, and as Brooks (2007, p. 2) 
highlights, traditionally security practitioners have focused on their niche areas.  
One arguable barrier in clearly defining a security professional is a lack in consensual 
body of knowledge and agreed educational standards (Smith & Brooks, 2013, pp. 1-2) 
underpinning their designation. Knowledge relates to that which can be clearly 
stated...verbally articulated (Jaques, 1989, p. 34), and is defined by the Collins 
Dictionary (Krebs, 1981, p. 698) as: “(1) the facts or experiences known by a person or 
group of people, (2) the state of knowing, (3) consciousness of familiarity gained by 
experience or learning, (4) erudiation of informed learning, (5) specific information 
about a subject, and (6) understanding”. As Jaques (1989, p. 34) expressed, if you 
cannot state it, you do not know it. Thus, if the knowledge underpinning the security 
professional cannot be stated, it is arguably not held.  
Congruent with Jaques’ views, Abbott (1988, p. 324) wrote that all kinds of knowledge 
(that which can be stated) are organisable as common resources for a body of 
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individuals. Such a resource is considered a “professional’s formal knowledge system” 
(Abbott, 1988, p. 53) articulated by Martin and Guerin (2005, p. viii) as “a body of 
knowledge, defined as the abstract knowledge needed by practitioners to perform the 
profession’s work”. Yet as Rogers, et al. (2007, p. 2) and Brooks (2007) point out, 
Security education at a university level is in its infancy, with little agreement towards 
curriculum, knowledge levels, and arguably competency indicators.  
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged by McCrie (2004, p. 17) and the Australian Interim 
Security Professional’s Task Force (2008, p. 10) that security has created a body of 
knowledge. However, authors including Manunta (1999), Horrocks (2001), Rogers, et 
al. (2007, p. 1), Brooks (2007, p. 7) and Griffiths, Brooks and Corkill (2011, p. 4) refute 
its cohesive existence. Nevertheless, in order to develop a definition of security, Brooks 
(2007, p. 5) conducted a study identifying 14 hierarchical security subject categories 
representing many associated industries across many occupations, highlighting the 
salient practice areas in which security as a discipline draws its body of knowledge (See 
Table 1.1) 
Table 1.1 Hierarchical security domain subject categories of Brooks (2007) 
Security domain subject category descriptors 
Criminology Business continuity 
management 
Fire science 
Facility management Industrial security Information & computer 
Investigations Physical security Security principles 
Risk management Safety Security law 
Security management Security technology  
However, these categories are broad in nature and lack content and structure. Therefore 
Brooks (2010, p. 237) recommended further research in the form of psychometric 
multidimensional scaling to create a concept map of security knowledge categories and 
relationships towards developing deeper understanding of the domain. This arguably 
would lead to a jurisdictionally valid curriculum and clearer competency requirements 
for future security professionals.  
  
P a g e  | 11 
 
1.4.1 The Australian non-traditional security context 
Security is recognised as a primary concern for modern-day societies (Sarre & Prenzler, 
2009, p. ix) where the growth of private security within the context of law and order is a 
transnational phenomenon (Prenzler & Sarre, 2012, p. 38). Australia has a stake in this 
phenomenon; combined across all sectors in Australia security supports the protection 
of government assets, commercial organisations, non-government organisations and the 
greater community (Australian Interim Security Professionals Task Force, 2008, p. 6). 
Today within Australia, as with global trends, the self-provision of security for 
corporations and individuals is reflective of the acknowledged repayments from 
prevention measures. Such measures have been achieved through situational and 
environmental design crime prevention techniques and principles (Prenzler & Sarre, 
1998, p. 2).  
Situational crime prevention as a concept is a salient basis for much of the non-
traditional security domain, and is defined as: “opportunity-reduction measures that are 
(1) directed at highly specific forms of crime, (2) that involve the management, design 
or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as 
possible, and (3) so as to increase the effort and risks of crime and reduce the rewards as 
perceived by a range of offenders” (Clarke, 1992, p. 4). Clarke (1992, p. 5) expresses 
that situational crime prevention thinking is a problem centred approach, analysing and 
defining the crime problem towards identifying and testing possible solutions, 
evaluating results, and where necessary repeating the cycle until successful. Physical 
security falls out of situational crime prevention theory (The American Institute of 
Architects, 2004, p. 45; Kiszelewska & Coole, 2013, p. 2; Lab, 2014, p. 219) and is 
complimented through environmental design theoretical underpinnings (The American 
Institute of Architects, 2004, p. 45).  
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As with the criminological approach, it is also acknowledge that the problem-centred 
approach is employed when conceptualising physical security requirements (Garcia, 
2008, p. xvii). This approach focuses towards defining and understanding the security 
problem prior to designing and then evaluating the protective mitigation system (Garcia, 
2008, p. xvii). Clarke (1992, p. 7) indicates this is a pan-cultural approach and can be 
utilized within any organisational or management structure that can amass the resources 
and dynamism to address crime problems. Extending this approach is the concept of 
environmental design in reducing opportunities for crime. This approach involves 
designing the built environment to reduce the opportunity for, and fear of crime and 
disorder. Such an approach takes advantage of natural opportunities to control access, 
increase opportunities for non-technical surveillance and establish territorial 
reinforcement (Atlas, 2008, p. 3). Combined situational crime prevention and crime 
prevention through environmental design (CPTED) theory provide an initial theoretical 
basis for physical security.   
Within the criminological paradigm, Prenzler and Sarre (1998, p. 2) argue that security 
becomes an umbrella term including synonymous terms such as “risk management, 
asset protection and loss prevention” and is now recognised as a highly diverse role that 
can be provided through a variety of mechanisms and sources to reduce deviance within 
a given context. These authors state that in Australia the private and public security 
industry involves a vast mosaic of occupational functions (Table 1.2) associated with 
both situational and environmental design approaches and investigations to reduce the 
incidence of deviant acts. Within this diverse range of strategies and their underpinning 
occupational categories, Prenzler and Sarre (1998, p. 2) further emphasize a stratum of 
responsibilities where different roles require different levels of technical or 
interpersonal skills to address the relevant societal problems according to context.  
  
P a g e  | 13 
 
Table 1.2 Australian security contributors (Prenzler, Earle & Sarre, 2009, p. 3) 
Security Providers, 1996-2006 
 1996 2001 2006 % change 
1996 to 2006 
% of total 
2006 
Private 
investigator 
904  1,205 761 ‐16  1.4
Security 
consultant 
584  733 894 +53  1.7
Locksmith 1,492  1,877 2,279 +53  4.3
Insurance 
investigator 
401  486 418 +4.2  0.8
Debt collector 5,933  9,666 10141 +71  19.2
Court bailiff or 
sheriff 
566  600 694 +23  1.3
Armoured car 
escort 
53  88 485 +815  0.9
Security officer 27,439  33,884 5,424 n/a  10.3
Alarm, security 
or surveillance 
monitor 
n/a  n/a 30,752 n/a  58.3
Crowd 
controller 
n/a  n/a 920 n/a  0.5
Total security 37,372  48,579 52,768 +41.2   
Police 39,225  41,426 44,898 +14.5   
Population 17,752,829  18,769,249 19,855,288 +11.8   
 
Within this industry mosaic is a complexity of tasks undertaken across various 
occupational groups, including operational roles such as surveillance, investigations, 
crowd control, prison escorts and court security, guarding and patrolling; along with 
proactive crime prevention, risk management and assessment, weapons training, crime 
scene examination, information technology, technology systems development and 
communications support (Prenzler & Sarre, 2009, p. 1). Such diversity and growth has 
reached a point where private security personnel outnumber sworn police by more than 
two-to-one (Prenzler, Earle & Sarre, 2009, p. 1), where their foremost focus is still 
towards crime prevention and the enforcement of laws (Prenzler & Sarre, 1998, p. 2) 
Such depth and breadth of the Australian security industry makes it difficult to measure 
(Prenzler, 2005, p. 53). Internationally, according to Prenzler and Sarre (2012, p. 38), a 
2011 survey across 70 countries estimated that around 19.5 million people were 
employed in private security duties, with an extended estimate of 25.5 million people 
across all countries. In addition, the entire industry was valued at $US 100-165 billion 
per annum, with an annual growth rate between 7-8 per cent. The Australian context is 
no different, with private security being a dynamic and rapidly evolving sector of the 
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Australian economy (Sarre & Prenzler, 2009, p. ix). This sector includes commercial 
contractors and in-house private security personnel (Prenzler, 2005, p. 53) as a large 
number of government agencies, businesses and educational enterprises employ their 
own security staff.  
Nevertheless, in Australia there are three ways in which the private security industry can 
be measured, each with their own limitations. The federal government’s Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) census survey conducted every five years, questions 
individuals regarding their main sources of employment. The ABS Labour Force 
Surveys gather occupational data based on employer reports on staff numbers and 
finally the industry licencing figures across licencing categories (Prenzler, 2005, p. 53) 
also yields valuable data. Table 1.2 presents tabulated figures indicating increased 
trends across occupational security categories in ABS census reports from 1996, 2001, 
2006 to 2011, indicating the depth and breadth of the Australian security industry 
occupational categories.  
 
1.4.2 The modern day security professional 
Consistent with the public’s perceptions (Nalla & Morash, 2002) a vast array of 
occupational groups, comprising the immense operational security industry in Australia, 
are presented in Table 1.2. However, lacking from this data set is the acknowledged 
occupational stream of the modern day security professional. Congruous with Table 1.2, 
the Australian Interim Security Professionals Task Force (2008, p. 4) offers the security 
continuum with security personnel working in the tactical, operational and strategic 
sectors of the industry. Nevertheless, it was emphatically acknowledged by the Task 
Force that there exists within this continuum a lack in understanding for those described 
as security professionals, stating:  
This lack of understanding is driven by ubiquitous understanding by 
security users of the difference between the quality and capabilities 
expected by those providing front-line operational services including 
manpower and technology, and those providing ‘professional services 
security advice’ such as security advisors and risk managers. (Australian 
Interim Security Professionals Task Force, 2008, p. 4) 
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The task force added that this position is further exacerbated by a lack of standards 
defining the expected knowledge, competencies and ethical behaviour of security 
professionals (p. 4), even in light of the acknowledgement of the requirement to 
promote the professional element of the security services stratum (p. 6). The Security 
Professional’s Task Force’s (2008, p. 4) viewpoint was more recently acknowledged in 
an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) report into corruption within 
the New South Wales (Australia) security industry. The report noted that the role of the 
security expert in achieving security project outcomes was rarely clearly defined, 
potentially leading to corrupt practices within the industry (ICAC, 2013).  
Such persons are theoretically required to take responsibility for security projects and 
programs in the most far-reaching sense; “they provide significant input into the 
shaping of security decisions and the environment in which the security system 
functions” (Security Professional’s Task Forces, 2008, p. 9). Within the literature it is 
acknowledged that the professions have had a short history in Australia, and not all 
emerging professions are classified by the Commonwealth Statisticians (Boreham, 
Pemberton & Wilson, 1976, p. 44), as is the case with the security professional. This 
lack of understanding of the security professional means this category of persons is 
neither recognised nor understood by Commonwealth Statisticians and the general 
public. As one participant in the study stated: 
When people ask what I do on a Saturday night, they say well what’s that 
(security professional), a security guard? Also, I have to write down on all 
my forms that I’m a security engineer otherwise they don’t know what I am. 
(Sharne)  
Nevertheless, within Australia’s occupational security categories (Table 1.2) is a 
specific statistic of interest for the study, an increasing number of security consultants 
from 584 (1996) to 894 (2006), the closest occupational group with regards to the Task 
Force’s professional services security advice category including security advisors and 
risk managers.  Again, this is a point supported in the ICAC report (2013) into 
corruption into the NSW security industry. The report expressed the view that for the 
electronic security industry there were three main participants; namely suppliers, 
installers and consultants. According to the ICAC report, suppliers sell electronic 
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security systems components to installers, installers or integrators integrate and supply 
various products to meet client requirements. However, consultants provide expert 
advice on security solutions based on customer needs and budget requirements.  
From an international perspective, the American Institute of Architects (2004, p. 184) 
states that “security consultants provide management consultancy services specialising 
in security; loss prevention or security training; and security equipment system design, 
evaluation, and specifications”. Their work explains that some security consultants also 
provide architecture and design services to clients and architects. The focus is to 
determine the security-related needs of their clients and to provide advice, information, 
and recommendations to clients; they offer their services by market or industry, by type 
of service, or by type of asset to be protected (p. 184).  
Fischer, Halibozek and Green (2013, p. 91) support the designation of security 
consultants as security professionals stating, “Security consultants are the professionals 
of the field, because they are paid for their professional opinions”. Nevertheless, such 
professionals can go by other names, where professional security advisors are 
positioned within the corporate security paradigm. Corporate security is a sector within 
the greater security domain that provides internal security services and functions within 
either public or private enterprises in their pursuit of security (Brooks, 2013, p. 2). For 
example, in the corporate security context such advisors are also known as Protective 
Security Advisors, a term used by the Australian Government for their various 
departments in-house security advisors. In addition to this articulation of the security 
professional the works of Sennewald (2013, p. 1) acknowledge the security executive or 
in-house security consultant as a security professional. Sennewald states: 
As a full time salaried employee, the security executive of a given 
corporation serves in some measure as a proprietary or in-house consultant 
to senior-level management. He or she recommends appropriate and cost-
effective strategies to achieve a wide variety of security objectives, loss 
control, crime prevention and investigative goals. (Sennewald, 2013, p. 1)  
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Sennewald (2013, p. 1) draws on the American Heritage Dictionary in supporting his 
notion, defining a consultant as (1) a person who gives expert or professional advice, (2) 
a person who consults another. Furthermore, Sennewald extends this view, explaining 
consulting as a problem solving process. In this process, the consultant must first 
identify the problem, gather available data pertaining to the problem, analyse the data, 
and then offer advice in the form of recommendations that will solve, or otherwise 
minimize, the problem (2103, pp. 6-7). Such views were expressed by Argyris and 
Schon (1974, p. 158) who, articulated that a professional must develop his or her own 
theory of practice which enables him or her to understand contextual, unstructured 
information presented by the client, sense which pieces are central or peripheral to the 
problem, to steer his or her professional behaviour in terms of outcome. 
Further supporting this broader group’s articulation as professionals are the writings of 
Abbott. Abbott’s (1988, p. 8) work  emphasized that for professionals the physical 
techniques themselves may be delegated to other workers (occupational groups) and 
that it is this very point that makes them professionals. Professionals control the 
abstractions that generate the practical techniques that solve society’s professional 
problems. Thus, the professional security advisors themselves are not locksmiths, alarm 
security or surveillance monitors, or security officers (Table 1.2), but rather provide the 
professional advice in relation to security policy development and governance, along 
with control selection and the necessary decision making to meet contextual risk 
reduction requirements (Kiszelewska & Coole, 2013, p. 2). Therefore, they must sit 
within a stratum (Figure 1.1), integrating the many occupational category’s outputs into 
a cohesive system commencing from a top-down approach, starting with a policy to 
protect and develop the appropriate systems to achieve said policies based on their 
understanding of the professional problem.      
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Figure 1.1 Security professionals/consultants and their supporting occupational 
categories   
 
It is perhaps within this context that the security consultant or advisor can be articulated 
as the security professional. Yet to date, limited data exists for such persons, especially 
in terms of education, qualifications and area of foci. A United Kingdom survey across 
all security occupational groups of the security industry by Gill, Howell, Mawby and 
Pease (2012, p. 24), found that 34.3% (n=48) had a post graduate qualification, and 
24.3% (n=34) had a university degree. This sample included the closest category to 
security professionals by the Australian designation, referred to as security specialists 
articulated as clients, demarcated as those persons who buy or manage security services 
(n=151). However, the study’s results did not state specific areas of academic study. 
But, to date, limited official employment, experience and qualifications data exists for 
such persons. 
While private security personnel out number their policing counterparts, it is pointed out 
by Prenzler, Earle and Sarre (2009, p. 5) that they are less likely to have obtained 
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tertiary education qualifications than their policing counterparts (see Figure 1.2), they 
earn lower salaries and they are more likely to be employed part time. Nonetheless, 
congruent with the concept of the security professional, Figure 1.2 does highlight the 
fact that for postgraduate level degrees security personnel were shown to be numerically 
more represented than their policing counterparts. These data indicate support for the 
premise that at the higher strata of the security continuum there does exist those persons 
with higher education qualifications who are employed in highly complex security 
advice activities. 
Figure 1.2 Security education standards in Australia (Prenzler, Earle and Sarre, 2009) 
 
The focus of this study is towards the physical security professional within the context 
of the contemporary security professional. That is, those persons at the higher strata of 
the operational sector and in the strategic sector of the security industry (Australian 
Interim Security Professionals Task Force, 2008) who specialise in providing a 
problem-centred approach to the physical protection (physical security) of assets. 
However, Johnston and Warner (2014, p. 13) question whether physical security has 
validity as a real field. They acknowledge physical security’s 10,000 year plus history, 
its immense number of practitioners and the importance of physical security to a 
community’s wellbeing. However they suggest that for the area to progress there needs 
to be an acceptance that physical security is a highly scholarly subject, with more 
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qualifications available at a tertiary level underpinned by more rigorous research. They 
openly question: Where are the degrees in physical security? 
Nonetheless, physical security professionals are potentially represented as security 
consultants (Table 1.2), or security clients (Gill, Howell, Mawby & Pease, 2012, p. 24) 
and protective security advisors. In outlining and articulating their support for the 
concept of the security professional, the works of Horrocks (2001, pp. 1-2) and Axt 
(2002, p. 142) put forward the argument that the security domain must pursue the 
establishment of and enforce unambiguous qualifications criteria. This viewpoint was 
supported by the findings from Security Professional’s Task Force (2008, p. 11), which 
acknowledged that standards defining the security professional were necessary, stating, 
“standards are concerned both with professional competencies and with working 
methods, practices and procedures”. Consequently The Task Force presented four 
potential frameworks to be drawn on for establishing professionals’ practice standards, 
which include: 
1. Alignment with the Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF); 
2. Certification levels based on responsibility and competence; 
3. Role-based requirements framework; and 
4. Alignment with Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge (SRMBOK) 
(Talbot & Jakeman, 2009) practice areas and activity areas. 
These frameworks provide a potential basis for understanding security professionalism 
and more specifically, the concept of the security professional within the broader 
security domain. Equally, potential alignment with the Australian Qualifications 
Framework (AQF) emphasizes both educational standards and an educational hierarchy 
within the Australian security professionals’ literature. Such hierarchies included 
security related roles aligned to educational attainment levels commencing with 
Certificate II qualifications (Guards) and progressing upwardly to include Doctor of 
Philosophy (PhD) level (Technical Specialist or Senior Consultant) (Australian Interim 
Security Professionals Task Force, 2008, p. 29).   
Nonetheless, within these frameworks the Task Force only stated educational bands; it 
did not specify the knowledge areas and their supporting content aligned with and 
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required to reflect competence at any defined level. In addition to alignment with the 
AQF, the Task Force highlighted certification levels based on responsibility and 
competence. But certification is not education, and again a reasonable question asks, 
what are the knowledge requirements for levels of responsibility? This view is 
supported in the work of Sennewald (2013, pp. 8-9) who asserts that educational 
credentials are separate from professional certifications, which follow after education.  
Sennewald (2013, pp. 8-9) holds the view that for a consultant argued to be a security 
professional, a two year college education should be the minimum for practice. 
However, ideally security professionals or consultants should have a Bachelor’s Degree 
in the security profession, in either security administration, security management, 
administration of justice, police science, electrical engineering or technology, or 
architectural design. In light of the fact that the majority of people in senior managerial 
or executive positions to whom the consultant (professional) seeks to advise have 
earned degrees, many expect the specialist to be similarly educated (Sennewald, 2013, 
pp. 8-9). Sennewald contends: 
We live in a world in which credentials are mandated…An attorney, 
accountant, teacher or registered nurse has a clearly defined path of 
preparation to follow to earn that title. That is true with virtually any 
occupation. If a person deviated from the prescribed preparatory steps, yet 
claimed to be say, an engineer, that person could be viewed as a fraud. 
(Sennewald, 2013, p. 9)  
In considering the relevance of education, The Australian Interim Security Professionals 
Task Force also highlighted role based requirements and alignment with the Security 
Risk Management Body of Knowledge (SRMBOK) of Talbot and Jakeman (2009). 
Consequently if such an alignment is accepted, the question is posed, what are the 
knowledge areas and their content that underpins professional competency, as the 
explicit roles for a physical security professional are not articulated at any agreed level? 
This is in light of the fact that Zipser’s (1999, p. 1) works highlighted that professionals’ 
standard of care in exercising their professional work will be judged according to the 
standards of a reasonably competent qualified person holding that skill. Nevertheless, 
these four frameworks present a starting point for professional consideration. However, 
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there does not exist research to support clear jurisdictional knowledge areas, content and 
syllabus structure, which align to roles, responsibilities and professional competencies. 
Nor is there research indicating how these jurisdictionally fit into the broader security 
domain, and couple with institutions of higher education.  
On the other hand, SRMBOK (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009) does provide an initial means 
of articulating practice areas for professionals for whom knowledge areas and 
supporting content can be explored, and these practice areas were loosely aligned with 
the AQF (Australian Interim Security Professionals Task Force, 2008, p. 29). For 
instance, within the greater security domain is the accepted practice or professional 
field, referred to within this study as a cultural domain (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 164) 
of physical security (Horrocks, 2001, p. 221; Brooks, 2007, p. 5; Talbot & Jakeman, 
2009, p. 55; p. 220; ASIS, 2009, p. 3). Physical security is defined by ASIS 
International as that part of  a security program concerned with physical measures 
designed to safeguard against a security incident using measures as a device, system or 
practice of a tangible nature to protect people and prevent damage to, loss of, or 
unauthorised access to protected assets (2009, p. 3).  
However, physical security as a cultural paradigm is one of low development when 
compared to the more traditional academic fields such as physics. For instance, Lodahl 
and Gordon (1972, p. 68) explain that physics is a highly developed paradigm field, 
whereas there are many fields which are not and are still in their pre-paradigmatic stage. 
They explain that the essence of a paradigm or cultural domain relates to the degree of 
consensus or sharing of beliefs within a field about theory, methodology, techniques 
and problems. Thus, when compared to well-developed paradigms such as physics, 
physical security is poorly developed, most likely in its pre-paradigmatic stage. Such 
maturity will only progress if the important content of the field and its cultural structure 
is captured. As Lodahl and Gordon (1972, p. 66) point out, the more developed 
paradigms have more structure and thus more predictability than fields with less 
developed paradigms.     
1.5 The cultural domain of physical security 
The combined literature of Clarke (1992, p. 4), The American Institute of Architects 
(2004, p. 1), Talbot and Jakeman (2009, p. 55), Smith and Brooks (2013) and Bernard 
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and Ryan (2010, p. 164) lead to the premise that physical security as a professional 
occupation is a distinct academic paradigm and cultural sub-domain within the broader 
domain of non-traditional security. In ethnographic vocabulary, cultural knowledge 
refers to the acquired knowledge that people use to interpret their world (Spradley, 
1979, p. 5). Spradley (1979) considers such knowledge to be that which people have 
learned as members of a specific group (p. 7). Accordingly, the study asserts it is within 
the specific cultural domain of physical security where security professionals find the 
knowledge base to analyse, define and solve through economically feasible options and 
measures those which attain situational and environmental design crime prevention 
techniques and principles. These techniques combine towards blocking opportunities for 
particular criminal acts; aspects acknowledged as efficacious and a driver for the self-
provision of security for corporations (Prenzler & Sarre, 1998, p. 2).  
The objectives of the study therefore sat within an ethnographic architecture, as 
ethnography according to Spradley (1979, p. 3) is the vocation of describing and 
analysing a specific culture. Such an analysis was steered towards fusing, through 
codification, the diverse cultural knowledge of physical security in terms of desired 
knowledge areas and their supporting content along with its internal structure as an 
organised knowledge system (body of knowledge) for future physical security 
professionals and institutions of higher education. Informed by the writings of Spradley 
(1979) and Bernard and Ryan (2010) this exploration was best achieved through a 
cultural domain analysis.  Spradley (1979, p. 145) explains that a cultural domain’s 
knowledge structure is based on isolating the fundamental units of cultural knowledge 
(symbols) (p. 142), accordant with a single semantic relationship (p. 145), organised 
according to concept relationships in terms of similarities and differences (p. 157). Such 
an articulation highlights internal knowledge structural boundaries, where we discover 
that some fundamental units belong inside a specific internal boundary due to features 
of similarity, and that others belong outside because of differences (dissimilarity) (p. 
157).  
The notion of culture is expanded within the work of Johnson (1995, p. 68) who 
explains it as “the accumulated store of symbols, ideas, and material products associated 
with a social system, be it an entire society or a family unit”. In other words, it is a 
shared system of meaning (Spradley, 1979, p. 4). Culture is material and non-material in 
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nature, where material culture includes everything that is made, fashioned, transformed 
as part of collective social life, from the preparation of food to the manufacture of steel 
and computers. Non-material culture includes symbols from words to musical notation- 
as well as ideas that shape and inform the lives of humans in relation to one another and 
the social systems to which they participate. The most important of these ideas are 
attitudes, beliefs, values and norms. This definition is summed up by Malcolmson 
(2009, p. 361) in reference to security culture as a set of common understandings, 
expressed in language, or shared patterns of meaning, or shared values and beliefs. As 
an extension of this literature a cultural domain analysis is expressed as an examination 
of a domain of interest to elicit it’s content (elements) and understand its structure 
(Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 164).  
1.6 Underlying theory 
The study undertook a cultural domain analysis, denoting an occupational culture as a 
professional group whose knowledge could be represented through psychological maps 
revealing both content and structure. The work of Bloom acknowledged psychological 
structures as a means of knowledge representation and expressed that educational 
objectives must be related to a psychology of learning. Congruent with the concept of 
knowledge structure, the use of a psychology of learning enables the capacity to 
determine the appropriate placement of objectives in a learning sequence. It also helps 
discover those conditions under which it is best possible to attain identified learning 
outcomes. The study provides the means of determining the appropriate 
interrelationships among learning goals (Anderson & Sosniak, 1994, p. 43). A 
psychology of learning therefore provides the impetus to develop physical security 
cultural maps, expressed as cultural symbols or heuristics, from a large set of 
knowledge categories and units, which serve as a guide for acting and interpreting 
human, and more specifically professional security experience (Spradley, 1979, p.7). 
Fittingly, the study drew on cognitive constructivism within the assimilation theory 
paradigm as its theoretical foundation for exploring a knowledge structure as a formal 
knowledge system for the domain of physical security. This sought to represent this 
domain’s body of knowledge or formal knowledge system through the use of cultural 
symbols. Cognition refers to, or means thinking or knowing, with the process of coming 
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to know something (knowledge) (Tovey & Lawlor, 2004, p. 65). Knowledge is defined 
as those behaviours and situations that emphasize the remembering, either by 
recognition or recall, of ideas, materials or phenomena (Anderson & Sosniak, 1994, p. 
18). Consequently, since the 1970s, the cognitive perspective has been the strongest 
influence on learning theory that still endures today (Tovey & Lawlor, 2004, p. 64). In 
this frame of thinking, learning is explained as the process through which learners 
construct and integrate new knowledge with existing knowledge within conceptual 
frameworks to form deep understanding and skilled practice (pp. 59-65).  
According to Tynjala (1999, pp. 363-364) constructivism is articulated as a 
conglomeration of different positions within a theory of knowing with emphasis on how 
knowledge is built. He claims that accordant with this theoretical frame, knowledge is 
actively constructed by individuals or cultural communities not just discovered. In 
addition, constructivism holds that knowledge construction is based on previous 
knowledge, and that it is constantly evolving over time (Novak, 1993, p. 167); 
recognising that new ideas are built on the foundation of prior thoughts (Fraser, 1993, p. 
16). Within this foundation, Ausubel’s (1968) assimilation theory placed central 
emphasis on cognitive processes involved in knowledge acquisition and the role that 
explicit concept and propositional frameworks play in knowledge acquisition (Novak, 
1993, pp. 171-172). The cognitive perspective of learning views behaviour as being 
determined by how individuals perceive, structure, interpret and engage with their 
environment (Tovey & Lawlor, 2004, p. 65). Accordingly, the fundamental principle of 
constructivism is that learning is a constructive activity that students themselves must 
undertake (Fosnot, 2005, p. 7), as knowing something includes processes that are 
internal to the individual. Anderson and Sosniak (1994, p.8), regarding Bloom’s views 
of learning, stated “the more modern view of the learner is that his or her ability is 
neither permanent nor stable, rather it is highly alterable when proper stimulation and 
experience are provided”.  
Piaget (1951) launched the key notion that sets constructivism apart from other theories 
of cognition, expressing the idea that what humans refer to as knowledge does not and 
cannot have the purpose of producing representations of an independent reality, but 
rather is an adaptive function (Fosnot, 2005, p. 3). The concept of adaption stems from 
biology, and it indicates a particular relationship between living organisms or species 
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and their environment. Piaget took this notion and deduced that whatever knowledge 
was, it was not a copy of reality. As such, Piaget considered knowledge to be a mapping 
of actions and conceptual operations that have proven viable in the knowing subject’s 
experience, rather than a more or less accurate representation of external things, 
situations and events (p. 4). From this perspective, cognitive structures, i.e. action 
schemes, concepts, rules, theories, and laws, are evaluated saliently by the criterion of 
success, and success must ultimately be understood in terms of the organism’s efforts to 
gain, maintain, and extend its internal equilibrium in the face of disturbances (Von 
Glasersfeld, 1982, p. 6).         
According to Von Glasersfeld (1982), Piaget expressed what humans see, hear and feel, 
that is, their sensory world, as the result of their own perceptual activities and 
conceiving. Knowledge therefore arises from actions and the agent’s reflections on 
them. According to Fosnot (2005, p. 7) this highlights the point that students perceive 
their environment in ways that may be different from those intended by educators. The 
learning environment includes curricula, textbooks, didactic props including computer 
programs and micro worlds, tasks that have been given, and the teachers themselves. To 
this point Piaget emphasised that teachers need to construct a hypothetical model of the 
particular worlds of the students they are facing. Piaget’s later works focused towards 
the mechanisms of learning, that is, the process that enables new constructions, new 
perspectives to come about (p. 12). Here Ausubel, Novak and Hanesian (1978, pp. 21-
27) highlight two clearly distinct forms of learning. That is, the distinction between 
reception and discovery learning and between rote and meaningful learning.  
Supporting the principles of reception learning Ausubel et al.’s (1978) work emphasises 
that most of the understandings learners acquire both in and out of formal schoolings 
are presented rather than discovered. In reception learning (rote and meaningful) the 
entire content to be learned is presented in its final form. Thus, students are not required 
to engage in independent discovery; learners are only required to internalize and 
incorporate the material for availability and recall at some later time. In contrast, 
discovery learning incorporates an essential feature, that the principle content is not 
presented but must be discovered by the student themselves before it can be 
meaningfully incorporated into the learner’s cognitive structure. Learning by discovery 
requires a different process from that of reception learning.  
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For discovery learning, learners must first rearrange information, integrate it with 
existing cognitive structures and reorganize or transform the integrated combination in 
such a way that they can generate a desired-end-product or discover a missing means-
end relationship. After such learning is complete, the discovered content is then made 
meaningful in much the same way as presented content is made meaningful in reception 
learning (Ausubel, et al. 1978, p. 24). Ausubel, et al. (1978, p. 26) argue that discovery 
learning, or discovery methods of teaching, are not an efficient primary means of 
transmitting the content of an academic discipline. Rejecting the role of discovery 
learning Ausubel (1968) argued that reception learning could lead to more meaningful 
learning; putting forward the idea of an advance organizer which could serve as a 
cognitive bridge between new knowledge to be learned and existing relevant concepts 
and propositions in the learner’s cognitive structure (Novak, 1993, p. 172).  
In essence, cognitive constructivism views humans as developing organisms, not only in 
the physical and biological sense, but also in the cognitive sense. Piaget proposed and 
demonstrated through research that the mechanisms promoting change in cognition was 
the same as that in evolution-equilibrium (Fosnot, 2005, p. 16). This biological 
landscape characterized by autopoietic systems and dissipative (transforming) structures 
provide the basis for a psychological theory of learning referred here as constructivism 
(Fosnot, 2005, p. 27). Autopoietic systems are those systems which reproduce their 
elements on the basis of their own elements-themselves based on their interactions 
(Seidl, 2004, p. 2), as cognition is a self-referential, autopoietic process (p. 3). Within 
this proposition is the viewpoint that human beings have no access to an objective 
reality, as they are constructing their version of it, while at the same time, transforming 
it themselves (Von Glasersfeld, 1982, pp. 1-3). But here the focus shifts from the 
cognising individual, and the culture in which the learning is taking place, or more 
precisely, to the interplay between them. According to Fosnot (2005, p. 28), we cannot 
understand an individual’s cognitive structure without observing interactions in a 
context, within a culture.  
Yet, according to Fosnot (2005), culture cannot be understood as an isolated entity 
affecting the structure, because all knowledge within the culture is only-taken-as-shared. 
The process of construction is adaptive in nature, and requires self-organizing. As stated 
by Fosnot (2005, pp. 27-28): 
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Cultural knowledge that is assumed to be held by members of the culture is 
dynamically evolving, negotiated interaction of individual interpretations, 
transformations, and constructions. At best, cultural knowledge can only be 
assumed, or ‘taken-as-shared’ by its members. But cultural knowledge is a 
whole larger than the sum of the individual cognitions. It has a structure of 
its own which interacts with the individuals who are also constructing it. 
(Fosnot, 2005, pp. 27-28) 
Kelly’s (1955) influential work featured such a view. Kelly’s (1955, pp. 8-9) early work 
highlighted that humans look at their world through transparent patterns or templates 
which they create and then attempt to “fit over the realities of which the world is 
composed”. Acknowledging that the fit is not always great, Kelly asserts that without 
such patterns the world appears to be such an undifferentiated homogeneity 
confounding understanding. Kelly called these patterns constructs and considers that 
even a construct’s poor fit is better than nothing at all. Kelly defines such constructs as 
ways of construing the world. They are what enable humans, and lower animals too, to 
chart a course of behaviour, explicitly formulated or implicitly acted out, verbally 
expressed or utterly inarticulate, consistent with other courses of behaviour or 
inconsistent with them, intellectually reasoned or vegetatively sensed. In general, 
humans seek to improve their constructs by increasing their repertory, by altering them 
to provide better fits, and by subsuming them with superordinate constructs or systems 
(p. 9). According to Kelly (p. 9) these construction systems can be communicated or 
widely shared.   
Kelly’s view is supported by the works of Eden (1988) and McLucas (2003) who 
emphasise the use of cognitive and concept maps to make explicit such constructs or 
patterns. Fitting with a psychology of learning Eden’s (1988, p. 2) work articulated that 
basic to making sense of our world is the detection of repeated themes and the construal 
of them using a construct system, where the work of Smith and Brooks (2013, pp. 178-
179) states that as a consequence these patterns are viewed as information that can be 
collated to form knowledge. According to Smith and Brooks (2013, p. 179) the 
constructs of patterns from associations of information have the potential to represent 
knowledge. By understanding the patterns of information within a domain of data, 
knowledge is realized and understood along with its implications; learning occurs by 
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connecting new information to patterns that we already understand. Furthermore, 
Eden’s work separated the individual construct systems from those of a group (cultural). 
Eden (1988, p. 7) sees an individual’s construct system as a cognitive map, a personal 
mind map. Construct systems representing the views of several individuals (cultural) are 
differentiated and labelled concept maps. Concept maps represent shared cognitions, 
they are an aggregated model of a perceived world.  
Fraser’s (1993) work referred to group constructs as a shared paradigm, sitting well 
with this theoretical framework, expressing that groups of individuals can participate in 
the creation of such a paradigm. Fraser emphasised that such models (concept maps) 
highlight the structure of a paradigm of enquiry (Fraser, 1993). Fraser also 
acknowledges that shared paradigms are not static entities, but are in constant states of 
flux as the individuals who subscribe to them and participate in their creation and 
maintenance interact with them (pp. 2-4). Consequently, Fraser emphasises the 
requirement for flexibility in the construction of a shared culture arguing that each 
individual participating in this paradigm or construct has their own interpretation of it. 
Therefore, efforts in describing a particular culture must “ride-a-thin-line” between 
general description of the overarching concepts that make it up, yet allow for a broad 
range of interpretations of it. According to Fraser, “the term body of knowledge is such 
a shared paradigm, described by Fraser (1993, p. 25) as the term used to indicate a 
particular field of study…a shared paradigm”.   
Current biological models facilitate our human understanding that both the structure of 
the mind and the knowledge we construct within it, are part of an open system. 
Knowledge and the mind cannot be separated as one affects the other. Both are being 
developed as the natural outcomes of the evolution of autopoetic systems characterized 
by dissipative structures (p. 29). This is a point embraced in the earlier work of Bruner 
(1977, p. 11) who set forth the premise that learning is enhanced by giving learners an 
understanding of the fundamental structure of whatever subjects (constructs) we choose 
to impart…“This is a minimum requirement for using knowledge”. Accordingly Bruner 
(1977, p. 12) explains that the teaching and learning of structure rather than simply 
mastery of facts and techniques is at the centre of enhanced knowledge transference, 
especially in terms of explaining the relations between things encountered earlier and 
later towards establishing new knowledge.   
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Bruner’s writings (1977, p. 12) include the proposition “that all cultures represent the 
meaning of experience in some way; through symbols, music, myth, story-telling, art, 
language, explanatory scientific models, and/or mathematical forms”. Such a 
constructive process enables the creation of semiotic spaces where meaning can be 
negotiated (Bruner, 1977). Constructing symbolic representations empowers humans to 
go beyond the immediacy of the concrete, to cross cultural barriers, to encounter 
multiple perspectives that generate new possibilities, to become conscious of our 
actions in the world in order to gain new knowledge with which to act. This act of 
representing is what makes us human (Fosnot, 2005, pp. 27-31), where the work of 
Bloom highlighted that we need a method of ordering phenomena such that the method 
of ordering reveals significant representations among the phenomena (Anderson & 
Sosniak, 1994, p. 14).      
Thus, within the cognitive constructivist’s position, learning is a constructive, building 
process of meaning-making (constructs or paradigms). This results in reflective 
abstractions producing symbols within a medium. These symbols then become part of 
the individual’s repertoire of assimilating schemes, which in turn are used when 
perceiving and further conceiving (Fosnot, 2005, p. 31). As Bruner’s work (1977, p. 7) 
highlighted, grasping the symbolic structure of a subject understands it in a way that 
permits many other things to be related to it meaningfully. Therefore, many domains are 
understood through taxonomic structure, where the major task is selecting the 
appropriate symbols, giving them usable definitions and securing the consensus of the 
group that is to use them (Anderson & Sosniak, 1994, p. 11).  
As such, the broad rules of curriculum, course and program design used to impart and 
stimulate learning reflect the cognitive perspective in which the learner actively builds 
knowledge as bricks build a wall (Tovey & Lawlor, 2004, p. 65). Accordant with the 
proposed outcomes of the study, from a constructivist’s approach, learning is considered 
in essence a process of building knowledge through making connections, or seeing 
relationships (Fraser, 1993, p. 31). The underlying assumptions within constructivism 
provided the theoretical underpinning support for bringing together or fusing of a 
dispersed explicit and implicit knowledge base into a formal professional knowledge 
system, representing a shared paradigm and labelled a body of knowledge. This system 
illuminates and explicitly exhibits cultural knowledge areas and their associations with 
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other knowledge areas, facilitating superior reception learning through the development 
of cultural symbols within the physical security domain.  
The study’s research methodology was steered by this broad body of literature, seeing 
physical security as an emerging professional domain as the shared paradigm of 
enquiry, referred to as a cultural domain. This literature embedded the view that new 
knowledge is based on the foundations of previous knowledge. And that in looking to 
construct such knowledge basic to our making sense of our world is the search for, and 
detection of repeated themes and the construal of them using a construct system of finite 
number. Piaget’s (1951) work expressed knowledge to be a psychological mapping of 
actions and conceptual operations that have proven viable in the knowing subject’s 
experience. Eden’s (1988) work accepted this view, emphasising people differ from 
each other in their construction of events as they see or perceive different things in what 
could be regarded as the same situation by a third person.  
Thus the investigation of a shared paradigm (body of knowledge) is guided by a number 
of key assertions expressed in these works. These include the proposition that (a) man 
makes sense of his world through the detection of repeated themes, (b) man understands 
his world (repeated themes) through contrast and similarity, (c) man seeks to explain his 
world and (d), man seeks to understand the significance of this world by organising 
concepts hierarchically so that some are superordinate to others. In summary, man seeks 
to develop meaningful patterns or constructs of his world, as a means of construing the 
world. Once initially developed man seeks to refine his patterns or constructs to achieve 
better fits with reality, eventually subsuming subordinate constructs with superordinate 
constructs or systems. Thus, the primary aim of cognitive (individual) maps is to 
carefully guide the development of concept (cultural) maps, whereby participants can 
gently change their mind, and do so creatively and where each person can see their own 
concepts set in a wider context (Eden, 1988, p. 8), and these become the means of 
construing the shared paradigm.   
This study adopted a constructivist approach through a series of phases which sought to 
build new knowledge (construct) of physical security’s body of knowledge on the basis 
of previously constructed knowledge (Figure 1.2). Figure 1.3 highlights that consistent 
with the key assertions expressed in the study’s underlying theory each phase of the 
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study expands the previous phase’s outcomes, towards the articulation of a structured 
knowledge system supported by first iteration learning objectives.    
1.7 Research questions and objectives 
There are a number of interrelated research objectives (Figure 1.3) assigned to various 
phases of the study.   
1.7.1 Research questions 
The study seeks to respond to the research question: 
What is a desirable knowledge system (body of knowledge) for physical security 
professionals as conveyed through the published literature and accessible professionals? 
It is premised that this research question can be responded to through the following 
research sub-questions: 
Phase One:  What are the explicit knowledge concept categories for physical security as 
represented through repeated themes printed in security texts and their structure? 
Phase Two: What are the implicit knowledge categories, and instinctive structure used 
by security experts in achieving physical security risk mitigation not extracted from 
the literature critique?  
Phase Three: What is physical security’s macro knowledge content structure as 
measured by multidimensional scaling? 
Phase Four: Based on the extracted knowledge system, what are the knowledge 
requisites and supporting learning objectives for physical security professionals?  
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Figure 1.3 Study phases flow chart 
 
 
• Review and analyse physical security's explicit knolwedge 
concept categories and subordinate concepts through literature 
critique.
• Develop a qualitative heuristic map of explicit knowledge 
concept categoryies and subordinate concepts.
• Phase RQ: What are the explicit knowledge concept 
categories for physical security as represented through 
repeated themes printed in security texts and their structure?
Phase 1:
Literature critique
(Chapter 6)
• Develop a semi-structured interview questionnaire and conduct 
interviews with security experts to enhance and validate the 
Phase 1 heuristic.
• Develop final knowledge heuristic to articulate knowledge 
concepts and subordinate concepts for phase 3.
• Phase RQ: What are the implicit knowledge category areas, 
and instinctive structure used by security experts in achieving 
physical security risk mitigation not extracted from the 
literature critique? 
Phase 2:
Expert enrichment
(Chapter 7)
• Develop MDS survey instrument of physical security 
knowledge concepts from phase 2 outcomes
• Survey security experts.
• Analyse and interpret underlying MDS physical security 
knowledge structure.
• Phase RQ: What is physical security’s knowledge content 
structure as measured by multidimensional scaling?
Phase 3:
MDS analysis
(Chapter 8)
• Develop expert focus group semi-structured interview 
questionnaire utilizing Phase 2 and 3 knowledge maps.
• Conduct expert focus group discussions.
• Analyse and interpret security expert’s responses to knowledge 
content and structure.
• Respond to study’s research question.
• Phase RQ: What are the knowledge requisites and supporting 
learning objectives for physical security professionals? 
Phase 4:
Expert focus 
groups
(Chapter 9)
Study RQ: What is a desirable knowledge system (body of knowledge) for physical 
security professionals as conveyed through the published literature and accessible 
professionals?
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1.8 Reflection 
The reviewed literature illustrates that security, as a professional occupational category, 
is a broad and poorly defined domain. Nevertheless, considerable discourse is 
progressing towards identifying domain structure and vocational seating within this 
occupational mosaic. The chapter conceptualized the profession of security as a broad 
cultural domain where the very notion of security forms the cover term for the domain. 
This cover term (security) is supported by additional terms, which include categories of 
knowledge (constructs) accordant with some cultural boundary, and that are all 
semantically related. From the background literature it is inferred that physical security 
in terms of implementing situational crime prevention and environmental design 
measures to reduce the opportunity for, and fear of crime and disorder in society and for 
governments and organisations is an included term (knowledge category) of security. 
Nevertheless, the cultural domain of physical security in the professional strata of 
society is poorly conceived. The domain (included term) is saliently understood across 
broader society as a collection of occupational categories (Table 1.1) associated with 
discrete areas of applied expertise. However, the concept of the security professional, 
and more specifically the physical security professional, radiates as someone providing 
advice at a more sophisticated level, accordant with notions of professional strata. Their 
roles are arguably more focused towards coordinating the combined attributes of the 
occupational categories (Figure 1.1) to achieve a broader more significant product in 
relation to an identified professional problem. As Fennelly’s (2013) work highlight, 
physical security has become increasingly complex, where often many complex, 
interrelated controls are integrated to protect in a given security context.  
However, it is expressed that the very notion of the security professional and its 
bounded physical security professional will remain obscure to most outside of the 
domain, and perhaps many within, unless an ethnographic analysis of this cultural 
domain is undertaken. Such an analysis must clarify the sub set borders in professional 
practice, identify the units of knowledge for the category of physical security 
professional, and provide their cultural structure. This analysis would lead to an 
evaluation of what this structure means for future physical security professionals in 
terms of knowledge and educational requirements, and how these requirements can be 
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needs met through the higher education fraternity. The needs required for professional 
practice were implied to be a psychological structure of superordinate and subordinate 
knowledge concepts, theories and principles semantically related to the domain’s cover 
term security.  
Subsequently, the chapter drew on cognitive constructivism as its theoretical 
foundation, based on a theory of learning where knowledge is constructed based on 
previous knowledge not discovered. In this frame of thinking learners acquire new 
knowledge based on the foundations of their previous knowledge; where from a 
constructivist’s approach learning is considered in essence a process of making 
connections, or seeing relationships. The Interim Australian Security Professionals Task 
Force (2008) put forward the idea that an educational stratum could exist for security, 
which links educational attainment to professional employment. As such, the study 
asserts that this can only be achieved through a thorough ethnographic investigation in 
the form of a cultural domain analysis. Such an analysis will see the research enquiry 
driven by a clear set of research questions that are supported by a set of research 
objectives towards elucidating the knowledge content and structure for this cultural 
domain.       
1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the background discussion for the study, highlighting the current 
occupational diversity within security’s greater domain space, and definitional concerns 
stemming from this diversity. Section 1.2 highlighted the background debate regarding 
what constitutes the modern day security professional. Then Section 1.3 conveyed the 
significance of the study accordant with this discussion, where it was expressed that 
unless academia investigates the academic basis for relevant industry qualifications, the 
security industry cannot progress towards one with professional designation. Security’s 
professional discourse was extended in Section 1.4, discussing the Australian security 
industry within the context of the study. This discourse highlighted the occupational 
mosaic of the physical security domain within Australia through Table 1.1 and Figure 
1.1. In this section it was emphasised that in Australia, as with global trends, the use of 
self-reliant security is a growing leaning, where it is acknowledge that security is a 
dynamic and evolving sector within the Australian economy. Section 1.5 presented 
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limitations in the current discourse debating what determines a security professional 
within the Australian context and embedded physical security as separate occupational 
domain within the broader cultural domain of security (Section 1.5).  
Within this chapter Section 1.6 presented constructivism as a theoretical foundation 
supporting the assembling of a body of knowledge for physical security professionals, 
facilitating a response to the study’s research questions based on the concept of 
knowledge building. This discussion was supported in Section 1.7 which stated the 
study’s research objectives, supported by individual Phase outcomes and overarching 
research questions (Section 1.7.1). The chapter also presented a flowchart showing 
individual phases of the study and their interrelationships in responding to the study’s 
overarching research question. Section 1.8 summarised the chapter, reflecting on the 
reviewed literature in preparation for the literature informing the study presented in 
chapters 2 and 3.  
The combined literature indicated that a thorough review of the term security as the 
domains cover term is essential for understanding physical security as an additional 
term (sub domain). This literature also highlights that a clear understanding of what a 
professional is in terms of occupation, their knowledge constructs and educational 
objectives and requirements is essential for guiding the study’s research path. Finally it 
is acknowledged that a review of professional knowledge mapping is also required to 
ensure the validity of the study and its adopted methodology for elucidating the 
knowledge system or body of knowledge for physical security professionals and their 
educational objectives.       
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Chapter 2: Security and professionalism literature informing the study 
2.1 Introduction 
The very notion of security underpins the conception of the security professional and its 
emerging occupational embodiment. However, the embedded depth and breadth of 
security within modern society confuses understanding of who or what constitutes a 
contemporary security professional, their roles and knowledge requisites along with 
jurisdictional boundary. Chapters Two and Three therefore present the foundational 
literature informing the development of a cultural body of knowledge for physical 
security professionals. This understanding was achieved utilizing a conceptual literature 
review, which according to Stake (2010, pp. 109-111) highlights the broad and complex 
works from multiple disciplinary areas that combine to extend the comprehension of an 
area of interest. The conceptual literature review is represented through Figure 2.1, 
which includes the conceptual basis for the security professional, the theories and 
approaches underpinning professionalism and their underpinning body of knowledge 
and its relations to higher education.  
This chapter is divided into distinct literature discourses, which contribute to the seating 
of the study. Security’s conceptual denotation is established in Section 2.2, which 
articulates a conception of security as a broad domain cover term. This articulation is 
followed by Section 2.3, which conceptualizes the term professional, highlighting 
designation, as professional status is a social acknowledgement from the broader 
community rather than by individual occupational domains. The social designation view 
is reinforced by cognitive dimensions of professional knowledge, discussed in Section 
2.4. Then, individual professional expertise is explained in Section 2.5, which is 
supported by knowledge-based views of domain expertise acquisition in Section 2.6. 
This literature is enhanced through a discussion of the professionalisation process in 
Section 2.7. The chapter then concludes with Section 2.8.  
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Figure 2.1 Research themes of the literature review  
  
    
 
2.2 The concept of security 
Cultural domains and their supporting taxonomies are based on a single semantic 
relationship represented through a cover term (Spradley, 1979, p. 145); which for this 
study is the superordinate axiom: security. As such, informing the study is the 
acknowledgement that security as an axiomatic construct towards the preservation of 
life, maintaining rightful custody of possessions (Manunta, 1997, p. 11) and more 
broadly protecting interests is one of ancient need (Underwood, 1984, p. 3); considered 
“as old as life itself” (Manunta, 1997, p. 20). Consequently, it is well recognised that 
humans pursue and achieve a state of well-being through their actions, such as banding 
together into groups for mutual protection or through diplomacy to avert wars (The 
American Institute of Architects, 2004, p. 1). Historically under this cover term humans 
have actively pursued a state of well-being through specific activities targeted towards 
protecting from the malicious actions of others (Somerson, 2009, p. 51).  
Post-modern conceptions and pursuits of security have their roots embedded in ancient 
times. For instance, Neanderthal man pursued protection by grouping in tribes and 
altering entrances to their caves utilizing rocks to shield themselves and their 
possessions from attack (Schnabolk, 1983, p. 2). The historical walls of ancient cities 
such as Troy, Jerusalem and Jericho show that as humans evolved they pursued 
protection from more organised foe through more advanced social networks and 
engineered means (The American Institute of Architects, 2004, p. 4). Such undertakings 
Security
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This Study: What is the abstract 
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have interrelated social and physical means for protection, meaning a state of security 
also infers a social relationship (Roe, 2008, p. 778). As Clements (1990, p. 4) points 
out, security flows from social processes, which reduce risks, enhance normality, 
predictability and mutual reassurance. Accordingly, the cover term security has a long 
and functional history with mankind, as it is this historical pursuit that is pan-culturally 
termed security, or a state of being secure.   
Nevertheless, regardless of its historical roots, security has and continues to embody 
many definitions and usages (Griffith, 1997, p. 4). Accordingly, security as a 
contemporary cover term is considered so multidimensional such that no consensual 
definition exists (Manunta, 1997, p. 12; Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 2). As Neocleous 
(2007, p. 350) points out, today the need for security is so amorphous and ambiguous its 
application is almost limitless. In this current state of definitional opacity various 
authors including Baldwin who contends that the word security has become simply a 
used and abused term. According to this discourse the term security has been devolved 
into an issue or banner to be flown, or a general label to be applied depending on 
agendas (Baldwin, 1997, p. 9). Such agendas cloud the very notion of security.  
The work of Inglehart and Norris (2012, p. 79) avowed that if everything becomes a 
matter of security such as: food security, environmental security, political security to 
economic security, along with many other adjective categories which precede its 
namesake, then the word loses its core meaning. Except, security is, as it has always 
been, a significantly important human concept, as the alternative of insecurity is not an 
option in any stable society (Baldwin, 1997, p. 9; Corkill & Coole, 2013, p. 142). This 
literature presents a fundamental question for the study: if the very concept of security 
cannot be defined, then how can we define a security professional and identify their 
knowledge base?   
2.2.1 Security as a means of survival 
The writings of Baldwin (1997, p. 9) and Caballero-Anthony (2008, p. 510) coupled 
with a diverse breadth of contextual labels elucidate security in contemporary times to 
be a vast and perhaps vague concept contested in varying paradigms. As Roe (2008, p. 
780) states: 
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If we widen the definition of health to encompass the welfare of the 
individual in all its dimensions…we weaken our ability to allocate resources 
to a coherent and manageable health policy. Similarly, an exhaustive 
concept of security embracing all that contributes to human well-being, as 
well as perceived threats to it, would be too comprehensive and also useless. 
(Roe, 2008, p. 780) 
Therefore security as a domain must have societal boundaries, where concerns can be 
rightly included or excluded according to some criteria; conceivably their similarity or 
dissimilarity to what is denoted by the cover term security.  Consequently, to begin the 
study it is necessary to communicate what is meant by society through this 
superordinate axiom, Security. Therefore, the study draws on the astuteness of Socrates 
who articulated that for any true enquiry there must be some singular (shared) 
description that covers all of its cases. Socrates stressed that many varieties of an 
enquiry cannot be what the enquiry itself is; rather their shared name must denote 
something the same for them all, and it is this, which needs defining (Day, 1994, p. 1). 
Socrates’ view of virtue highlights this point, as he premised that:  
Many varieties of virtue cannot be what virtue itself is, their shared name 
‘virtue’ must denote something the same for them all, and it is this which 
needs defining…presumably it would be right to focus on this in one’s 
answer, and show the questioner what virtue is. (Day, 1994, pp. 1-37) 
Socrates did not seek an implicit meaning through countless examples, but sought what 
the thing really is - the essence of what is denoted by the word (Day, 1994, p. 84). If 
Socrates’ insight is accepted, than the many contexts applied to the term security do not 
denote what security is, as its diversity must have a shared meaning, and it is security’s 
shared meaning which grounds the concept and its practice domains, and therefore this 
study. Subsequently, any conceptual analysis of security as a domain cover term must 
be considered in the broadest possible sense. A view supported in the work of Baldwin 
(1997, p. 8) who emphasised that understanding the concept of security precedes the 
conditions under which it can be attained.  
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Baldwin (1997, p. 8) pronounced that the concept of security is different from the 
functional means under which it is pursued and realized. Here it is contended that 
concept definition embedded into contextualization facilitates tailored attainment. Thus, 
security in modern times can debatably be understood through an analysis of its origins 
(Burstein, 1996), along with its contemporary connotations, as security has always been, 
and will continue to be an important human requisite (Misiuk, 2011, p. 255). The 
influential work of Mill (1910) and Maslow (1970) recognised this point. Mill (1910, p. 
50) noted that security is the most vital of all human interests after physical nutrition, 
expressing that all other earthly benefits are needed by one person, not needed by 
another, and many of them can, if necessary, be “gleefully forgone”, or replaced by 
something else; but security no human being can possibly do without, “on it we depend 
for all our immunity to evil” (p. 50).  Maslow’s work supported this view through his 
renowned hierarchy of needs, stressing that at the most basic level humans require 
physiological needs to be met to ensure their survival. Then it is acknowledged of the 
necessity to protect these needs (Maslow, 1970, pp. 35-46; Paris, 2001, p. 102) before 
higher level needs can be pursued and maintained.  
These combined works emphasise security as a vital aspect of human life (Mill, 1910, p. 
50; Maslow, 1970, pp. 35-46; Manunta, 1997, p. 11). As such, Maslow’s (1970, pp. 35-
46) hierarchy of needs has been entwined with numerous conceptualizations of security. 
Such views arguably fall within sociology’s conflict perspective. Conflict theory 
predicates that social life is shaped by groups and individuals who struggle or compete 
with one another over scarce resources, and that such competition leads to conflict 
(Johnson, 1995, p. 52) and consequently insecurity. Subsequently, once these 
physiological needs are met, safety and security needs are crucial before other higher 
human developmental needs can be pursued (Maslow, 1970, pp. 35-46). This hierarchy 
provides a lens presenting in a protective sense safety, and more contextually security as 
a significant human concern.  
However, Maslow’s writings highlight an embedded overlap between safety and 
security, except in modern times these terms have become very distinct occupational 
concepts. Safety in contemporary industrial language focuses on hazards or accident 
management (Somerson, 2009. p. 51), whereas security’s focus is towards managing 
malicious centred human acts articulated as threats (Garcia, 2001, p. 2) rooted in 
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conceptions of risk. As the American Institute of Architects (2004, p. 22) express, safety 
threats arise from natural or accidental conditions. In contrast, security threats result 
from actions planned and carried out by people where “security threats are intentional 
and originate in human actions”. Such a view resonates across the security literature. 
For instance, McSweeney (1999) highlights that those threats grounded in the purposive 
behaviour of other actors, social-threats, are distinguishable in terms of the policy 
required to address them from those which arise from the chance occurrences of the 
natural order, they require different measures.  
Thus, a theory of security if it is to be appropriately bounded to facilitate effective 
mitigation must arguably be framed within a purposive behaviour paradigm. 
Accordingly, any theory of security in an adversarial sense, must be a social theory, as 
social relates to “(1) living or preferring to live in a community rather than alone, (2) 
relating to human society and organization, (3) behaviour and interaction of persons” 
(Collins Dictionary, p. 805); and without other humans to threaten, there is no need for 
security, regardless of context. Within a human centric paradigm security must consider 
that behaviour is planned or spontaneous as a result of cognitive processing factors. 
This accounts for a separation of planned and opportunistic threat typologies which both 
manifest security related consequences. Accordingly, a security threat or risk is 
someone or something that intends to, or could, cause harm (Smith & Brooks, 2013, pp. 
8-9) to someone, or something valued (Wolfers, 1952), be it planned or opportunistic. In 
this sense, threat drives risk (Coole & Brooks, 2011, p. 54), where a security risk is any 
assessed and evaluated threat event that could compromise the well-being of people or 
the integrity of interests or assets designated for protection; the central term being risk 
(Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, p. 7).  
Recognising this occupational dissection, the work of Talbot and Jakeman (2009) 
comprehend the concept of security to be a state of being protected (secure) in response 
to conditions of risk. However, security risks are pervasive, where nowadays both the 
functional embodiment and academic study of security is entrenched into most aspects 
of daily life (Corkill & Coole, 2013, p. 142), resulting in a diverse and emerging domain 
(Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 2). Plus, while the concept of security has an embedded 
history with human kind, as both a professional and academic field security is young, 
lacking singular definition (Manunta, 1997, p. 12; Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 2), or in 
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the words of Socrates, ‘what it is’. For this reason, security’s contemporary conceptual 
discourse embodies many understandings, contexts and definition, clouding singular 
understanding of the cover term security.  
Such diverse conceptions lead to security’s reference as multidimensional in nature and 
ubiquitous (Brooks, 2010, p. 225) to the point of impeding clarity (Manunta, 1997, p. 
12; Smith & Brooks, 2013), except within applied contexts (Brooks, 2007), thus, 
arriving back at Socrates’ contention. Nevertheless, it is broadly recognised that security 
as a concept includes both philosophical and operational (functional) facets (Baldwin, 
1997; Manunta, 1997), which have followed a pattern of communal evolution within 
that of social organisation, from individual-family to band, tribe, chiefdom and state 
(Manunta, 1997, p. 22), and arguably these facets can be analysed to articulate what 
security is.  
2.2.2 The depth and breadth of the security domain 
Today, both philosophically and functionally, security is considered at a macro level of 
analysis, from an international perspective with concerns towards safeguarding the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity against threats to a nation itself (traditional security) 
(Wolfers, 1952; Ullman, 1983; Rothschild, 1995; Baldwin, 1997); through to a micro 
perspective, with an emphasis on individual citizenry protection (non-traditional 
security) (Rothschild, 1995; Cabellero-Anthony, 2008; Pion-Berlin, 2010), and 
capturing every other malevolent risk concern in between. Consequently, within 
security’s multidimensional scope lies a broad range and sizable number of contexts and 
definitions that hinder monolithic classification and therefore obscuring the denotation 
of what security is.  
Griffith (1997) notes that many usages or definitions of security are based on traditional 
realism. The realist approach focuses on the state as the unit of analysis and stresses the 
competitive character of relations among states (p. 4). The traditional paradigm of 
security has therefore viewed security risks at a macro level, as malevolent threats 
associated with the conflict of war between states over resources and political agendas, 
embodied within the euphemism of national security (Reveron, 2011, p. 2). This domain 
of security views states as national actors, rationally pursuing their interests, focuses 
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saliently on external threats, and sees military and economic power capabilities as 
critical tools in achieving security (Griffith, 1997, p. 4). In this paradigm it is 
acknowledged that all nations have a right to defend themselves from threats (United 
Nations., 1986, p. 1), where Wolfers (1952, p. 482) expresses that national interest has 
become synonymous with the formula of national security. Within his understanding, 
Wolfers’ (1952, p. 485) seminal work saw security as a value, and defined security 
accordingly as “the absence of threats to acquired values, in an objective sense, and in a 
subjective sense, as the absence of fear that such acquired values will be attacked”.   
According to Wolfers (1952, p. 484), values represent characteristics such as national 
independence, territorial integrity, power, wealth, national character, tradition, 
individual liberty or preferences, and considered security to encompass both a physical 
and psychological state of being. Congruent with this body of work, Griffith (1997, p. 
5) saw security as the protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external 
military attack and coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of 
cherished political, economic and social values. Accordingly, Wolfers’ (1952, p. 500) 
security contention is that countries must hierarchically choose the values that deserve 
protection.  
Such literature highlights that values or interests may be regarded as higher or lower 
order. For example, in more recent times The United Nations broadened this archetype, 
establishing the theory of international security, a macro theory of security articulated as 
the sum of security of each state member of the international community. This in the 
words of Wolfers (1952, p. 482) would include the protection of values for all of 
mankind, especially when facing present-day security risks such as nuclear weapons, 
which pose a global threat (United Nations, 1986, pp. 2-8). In this contextual 
environment, the United Nations (1986, p. 9) contended that international security must 
sit within a commitment towards joint survival rather than a threat of mutual 
destruction. Such a characterisation reinstates the concept of collective security, where 
as with Neanderthal man, security is pursued collectively, as a community. However, 
this communal pursuit is broader through the uniting of the Nation state’s interests 
based on a global commitment to international peace and security. 
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Nevertheless, security is more than a macro state condition, as nation states cannot 
forget the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who seek solace in their daily lives 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2011, p. 74). In today’s global community, security is considered 
an inalienable right for every human being; all people have the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person (Article 3; The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights). As such, many security scholars, supported by international organisations 
(United Nations Development Programme) along with National governments advocate 
towards a broader thematic category labelled human security (Nef, 1999, p. 25; Paris, 
2001; Roland, 2001, pp. 89-91; Inglehart & Norris, 2011, p. 74). This purportedly 
embodies those security-associated concerns that threaten human survival, conditions of 
daily life and the individual’s dignity. This perspective is underpinned by the contention 
that such a broader linguistic embodiment of security dissolves previous boundaries and 
existing paradigms to link multiple risks and threats for enhanced understanding. The 
concept of human security still embraces sovereignty threats, but also includes a much 
broader range of societal concerns (Inglehart & Norris, 2011, pp. 71-74).  
The work of Nef (1999, p. 25) expressed “human security’s incarnation to comprise five 
component groupings, including: (1) environmental, personal and physical security 
concerns, (2) economic security, (3) social security, (4) political security, and (5) 
cultural security”. Yet in contrast, Inglehart and Norris (2011, p. 74) proposed seven 
major component groupings for human security, including economic security, food 
security, health security, environment security, personal security, communal security, 
and political security. Paris (2001, p. 91) highlights that such articulations represent 
more a laundry list approach, where again the notion of a rallying cry appears in the 
literature. Existing definitions of Human Security are expansive and vague, over 
inclusive, where everything from physical security to psychological security is 
encompassed under the one neologism (Paris (2001, pp. 87-91). For example, the work 
of Blatz (1967) expressed the concept of human security to be related to children’s 
psychological development within the child study domain.  
Accordingly, the human security paradigm’s discourse is embedded in disparaging 
views without consensual agreement of themes or monolithic delineation. As Paris 
(2001) states: 
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Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety 
from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it 
means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of 
daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities…Virtually any kind 
of unexpected or irregular discomfort could conceivably constitute a threat 
to one’s human security. (Paris, 2001, p. 89) 
Most formulations of human security emphasise the welfare of ordinary people (Paris, 
2001), and could be re-expressed as values accordant with the words of Wolfers (1952, 
p. 485). For example, Griffith (1997, p. 4) premised that political security pertains to the 
stability of nations and the ideological and organizational elements that facilitate their 
maintenance. In contrast, economic security is concerned with the monetary equilibrium 
of states such as the availability of, and access to economic capabilities. On the 
contrary, environmental security pertains to the maintenance of the eco system, or at 
least to the prevention of its deterioration. All contextual security examples represent 
conditions that, if altered to the negative, affect the welfare of ordinary people.  
Nevertheless, the concept of human security remains theoretically contested (Inglehart 
& Norris, 2011, pp. 79), as attention must also be paid to further threats that transcend 
national boundaries, which directly affect persons, and also threaten to erode national 
cohesion, ultimately degrading domestic well-being. These threats include for example, 
drug trafficking, transnational organised crime, nuclear smuggling, refugee movement, 
uncontrolled and illegal immigration, environmental risks and international terrorism, 
all of which capture concerns of human existence (Edgar & Ifantis, 2007, p. 452).  
Security’s focus throughout this literature is illuminated as the means or measures 
towards maintaining survival and conditions of human existence as a collective concern 
in the face of a decisive threat. Such thoughts were earlier voiced by Baldwin (1997, p. 
13) who altered Wolfers’ phraseology to define security as “a low probability of 
damage to acquired values” to consider impacts of natural events as well as harms from 
conflict. As Baldwin highlights, in ordinary language references to epidemics, floods, 
earthquakes, or droughts as threats to acquired values can be found. Thus, security is 
valued not only by states and other actors, but individuals and families (Baldwin, 1997, 
p. 18). 
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Accordingly, the writings of Colak and Pearce (2009, p. 13) re-acknowledge that states 
within contemporary society must protect communities and individuals from a wider set 
of risks than traditional sovereignty threats. States must, accordant with the values 
approach, focus towards conditions for well-being and social justice while being 
respectful of democratic values and human rights, along with accountability to their 
citizens. Such an extension is symptomatic of security’s emergence as both a condition 
of States themselves (sovereignty), and the conditions for individuals within them 
(society), that is, a macro-meso-micro relationship. These writings again express the 
existence of threats which pose a risk outside of the military paradigm, but which still 
challenge the survival and well-being of States and their peoples (Caballero-Anthony, 
2008, p. 510) that are embedded with referents of security.  As the writings of Maslow 
(1970) highlighted, if conditions of security are eroded, rapid reversions in his hierarchy 
of needs occurs until such a state can be restored.  
Thus, security is not just about the State as an entity, but also people themselves, at the 
societal and individual levels (Caballero-Anthony, 2008, p. 510). Therefore, security is 
seen as a pursuit in the traditional sense (traditional security), through the politics and 
international relations domain. However, the shift in conceptualizations of security in 
the 21st century has also thrust security to forefront of the criminological (Zender, 
2009), sociological-societal (Neocleous, 2007) and legal (Beccaria, 1775) agendas as 
well. As Neocleous (2007, p. 346) highlights, security is implied to be a public good. 
Where now in the personal sense security has been saliently embodied within the 
domain of criminology (non-traditional), constituted within a state-society-individual 
relationship (Figure 2.2) (Rothschild, 1995, p. 61). It is within this relationship that 
Cotterrell (1984, p. 5) affirms the concept of security to be one relating to a state of 
regulation of behaviours, achieved functionally through the provision of norms and 
laws.  
  
P a g e  | 48 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Security as a dual domain embodiment 
 
Cotterrell’s (1984) views are supported by the functions of the first recorded body of 
law in the code of Hammurabi, established in approximately 1700 B.C. The Code 
sought to regulate societal concerns including trade, commerce, agriculture and the 
early professions (Schnabolk, 1983, p. 2). From their early origins the charters of laws 
relating to the regulation of society evolved over time, and the pursuit of protection 
under the banner of security was part of this evolution. For example, in England an 
historical legal prescription under the banner of security includes the formal 
requirement to clear brushwood and other concealments within 200 feet from the side of 
the King’s road, to protect travellers against attacks from robbers, thus providing 
security (Fischer & Green, 2004, p. 22).  
Consistent with this view, Cotterrell’s (1984) contention was that the law is the practical 
craft of systematic control of social relations and institutions; it is the practical craft of 
government towards a state of security. The earlier writings of Beccaria (1704, p. 6) 
highlighted this very point, stating “society’s laws are the conditions under which men, 
naturally independent, united themselves in society”. Through laws individual liberties 
were sacrificed towards the pursuit of a common good of peace and security (Beccaria, 
1775, p. 6). Here the work of Misiuk (2011, p. 255) articulated that a State 
predominately serves to fulfil psychological needs, inter alia, in the field of feeling 
secure; and that the vast majority of the State’s organisation through its institutions and 
legal regulations concern the very concept of security.  
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The communal-legal conceptualization of security encompasses the idea that the State 
formally provides security in return for individuals surrendering a portion of their 
liberty. This occurs through an embedded contract between the public and State as a 
civil right of personal security. Such rights include, for example, freedom from assault, 
rape and coercion of various types, where the corresponding duties on the part of fellow 
citizens, government and its proxies, and social agencies are to abstain from deviant acts 
(Yanay, 2006, pp. 511-513). Within this paradigm security becomes synonymous with 
crime prevention, where Makinda (1998, p. 282) defines security as a concept 
concomitant to “the preservation of the norms, rules, institutions and values of society”, 
perspicuous through laws. Such writings re-emphasise the notion that man pursues 
security communally, through dedicated actions. Furthermore, these actions seek to 
control the actions of others, which in this notion is through the provision of society’s 
laws and norms, both globally and locally regulating against deviance to provide a state 
of being and feeling secure. 
Consistent with this proposition, Rothschild (1995, p. 61) explains that society’s 
understandings of security in the personal sense reflected early political ideas and 
stemmed from the Latin word securitas referred, in its primary classical use, to “a 
condition of individuals, of a particular inner sort; securitas denotes composer, 
tranquillity of spirit, freedom from care, the objective of supreme desire”. Rothschild 
(1995, p. 61) expresses that one of the principle synonyms for securitas, in the Lexicon 
Taciteum, is Sicherheitsgefuhl: the feeling of being secure. In this paradigm, Burstein’s 
(1996, p. 1) writings acknowledge that the entitlement to protect one’s self and property 
against attack is a notion of ancient origins, where the primary responsibility for 
protecting against harms through deviant means or otherwise rests with its owner.  
Such a notion was articulated in an organisational sphere within the early industrial 
writings of Fayol (1949), who recognised this responsibility for successful business 
operations, identifying the protection of assets and personnel as one of the fundamental 
functions of industrial undertakings. Fayol (1984, p. 9) defined security as to safeguard 
properties and persons against theft, fire and flood, to ward off strikes and felonies and 
broadly all social disturbances liable to endanger the progress and even the life of the 
business. Fayol (1984, p. 11) stated that those responsible for security protect the firm 
against all forms of threat to its assets and personnel, underscored through risk 
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management. The background to such a view stemmed from the Greek city-states, 
which were the first to establish formal domestic security to protect life and property 
through the Praetorian Guard, established by Caesar Augustus, Emperor of Rome at the 
time of Christ, to protect him and the palace, who eventually evolved into the Urban 
Cohorts to also protect the city (Schabolk, 1983, p. 2).  
Yet despite both a clear contextual and historical emphasis within this sphere, security 
incorporates a vast array of varying definitions. For instance, Underwood (1984, p. x) 
defined security as “confidence in the retention of belongings, confidence in personal 
safety”. Alternatively, O’Block, Donnermeyer and Doeren (1991, p. 7) define security 
as “freedom from fear of crime and the actual danger of being the victim of crime”. 
Such views are supported in principle through Craighead’s (2003, p. 21) definition, 
“free from danger, or safe”.  However, Fischer and Green (2004, p. 21) expanded these 
formations, stating that security in broader terms implies “a stable relatively predictable 
environment in which individuals or groups may pursue its ends without disruption or 
harm and without fear of disturbance or injury”. O’Shea and Awwad-Rafferty (2009, p. 
7) also consider the notion of security along psychological and physical states, defining 
security as “free from risks of loss, and free from danger, fear and anxiety”, 
emphasising both feelings (psychological) and a physical assurance.  
Such literature are consistent with the writings of Brooks (2010, p. 225) in that security 
is a multidimensional concept. Derived from the writings of Corkill and Coole (2013, p. 
144) this view is graphically expressed through an intersecting two-dimensional 
diagram (Figure 2.3) that captures a macro-meso-micro representation of such an 
embodiment. This represents security as a concept along intersecting continuums from a 
global-international theme to a local national concern, intersecting across another 
continuum from a state to an individual-micro focus. It is argued that this graphical 
representation better captures the breadth of security’s occupational and academic 
dimensionality. 
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Figure 2.3 Two intersecting continuums of security’s multidimensional embodiment 
(Derived from Corkill & Coole, 2013, p. 144) 
 
Nevertheless, Figure 2.3 only captures security’s dimensionality, rather than 
monolithically articulates the cover term security. The Manunta (1997, p. 19) centric 
paradigm considered security in its broadest sense (Philosophically) to be an attempt to 
reach and maintain a state of, absence or freedom from danger and worry, a point 
expressed by Corkill and Coole (2013, p. 147) in their phrase “freedom of action”, or 
“freedom to act without fear of threat”. On the other hand, in its operational or 
functional sense, Manunta (1997, p. 19) considered security as a “set of functions and 
activities aimed at preventing unacceptable losses and damages to those tangible and 
intangible assets considered worthy of protection”. In these words security is the pursuit 
of a desired state, to protect from threat, for as Manunta contends, “if there is no threat, 
there is no need for security”.  
The reviewed literature highlights that all security perspectives arguably embody 
overarching philosophical and functional aspects to contextually provide a desired state 
of affairs. Within this view it is considered by Baldwin that regardless of where security 
sits dimensionally, they are all interrelated stating “security at the individual level is 
related to security at the level of the state and the international system”. A viewpoint 
also accentuated in the work of Paris (2001). In pursuit of a contextually secure state the 
standard rational from within the international perspective (traditional domain) is that 
security is about power (Stone, 2009, p. 2). Yet the emerging theme within the 
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criminological perspective (non-traditional domain) is that security is about control, real 
and perceived.   
2.2.3 Denoting what is meant by the word security 
The work of Corkill and Coole (2013, p. 143) bridge the traditional and non-traditional 
security domains views together, arguing power is a means of pursuing control, a view 
arguably implied in the earlier writings of Wolfers (1952, p. 485) who stated, “power is 
the ability to control the actions of others”. As such, Corkill and Coole (2013, p. 143) 
affirm that the term security is linguistically a lulling term for the word control, and it is 
mechanisms of control, which brings about a contextual state of security, or in the 
words of Fischer, Halibozek and Green (2008, p. 31), “a stable and predictable 
environment”.  
In addition, security is not a static concept, as humans have continually been developing 
the means to protect themselves and their possessions from the dawn of time, constantly 
devising and refining protective systems (Schnabolk, 1983, p. 2). According to the 
American Institute of Architects (2004, p.183) “Security can only be achieved through 
constant change, through discarding old ideas that have outlived their usefulness and 
adapting others to current facts”. 
Such combined actions influence or control potential threat actor’s behaviour to achieve 
what Coole (2010) referred to as a steady state condition, or again, a predictable 
environment (Fischer, Halibozek & Green, 2008, p. 21). Such a viewpoint is 
acknowledged in the writings of Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, p. 182), and Fischer, 
Halibozek and Green (2008, p. 31) articulating that security is a dynamic process, 
responsive in time and place. Security approaches are gradually altered throughout 
history “as a response to, and reflection of, a changing society”. Brooks (2010) 
acknowledges this theme, describing security as both changeable in nature and function. 
Such a broad discourse is captured in the writings of Stone (2009):  
Security is taken to be the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of 
states and societies to maintain their independent identity, and their 
functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The 
bottom line, security is about survival, but it also reasonably includes a 
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substantial range of concerns about conditions of existence. (Stone, 2009, p. 
1).  
Security, along with safety, is among the most basic and central human needs and rights 
(O’Shea & Awwad-Rafferty, 2009, p. xv). Nowadays, security is still about survival, 
conditions of existence along with the retention of belongings, but at the international, 
national, state or regional, organisational and personal levels. In these societal strata, the 
depth and breadth of the contemporary security domain is represented through thematic 
categories, neologisms or euphemisms accordant with the adjectives that precede its 
namesake. For example, national security, human security, energy security, water 
security, food security, border security, aviation security, maritime security, 
organisational security, cyber security, or information security (Corkill & Coole, 2013, 
pp. 145-146). Therefore, security is more recognised by its context (Baldwin, 1997). 
But again, as Socrates pointed out, many categories of security do not denote what 
security is. It can be argued that all adjective categories embody legitimate concerns that 
threaten survival or conditions of daily life. According to Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, 
pp. 181-182) a common thread within the security discourse is the desire on part of all 
to protect against malicious human intervention in the form of perceived risks and 
perpetrated consequences using a variety of countermeasures.  
As such, the examined literature highlights that, as an axiomatic construct, security 
remains a broad term, encapsulated in various linguistic forms, where a singular 
conjugal definition is unlikely in the near future. Yet the cultural domain taxonomy for 
physical security professionals is based on the single semantic relationship with the 
axiom security; where semantic is defined as “(1), relating to the meaning of different 
words or symbols, (2), of or relating to semantics; where semantics is defined as (1), the 
branch of linguistics that deals with the study of meaning, (2), the study of the 
relationships between signs and symbols and what they represent” (Collins Dictionary, 
1981., p. 1179). As such, there must exist semantic and linguistic commonalities across 
all conceptions and examples of security. Again, deferring to the words of Socrates, “we 
are searching for that thing which is the same in all these”.  
Accordingly, the proposition of this study is that there does exist thematic facets that 
can be extracted from this broad discourse to denote the term security and seat the 
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study. Consequently, it is argued that a thematic analysis of the examined literature 
leads to the assertion that both philosophically and functionally the axiomatic meaning 
of security can be understood in relation to conditions of well-being for values in the 
face of threat. Hence, the study denotes security as:  
Security is philosophically, a communal theory of survival and conditions of human 
and entity existence; where functionally it is the pursuit of this philosophy underscored 
by conceptions of risk. The cover term Security denotes the pursuit to protect defined 
values against real and perceived threats to them…where the functional word security 
relates to the degree of control or influence over an environment to achieve protection.  
Security in terms of control or influence is achieved through adaption, accordant with 
its biological definition. This in the words of Freidson (1973), refers to the evolutionary 
means of survival through changes in physical characteristics and ways of behaving that 
have proven viable in an environment in the face of conditions and constraints in which 
they happen to exist.  
Thus, security denotes protection from the adverse effects of threat, and functionally it’s 
the pursuit of such protection. Congruous with the writings of Wolfers (1952) and 
Maslow (1970), security as a referent to values elucidated in survival and conditions of 
human existence, including the retention of belongings is a very crucial societal 
concept. Mill’s (1910) work on society recognised this view, stating that security of the 
person and property, along with equal justice between individuals are the first needs of 
society, and the primary end of government (p. 355); from the beginning of human kind 
to the advanced society of today that security has always been a concept essential for 
survival (Mill, 1936, p. 50). Security is about survival at a global, National/State, 
organisation or group and individual levels.  
Security as a subject is concerned with very important matters, be it physical survival, 
economic survival or a state of enhanced being. The function of security is about 
providing wellbeing consistently, resulting in a stable-predictable environment to 
pursue higher order objectives. When threats are not managed, accordant with Maslow’s 
work, a reversion or refocus in pursuits occurs until security is again achieved to a 
degree where higher pursuits can be a priority pursuit again. Security exists in a context 
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but its denotation is the same. Its pursuit also exists in a context where various means 
are utilized to obtain a desired state. Such means exist across all contexts or many of 
them and they can be grouped and organised accordingly. The context of the study lies 
in the pursuit of wellbeing in terms of survival and the retention or integrity of assets 
through the means of physical security practices as a more focused area of foci within 
the broad societal domain of security. 
Nonetheless, it must also be acknowledged that security, regardless of context, is a more 
relative rather than absolute term (United Nations, 1986, p. 2), epitomised as entwined 
in layers of values (Baldwin, 1997). For instance, Corkill and Coole (2013, p. 144) 
stated that security is achieved utilizing a control thesis, which holds that without 
control, or at least influence there can be no security. Consequently writers such as 
Wolfers (1952, p. 494) and Stone (2009, p. 8) make the point that absolute security is 
never going to be attained, as absolute power (Baldwin, 1997) and therefore total 
control is not achievable. Ullman’s (1983, p. 1) writings acknowledged this very view 
reminding us that a state or level of security towards protecting values must be balanced 
against other values, as often measures implemented to achieve security (control) can be 
experienced as a burden (Wolfers, 1952, p. 488). As such, efforts are made to keep such 
control at the lowest level required, which will provide what is considered proportional 
protection within a context (Wolfers, 1952, p. 488). In 1952 Wolfers (p. 494) expressed 
that a security balance is required accordant with the economic law of diminishing 
returns, where the gain in security no longer compensates for the added cost of attaining 
it; this point still holds today. Thus, while security philosophically is a communal 
pursuit, at a functional level it is about establishing the right level of cultural influence 
or control within a context commensurate with costs benefits accordance to conceptions 
of risk. 
Security, especially physical security, inhibits or facilitates actions, and as a construct 
has a long crucial history with mankind (Maslow, 1970, pp. 35-46; Underwood, 1984, 
p. 3; Manunta, 1997, p. 11), with its universal need unquestionable (O’Shea & Awwad-
Rafferty, 2009, p. xv-xviii). In pursuing security, humans’ survival as a species and as 
entities within the global community is determined by their ability to organise and adapt 
as a group to develop a degree of influence or control over an environment. Such 
control is towards protecting values as referents to people, possessions or beliefs from 
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harms in the face of real and perceived threats. Such threats stem from malevolent 
human actions and conditions that may result in such actions. Security is a concept 
essential for survival and also provides a better quality of life.  
Further framing the study is the acknowledgement that security across contemporary 
society is more recognised and defined by its euphemistic category contexts rather than 
in terms of broader conceptualizations of values and control, regardless of the point that 
security concerns values and is achieved through control. Furthermore, vocationally 
security is considered as an array of various fields in which it is applied (Table 1.2) and 
within these contexts are various applications to achieve security functionally. Thus 
security is conceptualized as an umbrella term (cover term) in relation to its contextual 
pursuit, rooted within its euphemistic or adjective categories. Accordingly the pursuit of 
a state of security as an occupational domain is acknowledged within the study as 
taxonomy of professional or occupational subdivisions, where security is 
philosophically understood implicitly and functionally pursued contextually.  
Security as a domain discipline explained in taxonomic terms means that regardless of 
its crucial and historical basis, its diversity along with academic youth, especially in the 
non-traditional paradigm, means that its holistic knowledge domain is yet to achieve the 
formal status of traditional professions and their supporting academic disciplines. For 
instance, to date, no study has ever demonstrated an all-encompassing knowledge base 
that captures the depth and breadth of the security domain. As highlighted by Smith and 
Brooks (2013, pp. 1-2), when compared to disciplines such as medicine and law, 
security lacks validity in significant characteristics, including a well-defined formal 
knowledge structure and agreed skill sets, largely due to its infancy and diversity (p. 
16).  
Yet irrespective of security’s diversity and its limited explicit knowledge structure, 
corresponding with security’s cruciality and its functional embeddedness within 
contemporary society, an emerging occupational group is the modern day security 
professional (Section 1.4). Thus, this emerging professional must theoretically be 
educated or trained and experienced in protecting modern society from the multifaceted 
security centred threats that pose a risk to survival, property or threaten conditions of 
existence for nations, states, organisations and groups, and individual people. Though 
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pragmatic questions remain, given the breadth and depth of the domain. What 
constitutes a security professional? What is their occupational boundary and 
commensurate knowledge basis along with competencies and supporting formal 
educational requirements? 
2.3 Conceptualising a modern day professional 
The study is also seated within the concept of the modern day professional. Therefore, 
informing the notion and embodiment of the modern day security professional is the 
literature of professionalism. According to Abbott (1988, p. 3), historically the 
professions and its supporting embodiment professionalism as a concept is derived from 
medieval times, from the guilds. However, clearly defining a profession is somewhat 
controversial (Cogan, 1955, p. 105). As early as 1915, Flexner’s work sought to define 
the concept of professionalism, asserting that a profession is characterised by six 
criteria: (1) intellectual operations coupled with large individual responsibilities (2) raw 
materials drawn from science and learning (3) practical application, (4) an educationally 
communicable technique, (5) tendency towards self-organization, and (6) increasing 
altruistic motivation (Flexner, 1915). However, in 1955 (p. 105) following on from 
Flexner’s work, Cogan’s work avowed that “there is still no universal definition of a 
profession”, an assessment which arguably still remains today.  
The work of Jaques (1989) echoed that professionalism as a concept relates to the 
stratification of work in society. Jaques (1989, p. 15) articulated professional work as 
the use of discretion and judgement in making decisions, in carrying out a task, backed 
by knowledge, skills, temperament, and wisdom, and driven by values. According to 
Jaques (1989, p. 23) work, professionalism relates to problem complexity where 
complexity is defined in terms of the number of variables operating in a situation, the 
clarity and precision with which they can be identified and their rate of change. 
Professional work has to do with higher strata problem solving; problems start with 
something you value, need or want (goal) that is not immediately available and the 
development of the processes to achieve the desired goal. Only as problem complexity 
is reduced can tasks be delegated to lower work strata (Jaques, 1989, p. 34).  
Such views were summarised in the earlier and influential work of Wilensky (1964, p. 
138) who expressed that, “there are two criteria for professional groups, (1) the job of 
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professional groups is technical-based on systematic knowledge or doctrine acquired 
through long prescribed training (cognitive), (2) and that the professional adheres to a 
set of professional norms” (normative). Nonetheless, the more recent work of Eraut 
(1994, p. 1) contends that regardless of individualistic account, the profession’s explicit 
conceptual boundary is still poorly defined. Eraut’s (1994, p. 1) work contends that as 
opposed to a true entity the contemporary concept of professionalism is somewhat more 
of an ideology that in the words of Larson (1977, p. x) embodies varying attributes 
amongst authors, but generally include cognitive, normative and evaluative dimensions.  
According to Larson (1977, p. x) a profession’s cognitive dimension is centred upon the 
knowledge and techniques in which this knowledge is applied. The normative 
dimension covers the service orientation of the profession, underscored in appealing 
values including ethics or trustworthiness, integrity, autonomy and reliable standards. 
Evaluative refers to the profession’s comparison to other occupations in terms of its 
prestige (Larson, 1977, p. x). Jaques bridged these views together; defining cognitive 
processes as “the mental processes by which you take information, pick it over, play 
with it, analyse it, put it together, reorganise it, judge and reason with it, make 
conclusions, plans and decisions and take action”. In professional work you exercise 
discretion, judgement and decision making, within limits, in carrying out tasks: driven 
by your values, and bringing your knowledge, skills, wisdom and temperament into play 
(Jaques, 1989, p. 33).  
Cogan’s, Wilensky’s and Jaques’ works are still influential today; it is within these 
embodiments that the most prominent professions of medicine and law are held up as 
the ideological symbol of professionalism (evaluative) (Eraut, 1994, p. 1; Axt, 2002, p. 
142). As Gillespie (1981, p. 371) notes, although there is considerable debate over 
‘what is a profession’, there is no debate that both medicine and law are professions 
(high prestige). Acknowledging the cognitive dimension of professionalism, Cogan’s 
(1955, p. 107) work further articulated that a profession is “a vocation whose practice is 
founded upon an understanding of the theoretical structure of some department of 
learning or science, and upon the abilities accompanying such command”. A viewpoint 
later supported by Freidson (1973, p. 40) who further exclaimed that in terms of 
professional work, scientific knowledge is the most respected in contemporary society.   
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The work of Freidson contended that many professions assert as evidence of their 
professional status their possession of expert knowledge stemming from scientific basis. 
For example, according to Freidson (1973, pp. 40-41) medicine and occupations such as 
medical technology and nursing lay claims to portions of biology and the physical 
sciences in their assertion of professional status. Engineering rests its professional status 
on its foundations in the physical sciences and mathematics. Nevertheless, it is also 
acknowledged that professional status can rest on claims upon knowledge of some 
arbitrarily constructed model of social organisation, such as the law profession, where 
the knowledge is not scientific per se, but is complex and critical for overcoming 
problems that arise in modern society, presenting the notion of esoteric or abstract 
knowledge as a further basis for professionalism.  
Knowledge-based views underpinning professionalism resonate within the literature. As 
the writings of Freidson (1973b, p. 173) express, professionals possess processed 
knowledge based on measurement, systematic observation, and scientific theories. The 
work of Olufs (1985, p. 29) supports this view; asserting that instrumental in the 
existence of a profession is a formally established body of knowledge as a cognitive 
underpinning of its practice. A view unremitting by Eraut (1994, p. 102) who explains 
that within the professionalism criteria sit two primary bases for establishing 
professional specialisation. These include a profession’s substantive field of knowledge 
that is professed to be of their command, and its technique of production or application 
of that which the professional claims mastery.  
Congruent with the cognitive constructivist view (Section 1.6), all reviewed authors 
present a knowledge-based view characterising professionalism in relation to 
professional work. Knowledge was defined in Section 1.2.1 as the: (1) the facts or 
experiences known by a person or group of people, (2) the state of knowing, (3) 
consciousness of familiarity gained by experience or learning, (4) erudiation of 
informed learning, (5) specific information about a subject, and (6) understanding. The 
work of Eraut (1994, p. 103) highlights that such professional knowledge is divided into 
three salient categories including (1) discipline based concepts and theories derived 
from bodies of coherent, systematic knowledge, (2) generalizations and practical 
principles in the applied field of professional action, and (3) specific propositions about 
particular cases, decisions and actions, referred to as reflective practice.  
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Concepts in an occupational sense can be understood as something which can be 
conceived, a notion, an idea, thought or device (The Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.) a 
mental representation of a thing or class of things so that an individual can decide 
whether a specific stimulus is an instance of that object or class of objectives and act on 
the basis of that judgment (The Cambridge Dictionary of Psychology, 2009, p. 123).  
Whereas, an occupational theory can be understood as (1) a conception or mental 
scheme of something to be done, (2) or of method for doing it; a systematic statement of 
rules or principles to be followed (The Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.). However, a 
theory is also defined as a conjecture or opinion on a topic (The Cambridge Dictionary 
of Psychology, 2009, p. 542). Then a principle is the chief or main part, point or 
element of something…a primary or fundamental point of a subject, upon which the rest 
depends…a common (The Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.).  
Bringing such literature together as organised professional knowledge, Jaques (1989, p. 
34) expressed the view that “all knowledge is verbally articulated, and is held in 
memory”. You may sense something, but “if you cannot state it, you do not know it”. 
Therefore this definition of knowledge is applied in the professions’ literature within an 
individualistic-professional sense, relating to masters of a field; knowledgeable about 
technical concerns and schooled in the judgements required in their application.  
2.4 Cognitive dimensions of professional knowledge  
The reviewed literature has expressed the importance of cognitive attributes, 
specifically specialized knowledge as the currency for producing professional work and 
ultimately designation as professionals. Yet few authors have explored where this 
knowledge comes from and how it gets established as recognised knowledge; and how 
its development and utilization become organized, evaluated and controlled (Freidson, 
1973, p. 28). Within the literature is the view that a profession’s cognitive dimension is 
centred on the formal body of knowledge and techniques which the professionals apply 
to their work (Larson, 1977, p. x).  
The work of Epstein and Hundert (2002, p. 227) explained that the cognitive 
dimensions of professional competence include a component of acquiring and using 
knowledge to solve problems. Such competence is underpinned by fundamental facets 
including core knowledge, using resources (e.g. published evidence, colleagues) along 
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with using tacit knowledge learned from experience coupled with abstract problem 
solving skills. Fittingly, the earlier work of Abbott (1988, p. 323) highlighted that 
professionalism has been the main way of institutionalising individual’s expertise, 
where the technical knowledge within expertise can be formally codified (Oakeshott 
cited in Eraut, 1994, p. 65). Acknowledging such a process, Brooks presented the 
argument that “security experts individually hold a rich knowledge structure” which can 
be captured (2007, p. 1).  
Thus, the emergence of a profession is predicated on the concept of individual expertise, 
which moves from an individualistic position, to a group phenomenon. Individual 
expertise is considered within the work of Ericsson and Charness (1997, p. 6), who 
claim that expert performance within a domain is defined as consistently superior 
performance on a specified set of representative tasks for the domain that can be 
administered to any subject. Expertise is viewed in terms of reasoning ability and 
knowledge (heuristic and compiled) (Patel & Ramoni, 1997, p. 76).  In addition, 
Ericsson and Charness (1994, p. 731) define experts as individuals who are performing 
at least two standard deviations above the mean level of performance in their domain 
population. The mechanisms of expertise and expert performance reflects the complex, 
domain specific cognitive structures and skills that performers have acquired through 
their incremental accumulation of knowledge and skills over a decade of intense 
experience (Ericsson & Charness, 1997, pp. 4-5). That is, accordant with Section 1.6, 
professional knowledge is built on the foundations of existing knowledge. 
Congruent with the constructivist approach (Section 1.6), studies have shown that a 
large organized body of domain knowledge (technical knowledge) is a prerequisite to 
expertise (Bedard & Chi, 1992, p. 135). That is, experts have a greater quantity of 
domain-relevant knowledge than do novices and it is better organised than novice’s 
structures. In addition, experts perceive more meaningful structural patterns in their 
respective domains than non-experts, whereas novices perceive random or disconnected 
structures or patterns within and between cases (Johnson, 2003, p. 58). Furthermore, 
while expert knowledge is argued to be more organized, accessible, functional and 
efficient than that of novices, Bedard and Chi (1992, pp. 135-136) emphasize that an 
expert’s knowledge is also cross referenced with a rich network of connections amongst 
concepts. According to Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 135) within the context of professional 
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knowledge what is crucial is the manner in which it is organized that makes it more 
accessible, functional and efficient.  
2.5 Individual professional expertise 
Expertise underpins the concept of professionalism, which as a subject of research 
resulted from developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive psychology 
(Chi, Glaser and Farr, 1988, p. xv). The study of expert performance is considered 
across two broad discourses including a physiological (unmodifiable-innate) or talent-
based view and cognitive factors (modifiable-mental factors), which influence the 
achievement of expert performance (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Chi, Glaser & Farr, 
1988; Tynjala, 1999).  The focus for this study is on cognitive factors as expertise 
drivers based on the argument that professional competence includes a cognitive 
dimension including core knowledge, using tacit knowledge and personal experience, 
self-directed acquisition of new knowledge, using resources and learning from 
experience (Epstein & Hundert, 2002, p. 227) that is modifiable over time.  
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, p. 221) describe cognitive processes as a sequence of states 
or thoughts. For example, the works of Degroot (1966) and Simon and Chase (1973) 
showed that specialised structures of knowledge were strongly implicated in expertise 
(Chi, Glaser & Farr, 1988, p. xv). Within the context of professional knowledge, 
Sternberg’s (1997, p. 159) views are that expertise can be considered as a domain-
specific multidimensional prototype underpinned in varying degrees by seven attributes:  
1. Advanced problem solving processes; 
2. A great amount of knowledge; 
3. Advanced knowledge organisation; 
4. An ability to use knowledge effectively; 
5. Creative ability; involving creating new knowledge on the basis of knowledge 
that one already knows; 
6. Automated actions; and 
7. Practical ability (p. 150). 
The reviewed literature highlights that salient within the cognitive literature of expertise 
is the concept of expert knowledge within a particular domain and its organisation 
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(Bedard & Chi, 1992; Ericsson & Charness, 1997; Sternberg, 1997; Zeitz, 1997; 
Tynjala, 1999). Research on the development of expert knowledge is of fundamental 
importance towards understanding the acquisition of expertise (Tynjala, 1999, p. 359) 
and specifically as it relates to this study. Professional knowledge is often broken down 
into three salient components namely formal knowledge, practical knowledge and self-
regulative knowledge. Formal knowledge refers to declarative knowledge often known 
as explicit, factual or propositional knowledge. Such knowledge is considered to play a 
major role in education and constitutes the core of professional knowledge competence 
(Tynjala, 1999, p. 359). This knowledge is the province of the cognitive domain (Carter, 
1985, p. 139). Practical knowledge, often referred to as procedural knowledge, is that 
knowledge structure which manifests itself as skills or ‘knowing-how’ and is considered 
more personal or tacit in nature. Self-regulative knowledge consists of meta-cognitive 
and reflective skills that individuals use to monitor and evaluate personal actions 
(Tynjala, 1999, p. 359). 
2.6 Knowledge-based views of domain expertise acquisition 
A recurring theme within the literature is that professionalism is predicated on the 
authority of expertise (Freidson, 1973, p. 25). As such, central to the proposed outcomes 
of the study is the knowledge–based views of expertise acquisition that incorporates a 
human information processing or skills approach (cognitive). This explains exceptional 
performance in terms of knowledge and skills and posits that outstanding performance 
results from incremental increases in knowledge and skill (constructed) due to the 
extended effects of learning and experience (Ericsson & Charness, 1997), which builds 
over time. Within this school of thought it is argued that experts acquire memory skills 
to meet specific information processing and accessibility demands in specific activities 
(Ericsson & Charness, 1994, p. 736). According to Ericsson and Charness (1994, p. 
736) acquired memory skill (Skilled Memory Theory and Long Term Memory) 
accounts for the superior memory of domain specific knowledge of experts. Experts 
develop domain specific memory skills that enable them to store domain relevant 
information in their Long Term Memory (LTM), circumventing general Short Term 
Memory (STM) capacity constraints.  
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Ericsson and Charness (1997, pp. 13-16) contend that a critical aspect of expert’s 
working memory is not the amount of information individuals have stored per se, but 
rather how they have stored and indexed their information for retrieval from their LTM.  
Contemporary views of human memory emphasise two distinct forms of storage 
systems, referred to as Short Term memory (STM) and Long Term Memory (LTM). 
Short Term Memory is characterised by a limited storage capacity with a memory span 
limited to around 7 different digits or consonants and slightly fewer (5-6) colours, 
visually presented geometric designs, and words. This is summarised as...STM has the 
capacity to retain 7 plus or minus 2 symbols or chunks of information. As such, for 
information to be stored permanently it must be placed in LTM an unlimited and 
permanent storage system (Ericsson and Chase, 1982, p. 607).  
Nevertheless, information in LTM can only be retrieved through precise retrieval cues, 
where storage and retrieval of information in LTM for normal people requires 
considerable effort and time. Storage in LTM is assumed to be primarily associative, 
relating different items to one another and relating items to attributes of the current 
situation (current context). According to Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, p. 212) the 
primary bottleneck for retrieval from LTM is the scarcity of retrieval cues that are 
related by association to the desired item stored in LTM. However, to perform complex 
cognitive tasks people must maintain access to large amounts of information. In 
working or professional contexts individuals require accessible information that changes 
as the individual continues with their task (constructive), and are often referred to as 
working memory, or as Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, p. 211) express, Long-Term 
Working Memory (LT-WM).  
It is premised that individuals can acquire domain-specific memory skills, which allow 
them to acquire LT-WM extending their working memory for a particular activity. LT-
WM is found for many types of expert performance and is the normal mode of expert 
processing (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995, p. 211). LT-WM is acquired in specific domains 
to meet specific demands imposed by a given activity on storage and retrieval and must 
therefore be considered in the context of specific skilled activities (p. 221). Again, it is 
emphasised that a critical aspect of experts’ working memory is not the amount of 
information stored, but rather how the information is stored and indexed in LTM. 
Bruner (1977, p. 24) highlighted, that human memory research supports that unless 
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detail is placed into a structured pattern, it is rapidly forgotten…detailed material is 
conserved in memory by the use of simplified ways of representing it, and such 
simplified representations have what is called a regenerative character.  
Emphasizing the importance of this theoretical foundation to expertise and domain 
professionalism, Smith (2002, p. 21) explains that the network of relations among 
concepts in LTM constitutes the substantive or subject matter structure of a particular 
domain. A view supported in the underlying premises within Bloom’s Taxonomy of 
Educational Objectives which acknowledged that experts and novices differ not only in 
the amount of knowledge they possess, but also in the organisation and accessibility of 
that knowledge. Such differences in knowledge structures are premised to be based 
around four principles: 
1. The knowledge of novices is structured around the main phenomenon in a 
domain, while that of experts represents phenomena in relation to higher order 
principles; 
2. For the expert, these principles are represented in the form of problem-solving 
procedures as well as in the form of declarative knowledge; 
3. Moreover, such procedural representations include specifications of the 
conditions under which principles are applicable. Thus, the principles are connected 
with the phenomena to which they can be applied and even the concrete components of 
the phenomena; and 
4. Experts’ knowledge structure, in contrast to those of novices, also includes 
understandings of the goals and structures of the domain (Anderson & Sosniak, 1994, p. 
61). 
Thus, accordant with the writings of Smith (2002, p. 21) and Brooks (2007, p. 1) 
security experts as individuals personally hold a rich knowledge structure in their LT-
WM. Congruent with such a view, the earlier work of Cogan (1955, p. 110) highlighted 
that professionalism can exist in a group phenomenon or it may be achieved 
individually. Then the writings of Ritzer 1973 (cited in Freidson, 1973, p. 60) further 
express that the “culture and technique, the etiquette and skill of a profession, appear in 
the individual as personal traits, where all occupations may be placed on a continuum 
ranging from non-professions at one end to the established professions at the other end” 
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(Figure 2.4). Once you pinpoint the position of an occupation on this continuum, the 
question that remains is the degree of professionalism of the individuals within.  For 
example, medicine falls on the professional end of the continuum, but individually 
doctors can vary in their degree of professionalism.  
Figure 2.4 Dimensions of professionalism 
 
Such a notion applies at the nonprofessional end of this continuum, whereby the 
occupational category of taxi driver is not regarded as a profession. However, some 
individual taxi drivers may be regarded as professional because of their knowledge of 
cars and the city (cognitive attributes), or their commitment to helping people 
(normative attributes). Thus, the individual in a professional occupation may be 
considered non-professional at the individual level if they do not have the intelligence to 
understand the theory that underlies their occupation. There is a relationship between 
occupational and individual professionalism (Figure 2.4), but the relationship is not 
perfect (Freidson (1973, pp. 60-61). Applying such literature to the security domain, it 
can be claimed that individually security experts can be professional. However, as a 
group they lack public acknowledgement as professionals. It is within this contention 
that Brooks postulates that such individual’s professional knowledge can be captured 
(2007, p. 1); where professionalisation has been the main way of institutionalising such 
expertise and attitudes towards establishing a profession (Abbott, 1988, p. 323), 
achieving formal codification.  
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2.7 Professionalisation 
Eraut (1994, p. 1) argued that the concept of professionalism lies in the social control of 
expertise, where according to Abbott (1988, p. 323) the concept of professionalism has 
been the salient means of institutionalising individual expertise in industrial countries. 
Thus, many proponents of professionalism view knowledge-based expertise as a prime 
source of professional power and influence (Eraut, 1994, p. 2), and therefore prestige 
(evaluative). From this ideological standpoint, professionalisation is the process or path 
to professionalism (Larson, 1977, p. xvi) that produces an occupational group of 
focused abstract skill sets, stemming from systematic knowledge where its capture 
requires extensive training (Abbott, 1988, p. 7).  
The writings of Bruner (1977, p. 17) recognised and separated two prominent means in 
which learning serves its future employment to produce work outcomes. First is the 
specific applicability to tasks that are highly similar to those in which original learning 
was geared to perform, referred to as specific transfer or training. The second way in 
which earlier learning renders later efficient occupational performance is through 
nonspecific transfer (learning abstractions), or more accurately, the transfer of principles 
and attitudes. In essence such learning consists of initially learning a general idea, 
which can then be used as a basis for recognising subsequent problems as special cases 
of the idea originally mastered. This type of transfer is at the heart of the higher 
educational process, as opposed to training. That is the continual broadening and 
deepening of knowledge in terms of basic ideas, this type of learning is what underpins 
the professional (Abbott, 1988, p. 7). 
In 1964 Wilensky’s persuasive work (1964, p. 137) recognised that many occupations 
pursue professional status. It is within this societal context where the current discourse 
towards defining the concept of the security professional and identifying their core 
professional competencies lies in the view that professions dominate contemporary 
society. Professions heal our bodies, measure our profits and save our souls (Abbott, 
1988, p. 1), and now they manage our security risks (Australian Interim Security 
Professionals Task Force, 2008). Together they make up an interdependent system 
where each profession has its activities under various forms of jurisdictional work 
boundaries (Abbott, 1988, p. 2).  
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Accordant with cognitive dimensions of professional competence, early works 
established and accepted that professions were organised bodies of occupational 
workers. These workers applied esoteric knowledge in the form of expertise to 
particular activities to produce professional work. They had elaborate systems of 
instruction and training, together with entry by examination and other formal 
requirements (Abbott, 1988, p. 4). Emerging from this basis, now a profession is seen as 
an occupational group or the body of people in such an occupation (Abbott, 1988, p. 7; 
Collins Dictionary, 1981, p. 1029), with some special skill, one of abstract nature (non-
specific transfer) requiring extensive training that is refined through practice (Abbott, 
1988, p. 7).  
Wilensky (1964, p. 142) noted that while many occupations assert a claim for 
professional status, they find their claims not honoured by the greater community. 
Freidson (1970, pp. 3-4) acknowledged this phenomena highlighting that virtually all 
self-conscious occupational groups apply it (profession) to themselves at some time or 
another, either to flatter themselves or to try to persuade others of their importance; but 
they are not recognised professions. Abbott’s writings (1988, p. 70) considered this 
responsive to the theme that self-labelling occupational groups do not define 
professions; the public and legal arenas, through supported explicit jurisdictional claim, 
define them. Therefore, professions are a social designation and have no real standing as 
long as they are implicit or self-professed. This very viewpoint was acknowledged for 
the security domain in the writings of Axt (2002). Congruent with this line of thinking 
Wilensky’s (1964, p. 145) work voiced that the lay public cannot accept the need for 
special competence in an area where everyone is an expert. In this sense, Abbott (1988, 
p. 7) insists that professional knowledge is not occupational knowledge applied in a 
purely routine fashion (specific transfer), but rather knowledge that requires revised 
application, case-by-case (non-specific transfer) over time. Furthermore, of significant 
importance in the professions is the concept of jurisdictional control to maintain 
professional standing.  
The literature on professionalism highlights that a profession must control its technique 
or its abstract knowledge system, where here practical skills grow out of this cognitive 
abstraction (transference of principles), to maintain its jurisdictional authority. Barnett 
(1994, pp. 34-35) embraces Abbott’s (1988, p. 7) views, declaring, “professionals are 
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academically qualified people in control of a body of knowledge that is denied to their 
client and secure remuneration for services rendered to said clients” (Barnett, 1994, p. 
34). Furthermore, it is emphasised within the Collins Dictionary (1981, p. 1029) with 
great skill or competence, and the furtherance of the profession. According to Larson 
(1977), Tawney stated: 
Professionals may, as in the case of the successful doctor, grow rich; but 
the meaning of their profession, both for themselves and for the public, is 
not that they make money, but they make health, or safety, or knowledge, or 
good government, or good law…Professionals uphold as the criterion of 
success the end for which the profession, whatever it may be, is carried on, 
and subordinate the inclination, appetites, and ambition of individuals to 
the rules of an organization which has its object to promote the performance 
of function. (Tawney cited in Larson, 1977, p. 58)  
The work of Marutello (1981, pp. 248-249) also reflected such a view, stating “the 
primary intrinsic or compelling aspects of an enterprise that make it eventually and 
ultimately evolve into a profession include the three elements of Cruciality, Mystique, 
and Denouement”. Here cruciality means that the occupation in question has an almost 
life-or-death fateful relationship to its clientele, the public or employers. Crucial matters 
are those that are defined by an individual as deadly serious. Mystique arises out of 
cruciality, where the person with the crucial problem seeks help from somebody 
believed to have a great deal more knowledge than the lay person to solve it. This 
someone is seen to be in possession of technical skills, expertise or having specialized 
advanced training, underpinned by a body of knowledge not available to the person 
seeking resolution. Denouement is the resolution of the critical matter and involves the 
application of the implicit concepts of the previous two elements and becomes the basis 
for the complete sematic definition of a profession. For instance, Marutello (1981) 
states:  
An individual engages in a profession when there is the application of a 
body of knowledge or principles seemingly available only to the select 
(Mystique). Which has been ‘scientifically’ or practically proven to be 
applicable to special contexts to bring about certain defined and largely 
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predictable or hoped for outcomes over a relatively short period of time 
(Denouement) about very vital matters for particular individuals 
(Cruciality). ( Marutello, 1981, p. 249).  
Fitting with such analyses, security as a concept has been well established as a vital 
human need (Section 2.1) (Cruciality), where security’s means of reducing threat related 
risks is broad and complex (mystique) and so its embodiment professionally can 
arguably be allied with Marutello’s (1981, pp. 248-249) discourse. For instance, through 
Table 2.1, Marutello’s defining elements of professions are aligned with the traditional 
professions of medicine and law adding the emerging profession of security in the non-
traditional sense. 
Table 2.1 Elements defining three professions (adapted from Marutello, 1981, p. 250)  
Profession Mystique Cruciality Denouement 
Medicine Body of medical 
knowledge accessible 
only to the select 
People are sick and want 
to be cured 
Application of 
mysterious principles to 
very concerned sick 
individuals with the high 
predictability of bringing 
about a resolution over 
the short term 
Law Body of legal knowledge 
accessible only to the 
select 
People are in big trouble 
and want to get out of it 
Application of 
mysterious principles to 
very troubled individuals 
and (largely) predictably 
bringing about a 
resolution over the short 
term 
Security Body of security 
knowledge accessible 
only to the select 
People or assets of value 
are in danger and 
protection from threat is 
sought 
Application of 
mysterious principles to 
very concerned 
individuals, groups or 
organisation to ensure 
their survival or quality 
of life 
 
In this sense, congruent with the writings of Wilensky (1964, p. 138), Barnett (1994, p. 
35) expressed the existence of a professional client relationship embedded in trust where 
their client expects the solicited professional to exploit his or her specialised knowledge 
in somewhat predictable fulfilment of their interests (Table 2.1). For this reason, 
professionalism places central emphasis towards a distinct, formal body of knowledge 
that aims to achieve predictable outcomes. As such, according to Eraut (1994, pp. 1-3) 
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some occupations, including teachers and social workers, which have had a long history 
of professionalisation, have been constrained in their professional progress, status and 
salaries, partly because they have not been able to explicitly articulate their distinct 
knowledge base, or control entry.  
These writings highlight that professionals’ concerns are towards the pragmatic 
usefulness of their jurisdictional knowledge (Table 2.1) (Eraut, 1994, p. 3) to produce 
professional work. Such usefulness includes both academic and practical aspects 
(Griffiths, Brooks & Corkill, 2011, p. 35). A profession’s academic basis therefore 
defines its jurisdictional practice (Martin & Guerin, 2005, p. 16; Morris, et al, 2006, p. 
710; Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 16), reiterating an academic versus practical dichotomy 
to professionalism. This dichotomy of professionalism further informs the concept of 
the security professional, as this very dichotomy led Fox (1994) to emphasize the 
requirement to separate the science or learning of a discipline with the profession of a 
discipline.  
In his review of the psychology profession, Fox (1994, p. 202) viewed the profession of 
psychology as being concerned with human problems arising from or associated with 
purposive behaviour that is understandable or potentially understandable through 
scientific knowledge in psychology. Yet, the science of psychology is concerned with 
understanding the behaviour of human beings…“where, professional psychologists are 
considered to be persons who have extensive expertise in the development and 
application of service to the public based upon domain relevant scientific knowledge of 
human beings” (p. 202).  
Fox’s (1994) analysis is more recently emphasized in the legal expert literature of 
Freckelton and Selby (2013). Congruent with the educational insights of Barnett (1994, 
pp. 34-35) and Abbott (1988, p. 7) for professionals, Freckelton and Selby (2013, p. 
1051) consider that science-based domain experts must have the qualifications, 
experience, and training that form the basis of their claimed expertise. For example, in 
contemporary times Freckelton and Selby (2013, p. 1051) state that within the expert 
domain of fire investigations, an area previously dominated by those who learned ‘on 
the job’, is now in a position where “unqualified experts are becoming less acceptable 
and less common”. From their legal standpoint Freckelton and Selby (2013, p. 1052) 
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assert that in the interest of scientific accuracy, credibility and justice it is reasonable to 
expect an expert to have completed the relevant academic study accordant with the 
science that underpins their domain.  
Furthermore, accentuating Abbott’s (1988, p. 7) and Barnett’s’ (1994, p. 34) analyses 
that professionals are academically qualified people, Freckelton and Selby (2013, p. 
1052) deem it a necessity to achieve the relevant undergraduate qualifications as now 
many post graduate programs afford for prior learning to fast-track students into tertiary 
courses. This means it is possible to obtain a post-graduate qualification without being a 
graduate, or a higher degree without first obtaining a lower degree. This can cause 
problems as the underpinning sciences are not acquired through practical experience. 
Although the dichotomy emphasises experience conversely cannot be acquired through 
academic knowledge (Freckelton & Selby, 2013, p. 1052). In bridging the literature 
together, Fox (1994, p. 202), states that “as a minimum professionals apply validated 
techniques where a profession is defined according to its verified knowledge base of the 
science or learning on which it is founded.”. 
The reviewed literature of Bowen, 1955; Cogan, 1955; Wilensky, 1964; Mosher, 1968; 
Gillespie, 1981; Kline, 1981; Marutello, 1981; Olufs, 1985; Barnett, 1994; Eraut, 1994; 
Abbott, 1988; Wilson & Oyola-Yemaiel, 2001; Borodzicz & Gibson, 2006, and the 
Australian Interim Security Professionals Task Force, 2008) highlighted that to date 
definitional and jurisdictional ambiguity shrouds the concept of the contemporary 
security professional. Nevertheless, there are specifically accepted core criteria that 
define a professional including: 
1. A body of knowledge or techniques; 
2. Formal; standardized education; training and experience; 
3. A representative organisation with the purpose of professionalisation; 
4. Fees based on service to clients or customers with priority given to service rather 
than financial returns; and 
5. An ethical code of conduct and broad-based responsibility. 
Reflecting on the reviewed discourse objectively, security does not stand up as a 
profession in the traditional sense as few outside the domain recognise its professional 
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stream.  As Criscuoli (1988, p. 102) notes, the general public does not perceive security 
as a profession. Petersen (2014, p. 80) clarifies this position well, stating traditionally 
common education is the seed to a profession whereas security in contrast draws its 
coherence not through such codified body of knowledge but through an informal 
community of practice. However, its professionalisation process is directly allied to 
common educational backgrounds and certification programs. Nonetheless, The 
Australian Interim Security Professionals Task Force (2008) designated security 
professionals as those groups of people working at the senior end of the operational 
sector and in the strategic sector of the Security Industry. However, this is a broad 
statement, lacking deeper qualification and arguably broader public acceptance. 
Especially in light of the view that security education is often too broad and too 
shallow, perhaps due to a lack of clear jurisdictional boundary and supporting structure.  
Therefore, accordant with the reviewed literature the study must reflect that a 
professional, as a minimum, is somebody who is academically qualified and specially 
trained, in a formal manner, in the liberal arts or sciences of which their jurisdictional 
domain is fashioned. This learning forms a substantive field of knowledge in which they 
are in command of, and apply validated techniques to solve society’s security related 
problems (Wilensky, 1964; Abbott, 1988; Barnett, 1994; Eraut, 1994; Fox, 1994; 
Freckelton & Selby, 2013). Professionalisation is the process an occupational group 
goes through to establish their group status as professionals accordant with the verified 
bases of their learning.  
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the foundational literature supporting the study. The chapter 
commenced with a philosophical yet functional discussion of the term security (2.2), 
which underpins security professionalism. Then, Section 2.3 conceptualized what a 
professional is, supported by cognitive dimensions of professional knowledge (2.4) and 
individual professional expertise (2.5), which was supported by knowledge-based views 
of domain expertise acquisition in Section 2.6. This literature was clarified through a 
discussion of the professionalisation process in Section 2.7. These discussions 
supported the view that security is a vital and legitimate construct (cruciality) for a free 
and civil society.  
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The chapter highlighted that professions and professionals apply validated techniques 
according to its verified knowledge base of the science or some complex department of 
learning on which it is founded (see Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6). Such experts in a field 
are argued have an implicit knowledge base that can be captured, codified and 
integrated to achieve a body of knowledge as a formal knowledge system.  
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Chapter 3: Jurisdictional boundary and education literature informing 
the study 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the occupation-jurisdictional and educational literature informing 
the development of a cultural body of knowledge for physical security professionals. 
Section 3.2 positions the physical security professional within the profession’s 
literature, where Section 3.3 establishes a clear jurisdictional boundary for the study. 
Section 3.3 discusses defining a professional person accordant with his or her body of 
knowledge, where section 3.5 presents professional status within the security domain. 
Section 3.6 discusses the ambiguity of security education in relation to this literature. 
Section 3.7 discusses the concept of a higher education curriculum for security 
professionals, whereas Section 3.8 presents the curriculum and the typologies as a 
vehicle for the broader recognition of security science.  
The chapter also explains the current debate of higher education’s roles for security 
professionals in Section 3.9, posing the question: does security possess a formal body of 
knowledge? Section 3.10 of the chapter presents the literature supporting focused 
research undertakings as a means of formally codifying occupational bodies of 
knowledge. This literature is fused together in Section 3.11 through a reflection, 
articulating how the reviewed literature influences the study’s enquiry boundary, 
research objectives and questions, and its methodological approach. The chapter 
concludes with Section 3.12.  
3.2 Conceptualising the physical security professional 
The concept of security is asserted to be a theory of both survival and conditions of 
human and entity existence (Section 2.1) that is multidimensional and ubiquitous in 
nature. Because security is so multidimensional there is no single methodology to be 
applied in its pursuit. The writings of Gillespie (1981, p. 19) highlight that for such 
umbrella or taxonomic domains it is a technical misnomer to call them professions, as 
they are actually a set of professions. Within such umbrella-like domains (sets), there 
are usually smaller sections designed to relate more specifically to the differentiated 
needs of the broader membership (Gillespie, 1981, p. 19). Thus, based on the reviewed 
literature the study contends that the methods for achieving security must stem from the 
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knowledge that underpins professional sets (practice areas) within, and across the 
broader domain (euphemistic categories) of security. Where congruent with Manunta’s 
(1997, p. 19) views in its operational sense, security includes the functions and activities 
aimed at preventing unacceptable losses and damages to those tangible and intangible 
assets considered worthy of protection.  
In this sense, Manunta (1997, p. 1) expressed a long held acceptance that, congruous 
with other professional domains (Section 2.2.2), security is an organised complex of 
specialised functions, which embodies well-identified principles, means and methods 
whose validity and consistency derive from millennia of experience and sound 
methodology. While such literature identifies a historical yet somewhat implicit or 
fractured explicit nature to security, it is accepted that professions do develop abstract, 
formal knowledge systems (explicit standing) from their first origins (Abbott, 1988, p. 
57). Footing the concept of the security professional is the works of both Jaques (1989. 
P. 34) and Fox (1994, p. 203) which highlighted that in contrast to the implicit aspects 
of security’s domain knowledge, professions are based on explicit knowledge, that 
which can be articulated. This is saliently important in the process of 
professionalisation, as professional education seeks out standardized educational criteria 
relating to such knowledge articulation. Such a requirement is because both the 
professions and their students need to be certain that they will learn the knowledge 
required to practice (Fox, 1994).  
Much of the non-traditional societal security paradigm understandably sits within the 
criminological stream (Figure 2.2, Section 2.2), as criminals commit crimes against the 
state, persons, property, information and business reputations with the intent to gain 
advantage, do harm, or both (The American Architects Institute, 2004, p. 24). Smith and 
Brooks (2013, p. 2) consider that the best means to understand this paradigm is through 
the articulation of context or practice areas, highlighted through their applied domains 
(Table 3.1) (p. 17). Such domains arguably sit within the vast thematic or euphemistic 
categories of non-traditional security (Section 2.2.1).  
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Table 3.1 Hierarchical security domain subject categories of Brooks (2007) 
Security domain subject category descriptors 
Criminology Business Continuity 
Management (BCM) 
Fire science 
Facility management Industrial security Information & Computer 
Investigations Physical security Security principles 
Risk management Safety  Security law 
Security management Security technology  
However, within the security domain there still lacks consensus of what constitutes the 
practice areas or contexts of security. For example, in contrast to Brooks’ (2007) 
security domain subject categories (Table 3.1), ASIS International (2009, p. 16) offer 
their organisational version (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.2 ASIS International Symposium Security Model (2009) 
Physical Security Investigations Legal aspects 
Crisis management Competitive intelligence Crime prevention 
Personnel security Loss prevention Emergence/continuity 
planning 
Disaster management Executive protection CPTED 
Information security systems Risk management Fire protection 
Counterterrorism Violence in the workplace Security architecture and 
Engineering 
Nonetheless, both tables offer what can be considered knowledge categories and 
practice principles or areas inclusively, but without more focused depth or structure. 
This perhaps may be due to limited research and development into the structures of the 
greater discipline (see Smith & Brooks, 2013). In contrast again, Talbot and Jakeman 
(2009, p. 55) within their security risk management body of knowledge (SRMBOK) 
present five salient, overarching yet overlapping professional sets, or practice areas (see 
Figure 3.1) for contemporary security professionals. These are argued to sit across all of 
the non-traditional thematic categories of security. According to Talbot and Jakeman 
(2009, p. 55), the knowledge areas of security in this domain stream are to be centred on 
physical security, people security, the security of information communication systems 
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(ICT) and information security, layered over by the thematic category of security 
management (Figure 3.1) as another focussed domain area.  
Accordant with Section 2.2, the combined literature introduces specific jurisdictional 
practice domains (Abbott, 1988, p. 2) for security and their potential knowledge content 
categories in relation to stored and indexed propositional knowledge (Sections 2.4 and 
2.5). These practice domains and their underpinning propositional knowledge sit within 
and across thematic or euphemistic categories of security for those persons identified by 
the Australian Interim Security Professional’s Task Force (2008, p. 6) as working at the 
senior end of the operational sector and in the strategic sector of the security industry.  
Figure 3.1 Interrelationships of security practice areas (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, p. 55)  
 
While disparity reigns across the security discourse, in terms of knowledge area 
consensus, many authors offer a separated core jurisdictional field labelled Physical 
Security (Brooks, 2007, p. 5; Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, p. 55; ASIS, 2009, p. 3). 
Physical is defined as (1) relating to the body, as distinguished from the mind or spirit, 
(2) resembling material things or nature: the physical universe, (3) of or concerned with 
mater and energy, (4) of or relating to physics (Collins Dictionary, p. 972). 
Accordingly, the professional field or practice area of physical security is demarcated 
by ASIS International (2009, p. 3), Roper (1997, p. 1), Fennelly (2003, p. 101), Talbot 
and Jakeman (2009, p. 55) (Table 6), Baker and Benny (2013, p. 1) and Smith and 
Brooks (2013, p. 105) as that part of a security program concerned with physical control 
P a g e  | 79 
 
measures designed to safeguard people, prevent unauthorised access to equipment, 
facilities, materials, documents, and to safeguard them against a security incident. 
Physical security measures include a device, system or practice of a tangible nature 
(Table 3.3) designed to protect people and prevent damage to, loss of, or unauthorised 
access to assets (2009, p. 3) utilizing a systematic approach (Garcia, 2006; 2008; Smith 
& Brooks, 2013).  
Table 3.3 Talbot and Jakeman’s security practice areas (2009) 
Area Description Activities Practitioners 
Physical Protection of physical 
assets as well as physical 
security measures 
designed to protect 
intangible assets or 
capabilities 
Crime prevention through 
environmental design. 
Design and 
implementation of 
procedures and physical 
controls for protection of 
facilities, property, 
capabilities and physical 
aspects of ICT systems 
Physical security advisers 
and consultants 
Guards, locksmiths, alarm 
and Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) 
installers and so on 
Accordant with the study’s denotation of security, physical security includes all those 
elements across the natural and built environment that are designed to reduce risk by 
controlling and managing geographical or spatial movement (Parker, 2007, p. 233). It is 
accepted that the best way to protect an asset is to control access to it (Coole, Corkill & 
Woodward, 2012, p. 28), or increase access difficulty (Kiszelewska & Coole, 2013, p. 
28). In this context, The American Institute for Architects (2001, p. 6) emphasise that 
the major components of physical security employed in the built environment are access 
control, surveillance and response measures. Access controls aim to prevent 
unauthorised entry, and regulate authorised entry, into environments against those 
actions seeking to carry out hostile or illegal acts.  Surveillance includes those measures 
to monitor and detect conditions that are, or potentially hazardous to people, 
information or property. The response component includes operational actions and 
procedures to intervene or neutralize a threat, or rescuing a victim, representing security 
algebraically as: 
Security=Access Control+Surveillance+Response 
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In addition, The American Institute for Architects (2001) also consider that security 
should be driven by the threat, recognising that in contemporary times security, based 
on threat, may have to embrace enhanced strategies. These include mitigating against 
the effects of bomb blast threats (Building Hardening), or protection against 
biochemical threat concerns. In these circumstances an enhanced model of security is 
required, represented algebraically as:  
Enhanced Security= 
Access Control+ 
Surveillance+ 
Response+ 
Building Hardening+ 
Biochemical Protection 
Such literature highlights that security is driven by a desire (philosophy) to protect 
against a threat, illuminated through risk messages and articulated through policy 
(cruciality). A physical security policy aims to direct environmental control or influence 
over an area. This aim is achieved through the process of using layers of physical 
manipulation measures, to mitigate against unauthorised access threats, or 
environmental design facets to reduce criminal opportunity within a location (Table 3.3) 
(Fennelly, 2003, p. 101).  
Physical security layering defines the defensive elements of a facility in the three 
primary elements. These elements include the site and perimeter, the building envelope 
and the building interior, resulting in concentric defensive rings and zones (The 
American Institute of Architects, 2004, p. 44). These combine to prevent an 
unauthorised level of access to protected assets or inhibit opportunity through their 
material strength (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 105), design facets and practices to resist 
deviance. Such an approach is captured in Clarke’s Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) 
framework (The American Institute of Architects, 2004, p. 45; Lab, 2013, pp. 216-219), 
which according to Kiszelewska and Coole, (2013, p. 28) provides a physical security 
rubric to reduce threat through increasing the difficulty, increasing surveillance and 
reducing the rewards. This approach is made possible through the integration of people, 
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procedures and equipment (Garcia, 2001; 2008, p. 1; Smith & Brooks, 2013, pp. 24-28). 
This field was also articulated as an essential sub-category within the embodiment of 
human security (Nef, 1999, p. 25) towards maintaining survival and the protection from 
sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life (Nef, 1999, p. 25; Roland, 
2001, p. 89). 
In considering the achievement of environmental control, a common or core theme that 
cuts across all domain categories of security is the concept of systems thinking. 
Therefore, salient within the physical security literature and of significance for defining 
a body of knowledge in this domain stream is the concept of systems thinking. As 
Underwood (1984, p. x) expressed, security should be designed, implemented and 
managed as a system. According to O’Shea and Awwad-Rafferty (2009, p. 14) such 
thinking is what affords an integrative, interdisciplinary, holistic perspective that builds 
parallel, complementary and interdependent aspects relative to security and the built 
environment. It is voiced in the writings of O’Shea and Awwad-Rafferty (2009, p. 14) 
that such an approach sees problems, including security problems, as part of an overall 
system.  
Within the security literature, Garcia (2001, p. 6) defined a system as an integrated 
collection of components or elements designed to achieve an objective according to 
plan. Where the plan for physical security is to interrupt or where necessary neutralize a 
malevolent adversary before they achieve their goal (Garcia, 2001; 2006; 2008). Thus 
physical security protects life, interests and property, which contribute to both survival 
and maintaining conditions of human existence across a vast array of protective 
contexts. As such, it is well acknowledged that this form of systematic security is 
considered to be the most fundamental aspect of any security program, which the 
reviewed literature highlights, transcends all security contexts, as Norman (2012, p. 94) 
states “all security begins with physical security”.  
Accordant with the earlier writings of Schnabolk (1983, p. 2), Manunta (1997, p. 21) 
reveals that functionally, evidence of physical mechanisms to control the environment 
such as physical access accompanies nearly every archaeological discovery. Locks, 
strong rooms, physical barriers and shields were known and used from the very 
beginning of civilisation. For instance, Schnabolk (1983, p. 228) points out that the first 
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recorded use of a lock that could be opened from the outside was in Egypt. Excavations 
of Egyptian tombs have disclosed locks that utilized an enormous key to move the 
locking device from side-to-side. In addition, walls, fences, and revetments of various 
kinds have long served as the first line of defence for specific sites. For example, the 
walls of ancient cities such as Troy, Jerusalem, and Jericho highlight how civilised 
worlds drew on physical modifications and barriers for protection against man (The 
American Institute of Architects, 2004, p. 4). Thus accordant with the study’s narrative 
of security (Section 2.2.1) this accentuates the evolutionary processes within the domain 
category of physical security.  
From its ancient origins (See Chapter 2) so embedded into contemporary life is physical 
security that regardless of security’s diversity, Fennelly (2003, p. 101) and Norman 
(2012, p. 94), convey that all other security processes are integrated with physical 
measures to develop a contextual protection posture. Such depictions in principle 
support Talbot and Jakeman’s (2009, p. 55) overlapping pose, and lead to the premise 
that physical security is not a euphemistic category, because it is a fundamental facet 
across all security contexts. Therefore as Schnabolk (p. 103), Fennelly (2003, p. 101), 
Brooks (2007), Talbot and Jakeman (2009, p. 55) Smith and Brooks (2013, p. 105) 
allude to (Tables, 3.1, 3.1, 3.3, Figure 3.1), physical security must be a salient 
jurisdictional knowledge category within the broader non-traditional professional 
domain of security. This articulation is represented indicatively through Figure 3.3, 
congruent with the writings of Wilson and Oyola-Yemaiel (2001, pp. 122-123) and 
Norman (2012, p. 364).  As Norman clearly states, “there are different bodies of 
knowledge required for security system design, installation and maintenance. The skills 
necessary to be a great designer are different than the skills necessary to be a great 
installer, and that good designers, design to risk” (p. 364).  
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Figure 3.2 Indicative security domain taxonomy 
 
Wilson and Oyola-Yemaiel (2001, pp. 122-123) explain that professions are 
occupations that have been able to establish specific jurisdiction over certain kinds of 
services. In reference to Figure 3.3, the concept of the physical security professional 
must be someone who sits overhead (vertical) of the trained occupational categories 
within the physical security set (Figure 1.1, Section 1.4). Supporting the premise that 
security professionals are bounded within jurisdictional foci accordant with other 
professions is the proposition put forward by Bloom. Bloom considered that expert 
versus novice research supports the premise that knowledge structures which make up 
proficiency in a given intellectual domain are distinctive to that domain (Anderson & 
Sosniak, 1994, p. 61). It is within this literature base that the assertion can be built that 
the jurisdictional depth and breadth of physical security as a professional domain 
category is not explicitly stated. That is, there is little consensus as to what constitutes 
the professional domain of physical security in terms of its knowledge content, structure 
and jurisdictional boundary for the modern day security professional rather than its 
allied practitioners (See Table 1.2, Section 1.3).  
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Such a poor state of articulation is disparate to Fox’s (1994, p. 203) views, that 
educational criteria needs to be somewhat standardised. This means the knowledge and 
skills that individual physical security centred professionals require to perform their 
professional task of protecting their client’s assets against incursions manifested 
through unauthorised access or crime facilitators is poorly defined. That is, it is not 
clear what a physical security professional is, or their knowledge and skills sets’ 
required and its organisational structure to practice compared to that of other security 
professionals. For example, security managers accordant with boundary overlap, or 
allied practitioners such as technology installers or locksmiths (Table 1.2, Section 1.3 
and Figures 1.1 and 3.3). 
3.3 Professionals and the notion of jurisdictional boundary 
The literature on professions highlights that the demarcation and distinction or 
jurisdictional boundaries in professional practice are of significant importance for 
professional standing and therefore for this study. Within this literature, Abbott (1988, 
p. 56) conveyed that “most importantly, any effective abstract system must explicitly 
define the borders of professional practice with utmost clarity”. For this study, such 
demarcations or distinctions are specifically important between the often confused and 
overlapping knowledge categories or practice areas of Physical Security and Security 
Management (Figure 3.1).  
Confusion arises, consistent with Norman’s (2012, p. 94) remarks along with Talbot and 
Jakeman’s (2009) views, that security managers, accordant with their own context, 
require knowledge of physical security practices, principles and measures. For instance, 
consistent with the writings of Bertalanffy (1968, p. 139), physical security systems are 
open systems as they attempt to achieve a steady state, but are affected by their internal 
and external environment (Coole, 2010; Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 26) and therefore 
need to be managed as a system (Underwood, 1984, p. x; Coole, 2010, p. 226). Such 
management must be in-line with its original, or reviewed, design parameters (Coole, 
2010, p. 226), or as stated by Underwood (1984, p. 250) be “managed by objectives”. 
Thus, the professional design and management of physical security are often separate 
domain practice areas (See Figure 3.1). 
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Freidson highlighted that embedded in the claim of each profession is a paradigm, a 
taken for granted conception of what the issue is, and how it is solvable, where each 
profession views the world in terms of its own characteristic conception of problems 
and solutions (Freidson, 1973, p. 30). Therefore, a jurisdictional view resonates within 
the professions, where the reviewed literature (Section 2.7) considers, that in managing 
by objectives, Security Management embodies conceptual, administrative management, 
and security risk management arrangements; it is professional administration (Manunta, 
1997, p. 54). In other words, security management can be considered within the systems 
approach of management, which accordant with the writings of Lussier (2009, p. 42), 
sees the organisation as a whole and as the interrelation of its constituent parts which 
are managed through interrelated tasks of planning, organising, staffing, leading, and 
controlling to achieve defined organisational objectives. This is a viewpoint congruent 
with the earlier demarcations established by Talbot and Jakeman (2009) (Figure 3.1; 
Table 3.1).  
Within a jurisdictional purview, security management relates to the management of the 
means implemented to achieve security risk management, including technical, physical 
and procedural aspects, perhaps along with other jurisdictional categories (Figure 5). In 
contrast, physical security’s jurisdictional foci are saliently focused towards establishing 
or implementing the necessary physical control measures (Table 6) to protect assets or 
prevent crime rather than its ongoing organisational management - the foci of security 
management. As pointed out by McNeil (1990, p. 73), definitions of how one discipline 
differs from another provides the organizational structure and indicates the borders of 
enquiry for that discipline. Such demarcation or boundary of professional practice is 
more clearly elucidated through the writings of Abbott (1988).  
In affirming the distinction between physical security and security management, 
Abbott’s (1988, p. 39) writings reveal the existence of several types of objective and 
subjective foundations for professional tasks that facilitate such jurisdictional division. 
According to Abbott some tasks are close together, where objective and subjective 
properties make problems alike, whereas others are further apart due to these very 
properties. Tasks that are objective are based within natural or technical imperatives, 
while those that are subjective are imposed by culture itself (1998, p. 36). In expressing 
that objective qualities lay in natural objects, facts and technological aspects, Abbott 
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(1988, pp. 39-40) offers the example that the body and the universe, water and weather, 
are objective aspects of the work of medicine, astronomy, hydrology and meteorology 
respectively. Whereas a profession’s subjective aspects arise in the current construction 
of the problem by the profession, currently holding the jurisdiction of that task. Here 
Abbott refers to the concept of professional boundary accordant with technical 
knowledge and specific area of foci.  
Abbott (1988, p. 40) conveys that in their cultural aspects, the jurisdictional claims that 
create these subjective or cultural qualities have three parts: claims to classify a 
problem, to reason about it, and to take action on it. Or, in more formal terms, to 
diagnose, to infer, and to treat an identified professional problem. According to Abbott 
(1988, p. 40), theoretically these are the three salient acts of professional jurisdictional 
practice. While professionals often run these modalities together, the sequence of 
diagnosis, inference and treatment embodies the essential cultural logic of professional 
practice. Abbott’s (1988, pp. 36-41) writings highlight three salient sequential aspects 
of professionals’ practice: the diagnosis, inference and treatment of target problems for 
their clients.  
Abbott considers diagnosis as a means to assemble a client’s needs into a picture and 
place this picture in the proper diagnostic category. In the security domain, the 
professional task of diagnosis is considered to be security risk management-an 
underpinning activity for all security practice (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, pp. 134-134). 
Such a task is considered by Abbott as two interrelated processes, colligation (the 
linking of various isolated facts) and classification. Colligation means assembling the 
‘picture’ of the client, consisting largely of rules declaring what kinds of evidence 
(Threat, Vulnerability and Consequences) (The American Institute of Architects, 2004; 
Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, p. 133; Standards Australia, HB167, 2009) are relevant and 
irrelevant, valid and invalid, as well as rules specifying the admissible level of 
ambiguity. Classification means referring the colligated picture to the dictionary of 
professional legitimate problems, ie. ‘what they know’.  
A classification system is a profession’s own mapping of its jurisdiction, an internal 
dictionary embodying the professional dimensions of classification. Colligation is the 
first step in which the professional knowledge system begins to structure the observed 
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problems. Information passing through these rules is then assembled into a picture from 
a professional’s long term working memory  (See Sections, 2.2.3 and 2.3.3) that can 
then be classified (diagnosed). Abbott’s (1988, pp. 41-49) work highlighted that 
information available to diagnose and reason about a problem may be incomplete or 
ambiguous at best. As such, there are likely to be several plausible accounts of the 
problem (colligations).  
Abbott’s (1988, pp. 41-49) views blend with the influential work of Jaques (1989, p. 24) 
who presents the issue of task complexity in professional work. Jaques emphasised two 
salient types of pathways for considering task complexity. Known pathways relate to 
those in which previously learned knowledge exists in available articulated form, and 
can be applied according to known rules, referred as retrieval from LTWM. In contrast, 
uncharted pathways are those in which there are unknown variables operating that 
create problems and call for the continual exercise of discretion, judgement and choice 
making. The art of diagnosis therefore lies in finding the real issue. Therefore, within 
the three aspects of professional practice is the distinction between well-defined, 
medium-defined and ill-defined problems (Eraut, 1994, p. 45).  
According to Eraut (1994, p. 45) for a problem to be well-defined there must be one 
clearly preferable solution and a small change in the problem results in a small change 
in the solution. However, where more than one potentially acceptable solution exists, 
the problem is considered “moderately-defined”. In either of such cases, there is wide 
consensus concerning the range of differential diagnosis and treatments and principles 
underlying their solution. Conversely, with ill-defined problems there may not be an 
ideal solution, or there may be more than one solution where small changes in the 
problem require large changes in the solution. In such an instance, professional problem 
solving strategies are required (Eraut, 1994, p. 45). According to Jaques (1989, p. 34) 
for complex problem solving it is the exercising of judgement and making decisions that 
you pay professionals for.  
Abbott’s (1988, p. 49) work emphasized that a profession’s diagnostic classification 
system is organised as a probabilistic hierarchy from common to esoteric rather than 
from general to specific. In the security context, this is explained as “the security 
assessment process works from the more obvious to the less obvious threats (The 
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American Institute of Architects, 2004, p. 34) and treatments”. In addition, where costs 
of failure are low and the professional is assured of a second chance, the most likely 
treatment is prescribed. This results in a short diagnosis-treatment time structure. But 
where the outcomes are prohibitive (high costs), or there is no second chance, a 
professional must set a strategy for treatment from the outset, through means of 
professional inference. This is undertaken when the connection between diagnosis and 
treatment is obscure, that is, a more ill-defined problem. Abbott (1988, p. 49) states: 
Professional inference can work by exclusion or by construction. For 
example, medicine, when a case is unclear, works by exclusion where 
doctors maintain a general supportive treatment while ruling out areas by 
using special diagnostic procedures, or watching the outcomes of 
‘diagnostic’ treatments provided, beyond general maintenance.  
In contrast, classical military tactics work by construction. Here the tactician 
hypothesizes enemy responses to gambits and considers their impact on his 
further plans. Here a tactician, due to the somewhat limitations in an 
adversary’s responses, constructs a plan allowing as many wining scenarios 
as possible, or those which may not win, but do not lose...where the 
emphasis is on constructing possible battles ahead of time, rather than 
fighting little ones to find out what does not work. (Abbott, 1988, p.49) 
Such an articulation indicates that reasoning by exclusion is a luxury available only to 
those who frequently get a second chance (sometimes not the case in the security 
domain). Thus, Eraut (1994, pp. 48-50) suggests that professional problem solving 
knowledge may get used in four modes. It may be used in a replicative mode, 
characterised by the close similarity between the epistemological context in which the 
knowledge was acquired and rehearsed (specific transfer) and that in which it is used. 
Alternatively it can be used applicatively, in a setting in which circumstances are unique 
or different from that of replicative mode (non-specific). On the other hand, 
interpretative use of knowledge involves the more mysterious quality of professional 
knowledge, and is referred to as ‘professional judgement’ embodying practical wisdom 
and feasibility along with appropriateness (discretion, judgement and choice making).  
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Professional judgement introduces the intuitive, more implicit aspects of knowledge use 
and includes the use of associative knowledge. Associative knowledge draws on 
knowledge presented in images or heuristics to employ knowledge principles (Eraut, 
1994, pp. 48-50) to solve ambiguous professional problems (non-specific transfer). 
Jaques (1989) represents this process through a tripartite cognitive model, which sees 
the outcome of problem solving (reasoning-inference) as an interrelationship between 
the elements of judgement, discretion and decision (Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.3 Cognitive processes trio for professional complex problem solving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbott’s (1988, p. 49), Jaques (1989) and Eraut’s (1994) views are congruent with the 
writings of Clarke (1992, p. 5) and Garcia (2008, p. xvii), and the views of the 
Advancing Security Professionals Congress, which highlighted that one hallmark of 
security professionals is their capacity to break new ground in an informed and 
responsible way (p. 9) (inference). Drawing on the writings of Abbott (1988), Jaques 
(1989), Clarke (1992, p. 5), Eraut (1994) and Garcia (2008), the study is focused 
towards the objective qualities of the physical security domain or practice area (the 
science and learning’s) as they lie in the subjective qualities (cultural jurisdiction) of 
diagnosis, inference and treatment. These combined qualities embody the four problem 
solving modes of replicative, applicative, interpretative and associative principles 
towards physical control concerns. Such concerns incorporate primary and secondary 
crime prevention strategies within the tripartite crime prevention model against a 
constructed or exclusionary threat, thus, the security risk context.  
 
Judgement 
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The tripartite model of crime prevention sees strategies categorised according to their 
intervention focus (Lab, 2013, p. 28). Primary crime prevention focuses on physical and 
procedural measures designed to take effect before a crime occurs or offenders are 
identified, to reduce opportunities for potential offenders to engage in deviant acts. This 
includes neighbourhood watch and the use of private security, along with environmental 
design techniques. Environmental design focuses towards establishing a higher level of 
difficulty to commit a deviant act and may include situational measures such as 
surveillance, lighting and locks, fencing, along with property marking techniques that 
enables a level of control to be exerted over an area. Secondary prevention also focuses 
towards situational and social strategies but is steered towards existing problems, and 
tailors situational and social strategies towards highly specific deviances accordant with 
the crime problem (Lab, 2013, pp. 28-29). Lab (2013, p. 29) explains that the distinction 
between primary and secondary crime prevention lies in the contextual focus at the 
time, as many secondary efforts resemble those of primary prevention. Primary 
prevention aims to prevent the conditions that foster crime from arising (deterrence), 
whereas secondary prevention efforts are focused towards factors that already exist and 
are fostering deviance (treatment).     
O’Shea and Awwad-Rafferty (2009, p. 22) expressed that for the purposes of protective 
design (primary and secondary crime prevention), security is focused towards the 
protection of assets, both physical and psychological from unauthorised access, theft 
and damage. They consider the goal to be the deterrence or the detection and 
apprehension of offenders, focusing towards prevention. The American Architects 
Institute (2004, p. 13) supports this view expressing the general goal of physical 
security is the protection of assets by providing enough time during a security event to 
facilitate a response. Accordingly, the reviewed literature jurisdictionally presents 
physical security as the use of physical and technological measures combined with 
procedural processes (Fennelly, 2003, p. 101) that as integrated systematic components 
provide environmental control or a level of difficulty to overcome for both opportunistic 
and planned adversaries.  
Such measures contribute to securing an environment utilizing technical, physical and 
procedural control variables integrated into a barrier system and defined as a Physical 
Protection System (PPS) (Garcia, 2008, p. 5; Smith & Brooks, 2013). In contrast, while 
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significant overlaps exist culturally (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, p. 55), security 
management relates to the diagnosis, inference and treatment of management concerns 
as they relate to achieving organisational objectives utilizing the security function. 
Security management is saliently focused towards management acts including planning, 
organising, staffing, training, leading and controlling, along with budgeting where 
physical security forms a component of a broader cultural posture.  
The combined literature highlights that for the professional tasks of diagnosis, inference 
and treatment of societal problems, within the domain of physical security, a PPS is 
achieved through layers (O’Shea & Awwad-Rafferty, 2009, p. 247) of technical, 
physical and procedural control measures (Smith & Brooks, 2013) as a treatment 
strategy. These measures are directed at protecting an environment or asset (Corkill & 
Coole, 2013) through deterring, removing opportunity or preventing physical access 
(Fennelly, 2003, p. 101). In addition, where unauthorized access is gained or 
opportunity exploited, physical security facilitates detection, delay and response within 
a defined period of time with resilience against a defined threat actor’s actions (Garcia, 
2008, p. 5; Smith & Brooks, 2013).  
Thus, consistent with the writings of Wolfers (1952), Schnabolk (1983), Abbott (1988), 
Clarke (1992, p. 5), Manunta (1997), O’Shea and Awwad-Rafferty (2009), Talbot and 
Jakeman (2009) and Smith and Brook’s (2013) works, physical security as professional 
jurisdictional foci is directed towards the diagnosis, inference and treatment system of 
security or loss coupled risk concerns manifested through unlawful access or crime 
enablers in the protection of assets. Loss or risk concerns include threats to people, 
information and property, where treatment is synonymous with control and is pursued 
accordant with the economic law of diminishing returns (See Section 2.2.1). A point 
emphasised by the American Institute of Architects (2004, pp. 12-19) text, highlighting 
that as with the earlier writings of Wolfers, a balance between physical security 
measures and budget must be achieved, stating “all security decisions involve long-term 
cost considerations, with respect to operating personnel and systems, as well as 
maintenance and repair”. Such systematic treatment results in a security function as an 
organised complex of specialised technological, physical and procedural elements 
integrated into a protective barrier system.  
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Informing the idea of a professional body of knowledge for physical security 
professionals, the reviewed literature emphasises that physical security should be 
integrated as a system. Such a system achieves a desired level of control within a 
context (Corkill & Coole, 2013, p. 144), based on sound methodology. Congruous with 
the writings of Fox (1994, p. 202), Freckelton and Selby (2013, p. 1051) and Smith and 
Brooks (2013, p. 1) such a systematic approach should comply with well-identified 
theories, principles, means and methods, as a knowledge structure based on the science 
or learning on which they are founded. As such, the jurisdictional framing or boundary 
of enquiry for this study must lie in the cultural demarcation relating to organised, 
stored and indexed declarative-propositional knowledge.  
This knowledge relates to the skills embodied within diagnosis; inference and treatment 
of those physical protection or primary and secondary crime and prevention concerns 
manifested through opportunity, crime facilitators, or unauthorized access of an area or 
space. Whereas a jurisdictional foci, physical security aims to implement control 
measures in a delineated environment to mitigate the risks associated with an expressed 
threat. Such expression is the articulated diagnosis of the problem achieved through 
security risk management.  
3.4 Defining a profession accordant with its body of knowledge  
The reviewed literature highlights that diagnosis inference (reasoning about) and 
treatment are aspects of professional practice accordant with the science or societal 
learning that underpins their jurisdictional application. Such learning exists within the 
four problem solving modes, accordant with their objective and subjective professional 
properties. According to Abbott (1988, p. 52), in most professions these aspects are tied 
directly to a formal system of knowledge that formalizes the skills in which this work 
proceeds. Thus, accordant with the reviewed works of Abbott (1988, pp. 52-54; 
Wilensky, 1964; Eraut, 1994; Griffiths, Brooks & Corkill, 2011; Freckelton & Selby, 
2013) academic knowledge legitimizes professional work. Academic knowledge 
clarifies professional foundations, tracing them to major cultural values, where in most 
modern professions these have been the values of rationality, logic, and science, where 
academic professionals demonstrate this rigour (Abbott, 1988, p. 54).  
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It is emphasised within the reviewed literature that historically medicine has been held 
up as a codified knowledge benchmark by society in formal bodies of knowledge 
discourses (Wilensky, 1964; Abbott, 1988). As with security’s historical roots; the 
practice of medicine existed in early cultures, where the Greeks pursued a distinctly 
natural rather than supernatural approach (Freidson, 1970, p. 13). However, unlike 
security practices, according to Freidson (1970), the Hippocratic physicians accentuated 
an objective approach, systematically codifying knowledge through careful observation 
and description of diseases and their cause, with a view to accurate prognosis and 
ultimately treatment. For example, in Greek and Hellenistic times, formal schools 
participated in describing and classifying disease, organs and biological processes 
(codification), with seven hundred years of medicine, beginning with Hippocratics and 
ending with Galen in which a number of observed recordings were documented that are 
still considered correct in contemporary times. This development included careful 
anatomical descriptions of the eye, the trachea, the duodenum, together with 
descriptions of diabetes, leprosy and tetanus (Freidson, 1970, pp. 13-14), supporting the 
efficacy of meticulous codification in preparation of later transmission.  
Medical knowledge codification was further enhanced in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries through further medical observations and developments. However, the 
development of both physics and chemistry as academic domains made possible a more 
robust systematic foundation for contemporary medicine. Freidson (1970, pp. 14-15) 
contends that without such a foundation medicine as a profession would not be more 
than a variety of traditional conceptions, supplemented by quite variable individual 
clinical judgements, arguably where physical security seats currently. These 
developments were supplemented by technological advances in anaesthesia and parallel 
developments of a sociological foundation to create an occupation well established in 
society; a group “in command of the formal criteria that qualify men to work at healing, 
of exclusive competence to determine the proper content and effective method of 
performing medical work, and freely consulted by those thought to need its help” 
(cruciality) (Freidson, 1970, pp. 16-17).  
Congruous with the writings of Wilensky (1964), Freidson (1970, p.338) states: “we can 
justify removing decisions from the hands of the layman and placing them in the hands 
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of experts when only the experts have the especially reliable knowledge by which to 
make correct decisions in the lay interest (mystique)”.  
Thus, in the medical profession, Freidson (1998, p. 338) considers a professional to be 
an expert because he or she is trusted to possess some special knowledge unavailable to 
the laymen (mystique), who have gone through their special standardised course of 
professional training. In addition, it is recognised that such professional knowledge may 
not be demonstrably and consistently efficacious, but it is the best available to the times, 
and it is taught to all members of the profession in order to prepare them for proper 
performance of their work. The referents of ‘knowledge’ and ‘expertise’ refer to a body 
of assumed facts ordered by some abstract ideas and theories that are applied to a level 
that instils public trust in solicited services. These putative facts are embodied in the 
treatises and textbooks that provide the formal substance of what experts learn in 
professional schools and what they presumably know thereafter. 
The reviewed literature highlights that the academic-abstract knowledge system is 
arguably universally important throughout the professions, where “a profession’s ability 
to sustain its jurisdiction lies partly in the power and prestige (evaluative) of its 
academic knowledge (cognitive)” (Abbott, 1988, pp. 54-55; Martin & Guerin, 2005, p. 
viii). Therefore, the professional seating of the study lies in elucidating a formal system  
of knowledge for physical security professionals, defined as the abstract knowledge 
needed by these practitioners to perform their profession’s work (Martin & Guerin, 
2005, p. viii) and invoke professional trust. Such a resource is considered a 
“professional’s formal knowledge system” (Abbott, 1988, p. 53) which can be 
standardised and taught to all future members regardless of their place or institution of 
education.  
As such, central to the study’s discourse is the argument put forward by various authors 
including Martin and Guerin (2005, p. 16; Abbott, 1988, pp. 54-55; Eraut, 1994, p. 45) 
that a body of knowledge defines a profession’s jurisdictional practice. This view is also 
supported by Morris, Crawford, Hodgson, Shepherd and Thomas (2006, p. 710) who 
assert that ownership of a distinctive body of knowledge is a vitally important element 
of a profession. This very viewpoint is also promoted in the literature of Epstein and 
Hundert (2002, p. 227) who expressed that dimensions of professional competence 
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include a cognitive component-acquiring and using knowledge to solve problems, 
underpinned by other core facets. Gillespie (1981, pp. 17-18) claimed that while it is 
difficult to build systematic bodies of knowledge and theory within cohesive and well-
defined professions, within diffused professions (security) this task is more difficult, but 
nonetheless achievable. 
3.5 Professional status within the security domain 
The emerging theme is that a recognised professional in the societal group phenomenon 
is a person who holds special jurisdictional knowledge based within a systematic 
foundation passed on through formal education, that is taught to all category members. 
The reviewed literature therefore leads to the assertion that the security profession as a 
broader domain reflects a more taxonomy of occupations of specialized jurisdictional 
foci supported by declarative-propositional knowledge both as generalized and context 
specific. This literature highlights that if security, and more specifically physical 
security, is to achieve recognised professional status (profession) there exists a crucial 
need to explore and establish its jurisdictional academic knowledge content, structure, 
skills base and ultimately educational requisites. Such an investigation will inaugurate 
external credibility for the domain and its educational necessity. Such an explicit view 
has been emphasised by varied writers within the security domain including Tynjala 
(1999), Garcia (2000) and Smith and Brooks (2013).  
For instance, Tynjala (1999, p. 373) conveyed that more transferable knowledge needs 
to be produced for security practitioners using instructional methods that support 
understanding, emphasise application, and integrate theoretical and practical 
knowledge. Accordingly, Garcia asserts that as with disciplines such as medicine and 
psychology, practices within the security industry should be driven by research and 
validated results (2000, p. 80), which arguably can only be achieved through formal 
knowledge codification. Therefore, accordant with the writings of Wilensky (1964), 
Abbott (1988), Eraut (1994), Garcia (2000) and Smith and Brooks (2013) for security 
practitioners at the senior end of the operational sector and within the strategic sector 
(See Advancing Security Professionals Task Force, 2008, p. 4) to be viewed as 
professionals in the group phenomenon it is essential that accordant with a scientific or 
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constructed model basis for the profession, higher education needs to formally identify 
their core knowledge base.  
Furthermore, adequate representation of the domain’s knowledge content is essential for 
developing a validated curriculum and assessing professional proficiency to gain public 
support, trust and ultimately professional status. Here the writings of Bruner (1977, p. 2) 
highlight that adequate representation not only includes content but also structure and 
connections, congruous with the premises underpinning cognitive constructivism 
(Section 1. 6). For example, according to Bruner (1977, p. 8) scientists constructing 
curricula for physics and mathematics have been highly mindful of, and that their early 
gained success has been due to, the emphasis of teaching knowledge structure. 
Therefore, the driver to establish academia as the vehicle for steering recognition of the 
security professional, and specifically a physical security professional, is supported by 
the idea that the university is the focal point of professionalism (Gillespie, 1981, p. 
371).  
Higher education institutions are based on maps of propositional (factual) knowledge 
that they use for the construction of a syllabus (Eraut, 1994, p. 103). For example, the 
observed differences between experts and novices suggest that student proficiency can 
best be increased by instruction that facilitates the construction of knowledge bases that 
are comprehensive, structured in terms of higher-order principles and inclusive of 
problem-solving procedures. These knowledge bases can be supported by cognitive 
structures such as heuristics along with specifications of the conditions of their 
applicability, and framed by appreciation of the distinctive goals of the domain 
(Anderson & Sosniak, 1994, p. 61). The term heuristic is of Greek origin, and means, 
serving to find out or discover (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 454). Heuristics are 
considered mental shortcuts (Weiten, 2002, p. 251), developed to simplify and reduce 
efforts associated with a task (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008, p. 207). They represent both 
a conscious and unconscious cognitive process (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 451) 
developed to aid and enhances efficient judgements surrounding a topic of foci (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008, p. 207). Such a cognitive short cut allows the brain to create links 
and store conceptual information frames in a meaningful way, enhancing memory and 
retention of information (All, Huycke & Fischer, 2003). Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 
note that Einstein included the term (heuristic) in his Nobel prize-winning paper, 
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indicating that the view he presented on quantum physics was incomplete but highly 
useful. 
The works of Dhami and Harries (2009), Keller, Cokely, Konstantinos and Wegwarth  
(2010) and Marewski and Gigerenzer (2012) highlight that heuristics are widely used in 
contemporary society to help represent conceptual information in a meaningful way. In 
education the use of concept map heuristics in the form of spider maps, hierarchy maps, 
flowcharts and system maps have been shown to aid students with learning, 
understanding, recalling and integrating information (All, Huycke & Fischer, 2003; Bes 
Pia, Blasco-Tamarit & Munzo-Portero, 2011; Daley & Torre, 2010). Such reception 
learning builds declarative memory (Goucher, 2009). In their review of studies on 
decisions by individuals and institutions, including business, medical and legal 
decision-making, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier found that decisions based on heuristics 
can often be more accurate than more complex ‘rational’ strategies (2011, p. 473) and 
they save effort (p. 451). Thus, a vast body of literature supports the use of cognitive 
tools or heuristics for understanding and imparting knowledge structure.  
In the educational environment, the work of All, Huycke and Fischer (2003, p. 311) 
highlighted that the ability to put information together in meaningful ways improves 
retention of that information as well as understanding. They express storage of 
information in a manner that facilitates meaning is a cognitive process that promotes the 
act of remembering. The work of Fraser (1993, p. 24) explained that such cognitive 
structures could consist of a number of areas of knowledge, each a distinct knowledge 
domain. Each of these knowledge domains encapsulates a different area of knowledge. 
In this context learning is an interactive process where learners form linkages between 
newly perceived information and the previously created knowledge of the subsumer (p. 
27). Fraser states: 
The construction of relationships between concepts enhances the meaning of 
each of the interrelated concepts. Similarly, the enhancement of the meaning 
of one concept in a conceptual framework serves to enrich the meaning of 
other concepts within that framework. (Fraser, 1993, p. 27) 
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The work of All, Huycke and Fischer (2003, p. 312) asserted that key factors which are 
associated with meaningful learning include: 1) assimilation of new concepts and 
propositions into existing cognitive structures, 2) knowledge organised hierarchically in 
cognitive structures, and 3) subsumption of concepts and propositions into existing 
hierarchies.  Accordingly, professional knowledge domain heuristics can be considered 
‘rules of thumb’ for understanding the individual knowledge areas, their significance, 
along with presenting in simplistic form how they integrate. They aid in educational 
comprehension, and highlight how specialized knowledge can be applied to problem 
solving, serving as varied maps of propositional knowledge. For example, Garcia (2001, 
p. 4) drew on a heuristic representation to show how for a physical protection system 
(PPS), the system elements are linked together to achieve the system’s goals (Figure 
3.4). Figure 3.4 has become a domain heuristic for understanding relationships within 
the design and evaluation of PPS. Accordingly, heuristics can and are used to 
effectively communicate knowledge and structural relationships within a domain area of 
interest.  
Figure 3.4 Garcia’s PPS design and evaluation heuristic  
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The complexity of professional learning means that it is within the university that the 
initial training and preparation (professional education) occurs prior to entry into the 
professions (Gillespie, 1981, p. 372). The work of Eraut (1994, p. 103) divided 
professional knowledge into three salient categories including (1) discipline based 
theories and concepts derived from bodies of coherent, systematic knowledge, (2) 
generalizations and practical principles in the applied field of professional action, and 
(3) specific propositions about particular cases, decisions and actions. In such 
institutions professional knowledge is taught as the tool to diagnose, infer and treat 
(Abbott, 1988, pp. 36-41) problems in one of four modes, replication, application, 
interpretation or association (Eraut, 1994, p. 103).  
In examining higher education for security professionals, the work of Ericsson and 
Charness (1997, p. 34) highlighted that the broad literature of expertise suggests that 
human expertise involves two complementary processes (1) a high motivation to put in 
hours of deliberate practice necessary to acquire the mechanisms to bypass human 
physical and cognitive limitations, and (2) acquire the knowledge base necessary to 
respond accurately and flexibility to the tens of thousands of unique cases an expert 
may encounter. While engaging in hours of study is an individual endeavour, higher 
educational research can contribute to the means in which students can more efficiently 
and effectually acquire the knowledge base necessary for dynamic practice. For this 
element of higher education, Sternberg (1997, p. 153) points out that educationally it is 
the organization-of-knowledge that is of dominant importance, as “one has to know how 
to organize what one knows”. Accordingly, Feigenbaum (1985, cited in LaFrance, 
1997, p. 168) considered that expertise is something that has to be captured with an 
educational goal, to capture and incorporate the domain expert’s fundamental 
knowledge into existing knowledge structures .  
Today a formal pattern of professionalisation exists in society, so that now a major 
credential for the acceptance of a new applied profession is the acceptance of its 
program within the university framework (Gillespie, 1981, p. 372). Cogan’s (1955, p. 
108) early work implied this view, stating, “it is very necessary to set up standards 
(definitions) for accredited schools: their admission requirements, their formal 
curriculum, along with formal qualifications of instructional staffs and the requisite 
facilities for its instruction”. Focusing on the curriculum component of professionalism, 
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consistent with the writings of Fox, (1994) a critical role for higher education is to 
define the security profession and provide the academic learning base that allows the 
establishment of generalised standards and credentials underpinning the breadth and 
depth the security domain (Rogers, 2000, p. 65) and supports the classification of 
security professionals as a cultural group.  
3.6 The ambiguity of security education 
In looking towards the future, Freidson (p. 27) in 1973 wrote that it was accepted by 
most futurologists that the projected outlook for society sees an ever-increasing reliance 
on specialized knowledge and skill, and on applying this knowledge to the solution of 
practical problems by specially trained individuals. Such a view may explain the many 
emerging professions within modern society such as interior design, safety or human 
resource management. However, professionalisation for security is proving difficult due 
to poor understanding of the domain space. For instance, it has become a well-
acknowledged theme within the reviewed literature that security’s contemporary 
knowledge base is poorly defined and as such, its educational goals and standards are 
sporadic at best, consequently refuting the very concept of the security professional as a 
group phenomenon in possession of consistent specialized knowledge and skill. Rogers 
(2000, p. 66) stated that the challenge for supporting the security professional as an 
occupational group lies in defining the common threads that bind security’s domain 
diverseness together from the broadest possible perspective, that is the general as well 
as the specific. However, neither is undoubtedly articulated.  
Brooks expressed the view that there have been research attempts to achieve this 
through defining a security body of knowledge, but with limited agreed consensus 
(2007, p. 1). As Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, p. 189) point out, there exists much 
controversy surrounding the choice of a security curriculum, as some argue security is 
fundamentally an area of criminology. Yet the strategic corporate level is more a 
management science, consequently clear jurisdictional boundary is essential. 
Furthermore, attempts to define security professionals according to educational 
qualifications are compounded by the truth that regardless of the paucity of an accepted 
body of knowledge, since September 2001 there has been a proliferation of programs 
offering courses, certificates and degrees in security or homeland security. Yet these 
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courses have no vetting process to determine the quality or legitimacy of the conferred 
credentials (Rogers, et al, 2007, p. 2) and offer what Brooks (2007, p. 2) contends to be 
allied discipline education badged as security education.  
Nevertheless, Ericsson and Charness (1994, p. 738) stress that a relative uncontroversial 
assertion is that training to an expert level of performance in a domain requires mastery 
of all the relevant knowledge and prerequisite skills. Such a point highlights the very 
problem for security professionals as a group phenomenon. That is, the study of security 
at the university level is recognised to be disparate, drawing on a broad unfocused body 
of knowledge (Table 1). This knowledge incorporates a vast array of theory and 
principles across multiple areas of foci, across multiple domain disciplines, without a 
clear professional and supporting educational objective. In addition, outside of the 
profession’s discourse (Section 2.2.2), there does not exist literature or governing body 
requisites that overwhelmingly state that a security professional must attain a university 
qualification. Nor do registration regulations exist requiring this, with most requisites 
focusing towards the occupational sectors (See Table 1.2 & Figure 1.1) and their 
associated licencing such as installers and maintainers. For instance, in the West 
Australian context, police licences require a Certificate four in Security and Risk 
Management, or higher to become a security consultant. However, in-house security 
advisors do not require this. A critical analysis of such training courses highlights a lack 
of core security knowledge, supporting the view that educators at this level do not know 
what to teach.  
Phinney and Smith (2009, p. 2) support these broad criticisms which undermine the 
professions stream of the security domain, highlighting that the knowledge domains of 
security science are relatively unknown. Consequently, this acknowledgement arguably 
challenges the very requirement for security focused university education. In addition, 
for practitioners, especially physical security specialists, not all theories and principles 
across its broad domains are directly relevant within their jurisdictional foci (subjective 
properties). Consequently, there are no universally accepted learning objectives and 
supporting knowledge base to draw curriculum and assessment instruments from for the 
professions stream of the security domain.  
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3.7 A higher education curriculum for security science 
The concept of a formal professional stream based on the sciences and learning that 
underpins the concept of security within the non-traditional domain of security is 
perhaps new by historical standards. However, the non-traditional domain of security is 
saliently centred towards the notion of crime prevention, and within this contemporary 
notion exist disparate domain jurisdictional views. For instance, towards the notion of 
crime prevention within society Lab (2014, p. 32) refers to the emerging domain of 
crime science within the crime prevention realm, yet Smith and Brooks (2013, p. 21) 
refer to the contemporary professional domain of security science. For instance, 
drawing on Laycock’s (2005) work, Lab explains that crime science as an emerging 
discipline relates to the application of the methods of science to the problem of crime 
and disorder.  
According to Lab (2014), the emerging discipline of crime science focuses on attacking 
crime in society utilizing a wide range of disciplines, employing a broad array of tools 
to control or manipulate the social and physical environment in the fight against crime.  
This approach includes the development of safety and security devices, or a myriad of 
other factors that play a role in crime and crime control. Smith and Brooks (2013, p. 21) 
articulate the notion of security science in a similar manner, defining it as “an emerging 
academic discipline that brings together broader discipline concepts into a structured 
body of knowledge, integrating them into a single domain boundary”. This theme is 
repeated for the domain of crime science, which is purported to include the disciplines 
of sociology, psychology, criminology, engineering, physics, architecture, computer 
science, biology, genetics, communications and education. It is stated that the primary 
goal of crime science is to bring these diverse disciplines together into a functional, 
coordinated response to crime (Laycock, 2005). But this articulation puts emphasis on 
law enforcement functionalities as well.  
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Nevertheless, the United States Hall Crest Report (1985, p. 225) formally 
acknowledged that while security and law enforcement comprise overlapping 
ideologies, they are distinct knowledge domains. Not incongruent with the notion of 
crime science, Smith and Brook’s (2013, p. 21) definition of security science 
emphasises a domain boundary which includes overarching knowledge areas of security 
management, security theories and principles, the built environment, and security risk 
management. They also include knowledge areas of physical security, personnel 
security, industrial security and business continuity management. They consider that 
such principles may include the functions of deter, detect, delay, response and recover 
to criminological concerns.  
This combined literature presents an argument for a recognised branch of formal 
learning jurisdictionally separate from international relations (Traditional security) that 
requires action based on the sciences and learning to resolve crime or security related 
problems in society. In addition, while the concept of crime science cannot be snubbed, 
the focus of this study is towards the sub-domain or practice area of physical security. 
As such, the emphasis is towards informing a body of knowledge for physical security 
professionals. Therefore the study will draw on the notion of security science as 
opposed to crime science to further seat its investigation. Such reviewed literature bares 
the supposition that Security Science (Smith & Brooks, 2012, pp. 2-3) as opposed to 
international relations (Section 2.2.1) as a professional focus is a branch of 
contemporary science underpinned by codified scientific knowledge relating to the built 
environment, the protection of assets and crime prevention within the non-traditional 
domain of security. This discourse highlights two broad sub-domains of security as an 
academic discipline, where physical security is arguably a further sub-domain within the 
broader non-traditional domain of security.  
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Figure 3.5 The two salient domains of security  
 
Accordingly, the status of the security professional in this domain stream must relate to 
somebody formally educated in the means of diagnosis and reasoning about society’s 
protective security and crime prevention problems. Then applying validated techniques 
from this branch of knowledge to solve such problems at a professional level. That is, to 
reconcile the types and levels of control in relation to a confluence of threat, 
vulnerability and consequences through underscorings of risk articulation (Figure 3.6) 
for a protected value or asset. Congruent with the writings of Freidson (1970, pp. 14-
15), the necessary developments in the areas of physics, electronics, criminology theory, 
psychology and architecture, along with many more disciplines has made possible a 
systematic foundation (Section 2.4.1) for the development of a formal physical security 
professional’s body of knowledge.  
The reviewed work of Mosher (1968, p. 106) exclaimed, “a profession is an 
unambiguous occupational field, which requires higher education”. Therefore, as 
emphasized within the literature, central to security’s profession-professional discourse 
Traditional Security
Referent Object:
“The State”
Balance of power
Protection from invasion
Revolution
Civil Conflict
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Non-traditional 
Security
Referent Object:
“Non-State threats”
Personal security
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as a group phenomenon is a curriculum linked directly to a consensual body of 
knowledge. This knowledge is organised in a systematic manner, according to its 
jurisdictionally verified knowledge base of the science and learning on which it is 
founded, framed within the goals and objectives of the profession.  
Figure 3.6 Non-traditional security professionals’ foci 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Congruent with this articulation, the work of Fox (1994, p. 202) conveyed that both  
 
 
Congruent with this articulation, the works of Fox (1994, p. 202) convey that both 
prospective professionals and the public rely on uniform standards of education. Such 
standards develop dependable expectations regarding the scope of any profession and 
the competencies that those who complete its formal education can reasonably be 
expected to possess.  As highlighted through the works of Wilensky (1964, p. 145), 
Abbott (1988), Barnett (1994) and Eraut (1994) the lay public will not recognise 
professional status for a domain area in which everyone is an expert. Therefore, it is 
accepted that corresponding with the writings of Abbott (1988), Barnett (1994), and 
Eraut (1994), professional knowledge is usually presented through a formal curriculum 
linked to codified bodies of systematic knowledge. This provides trustworthiness an 
academic basis for any profession accordant with the sciences, knowledge of 
constructed model of social organisation and practices that underpin it.  
The security professional’s role is to 
reconcile the security continuum for 
the confluence of threat, vulnerability 
and risk appetite within a protective 
context through their professional 
practice of diagnosis, inference and 
treatment of the security risk problem. 
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3.8 Curriculum as a vehicle to professionalism 
As a vehicle to professionalism curriculum is a term with a long history, originally used 
by both Plato and Aristotle to describe the subjects taught during the classical period of 
Greek civilization (Marsh, 1986, pp. 3-9). Historically curriculum drew on a subject 
form approach (content), which is still used in modern times, but has expanded to 
include a broader range of educational topics, beyond the classical subjects such as 
philosophy and mathematics (p. 3). The term curriculum is now used very variedly 
(Peters, 1973, p. 2), where a clear distinction between concept and structure is 
emphasised by many authors (Kelly, 1982, pp. 6-7; Toombs & Tierney, 1993, p. 177).  
Curricula are considered to have at least two aspects, where the use of the word denotes 
content of a particular subject, or reference to the total programme and experiences 
offered by an educational institution; “it can mean anything from the ‘bundle’ of 
programs an institution offers to the individual experience of a particular student or 
what is taught” (Toombs &Tierney, 1993, p. 177). As Hare and Portelli (1988) 
observed, there exist more than 120 definitions of the term. For instance, Ornstein and 
Hunkins (1988, p. 6) offer six variant definitions including “a plan for action, or a 
written document, which includes strategies for achieving desired goals of ends”, or “a 
plan for providing sets of learning opportunities for persons to be educated”, or “a set of 
formal education and/or training intentions”, or “a plan for learning [whereby] 
objectives determine what learning is important”, or “a field of study, comprising its 
own foundations and domains of knowledge, as well as its own research, theory and 
principles”, or “in terms of subject matter or content”.    
Kelly’s (1982, pp. 6-7) views demarcate between the explicit and also hidden aspects 
(implicit), where students learn as a result of the way in which educational institutions 
work, such as social skills. In terms of explicitness, Kelly (1982, p.6) defines 
curriculum as: “a content or body of knowledge to be transmitted” . 
Nevertheless, Hirst (1974) presented a slightly divergent definition, also based around 
the same notion that a curriculum has two elements, a content to be used and methods to 
be employed to bring about learning, defining curriculum as “a plan of activities aimed 
at achieving objectives”. 
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Accordant with the reviewed literature, for the domain of physical security this study 
adopted the content and its structure definition of curriculum. Furthermore, many 
understandings of curriculum focus towards pedagogy, defined as the art and science of 
helping children learn, which is distinct from adult education. Conversely, Knowles 
(1980) and Jinks (1999, p. 223) make a clear distinction between the processes in which 
children and adults learn, defining the art and science of helping adults learn as 
andragogy (Jinks, 1999, p. 223). Consequently, while much discussion and debate exists 
in the literature regarding curriculum philosophies, the focus of this study lies in the 
provision of higher education for future Physical Security professionals. Contextually, a 
major difference between school education and higher education is that adults are 
saliently focused towards learning those subjects or topics they see the need to learn 
(Knowles, 1980, p. 47). Here the writings of Carter (1985, p. 136) and Schwartz (2012, 
p. 58) highlight that the planning of educational programs in this frame begins with 
understanding the knowledge demands of the profession.   
The andragogical frame of the study is therefore driven by the fact that higher education 
curriculum decisions are steered by the market place as opposed to any educational 
philosophy or theory (Schwartz, 2012, p. 58), that is, the goal or objectives of the 
profession. Here a more pragmatic approach or ‘competency-based’ approach to 
curriculum can be sketched, where McNeil (1990, p. 84), Marsh (2004, p. 7) and 
Toombs and Tierney (1993, p. 179) (Table 3.3) point to varying multiple factor attribute 
approaches to curriculum. This is due to the motivations of adult learners, which differ 
from children. Children have a more postponed application on most of their learning. In 
contrast, Knowles (1980, p. 53) and more recently Tovey and Lawlor (2004, p. 24) 
point out that adults have a more immediacy of application. Additionally, adults engage 
in learning generally in response to pressures from their current situation. Adults tend to 
enter an educational activity in a problem-centred or performance-centred frame of 
mind (Knowles, 1980, p. 53; Tovey & Lawlor, 2004, pp. 11-14). 
Table 3.4 The attributes approach to specialised curriculum 
McNeil Marsh Toombs and Tierney 
Purpose 
Methods 
Organization 
Evaluation 
Content 
Purpose 
Organization 
Purpose 
Content 
Organization 
Evaluation 
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From an academic orientation, people see curriculum as the vehicle by which learners 
are introduced to the subject matter disciplines and to organised fields of study (McNeil, 
1990, p. 1). Learning is described psychologically as “a process of needs-meeting and 
goal-striving by individual learners” by Knowles (1980, p. 56). According to Knowles 
(1980, p. 89) an educational need is a discrepancy between what individuals (or 
organisations or society) want themselves to be, and what they actually are, the distance 
between an aspiration and a reality.  
Thus, adopting the subject form approach in terms of content and structure for physical 
security relates to an understanding of the content and its application (form) in 
diagnosing, reasoning and treating society’s protective security and crime prevention 
problems. If it is accepted that curriculum is “a plan of action, or a written document, 
which includes strategies for achieving desired goals or ends. It includes a set of formal 
education or training intentions; in terms of subject matter or content” (Ornstein & 
Hunkins, 1988, p. 6) to be learned and engaged for remuneration; then a physical 
security professional must be underpinned by such a formal, standardised curriculum.  
Formal curricula include a mixture of generic concepts and principles, and the facts, 
concepts and generalizations of specific subjects or groups of subjects (Davis & Dark, 
2003, pp. 2-3). Here the central objective of education is towards developing integrated 
structures of understanding to yield work. In this view, items of knowledge in the form 
of theories, concepts, facts, norms, principles and so on are not detached but rather form 
distinct networks of relationships (Anderson & Sosniak, 1994, p. 32). This specifically 
relates to the scope, organisation and sequence of the knowledge content. For example, 
scope refers to the amount or depth to be taught based on the student’s required 
understanding of fields of knowledge. Organisation is the sequence of topics based on 
their prior knowledge requirements and sequence is the ordering of content based on 
these three prior design drivers (Davis & Dark, 2003, pp. 2-3). For adult learners, an 
appropriate principle of learning is that the sequence of the curriculum must be timed so 
as to be in step with their developmental tasks (Knowles, 1980, pp. 52-53).  
The earlier writings of Bruner (1977, pp. 31-32) conveyed that curriculum design 
should be based on the structure stemming from the underlying principles of the 
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academic discipline, for reasons of economy. Such a view was also supported by Bloom 
who emphasised that the organisation of learning depends on the structure of the 
domain being learned. Furthermore, Bloom also expressed, congruent with cognitive 
constructivism’s premise, that transfer and generalizability of knowledge will be 
determined by its structure and skill that students construct in the course of their 
learning (Anderson & Sosniak, 1994, p. 60).  
According to Bruner (1977) the correct structure of learning permits broader 
generalizations, makes knowledge usable in contexts other than that in which it was 
learned (non-specific), and facilitates memory (heuristic retrieval from LTM) allowing 
the learner to relate what would otherwise be unconnected facts and therefore easily 
forgotten. The literature highlights that curriculum connotes the substance of what is 
being taught and its formal structural arrangements (Toombs & Tierney, 1993, p. 177). 
A view emphasised in the writings of McNeil (1990, p. 73) who states, “the concept of 
structure in the disciplines was widely heralded as a basis for curriculum content.”  
Effective organizing principles exist for curriculum where the concept of design is one 
such principle. This includes the content or subject matter and its presentation 
organisation to put it to its greatest advantage, or to have it in the most interesting, 
shape, form or position as possible to enhance learning. But a good design never comes 
from chance, it is the product of trained intelligence...By design we mean the creating of 
relationships (Toombs & Tierney, 1993, p. 182). Bruner (1977, p. 9) considered 
creating the relationships of this content of salient importance for the less able student 
than for the gifted ones, as it is the less able students who are most easily thrown off 
track by poor teaching.  
Marsh’s (2004, p. 19) work sees the concept of design as a framework, or “curriculum 
framework”, defined as a group of related subjects or themes which fit together 
according to a predetermined set of criteria to appropriately cover an area of study, in 
other words, a domain of interest. Thus, the salient focus is towards individual subjects 
and their grouping; they are guides explicitly designed and written to assist those with a 
stake in the education, in their curriculum decision-making through the establishment of 
learning areas and relationships.  
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According to Bloom the most common American educational objective is the 
acquisition of knowledge or information. As it is expressed that problem solving or 
thinking cannot occur in a vacuum, it must be based upon knowledge of some of the 
realities (cognitions) (Anderson & Sosniak, 1994, p. 16). The study’s development of a 
body of knowledge is informed by this body of literature, which highlights that within a 
domain’s jurisdictional boundary, the two salient aspects of curriculum include the 
substance of what is being taught and its formal structural arrangements and 
sequencing. These aspects can be embodied within four basic components including (1) 
purpose, (2) content, which includes discipline based theories and facts, generalisations 
such as principles and concepts and propositions about cases, (3) their organisation and 
(4) means of evaluation in relation to professional practice.   
3.8.1 Curriculum typologies  
Further informing the development of a body of knowledge for physical security 
professionals is the view that curriculum as a term has different messages; as there exist 
different forms or typologies across different educational institutions, at different levels 
(McNeil, 1990, pp. 103-104). For example, a curriculum formulated at one level or 
institution may not be adopted and implemented at another. Such a varied educational 
state characterises security education (See Section 2.4.3). For instance, the work of 
McNeil (1990, pp. 103-104) highlighted five variant typologies of curriculum. First is 
an ideal curriculum, one which expresses desired directions as seen by those with a 
particular value system or specialised interests. Then, there exists a formal curriculum, 
which is one that is adopted by an appropriate, governing body. Third, is a perceived 
curriculum, which is one in which individual educators perceives the curriculum to be. 
Fourth is an operational curriculum, which represents what actually goes on in the 
classroom setting. This is followed by an experiential curriculum, what the students 
actually derive from and think about the operational curriculum.  
Such typologies consider differing functions of educational curriculum. These functions 
include the delivery of a general education, a supplementary function; alternatively one 
designed to extend higher achieving students, exploration functions, a curriculum 
designed to provide individual learners opportunities to develop their personal interests. 
Then there exists a specialized curriculum, which is a type of curriculum in which the 
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current standards of a trade or profession, or academic discipline prevail (McNeil, 
1990). The focus for this study is towards a specialised curriculum in which students are 
exposed to specific content and structure and as a result are expected to emulate those 
who are successfully performing as skilled workers or scholars in a domain. But other 
aspects must also be considered such as the hidden curriculum (McNeil, 1990), where 
training is different from education, distinguishing between basic academic 
competencies such as reading, writing, reasoning, or more general graduate attributes 
and subject matter competencies.  
This literature also highlights that once a curriculum typology has been agreed upon or 
selected; a fundamental issue in curriculum planning is how to come to an agreement 
over what is to be taught. That is, “what knowledge to be transmitted” (Marsh, 2004, p. 
19) in relation to the educational objectives (Allan, 1996, p. 1)? The work of Tyler 
(1949, p. 37) stressed that educational objectives should be obtainable, that is, 
achievable, and tangible as an observable product. This product must prescribe in 
advance the desired behaviour to be developed in a student in terms of topics, content 
and concepts, as well as what the students is expected to do with this content (Tyler, 
1949, pp. 46-47). As such, congruent with the principles of andragogy, Mager (1962) 
presented a shift from generic educational objectives to instructional objectives that 
linked work competencies to formal education. This approach emphasises a link 
between instruction and a student’s achievement of pre-specified objectives. Mager’s 
(1962, pp. 20-36) work considered that educational objectives should fulfil three 
criteria: they should be 1) observable, 2) performance centric, and 3) criterion based.  
Mager’s (1962) work emphasised that language used in educational or instructional 
objectives should be less open or ambiguous and more closed to represent clearly 
observable student actions. Mager emphasised the inclusion of words such as write; 
recite; to sort; to solve; to construct; and to compare. Mager (1962) also highlighted that 
the conditions under which performance is to take place should be unequivocally stated 
in the educational objectives. This view was supported by an expression of the quality 
or level of performance that will be considered acceptable in each discrete objective. 
However, the later writings of Macdonald-Ross (1973) and Eisner (1979) emphasised 
the integration of specific behavioural objectives in education instead of purely 
instructional intentions. This approach aimed to reflect an emphasis on the behavioural 
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aspects of what the student will be able to do after their learning experience. Such an 
emphasis could not be achieved under previous conceptions, again, the difference 
between an aspiration and reality.  
Allan’s (1996, p. 99) work highlighted that further more specific learning shifts 
occurred, exemplifying perceived deeper learning outcomes (Allan, 1996, p. 99). Such 
changes were congruent with the earlier work of Eisner (1979), which emphasised 
subject-specific outcomes, along with student and teacher outcomes. Here informing the 
cognitive aspects of professionalism are subject-specific outcomes that relate directly to 
the content to be taught and what can be done with it. For example, “on completion of 
the module (subject) the student will be able to apply knowledge of crime prevention to 
reduce a particular crime problem”. Educationally this focus provided a clear statement 
of what the student will be able to do as a result of their learning experiences that have 
been planned.  
Nevertheless, such a learning statement differs from an instructional and behavioural 
objective in that the outcome is not expressed in a single discrete element. As competent 
students are expected to possess both the knowledge of crime prevention and an ability 
to apply it to a chosen issue. In addition, personal outcomes needed to be emphasised 
which are argued to be transferable to a wider range of contexts. From an educational 
standpoint personal transferable skills are embodied within generic academic outcomes 
producing broader learning outcomes (Allan, 1996, p. 102). Arguably though, these 
views refer back to the writings of Abbott (1988, pp. 36-41) to include the diagnosis, 
inference and treatment principles of professional practice. Here, such an educational 
objective in this context may include the learning outcome statement:  
To be able to identify and compare contextual access control and crime prevention 
options to develop a systematic treatment plan which addresses the security risk 
concerns within a cost versus benefits framework. And produce a professional report 
and relevant supporting documentation to achieve such a plan. 
This combined literature highlights that the context of this study lies in the development 
of a systemised body of knowledge that can be drawn on to inform and articulate an 
ideal curriculum of a specialized typology for future Physical Security Professionals. 
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Such a knowledge system would include domain specific content and general 
professional objectives (transferable skills), which facilitate their professional work, as a 
perfect solution may never be found (Toombs & Tierney, 1993, p. 181). This would 
include academic subject matter and competencies as they relate to core content and 
knowledge structure and other more general attributes considered essential for 
competent professional practice, along with the technique of application. The work of 
Peters (1973, p. 3) supported such a notion emphasising the requirement for a clear 
educational objective, arguing without, there can be no valid curriculum. Furthermore, 
such an objective must be supported by methods to bring about learning (Peters, 1973, 
p. 3).  
Referring to the work of Ausubel (1968) (Section 1.8), a method most educators 
embrace to facilitate initial learning is reception learning where most understandings 
learners acquire of new a subject area are presented rather than discovered (discovery 
learning). Such presented learning can be achieved through the use of heuristics that 
show content, structure and relationships. In reception learning the entire content to be 
learned is presented in its final form, as this is the most efficient means of transmitting 
content of an academic discipline. This educational aspect presents the views of Marsh 
(2004, p. 199) who points out a fundamental question for any curriculum is “what 
should we teach”, which in principle must be that knowledge needed to professionally 
practice within a domain of interest when asked within the context of adult education.  
3.9 Does security possess a formal body of knowledge? 
A well-established premise within the reviewed literature is that an important element of 
a profession is their ownership of a distinctive body of knowledge within a 
jurisdictional boundary. This view is explicitly supported in the work of Morris, 
Crawford, Hodgson, Shepherd and Thomas (2006, p. 710). Smith and Brooks (2013, pp. 
1-2) also expressed this very observation for the security profession. However, in the 
security profession dissention exists; while some security authors such as McCrie 
(2004, p. 17) argue that security has created a body of knowledge through industry 
specific research and practices over the past generation; others argue this body of 
knowledge is sporadic, spread over a vast array of textual publications and held 
implicitly by many individual experts. That is, such texts do not explicitly enunciate 
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consensus content, structure and relationships as an organised system of knowledge 
underpinned by the science and learning on which it is based at an appropriate depth or 
level for future professionals.  
In addition, it can also be argued that such texts do not develop general academic 
attributes that combine with such knowledge to produce a graduate level professional. 
Professionals are more recognised as formally educated (Abbott, 1988) and therefore 
consistent with the educational literature, the existence of texts without clear 
educational goals and professional quality control of understanding does not constitute a 
formal body of knowledge, but rather presents a diverse repository of information. 
Furthermore, as expressed in Section 2.4, there exists a range of professional security 
courses with little vetting process offering what Brooks (2007, p. 2) expresses as 
nothing more than allied discipline education badged as security education with little 
constancy. As presented in Section 2.3 consistent knowledge needs to be taught to all 
members of a profession, where its academic basis legitimises the profession’s work. In 
this lucidity, deferring to the work of Manunta (1999, p. 58), a vital question must be 
asked, “how can a particular case or situation be assessed and performance measured?” 
or “how can essential matters such as liability and responsibility be decided in the 
current state of security education ambiguity”?  
In the reviewed articulation of a professional, central emphasis is placed on defining the 
professions’ formal knowledge system (Abbott, 1988, p. 4; Morris, Crawford, Hodgson, 
Shepherd & Thomas, 2006, p. 710), or body of knowledge (Martin & Guerin, 2005, p. 
viii) since this is considered the professions’ currency (Abbott, 1988, p. 4). As Barnett 
(1994, p. 34) acknowledged, professionals are academically qualified people, who are in 
charge of a formal body of knowledge, which is sold for their remuneration. 
Accordingly, the work of Phinney and Smith (2009, p. 2) expressed the portrayal of 
knowledge structures for a discipline is an approach to researching the instruction-
learning paradigm for novice learners. Organizational and structural relationships 
among security concepts may provide an understanding for the acquisition of concepts 
in memory, with a subsequent improvement in the security instructional process 
(Phinney & Smith, 2009, p. 2). As Bruner (1977, p. 7) expounds, grasping the structure 
of a subject is understanding it in a way that permits many other things to be related to it 
meaningfully…to learn structure in short, is to learn how things are related.    
P a g e  | 115 
 
To date there does not exist an explicit, singular formal body of knowledge showing 
content, structure and relationships for institutions of higher education for the domain of 
Physical Security. Nevertheless, where community acceptance of a recognised formal 
body of knowledge does not exist some associations have their own certification 
programs that test for elements of knowledge in which they deem domain practitioners 
should demonstrate understanding (Morris, et al, 2006, p. 713). However, professional 
associations are not higher education institutions, and offer certifications accordant to 
their standards rather than higher education qualifications based on a clear educational 
objective. Such an approach perhaps misses those other attributes considered essential 
for professional practice, especially in light of the view that the continuity of non-
specific transfer learning (Section 2.2.2) is dependent upon the mastery of the structure 
of the subject matter (Bruner, 1977, p. 18).  
ASIS is one such organisation within the security domain that offers both their Certified 
Protection Professional (CPP) and Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification 
programs. These are based on a benchmark score attained on their multiple choice 
questionnaire, derived from a number (seven) of prescribed texts. Yet, accordant with 
the principles of what a professional is, this does not holistically meet the requirements 
as a formally accepted academic body of knowledge. Nor does it meet the requirements 
of a higher education experience or qualification teaching the science which underpins 
the application of core knowledge (Section 2.3) (Fox, 1994; Freckelton & Selby, 2013). 
Thus, Morris et al., (2006, p. 711) expressed that given the vested interests in formal 
bodies of knowledge, research has a significant role to play in providing theoretically 
grounded, empirically-based evidence of the knowledge and aspects of competence for 
Physical Security Professionals.  
3.10 The development and mapping of bodies of knowledge 
The study is grounded within the notion that institutionalising expertise (Abbott, 1988, 
p. 323) is not a new concept. Such a notion is supported by the work of Ericsson and 
Charness (1994, p. 7373) who highlight that prior to codification, knowledge in natural 
science and calculus which were presented as the cutting edge of mathematics a few 
centuries ago where only experts of that time were able to master, is in contemporary 
times taught in high schools and colleges. Further accentuating their point Ericsson and 
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Charness stress that when Tchaikovsky asked two of the greatest violinists of his day to 
play his concerto, they refused, deeming the score unplayable. However, in 
contemporary times elite violinists consider the concerto part of their standard repertory. 
Tchaikovsky’s concerto was deemed impossible until other musicians figured how to 
master and describe it so that students could learn it as well (1994, p. 737). Drawing on 
this example, Ericsson and Charness (1994, p. 738) explain that in most domains 
methods for instruction and efficient training have developed in parallel with the 
accumulation of relevant knowledge and techniques.  
However, many areas of professional knowledge are yet to be codified as it is 
increasingly recognised that experts often cannot explain the nature of their own 
expertise (Eraut, 1994, p. 102). Nevertheless, drawing on older domains such as 
medicine as a sociological basis (Section 2.3.1), a growing number of contemporary 
professions have, or are pursing clearer articulation of their knowledge systems through 
both sponsored projects and academic explorations. For example, as a sponsored 
research project, Hilburn, Hirmanpour, Khajenoori, Turner and Qasem (1999) examined 
the software engineering body of knowledge to use in defining competencies and 
establishing curriculum for the United States (US) Federal Aviation Administration’s 
technical and management staffs. They sought to organize and catalogue the knowledge 
structure to provide a systematic, concise and complete description of the software 
engineering discipline. Their purpose was to provide the systematic foundation through 
a single source-reference base (p. 2). Their research produced a three tiered architecture 
including knowledge categories, which consist of knowledge areas, that consisted of 
knowledge units (p. 6) providing a strata of systematic depth and breadth for their 
domain’s knowledge and its structure.  
The work of Smart and Pontifex (1993) recognised the human resources management 
profession’s (HRM) codified body of knowledge. This profession developed from the 
Personnel and Industrial Welfare Officers Association formed in 1943 into the 
Australian Human Resources Institute in 1992. This development was based on the four 
criteria for an occupation to achieve professional status, in which one of these included, 
“the mastery of discipline and specialized body of knowledge and skills”. The 
development of a codified knowledge base was salient for their professionalisation 
process. This task was undertaken through research involving practitioners in the United 
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States to produce a category list of competencies. As with the security profession, this 
research showed a diverse and multidisciplined domain (Smart & Pontifex, 1993, p. 13), 
which included core and support knowledge areas. Examples of core subject areas 
included human resource planning, industrial relations, recruitment and selection. 
Examples of support subject areas included accounting, economics, quantitative 
methods and business law (Smart & Pontifex, 1993, p. 13). Nevertheless, consistent 
with Section 2.4.4 of the reviewed literature, it was acknowledged within the analysis 
that given the multi-disciplinary nature of the human resources management (HRM) 
profession, is unlikely that the body of knowledge relevant to the HRM will ever be 
defined to the satisfaction of all parties, resulting in a desirable body of specialised 
knowledge.    
Martin and Guerin (2005) codified the Interior Design Profession’s body of knowledge. 
Their process included an analysis of content of published documents from interior 
design entities that represented the career cycle of professional interior designers. They 
drew on an analysis of content, identifying keywords or knowledge areas and then 
weighted those knowledge areas to distinguish between the domain knowledge required 
in depth and that, which was considered desirable, or that which they should be aware. 
Then knowledge was grouped by theme and mathematically weighted. Then expert 
panellists, including two educators, reviewed their results assessing both their 
methodology and conclusions. While, limitations were acknowledged, such as 
highlighting that the findings were a snap shot in time, based on journals, conference 
proceedings, trade publications, industry reports which were organised into annotated 
bibliographic format. Their process documented at that time the foundational 
knowledge areas of the body of knowledge used by interior design practitioners.  
Within the non-traditional security paradigm Brooks (2007) investigated the knowledge 
categories of security using a multi-phase methodology. Brooks sourced, extracted and 
tabulated security knowledge categories and their supporting concepts. Findings 
presented a table of 14 security knowledge categories and 2001 supporting subordinate 
concepts. Knowledge categories included criminology, emergency/contingency 
planning, facility management, fire science, industrial security, information and 
computer security, investigations, physical security, principles, risk management, 
security law, security management, technology and threats. In the words of Brooks 
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(2007), “the presented security knowledge categories provide a greater insight into 
defining security, through supporting the development of a security body of 
knowledge”. 
Phinney and Smith (2009) explored the knowledge structures in the electronic security 
sub-set and its associated concepts. They sought to understand comprehension levels 
and perceptions of students enrolled in a security technologies program in Singapore 
towards basic security-related topics. They employed multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
to map the formal knowledge structure for selected electronic security concepts. Their 
research instrument consisted of a rating scale that asked students to compare the degree 
of similarity between concept pairs. MDS spatially represented the data based on 
student’s perceived relationships of the subjects. Items included: magnetic cards, video 
motion detection, passive infrared sensors, proximity readers, microwave sensors, 
microphonic cable, photoelectric beam, crime prevention through environmental design, 
defence in depth, and closed circuit television. Results showed that knowledge 
clustering occurred with similar concepts located near each other in MDS. According to 
Phinney and Smith (2009, p. 13) these relationships in dimensional space can provide 
the foundation for the development of a syllabus for instruction for student learning.  
A further study by Brooks (2011) investigated security expert’s knowledge structure 
towards, developing a security body of knowledge within the domain area of security 
risk management. Employing an interpretative approach Brooks (2011) also applied 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) as a technique to develop and present a psychometric 
security risk management body of knowledge. Results presented a psychometric map 
with a central conceptual theme of threat and the clustering of psychology risk concepts 
to threat, and outlying of risk assessment concepts including probability of occurrence 
and consequences. This map was validated through interviews with security experts. 
Brooks’ (2011) findings presented how understanding experts’ knowledge structure 
assists towards the development of a security body of knowledge, and improved 
security directed education, and that MDS and experts as a combined approach is a 
valid research technique.  
As an exploratory review Coole and Brooks (2011) presented a physical security 
heuristic that captured knowledge content and structure from a first pass qualitative 
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analysis of printed texts. Their heuristic supported that, congruous with the writings of 
Martin and Guerin (2005) and Morris, Crawford, Hodgson, Shepherd and Thomas 
(2006), physical security does have both a knowledge content and structure which can 
be captured and explicitly articulated, although this was limited in its research depth. 
Nevertheless, the study did highlight that physical security has knowledge content, 
subordinate content and structure requiring further research. Their results are congruent 
with Abbott’s (1988, p. 324) view that, once jurisdictional boundaries are established, 
nearly all kinds of knowledge are organisable as common resources for a body of 
individuals.  
Consistent with the reviewed literature, Richardson (1988) expressed that professional 
knowledge can be codified, but arguably it must be done through some formal 
methodology that demonstrates generalizable validity in terms of professional 
education.  Universities aim to develop a single codified framework, based on scientific 
criteria of validity, on which the profession practices (Richardson, 1988, p. 384). As 
Phinney and Smith (2009, p. 13) explain, it can be shown that learners acquire a 
knowledge structure more like that of experts after formal instruction. Brooks (2012, p. 
1) considered that the task of educators is therefore to assist students with acquisition of 
the major concepts of a discipline into memory so that they may perceive the correct 
relationships among concepts of the knowledge domain. The ability of educators to 
understand, define, map and visually represent expert knowledge is vital if teaching and 
learning is to me more effective (Brooks, 2012, p. 1), and arguably consistent across 
teaching institutions.  
Schon’s work reflected that the systematic knowledge base of a profession consists of 
four essential properties, they are 1) specialised, 2) firmly bounded, 3) scientific and 4) 
standardised (Schon, 1983 cited in Eraut, 1994, p. 101). In achieving such criteria the 
work of Eraut (1994, p. 119) identified three essential questions that need to be 
addressed for every profession: (1) What is our professional knowledge base? (2) What 
is best learned in higher education and what is best learned in professional practice and 
what is best learned through an integrated course involving both contexts? (3) What has 
to be learned before qualification, and what is best postponed until after qualification? 
The syllabus for higher education is based on propositional-declarative knowledge 
(facts) and discipline based methods of enquiry within a strictly academic frame of 
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reference (Eraut, 1994, p. 116). Here curriculum development entails the selection and 
organisation of a set of intended learning outcomes, based on clear educational goals, in 
terms of what is to be learned (Posner & Rudnitsky, 1982, p. 8) and their supporting 
content and structure.  
Furthermore, the writings of Posner and Rudnitsky (1982) highlight that educational 
outcomes should consider broader professional goals, where learning units should be 
planned in context with other units based on relationships. In addition, their sequence 
should logically precede, and, or follow other related learning units. Accordant with the 
premises of cognitive constructivism (Section 1.6) such goals are expressed through 
cognitive or conceptual maps, (heuristics) as these help develop educational bearings. 
Cognitive and concept maps are concerned with relationships among ideas, based on 
arranging them in some reasonable pattern or structure. These ideas include concepts, 
theories, propositions, facts, rules, principles and generalizations. They depict 
relationships among ideas in both simple and more complex terms. Such maps can be 
hierarchical or organised in some other way, but force the expression of broader themes, 
which tie the specifics together. This provides clarity and coherence to what is to be 
taught, highlighting the ideas central to understanding a domain of interest. 
Furthermore, the details of such maps may change, but the foundational ideas and their 
relationships are stable. The mapping process is flexible, and a map for any given set of 
concepts can take many forms. However, they allow educationalists to make the 
knowledge framework explicit, revise it, and generally be more conscious of it (Posner 
& Rudnitsky, 1982, pp. 8-39).  
Informed from the reviewed literature, the study established the requirement to explore 
the systematic foundation for physical security as a professional endeavour. This is 
argued to exist in the knowledge categories, content and units as they relate to theories, 
facts, principles, generalisations, concepts as core subject knowledge (Superordinate) 
and supporting subject areas (Subordinate) and its cultural organisational structure. This 
required the development of a physical security professional’s taxonomic framework 
represented through maps (heuristics) of propositional-declarative knowledge, arranging 
such knowledge in terms of form or structure. The work of Krimsky and Golding (1992, 
pp. 9-10) highlighted that the function of such taxonomies is to offer a conceptual net or 
template that provides order or structure to a domain of empirical phenomena.  
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Taxonomies are subsets of domains; but functionally are tangible sets of content 
classifications organized on the basis of a single sematic relationship (Security), which 
also explicitly show their relationships (Spradley, 1979, p. 137). They are instrumental 
category structures that serve an embryonic theoretic role for suggesting lines of 
enquiry, dividing up a field of study, making salient distinctions, or generating 
hypotheses. Taxonomies are not true or false, but rather a useful tool (Krimsky and 
Golding, 1992, pp. 9-10) which in this study will be used to inform towards an ideal, 
specialised curriculum that is firmly bounded, scientifically based and which can be 
standardised across educational institutions for future physical security professionals in 
relation to their educational objectives.  
3.11 Literature reflection 
This study’s objectives are informed by a vast and diverse breadth of interrelated and 
overlapping literature, as accentuated by Figures 2.1 and 3.1. This literature includes the 
very notion of security, the architecture of the professions, and how higher education is 
instrumental in underpinning through its schooling processes modern day professionals 
as a group phenomenon. In this review security was philosophically professed to be 
about our survival as a species and well-being in terms of conditions of our day-to-day 
existence in the face of threats to a way of life or prosperity.  
Accordingly, functionally non-traditional security was viewed as the pursuit of a stable, 
steady state which ensures our well-being, by protecting from threats through 
mechanisms of control, which if efficacious, lead to a relatively predictable 
environment. Regardless of contextual concern, security is predominately achieved 
collectively, as a group rather than individually. Such cooperation may encompass the 
international or national, state or regional community, individual organisations or sub-
groups and individuals according to government or private ownership. Therefore, 
informing the contemporary notion of the physical security professional was a fused 
philosophical nevertheless operative discussion of the term security. This established 
the position that security is a broad nonetheless embedded notion within any given 
culture and that its vast thematic or euphemistic categories reflect its cruciality in 
maintaining comprehensive well-being across contemporary society.  
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Furthermore, the reviewed professionalism literature underscores the assertion that 
professions relate to groups of people who undertake complex, crucial problem solving 
for society accordant with an abstract knowledge system. This discourse highlighted 
that professions are not labels individual occupational groups such as those in the 
security domain apply to themselves. Rather, society and the legal fraternity through 
formal acknowledgement define the professions. This acknowledgement is 
sociologically based upon both cognitive and normative criteria underpinning both 
historical and present-day conceptualizations of a professional; where, (1) the job of a 
professional group is technically based (Cognitive), and (2), a professional adheres to a 
set of cultural norms (Normative) towards the solving of very crucial matters. In 
addition, it was acknowledged that the cognitive component is based upon the 
understandings of some complex department of learning or science, where professionals 
are braced by their acquisition of cognitive dimensions of domain specific knowledge 
that build over time leading to predictable outcomes. Then, their individual expertise is 
based on applying this knowledge, forming a cultural currency.  
The reviewed literature also emphasised that professions are additionally defined in 
terms of their jurisdictional foci, which culturally relates to the diagnosis, inference 
(reasoning) and treatment of specific jurisdictional abstract problems due to their 
focused expertise, accordant with their relevant knowledge system (body of 
knowledge). Thus, professional work is bounded vertically and horizontally according 
to cognitive and cultural strata. Domain professional knowledge relates to domain 
specific, theories, concepts, principles and facts (content), supported by structure and 
relationships with other domain knowledge. This system’s basis is built on, and 
encompasses the science or embodying knowledge on which their domain is 
constructed.  
This embodying knowledge forms a system reflective of that knowledge required to 
practice at a professional level within specific areas of foci (Figures 3.1 and 3.3, Section 
3.1). This body of knowledge embodies domain specific or what is referred as core 
knowledge (Superordinate), further supporting knowledge (Subordinate) and enabling 
general academic qualities, which interactively facilitates professional practice. 
Professionals are academically qualified people, who are formally educated in 
institutions of higher education, who are schooled in formal bodies of declarative, 
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propositional knowledge within a domain of foci. Formal bodies of knowledge include 
codified knowledge along with the relevant domain’s procedures accordant with the 
application of such knowledge as a formal knowledge system (body of knowledge). 
Thus, professional knowledge relates to formally codified (explicit) knowledge 
representing the roles and tasks of the domain, again, to diagnose, infer and treat.   
Accordant with such literature, security professionals must broadly be formally 
educated persons who focus towards protecting against a range of societal threats 
manifested by malicious actors at both macro and micro levels. As such, the concept of 
the physical security professional was seated accordant with this broader literature. The 
reviewed literature lead to the contention that jurisdictionally a contemporary physical 
security professional can be understood as a professional within a broader taxonomic 
domain (Figures 3.1 & 3.3, Section 3.1), encapsulated under the cover term security. 
Jurisdictionally physical security professionals are persons formally trained and skilled 
in the means of diagnosis, inference and treatment of loss or harm (security/crime) 
coupled risk concerns manifested through unlawful access and crime enablers to protect 
people, information or property.  
Physical security professionals relate to persons formally trained to apply validated 
techniques according to their jurisdiction’s verified knowledge base of the science or 
reasoning on which it is founded (2.4.1), (2.4.2), (2.4.3). Such knowledge is organised 
through a series of hierarchical relationships semantically related to the cover term 
security, which accordant with the writings of Smith and Brooks (2013), and Lab (2014) 
may initially stem from a vast array of other domain disciplines including: engineering, 
physics, architecture, criminology, psychology and sociology along with other domains 
that can contribute materials to such a fused knowledge system.  
Consistent with knowledge-based views of expertise, the cognitive perspective has 
been, and remains the strongest influence across learning paradigms. Such bodies of 
propositional knowledge are used to both inform and develop a higher education 
curriculum for the professions and provide a substantive base for professional practice 
to be reflected or benchmarked against. This includes subjects and supporting content as 
well as organised structure represented through symbols and heuristics as maps of 
domain specific declarative, propositional knowledge. Such maps or heuristics come in 
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many forms, and they become the domain’s symbols for communicating knowledge 
categories, concepts and their superordinate and subordinate relations (its structure). 
These heuristics or maps enhance understanding for novice learners and facilitate the 
remembering, either by recognition or recall, of ideas, materials or phenomena, and 
enable new knowledge structures to be built on their foundations, systematically 
integrating new information with previously established knowledge. In addition, these 
knowledge structures become cultural norms, standardised and taught to all new 
candidates of the profession setting as a minimum formal entry criteria to which 
competency can be assessed.  
Such a view is supported by the actions of many aspiring professions, who have, as part 
of their journey to professionalise, sought to establish their formal knowledge base 
(body of knowledge) within the higher education system. This is done so that 
dependable educational standards can be developed which provide society with the 
confidence to place in their trust crucial problems to be solved in an ethical and cost 
effective manner. Thus, without such a formal knowledge basis and its acceptance 
within the broader higher educational system, the security expert will remain an 
individual accomplishment, but as a profession will remain highly questionable and not 
supported by the broader public. In short, this literature highlights that the current state 
of security education does not meet the standards of other, better-established 
professional domains.  
In summary, the reviewed literature leads to the contention that the security domain as a 
minimum requires a generalizable ideal curriculum for each of its practice areas. Such a 
curriculum needs to explicitly state what the various security practice areas knowledge 
content includes, the structural properties of this content, and the internal relations along 
with broader academic attributes essential for professional practice. Only then can such 
a broad domain begin to be tied together accordant with definitions of security science 
(Section 3.7), and interconnected to the broader security domain. Formal bodies of 
knowledge can be codified, but they must be done through a structured formal process, 
a possibility which, for security education has not been explored holistically in previous 
research. As such, the study sought to develop cognitive maps of propositional 
knowledge that show both local relations and a macro organised structure towards 
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establishing a learning objective and generalizable knowledge system as a curriculum 
framework for institutions of higher education in the physical security realm.   
3.12 Conclusion 
This chapter established the educational guidelines for pursuing the development of a 
first iteration formal knowledge system for physical security professionals. Section 3.1 
positioned the physical security professional within the profession’s literature from 
Chapter 2. Then, Section 3.3 established a clear jurisdictional boundary for the study. 
Section 3.3 discussed defining a professional accordant with their body of knowledge, 
where section 3.4 presented a discussion on professional status within the security 
domain, and the ambiguity of security education (3.6) in relation to this literature. 
Section 3.7 discussed the concept of a higher education curriculum for security 
professionals; this was reinforced in Section 3.8, which explained a formal curriculum 
as a vehicle for furthering the notion of security science.  
The current debate of higher education’s roles for security professionals was discussed 
in Section 3.9. This was also reinforced in Section 3.10, which discussed the 
development and mapping of bodies of knowledge through formal research enquiry to 
reveal the content and structure of emerging professional domains. This discussion 
presented literature supporting focused research undertakings as a means of formally 
codifying occupational bodies of knowledge. The study’s reviewed literature was then 
fused together in Section 3.11 via a reflection. The reflection articulated how the 
reviewed literature influences the study’s enquiry boundary, research objectives and 
questions, and its methodological approach. The chapter then concluded with Section 
3.12.  
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Chapter 4: Research methodology 
Key Words: Exploratory, Descriptive, Explanatory, Validity, Instrument, Ethics. 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and describes the philosophical and methodological approach 
drawn on to achieve the study’s research outcomes. The study incorporated a 
methodological architecture, seated within an ethnographic enquiry, with its theoretical 
foundation within the constructivism paradigm (Tynjala, 1999, pp. 363-364). The 
research design exemplified a mixed-methods approach (Johnson & Christensen, 2004; 
Fraenkel, Wallen & Hyun, 2012, p. 558). This design included a literature critique in 
Phase One supported by expert enrichment through physical security professional’s 
views derived from interviews (Phase Two). Phase Three then undertook a 
Multidimensional Statistical Scaling (MDS) analysis to provide macro description of 
Phase One and Phase Two’s outcomes drawing on a larger participant sample. Finally, a 
focus group (Phase Four) was employed as a way of interpreting, from an educational 
perspective, Phase One, Two and Three’s outcomes in order to respond to research 
questions relating to physical security’s body of knowledge. The methodology 
comprised a pilot study to test the research process and a principal study adjusted from 
the pilot study findings.  
The study’s design is presented in Section 4.1, and its phases in Section 4.2. Section 
4.2.1 explains Phase One, the literature critique, as a means of exploring the explicit 
knowledge base of physical security. Then, Section 4.2.2 explains Phase Two, expert 
interviews to supplement the explicit knowledge base with expert’s implicit knowledge 
that was not revealed by the reviewed literature. The chapter then presents Phase Three 
of the study (4.2.3) as a means of discovering how macro properties of physical 
security’s body of knowledge are organised. The results from Phases One, Two and 
Three are educationally interpreted in Phase Four (4.2.4) where the qualitative and MDS 
solutions are considered by security experts towards establishing a desired curriculum 
framework based on a sample consensus body of knowledge. Furthermore, the chapter 
presents the reliability of the various phases, an explanation of the research instruments 
utilised (4.3) as well as limitations of the study accordant with the chosen research 
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methodology (4.4). Research ethical concerns (4.5) within the study are discussed 
followed by the chapter conclusion (4.6).  
4.2 Study methodological philosophy and design 
The study’s methodological approach and design was guided by the combined works of: 
Spradley (1979), Eden (1988), Bruner (1977), Balnaves and Caputi (2001), Marsh 
(2004) along with Bernard and Ryan (2010). From an educational standpoint Marsh’s 
(2004, p. 199) (Section 2.5.2) work highlighted that a fundamental question for any 
curriculum is ‘what should we teach’? Eden’s (1988, p. 8) work noted that such 
understanding comes from the detection of repeated themes and the construal of these 
using a construct system of finite number (Section 1.8). Whereas Bruner (1977, p. 19) 
conveyed that the better minds in a particular discipline should decide what constitutes 
the fundamental ideas and structure to be taught.  
From a research perspective, the writings of Balnaves and Caputi (2001) emphasised 
three salient categories of social science research including exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory typologies. According to Balnaves and Caputi (2001, p. 17) exploratory 
designs are valuable for investigating a new area of focus, where the goal is to discover 
themes and patterns in that area, as they put it, “what is there” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, 
p. 8). Yet descriptive research (qualitative or quantitative) seeks to provide a detailed 
outline of research observations (structure). Whereas explanatory research seeks to 
understand in detail the results obtained (Balnaves & Caputi, 2001, p. 17) in relation to 
the research enquiry.  
Drawing on such literature, the outcomes of the study required all three research 
category typologies, to explore, describe and understand the obtained data in relation to 
the study’s phase research questions and overarching research question (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Study research questions 
Phase Research Questions 
Phase One What are the explicit knowledge concept categories for physical security as 
represented through repeated themes printed in security texts and their 
structure? 
Phase Two What are the implicit knowledge categories, and instinctive structure used by 
security experts in achieving physical security risk mitigation not extracted 
from the literature critique?  
Phase Three What is physical security’s macro knowledge content structure as measured 
buried by multidimensional scaling? 
Phase Four Based on the extracted knowledge system, what are the knowledge requisites 
and supporting learning objectives for physical security professionals?  
Research 
 Question 
What is a desirable knowledge system (body of knowledge) for physical 
security professionals as conveyed through the published literature and 
accessible professionals? 
The study design included mixtures of both qualitative and quantitative research 
paradigms (Fraenkel, Wallen & Hyun, 2012, p. 557) where sequential phase outcomes 
(Tashakkori & Teddle, 1998, pp. 17-18; Johnson & Christensen, 2004, p. 51) were 
carried forward, informing the next phase of the study (Tashakkori & Teddle, 1998, pp. 
18-19). Such mixed methods designs are defined by Tashakkori and Teddle (1998, p. 
19) as “studies that are products of the pragmatist paradigm and that combine the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches within different phases of the research process”. 
The study’s design included a qualitative-quantitative-qualitative approach interlinking 
a number of discrete, interwoven, expert-centred phases where each phase had specific 
outcome objectives (Johnson & Christensen, 2004, p. 51) and supporting research 
questions (Figure 1.3). The literature and experts informed the development of two 
structural models which were interpreted (explained) through the use of an expert focus 
group. This approach was supported in the writings of Tashakkori and Teddle (1998, p. 
47) who explain that qualitative-quantitative sequences are common as many 
quantitative survey instruments (Phase Three) are developed from an exploratory 
qualitative process (Phases 1 & 2). Then Phase Four was informed by the work of 
Shepard, Romney and Nerlove (1972, p. 3) who pointed out that representations 
obtained from many quantitative approaches such as survey questionnaires including 
multidimensional scaling (Phase Three) are not the research end in themselves. Rather, 
the primary purpose of results is to facilitate a better understanding of the underlying 
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structural relations and clusters present in the map (Shepard, Romney & Nerlove, 1972, 
p. 3) (Phase Four).  
This approach was also supported in the writings of Abbott (1988) and Smith (2002). 
Abbott (1988, pp. 8-9) conveyed that professionals’ knowledge involves abstract 
knowledge, where the work of Smith (2002, p. 21) highlighted that experts within a 
discipline define the abstract structural acquisition of concepts from that discipline. 
Merging Abbott’s and Smith’s works, experts were used to develop and articulate the 
organized knowledge structure for the cultural domain of physical security.  
4.3 Study phases 
4.3.1 Phase One: Literature critique   
Qualitative studies are referred to as interpretative text studies (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, 
p. 4) and Phase One utilized such an approach to establish a qualitative benchmark, 
mapping physical security’s explicit knowledge and structure through literature critique. 
This approach drew on the format of Coole and Brook’s work (2011) but with a specific 
jurisdictional focus. The phase established detailed knowledge content (Table 6.18) and 
qualitative map (heuristic) (Figure 6.2) presenting thematic categorical data (nominal 
scale) of the relevant concepts, principles and theories within the written domain of 
physical security. This approach was informed by the work of Bernard and Ryan (2010, 
pp. 164-165) which explained that a cultural domain incorporates “an organised set of 
words, concepts or sentences, all of the same level of contrast, that jointly refer to a 
single conceptual sphere”, stating: 
Apples and oranges are the same level of contrast, where apples, oranges 
and lemons while contrasting, are all elements of fruit, but two levels of 
contrast: One level group oranges and lemons (as citrus fruits), but apples 
are a different kind of fruit, being more closely paired with pears and plums. 
(Bernard and Ryan, 2010, p. 164)  
This literature explained that to map the substantive knowledge structure for the cultural 
domain of physical security it was necessary to establish the repeated knowledge 
concept categories and their supporting elements or items represented within the printed 
domain. The printed domain literature presented the explicitly available domain 
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knowledge (Kumar, 1996, p. 26), as “by far the largest trove of qualitative data is the 
mountain of written texts that have been produced” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 14). 
Superordinate and subordinate concepts and domain principles were extracted through 
cultural domain key word analysis (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 164) and then organised 
according to frequency (Bedard & Chi, 1992; Ericsson & Charnes, 1997; Sternberg, 
1997; Zeitz, 1997; Tynjala, 1999). This approach focused on extracting nouns, verbs 
and synonyms and terms as they relate to physical protection and crime prevention 
concerns connected with physical security.  
The Collins Concise Dictionary (Krebs, 1981.) defines nouns as a word or group of 
words that refers to a person, place or thing (p. 881). Synonyms are defined as words 
that mean the same or nearly the same as another word, or a word or phrase used as 
another name for something (p. 1321), and synonymous is being a synonym or closely 
associated or suggestive (p. 1321). Whereas verbs are defined as any of a large class of 
words that serve to indicate the occurrence or performance of an action, and the 
existence of a state (p. 1445). The study utilized an annotated bibliographic approach to 
support this extraction where, congruous with the views of Smith (2002) as well as 
Nalla and Morash (2002, p. 9), the essential core functions or elements of a discipline 
are represented in its printed texts. The annotated bibliographic approach sought to 
establish clear contextual textual lineage with the physical security domain and relevant 
extracted concepts. 
Yet, the literature highlights that it is neither necessary, nor feasible, to begin 
information collection from scratch (Maher, & Burke, 1991, p. 13). Rather it is 
desirable to know what has been done and to utilize information and findings of other 
works as a guide. Thus the literature was initially explored to determine themes and 
issues that belong together, developing a rough framework of the main themes (Kumar, 
1996, p. 30) and patterns (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 8) towards “uncovering what’s 
there; experiencing the phenomenon being studied” (p. 8). In uncovering such themes or 
concepts and patterns within the literature the study drew on Kumar’s (1996, p. 31) 
work that accentuated the research paradox where “until you go through the literature 
you cannot develop a theoretical framework and until you have developed a theoretical 
framework, you cannot effectively review the literature”. Accordingly the study drew 
on priori themes to establish an efficient literature critique, which come from a 
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researcher’s own ‘first cut’ understanding of any phenomenon (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, 
p. 55). For example:  
If you are studying the night sky, it won’t take long to decide that there is a 
unique, large body (the moon), a few small bodies that don’t twinkle 
(planets), and millions of small bodies that do twinkle (stars). (Bernard & 
Ryan, 2010, p. 55)  
Consistent with the writings of Kumar (1996, p. 30) the main themes pertinent to the 
research topic were identified by reviewing selected texts utilizing a word count 
analysis, where words were sorted according to frequency count from highest to lowest. 
Then non-security related words were removed from the analysis such as: and, the, page 
and the like. The count analysis was then undertaken again; removing non-security 
related words, with a final count analysis undertaken. The top 49 security related words 
were then placed into an Excel table. The procedure was repeated for each reviewed 
text. Then word count data was combined through the merging of synonymous terms. 
Where words were merged their frequency counts were summed. Then another count 
analysis was conducted, and sorted from highest to lowest frequency of occurrence. 
This presented, through repetitive words, the 49 most frequently appearing security 
themes as superordinate and subordinate concepts relating to physical security risk 
concerns. The top 49 were tabulated accordant with their numerical values producing a 
text matrix (Table 6.16). This technique was accordant with the writings of Guest, 
MacQueen and Namey (2012, p. 6) who highlight that a mathematical analysis of text 
through frequency count is an orthodox form of qualitative analysis.  
 
For the Pilot Study, the Phase One literature extraction highlighted the superordinate 
and subordinate concepts to be carried forward into Phase Two (Table 5.4). However, in 
the Principal Study, the Phase One superordinate and subordinate concepts revealed by 
the literature extraction (Table 5. 8) were combined with concepts presented during the 
Pilot Study expert interview process (Table 6.17) to develop a Phase concept table 
(Table 6.18).  
  
The analysis of Phase One data drew on the concept of repetitions where according to 
Bernard and Ryan (2010, pp. 56-57) the more a word, concept, principle or theory as a 
P a g e  | 132 
 
noun, verb or phrase appears in a text the more likely it is a salient theme. This occurred 
through the development of a word list where key words were identified via an analysis 
of text’s contents pages and chapters utilizing Nvivo. Then a mathematical summation 
of occurrences was conducted (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 65) where themes were 
organised accordant with the repetitive values utilizing Nvivo then placed in an Excel 
spread sheet for further analysis to produce knowledge concept categories. Categories 
are the basic building blocks of qualitative data, as categories enable researches to make 
sense of their data. Furthermore, categories were organised into different levels of 
hierarchies as a folk taxonomy to produce Table 6.19. In this approach, consistent with 
the writings of Spradley (1979, pp. 138-139), Johnson and Christensen (2004, p. 511) 
and Bernard and Ryan (2010, p. 86) sets of subcategory data fell beneath a certain 
higher category, and that category fell beneath an even higher level category. For 
example, Johnson and Christensen (2004, p. 511) highlight the analysis process adopted 
within the study utilizing a fruit analogy: 
In the case of fruit, some possible subcategories are oranges, grapefruit, 
kiwi, apples and bananas. These are all subcategories because they are part 
of or types of the higher level category called fruit. Yet the category of fruit 
maybe the subcategory of a higher category called food group. Systems of 
categories such as this are called hierarchies because they are layered or fall 
into different levels.   
The Nvivo analysis complied with the writings of Johnson and Christensen (2004, p. 
502) who considered a meaningful unit (a segment) to be a single word, a sentence or a 
complete document; the key is that the segment must have a meaning that the researcher 
reasons should be documented. (Johnson & Christensen, 2004, p. 511) 
For structural relations Johnson and Christensen (2004, p. 515) claim that the objective 
is to establish relationships (relations or connections) between superordinate and 
subordinate categories within the data sets through mutually exclusive categories, 
defined as those that are clearly separate (contrasting) and distinct within the taxonomy. 
For example, Coole and Brooks (2011) highlighted detection as a hierarchical category, 
with internal detection and external detection, as subordinate, contrasting categories, 
supported by further subcategories such as application and contrasting key words such 
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as free standing (Figure 4.1). As a priori these works demonstrate and support the 
hierarchical proximal relations between security concepts to uncover knowledge 
structure. Accordant with the work of Spradley (1979, pp. 137-140) a macro-to-micro 
approach was adopted. Presenting the larger parts first, followed by parts included in 
those larger parts (internal organisation). 
Figure 4.1 The priori of Coole and Brooks (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 is consistent with the writings of Spradley (1979, p. 137), Johnson and 
Christensen (2004, p. 513) and Bernard and Ryan (2010, p. 164) showing the qualitative 
relations between the hierarchical category of detection and the relationships between 
the subordinate, contrasting categories of external and internal detection subsystems are 
established and explicitly highlighted.    
This research method was developed from the work of Spradley (1979), and tested and 
supported in Coole and Brooks (2011). Therefore, the study’s hierarchical analysis drew 
on these orderings as an already developed hierarchical system, referred to as a priori 
code. Priori codes are used when researchers bring an already developed coding scheme 
to the research project where the aim is to replicate or extend a specific line of enquiry 
(Johnson & Christensen, 2004, p. 508). The study utilized the assignment of categories 
and subcategories to analyse Phase One explicit literature data as this approach enabled 
the organisation of superordinate and subordinate knowledge concepts of physical 
security’s knowledge categories through key words (codes) which became themes, into 
a researcher-centred cognitive map (Figure 7.4; See Section 1.8).  
Therefore, for the Pilot Study, the Phase One literature extraction highlighted the 
superordinate and subordinate concepts to be carried forward into Phase Two (Table 
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5.4). These were ordered into a preliminary knowledge structure congruent with the 
work of Spradley (1979, p. 137) by drawing initially on the priori of Coole and Brooks 
(2011) to develop a Phase One hierarchical table (Table 5.5) and heuristic (Figure 5.1). 
For the Principal Study, the Phase One superordinate and subordinate concepts revealed 
by the literature extraction (Table 6. 16) were combined with concepts presented during 
the Pilot Study expert interview process (Table 6.17) to develop a Phase concept table 
(Table 6.18). Concepts were then hierarchically organised using a deductive analytical 
process to develop a Phase hierarchical table (Table 6.19) and heuristic (Figure 6.2). 
Physical security professionals were presented with the Phase concept table, 
hierarchical table and heuristic during Phase Two of the study. 
4.3.1.1	Exploratory	Phase	Reliability	and	Validity	
Supporting the reliability and validity of the literature critique and initial map is the 
argument emphasised by Silverman (2002, p. 229) that such textual data are in principle 
reliable sources for analysis. To achieve a valid result the software program Nvivo was 
utilized using a count analysis of occurrences, providing objective categories external 
from the researcher. The use of software tools for qualitative analysis is supported in the 
writings of Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006, p. 274) who point out that computers are both 
useful and more efficient in completing some tasks and can improve productivity in a 
research enterprise. In addition, the data extraction was supported through expert 
interviews (Phase Two) providing a degree of validation to Phase One outcomes.  
4.3.2 Phase Two: Expert enrichment  
Informed by the writings of Maher and Burke (1991, p. 13) and Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison (2000, p. 267), Phase Two sought to enrich Phase One outcomes through 
semi-structured interviews (Phase Two). The aim was to enhance the knowledge 
category corpus (Table 6.18) and further develop the shared (concept) heuristic (Table 
6.19 & Figure 6.2) drawing on the more implicit knowledge of experts (See Section 
1.8). Semi-structured interviews are common in qualitative research where a researcher 
draws on participants as constructors of knowledge (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 57). 
As Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000, p. 267) explain, interviews consider that 
knowledge is something generated between people, often through conversation. Given 
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that a basic objective of research is to combine both existing and new information into 
contemporary knowledge outcomes (Maher & Burke, 1991, pp. 6-13), interviews 
provide a systematic means of discussing the domain area under investigation, thus 
constructing knowledge in research. 
 
In addition, interviews are also a means to check the accuracy of, or to verify or refute 
the impressions a researcher makes towards their initial data (Fraenkel, 2012, p. 450) 
providing a degree of member checking (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Therefore, this 
phase also embeds a confidence level towards Phase One outcomes. Accordant with the 
writings of Bernard and Ryan (2010, p. 29) this method consisted of asking participants 
questions relating to Phase One outcomes and having them draw on their knowledge to 
extend on obtained results to date for further evaluation (Fraenkel, 2012, p. 451).  
 
Therefore, Phase Two sought to extract new information (Fraenkel, 2012, p. 451) held 
implicitly by the experts, adding additional knowledge or practice requisites and 
enhanced local connections with other content areas. The interview participants for the 
study (security experts) stemmed from the broad fields highlighted in Table 1.2 with a 
concentration towards physical security (Table 5.6 & 7.2). This utilized a small sample 
for both the pilot study (N = 3) and the principal study (N = 9), as it is well 
acknowledged in the research literature that for such studies (qualitative) very few 
participants are required (Rundblad, 2006, p. 2). As Kopala and Suzuki (1999, p. 38) 
state, “qualitative research is exploratory, done with a smaller research sample focusing 
on a relatively unknown subject, and is often a precursor to quantitative means”. The 
aim was to add experts’ implicit knowledge to the depth of the literature critique 
(explicit knowledge) due to their specialised subject matter expertise and where possible 
add expert validation to the conceptual map (Member checking). The expert interviews 
elicited knowledge concept categories that were not uncovered during the literature 
critique phases, yet considered essential for professional practice by the experts.  
 
Participants were contacted via telephone call or email and asked if they would 
participate in the study based on their professional standing or due to professional 
referral. The genuine purpose of the research was explained to solicited professionals. 
Once participants agreed, a time was arranged that was suitable for both the participants 
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and the researcher. Interviews were conducted either at the researcher’s office, the 
participant’s place of selection or via telephone. All participants were provided with an 
information sheet and informed of the study’s objectives, along with an informed 
consent form prior to commencement of the formal interview. Once informed consent 
was notarised the interview commenced. All interviews were recorded utilizing a digital 
recorder and later transcribed verbatim for analysis through a transcription service.   
 
The focus was on presenting extracted knowledge concept categories (Fraenkel, Wallen 
& Hyun, 2012, p. 453) from Phase One outcomes including Phase One knowledge 
concept tables, hierarchical tables and qualitative heuristics to the experts towards 
cueing their richly cross referenced professional knowledge of the physical security 
domain from their long term working memory. For the pilot study, the phase objective 
was therefore to draw out implicit knowledge concepts not extracted from the reviewed 
texts. However, for the principal study the phase objective was to present to the experts 
the extracted concepts from the literature along with those novel concepts extracted 
from the experts in the pilot study as a fused taxonomic framework and seek additional 
knowledge concept categories not yet uncovered. 
 
Furthermore, due to participant feedback there were slight differences in the interview 
questions used between the pilot and principle studies. Notably a question regarding the 
merging of synonymous terms towards developing a common language priori for the 
principal study was removed. This approach was informed by the work of Manunta 
(1999) who highlighted that security lacks such common language. The issue of 
common language in research was noted by Jaques (1989, p. 7) which expressed that 
any true science must have a language of univocally defined concepts. Jaques stated, 
“without such clear meaning it is impossible to think, or to test propositions, or to talk 
to one another with any hope of understanding; and you certainly cannot train people”. 
Nevertheless, on review of the pilot study data and participants’ feedback this procedure 
was not continued in the principal study. Participants felt that a study of language in 
security was a study in and of itself, and as such, the principal study adopted the lead of 
Brooks (2008, p. 154) and did not attempt to provide precise concept definition, 
allowing the experts to define their own understanding through relationship of concepts 
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or knowledge structure.  The final outcome of this phase was the refinement of the 
phase knowledge tables, hierarchical tables and knowledge heuristics. 
  
Phase Two of the study used a qualitative, interpretative approach for interview analysis 
(Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2000, p. 282) within the content and thematic analysis 
paradigms (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 260). This method incorporated both 
inductive and deductive approaches, sequentially guided by the physical security 
taxonomy of Coole and Brooks (2011). The inductive analysis was used to identify 
content in terms of initial concepts that emerged from the interview data transcripts. 
Content analysis led to the development of themes. Emerging themes supported the 
redevelopment of the map (priori) by drawing on experts’ implicit knowledge. The term 
theme/s was drawn on as an expression to explain the fundamental notions a researcher 
is attempting to describe which are referred to in social science through different terms 
by different authors (Bernard & Ryan, 2010), such as categories (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994), labels (Dey, 1993:96), segments (Tesch, 
1990), thematic units (Krippendorff, 1980b), data bits (Dey, 1993) and chunks (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).  
This study followed Miles and Huberman’s (1994) lead and used the term categories to 
represent thematic meaning. As such, themes were systematically grouped and 
converted into content then category codes through segmentation articulated by Johnson 
and Christensen (2004, p. 502) as “the inductive dividing of data into meaningful units”, 
stating “when you segment the text data, you read the text line-by-line asking if a 
specific segment is present and what is it’s specific meaning which may be of 
importance for this study”? Categories were represented in separate phase tables, one 
for explicit (Phase One) knowledge concepts (table 6.18) and one for implicit (Phase 
Two) (7.2) knowledge concepts and integrated into both a Phase (7.3) then hierarchical 
table (7.4) followed by a heuristic map (Figure 7.2) accordant with the representation 
developed by Coole and Brooks (2011).  
This approach is supported within the broader research literature, where Liamputtong 
and Ezzy (2006, p. 259) contend that the majority of qualitative research incorporates a 
combination of inductive then deductive theorizing. Accordant with this literature, the 
inductive analysis identified physical security themes using line-by-line analysis of 
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content within the interview transcripts towards generating additional knowledge 
themes, to be integrated into the existing table (Table 6.18) and heuristic (Figure 6.2). 
Then the deductive analysis was drawn on to organise the participant’s new knowledge 
categories and subordinate concepts and elements into the Phase Two’s data set. 
Deductive theorizing occurs through building from pre-existing knowledge, an 
approach supported in the writings of Ausubel (1968; Novak, 1993; Fraser, 1993; 
Tynjala, 1999) who collectively express that knowledge changes over time as it is 
constructed with new information added to prior knowledge.  
Integrated with Phase One outcomes, the semi-structured interview questionnaire data 
(Phase Two) developed a combined textual and expert group, steered knowledge table 
(Table 7.3). Through deductive theorizing, a hierarchical table (Table 7.4) was 
developed accordant with the works of Spradley (1979, p. 137), Johnson and 
Christensen (2004, p. 513) and Bernard and Ryan (2010, p. 164) indicating local 
relationships centred on mutually exclusive categories. Accordingly, a heuristic figure 
(Figure 7.2) of knowledge categories, concepts and subordinate concepts, theories and 
practice principles within the cultural domain of physical security was developed. This 
was achieved by making physical connections between hierarchical table (Table 7.4) 
contents to produce Figure (7.2) a qualitative hierarchical knowledge structure heuristic 
that graphically presents a snap shot of physical security’s knowledge system. 
Nevertheless, such an analysis only shows local connections rather than macro 
structure, as Bernard and Ryan (2010, p. 169) point out, the whole idea of a cultural 
domain is that the content is shared.  Phase Two was therefore enhanced through Phase 
Three.  
The development of Phase Three was informed by the writings of Bernard and Ryan 
(2010, p. 169) who state “once we know content of a cultural domain, the next step is to 
examine how they are related to each other, which can be achieved by asking 
participants within the domain how similar or dissimilar content is” (p. 171). Therefore 
the knowledge table (Table 7.4) qualitative heuristic was used to inform Phase Three, 
the development of a multidimensional statistical scaling (MDS) survey questionnaire 
to be administered to a larger research sample where the outcome would reveal the 
macro structure as informed by a larger participant sample.   
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Interview data was recorded and transcribed verbatim supporting truthfulness in 
reporting (Schensul, LeCompte, Nastasi & Borgatti, 1999). Then following analysis 
converted into knowledge category codes, using both the priori of Coole and Brooks 
(2011), and then integrated into the existing map. This provided step one in establishing 
trustworthiness and validity in Phase Two’s outcomes. From this point further reliability 
of Phase Two stemmed from the view that qualitative data itself is not what is 
questioned, but rather the inferences drawn from them (Maxwell, 1992, p. 283). As 
Maxwell (1992, p. 284) explains, for qualitative data that validity is not a sole product 
of any methodology, rather it pertains to the data accounts, or conclusions reached. 
Therefore, both descriptive and interpretative validity techniques were employed within 
Phase Two.  
Descriptive validity refers to factual accuracy of participant accounts, and was achieved 
utilizing a narrative account of what participants said. Along with the transcripts the 
narrative account provided trustworthiness, where the narrative supported by the 
transcripts provides such qualitative validity. Descriptive validity was supported by 
interpretative validity, which relates to the proper denotation of what participants said. 
This was achieved again utilizing the narrative account, through participants’ own 
language, relying as much as possible on participants’ own words and concepts 
(Maxwell, 1992, p. 289). Then, where possible, categories of knowledge participants 
responded as important were supported through text references acknowledging such 
requisite, providing a degree of triangulation in the data (Creswell & Miller, 200, p. 
126) as well.  In addition, consistent with Phase One’s reliability and validity, where 
possible outcomes were taken to other participants within the phase providing a degree 
of verification through member checking (Creswell & Miller, 2000).  
4.3.3 Phase Three: MDS analysis  
Phase Three was informed by the writings of Bernard and Ryan (2010, p. 111), who 
articulated that for social science a salient focus is towards uncovering how properties 
of enquiry are related. This Phase required a purposive sample of participants of an 
international nature to facilitate a multidimensional statistical scaling (MDS) analysis 
which sought to capture a psychometric map of security professionals organized 
knowledge structure for the cultural domain of physical security. This approach was 
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supported in the literature of Smith (2002, p. 21) who expressed that the substantive or 
subject matter of a domain are cognitive in nature. Cognitive studies seek to uncover 
mental representations or cognitive structures and their processes of change within a 
domain (Tynjala, 1999, p. 367), where internal representations of complex data may be 
represented in n-space (Michon, 1972, pp. 92-94). Bernard and Ryan (2010, p. 115) 
express such representations are achievable through the use of proximity matrices which 
represent domain content according to their similarity or dissimilarity (Bernard & Ryan, 
2010, p. 115).  
Phase Three’s objective was achieved using proximity matrices questionnaires that 
asked participants to rate relations, or proximities, between content items, where people 
judge the psychological distance or closeness of survey items (Kruskal, 1978, p. 9). 
These ratings facilitated geographical representation of how related individual 
knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts were considered (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, 
pp. 111-115). This phase was also informed by the writings of Kruskal (1978, p. 6), 
who explains that the perceived similarity or dissimilarity between any two items may 
be expressed numerically. Thus, in similarity matrices the higher the number in each 
data cell, the higher the relationship (correlation) there is between these two items and 
the more alike they are perceived to be (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 117). However, 
further informed by the writings of Giguere (2006), the study drew on dissimilarity data, 
where the further apart items are perceived to be the larger the numerical distance rating 
between items are and the further apart they appear in n-dimensional space.  
MDS employs an algebraic equation to summarize proximity matrices’ data as this 
equation has a geometric counterpart enabling the development of the information data 
picture (p. 59). Consistent with the literature this mathematical procedure represents 
dissimilarities of knowledge items spatially in a geographical map (Schiffman, 
Reynolds and Young, 1981, p. xv; p. 57). This reflects the hidden structure in the data 
making it easier to comprehend (Kruskal, 1978, p. 6). As Gonzalvo, Canas and Bajo 
(1994, p. 601) reiterate, “people’s judgements of the relatedness or similarity between 
the members of pairs of concepts are assumed to capture the underlying organization of 
semantic knowledge”.  
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In general, MDS results in a table of subjective distances between pairs of items 
(Michon, 1972, p. 93), arranging data into a table (data matrix) according to a shape 
typology. The literature indicates two MDS matrix shape typologies, a square and 
rectangular array (Schiffman, Reynolds and Young, 1981, p. 57). This study employed a 
square array as it sought to represent domain content according to their dissimilarity 
with every other item in the matrix, where a square matrix has the same number of rows 
as it does columns (p. 57) and is symmetrical (Figure 4.2) (Kruskal, 1978, p. 12). This 
means that every item in the matrix is related to every other item, providing a map of 
content structure accordant with all content.  
Figure 4.2 A square MDS data matrix 
  
 
 
 
 
As an example, Figure 4.2 represents a square MDS data matrix and its supporting 
geographical map locating each US city in an n-dimensional space in which distance 
between pairs reflects individual city proximities of the corresponding cities (Gonzalvo, 
Canas & Bajo, 1994, pp. 601-602). The figure demonstrates the proximity in the first 
column between item 1 (Atlanta) and each of the succeeding items, the second column 
shows the proximities between item 2 (Chicago) and succeeding items and so on (p. 
14). The square typology presents the similarity judgements of all pairs of items 
(Schiffman, Reynolds & Young, 1981, p. 57) where  the symmetric aspects of the 
matrix show that the proximities in the upper half of the matrix are equal to those in the 
lower half (Kruskal, 1978, p. 9; Schiffman, Reynolds & Young, 1981, p.14). Thus, 
where variable X (New York) was highly correlated with variable Y (Washington D.C.) 
then these two variables were numerically closer and situated close together on the 
MDS plot, however the larger the value the further apart or dissimilar two items are 
(Breakwell, Hammond & Fife-Schaw, 2000, p. 390). 
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The use of MDS in the third phase of the study is supported through the writings of 
Michon (1972, p. 92) as well as Schiffman, Reynolds and Young (1981, pp. 3-9). These 
authors explain that multidimensional scaling is a viable technique suitable for 
investigating cognitive space representations of complex data sets based on their 
similarities and dissimilarities. As a research methodology MDS is suitable for 
revealing the underlying dimensions on which study participants base their judgements 
relating to knowledge structures across a domain (Zeitz, 1997, p. 52). As such, the 
phase objectives of MDS was to (a) represent the semantic dimensions (diagnosis & 
treatment) underlying the knowledge domain and (b) to arrange the concepts in the 
dimensional space (Gonzalvo, Canas & Bajo, 1994, pp. 601-602) presenting both 
dimensionality and clustering for analysis (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 116).  
The psychometric instrument used for the purpose of the MDS analysis was based on 
the results of Phase Two. Body of knowledge concepts were extracted from the Phase 
Two hierarchical knowledge table (Table 7.7) and heuristic map (Figure 7.4) to develop 
an MDS survey questionnaire instrument. However, as per the writings of Giguere 
(2006, p. 30) MDS questionnaires require all content items to be related to all other 
content items, resulting in potentially large and unworkable survey questionnaires. As 
such, it was necessary to reduce the number of judgements required by participants. 
Therefore a deductive data reduction procedure was again undertaken, where items 
subordinate to a clear superordinate category were removed producing Table 8.5, a list 
of 24 knowledge categories and subordinate content areas. Then all items were matched 
to each other for judgement ratings in a Qualtrics based MDS survey questionnaire.  
This questionnaire was then divided into two conditions (a and b) accordant with the 
writings of Giguere (2006, p. 26) who acknowledged that often the number of item pairs 
in a design might be too high to be judged by a single participant and as such, pairs may 
be distributed over participants randomly assigned to different conditions of the 
instrument, with the set of pairs being judged by different participants completely 
independently. The questionnaire was then launched electronically via email, where 
Qualtrics as a research program managed the random assignment, data collection and 
initial statistical analysis, including mean and standard deviation scores. Data collection 
was allocated a three-month collection period, after which the survey was closed and 
results extracted.  
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The MDS survey questionnaire measured expert’s ratings as ordinal level data as 
according to Searle (2007. p. 103) data including attitudes, opinions or ratings are to be 
treated as such. Therefore, while there are many MDS algorithms including ALSCAL, 
INDSCAL/SINDSCAL, POLYCON, MIMISSA and KRYST (Schiffman, Reynolds 
and Young, 1981, p. xv) this study used the ALSCAL algorithm which is suitable for 
both metric and non-metric scaling (Schiffman, Reynolds & Young, 1981, p. 169) and 
represents the best method to process ordinal data, capturing expert’s perceived 
(Bernard & Ryan, 2010) ratings of knowledge concepts (Fraenkel, Wallen & Hyun, 
2012, p. 138) for analysis. 
Data categories were entered into an IBM SPSS data file in matrix format. This was 
done for symmetrical data (square matrix), with the upper triangle missing. Horizontal 
and vertical column variables represented body of knowledge category data, which were 
assigned coded acronyms, as SPSS does not provide for enough characters to type in 
full category names. These acronyms were used as category identifiers in the output 
graphs. Then dissimilarity data in the form of mean ratings were manually inputted into 
the SPSS data matrix sheet. Then, default values were entered into SPSS which 
included: data format as proximities-dissimilarities, data level, being ordinal, condition 
being Matrix, Model being Euclidean, dimension-both two and three were selected and 
run, Plot- common space-Transformed proximities vs. distance was selected along with 
all sources. Data was transformed into an MDS data map, showing macro structure.        
Data analysis occurred through placing values in a half matrix configuration into an 
IBM SPSS program, where each item was represented by a point, where xi indicates the 
point which corresponded to the ith item. X is used to indicate the entire configuration of 
points Xଵ,...,X୍. By utilizing a coordinate system each point can be represented by 
coordinates. The distances between two points xi and xj are indicated algebraically as: 
൫x୧, x୨൯ ൌ distance	from	x୧	to	x୨. This is simplified to d୧୨= dሺx୧, x୨), where distances, 
unless indicated, refers to Euclidean distance. The central point of MDS is that distances  
d୧୨ between the points should correspond to the proximities δ୧୨ (pp. 15-17). This, 
(Figure 9) results in main diagonal of the matrix (upper left to the lower right) consist of 
0’s, and a symmetrical matrix. Yet as pointed out by Kruskal (1978, p. 15) MDS 
calculations are complex, where even the simplest versions are performed through 
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computer modelling. Nevertheless, provides the algorithm (1) for the ALSCAL scaling 
procedure.  
δre ൌ ൝෍ሺxri െ xsiሻଶ
୧
ൡ
ଵ/ଶ
 
(1) 
Through this procedure MDS revealed the data structure in the simplest terms possible 
(Borg & Groenen, 2005, p. 9). Both, dimensionality and underlying knowledge concept 
clusters were of interest for the study as the study sought to understand content, 
structure and relationships, along with potential sequencing as a means of informing a 
desirable curriculum framework. Dimensionality sought to show how the domain 
knowledge structure was organised at a macro level. Perceived distances 
(dissimilarities) revealed concept boundaries or separation towards articulating the 
knowledge domains as sub-category content areas of physical security and their 
subordinate concepts as content matter within the various sub-domains. Such an 
analysis is argued to be valid as MDS is a valid technique for capturing structural 
knowledge within a domain (Gonzalvo, Canas & Bajo, 1994, p. 602) where at the heart 
of MDS analysis is the dissimilarity or similarity judgements among pairs of objects as 
distances between points of low-dimensional multidimensional space (Borg & Groenen, 
2005, p. 3) for recovering underlying structure of relationships among a group of items 
(Sciffman, Reynolds & Young, 1981, p. 19). The two-dimensional map showed the 
concepts within physical security’s body of knowledge in proper relative yet separated 
positions to one another (Schiffman, Reynolds & Young, 1981, p. 6) as an MDS 
perceptual space is useful in revealing and understanding order (Schiffman, Reynolds & 
Young, 1981, p. 13).  
A limitation of MDS is the number of dimensions researchers can conceptualise. 
According to Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Shaw (2000, p. 392) three dimensions is 
the maximum that most people can cognitively manage. This results in an MDS analysis 
reducing the variables down into 2-3 or a maximum of 4 dimensions. Reducing the 
dimensions puts stress on the data output, affecting its reliability as it restricts the 
expression of variables true dimensionality due to mathematical constraints of the MDS. 
Stress may also be referred to as the alienation coefficient which ranges between 0 and 
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1 and is a goodness of fit measure considering how much the data deviates from the best 
possible fit. A stress measure of 0 implies perfect modelling, resulting in a perfect 
dimensional fit or space configuration (Kruskal, 1978, p. 25). According to this scale 
the smaller the coefficient the less pressure exists in the data set and therefore the better 
the data fit within the MDS solution. However, as Kruskal (1978, p. 25) points out, it is 
not truly possible to achieve a stress score of 0 for any given data set. There are several 
methods to measure stress for MDS and this study adopted STRESS1. To overcome the 
potential of a large stress measure the study drew on face validity to assess the variable 
set drawn from Phase Two of the study and incorporated a number of trials or iterations 
to reduce the measure of error in the MDS analysis (Schiffman, Reynolds and Young, 
1981, p. 7).  
In addition, validity was tested against the MDS source data, using Cronbach’s Alpha. 
This measures reliability through an alpha coefficient between 0 and 1. A measure of 0 
for Cronbach’s Alpha means that the source data are unreliable, whereas a measure of 1 
represents perfectly reliable source data (Allen & Bennett, 2012, p. 211). For the 
principal study Cronbach’s Alpha produced a high (α=.913) value, indicating sound 
reliability and validity for the Phase Three survey questionnaire knowledge concept 
categories association with physical security.  
Furthermore, as a research methodology MDS has the advantage of being low in 
experimenter contamination (Schiffman, Reynolds and Young, 1981, p. 3). In addition, 
Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Schaw (2000, p. 390) explain another benefit of MDS as 
a research methodology is that the structure of the data can be examined in two salient 
ways. First, the regionality of the space can be examined to identify regions occupied by 
a particular group of variables, which for this study highlight specific sub-knowledge 
domains and respective separations. Second, the shape of the data plot can be examined 
to see if the variables arrange themselves in a straight-line or a circle. According to 
Gonzalvo, Canas and Bajo (1994, p. 602) and Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Schaw 
(2000, p. 390), MDS captures global structural properties, an outcome recommended by 
Rogers (2000, p. 66) who explained the necessity to define the common threads that 
bind the diverseness of the domain together from the broadest possible perspective.  
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MDS is a valid technique to discover the underlying perceptual dimensions that people 
use to distinguish among items in a cultural domain (Schensul, LeCompte, Natasi & 
Borgatti, 1999, p. 138). Congruent with the mixed-model design (Fraenkel, et al, 2012, 
p. 558), Phase Three provided a description of the cultural domain knowledge concepts 
and subordinate concepts drawn from Phases One and Two in terms of shared 
knowledge including categories, content and their interrelationships as a systematized 
knowledge structure. 
4.3.4 Phase Four: Expert focus group  
Phase Four sought to understand Phase Two and Three’s outcomes from an educational 
standpoint using a purposive sample of security experts (n=7) in a focus group 
paradigm. This phase compared the qualitative concept map (Figure 7.4) and MDS 
solution (Figure 8.2) in terms of a desired curriculum framework in relation to the 
epistemic aspects of the body of knowledge within a discourse analysis approach. The 
phase also enabled experts to add final (implicit) knowledge to the structure and 
articulate where their individual knowledge organisationally fit into the existing 
knowledge structures (cognitive maps).  
Focus groups are defined by Khan and Manderson (1992, p. 57) as a qualitative 
methodology which aim to describe and appreciate perceptions, interpretations and 
beliefs of a specifically selected population to understand a particular foci from the 
perspective of the group participants. As Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006, p. 77) explain, 
such groups have shared social and cultural experiences or shared particular areas of 
concern.  
Focus groups involve a discussion between a researcher and more than one other 
individual (Schensul, 1999, p. 51). Such interviews are useful for obtaining participant’s 
interpretations of results gathered in earlier research (Schensul, LeCompte, Nastasi & 
Borgatti 1999, p. 52), which for this study included the earlier phase outcomes. The 
strength of focus groups is their capacity to produce data and insight that would be less 
accessible without the interaction found in a group (p. 52). The work of Liamputting 
and Ezzy (2006, p. 80) highlighted that such groups can be used in a variety of ways 
and are suitable for mixed-methods studies, enhancing the outcomes of other phases. 
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Phase Four acknowledged that amelioration of knowledge content could only be 
achieved by having experts draw on their personal understanding and shared 
experiences of the knowledge concepts represented within the knowledge maps due to 
their specialization. This was due to their extensive, implicit knowledge and experience 
(Zeitz, 1997, pp. 14-55) considered valuable in articulating educational requisites of 
core knowledge categories and their elementary subordinate subject matter for physical 
security professionals.  
Consistent with Phase Two, participants were selected based on their professional 
standing, peer referral, or explicit status as published experts within the security 
domain. Once identified potential participants were approached via email, telephone or 
through industry association meetings. The focus groups were established based on a 
suitable day and time for participants.  
At the commencement of the focus groups all participants were provided with an 
informed consent form for signature, where it was expressed that participation is 
voluntary. Once informed consent was notarised participants were reminded that the 
focus group would be recorded for later analysis. For the focus groups the researcher 
acted as the group moderator introducing, through semi-structured questionnaire, the 
topics of interest and facilitated the group discussion in relation to the desired phase 
outcomes. This phase presented the qualitative and MDS representations from Phases 
Two and Three, as it was premised that these structures highlighted superordinate 
categories and subordinate concepts of subject areas required by physical security 
professionals for practice within their domain and therefore should be included in a 
physical security curriculum. 
For the pilot study, the questionnaire and supporting information was presented at the 
commencement of the focus group. However, as a result of feedback from the pilot 
study, a different approach was used for the primary study whereby participants were 
emailed, a week before their focus group, an explanatory sheet, along with the Phase 
Two’s knowledge table (Table 7.6), hierarchical table (Table 7.7), qualitative heuristic 
(Figure 7.4) and MDS solution (Figure 8.2) and focus group interview questionnaire. 
This provided them with the ability to understand the questionnaire in relation to the 
previous phase outputs, as they were being asked to draw on these data outputs to 
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provide their expertise towards establishing a desirable knowledge system for future 
physical security professionals.  
In addition, at the end of the primary study’s focus group, participants were asked to 
write down what they saw as desirable learning objectives for a physical security 
curriculum on provided note pads. These were later scanned in (Appendix D) for 
analysis. The primary study also included an independent note taker who recorded and 
transcribed the proceedings (Appendix E). 
The focus group interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim into written text 
(Martin, 2000, p. 15) where, consistent with the writings of Schensul, LeCompte, 
Nastasi and Borgatti (1999), this enabled close and repeated analysis of the data. This 
transcribed text facilitated interpretation and highlighted positions towards the abstract 
body of knowledge as was represented by the qualitative and MDS maps.  
Focus group data was analysed using a qualitative, interpretative approach (Cohen, 
Manion & Morrison, 2000, p. 282) within the content and thematic analysis paradigms 
(Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 260). This method incorporated both inductive and 
deductive approaches. Analysis commenced with coding of participant’s responses to 
the semi-structured interview questionnaire. Furthermore, for allocating content areas 
with their occupational category roles colour codes where assigned to knowledge 
categories relating to diagnosing (yellow), inferring or reasoning (pink), treatment 
(blue) or professional practice (orange) and then concepts fitted to these categories as 
appropriate. This combined with the written transcript, and participant’s written 
objectives (primary study only), provided a means to interpret or bring to light 
knowledge requisites and their supporting learning objectives based on the organisation 
(structure) of physical security’s knowledge systems.  
Descriptive validity was achieved drawing on a narrative account of what participants 
said, supported by the transcripts as a measure of trustworthiness. Descriptive validity 
was supported by interpretative validity, reaching findings through the use of 
participant’s own language, relying as much as possible on participant’s own words and 
concepts (Maxwell, 1992, p. 289). Descriptive and interpretative validity combined 
provided confidence in the focus group analysis. In addition, reliability and validity was 
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embedded into the mixed-methods design as it applied methodological triangulation 
using different methods and/or types of data to study the same research question. In this 
approach the strength of one method offset potential weakness within others (Fraenkel, 
Wallen & Hyun, 2012, p. 559) where data was continually taken back to the experts for 
validity of interpretation. For instance, experts’ opinions explaining the structural map 
of physical security’s body of knowledge was drawn on to explain and validate the 
structural representation towards articulating a shared, desirable body of knowledge 
within the participant sample. 
Validity was further enhanced through the use of an independent note taker whose notes 
(Appendix E) were used for cross referencing key themes emerging from this phase of 
the study. Combined these approaches sought to establish trustworthiness and validity 
in Phase Four’s findings. Further reliability of Phase Four stemmed from Maxwell’s 
(1992, p. 283) work, emphasizing the use of both descriptive and interpretative validity. 
For qualitative research Maxwell (1992, p. 284) explained that validity is not a sole 
product of any methodology, rather it pertains to the data accounts, or conclusions 
reached. 
The focus groups were used in this phase of the study to clarify what the experts 
considered essential as an epistemic framework for graduate level physical security 
professionals including the articulation of broad educational objectives. In addition, 
where convergence did not initially occur, the group interviews enabled such dissention 
to be teased out through discussion towards achieving consensual support. Due to the 
complexity of this phase’s objectives, outcomes were best achieved through a focus 
group analysis.  
4.4 Research instruments 
The study required three research instruments. 
4.4.1 Instrument No. 1: Semi-structured interview questionnaire (1) 
Research instrument number one, a semi-structured questionnaire for use in expert 
interviews (Appendix A-pilot study) (Appendix D-primary study), was developed from, 
and incorporated the enhanced physical security heuristic resulting from Phase One of 
the study. This instrument presented visually specific knowledge concepts, subordinate 
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concepts and structures within physical security’s body of knowledge to security 
experts. Security experts were asked to respond with their acceptance of and/or 
disagreement of knowledge concepts as they were represented within the heuristic. In 
addition, experts were asked if they knew of sources which explicitly provide for further 
knowledge concepts or personally knew (implicit) knowledge which should be added to 
the heuristic and where their individual knowledge organisationally fitted into the 
existing knowledge structure (heuristic). This semi-structured interview questionnaire 
was aimed towards cueing individual expert’s knowledge from their long term memory 
(LTM) and ensuring that their knowledge inputs are richly cross referenced with other 
knowledge concepts within the domain structure to provide the nominal scale data for 
Phase Three.  
4.4.2 Instrument No. 2: Multidimensional scaling survey instrument 
Research instrument number two (Appendix B-pilot study), (Appendix E-primary 
study) a multidimensional scaling survey questionnaire, was developed from the 
physical security knowledge concepts, principles, theories and underpinning 
subordinate concepts resulting from Phase Two. This approach is supported in the 
writings of Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Shaw (2000, p. 393) who explain that even 
when undertaking exploratory research, such methods do require some theoretical 
expectations of what they might find. That is, the selection of variables will have to be 
informed by some theoretical position. This is referred to as a priori expectation, and for 
this it is best to have a yardstick (p. 385).  Thus, Phase Three drew on the data set 
resulting from Phase Two as its yard stick. The MDS survey instrument listed paired 
physical security concepts where experts rated their perceptions of similarity or 
dissimilarity on a sliding scale (See Schiffman, Reynolds & Young, 1981, p. 23). 
Instrument validity was assessed for face validity supported by a pilot study trial run.      
4.4.3 Instrument No. 3: Focus group interview questionnaire  
Research instrument number three, an interview questionnaire for use with the focus 
groups, (Appendix C-pilot study), (Appendix F-primary study) was developed from, 
and incorporated the qualitative and MDS structural maps of physical security body of 
knowledge resulting from Phases Two and Three of the study. This instrument 
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presented visually specific knowledge concepts and structures within physical security’s 
body of knowledge and their subordinate concepts to security experts. As stated by 
Fraenkel, Wallen and Hyun (2012, p. 558) mixed-methods research includes the cross-
referencing of qualitative and quantitative methods to highlight convergence in research 
findings. As such, security experts were asked to respond with their acceptance of and 
or disagreement of knowledge concepts as they are represented within the domain maps 
towards supporting or refuting convergence in the data.  
4.5 Limitations 
All studies are subject to limitations (Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Shaw, 2000, p. 
247) and given the mixed-methods research design, a number of limitations within each 
phase of the study must be acknowledged.  
Phase One drew on a literature critique as a means to extract explicit knowledge 
concepts and subordinate concepts for articulating a physical security body of 
knowledge. As such, the first limitation within the study is the initial review of 
literature. As Kumar (1996, p. 30) points out, the review of literature is a never ending 
task, yet studies are time limited. This limitation was managed by reviewing the 
literature in relation to the main themes (Kumar, 1996, p. 30) assisted using the priori of 
Coole and Brooks (2011). In addition, when reviewing literature sources Johnson and 
Christensen (2004, p. 400) raise the issue of the trustworthiness of the sources. To 
overcome this concern all resources were considered for their quality and concepts were 
extracted from peer reviewed or industry body-endorsed text books (Fraenkel, Wallen 
and Hyun (2012, p. 39) where according to Silverman (2002, p. 229) such textual data 
are in principle reliable sources, and are considered by Kumar (1996, p. 29) as a 
coherent body of knowledge.  
Some of Phase One’s limitations were addressed through Phase Two which took the 
results of the critique to experts for their assessment regarding inclusion of key themes 
or core concepts they considered important to the body of knowledge. Nevertheless, this 
approach was not without its limitations either; that is, interviews rely on participants 
providing accurate and complete answers to questions (Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-
Shaw, 2000, p. 247). For example, the way subjects view a study can have a negative 
impact on their responses and the instrument used to collect their responses may suffer 
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from construct validity concerns (Fraenkel, Wallen and Hyun, 2012, p. 179) or demand 
characteristics and then provide responses according to the perceived demands of the 
experimenter (Martin, 2000, pp. 75-77). Alternatively participants may lie, distrust the 
researcher, or wish to sabotage the study (Breakwell, Hammond & Fife-Shaw, 2000, p. 
247).  
Such concerns need to be considered, however, the sampling selection was focused 
towards overcoming these concerns through individuals who were peer nominated as 
physical security experts (N=9) based on their extensive knowledge or ability, their 
experience, occupation and/or education and training such that they would not be 
swayed by experimenter characteristics. In addition, the questionnaire was organised in 
a manner that enabled observation of internal consistency across responses. This 
approach was also repeated for Phase Four of the study. Social science research 
limitations where similarity judgements can be affected by participant attitudes towards 
the study were also a possibility in Phase Three (Fraenkel, Wallen & Hyun, 2012). Such 
manifestations include the exaggeration or attenuation of similarities producing varying 
variances across subjects confounding the analysis. Again, this was overcome through 
the use of a participant sample in the form of a focus group, which was able to consider 
the accuracy of Phase Three outcomes according to their education and 
experiences.        
4.6 Research ethics 
In moving into the data collection phase of the study, it must be acknowledged that 
ethics are an essential aspect of scientific research. Fraenkel, Wallen and Hyun (2012, p. 
565) highlight three salient concerns when conducting research with human participants 
which include the requirement to protect participant’s identities, to treat all participants 
with respect, and protect all participants from physical and psychological harm. 
However, the research design did not place any participants in a state of undue 
discomfort physically or psychologically. However in pursuit of an ethically robust 
study, formal approval for conducting the study was gained from Curtin University’s 
Ethics Committee. All participants solicited to participate in the study were given an 
information sheet explaining the study and its methodology.  
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The study’s information sheet formed part of the questionnaires and highlighted that 
participation was voluntary and that there was no penalty for refusing to participate. 
There was no undue pressure placed on solicited experts who declined to participate and 
all participants were asked to sign an informed consent form either in writing or 
electronically. In addition, interviews were conducted without any time limits, and no 
financial or other material benefits were offered to individuals for their participation in 
this study.   
Furthermore, for some participants there was a legal obligation, or an expressed desire 
to protect their identity and keep their data/personal information confidential. To ensure 
the confidentiality of participant’s data and identities, participants were not asked to 
supply their last names or other identifying details outside of research data requirements 
(aside from signing an informed consent notification). All personal data was stored in a 
secure container (Filing cabinet) within a secure building. This approach ensured 
compliance with the principles of informed consent (Forshaw, 2004, pp. 45-48). 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the philosophical and methodological approach (3.1) and 
supporting literature drawn on to achieve the study outcomes. The study presented a 
research philosophy embedded within its theoretical foundation of constructivism where 
knowledge created in one study phase was carried forward to inform the next phase of 
the study.  Phase One, which included a literature critique was supported by expert 
interviews (Phase Two) as a further exploratory means of developing a qualitative 
structural map of physical security’s body of knowledge. Phase Two provided the 
means to develop Phase Three, a multidimensional statistical scaling (MDS) 
questionnaire for completion by a larger sample of security professionals. This approach 
provided a graphical representation of the knowledge categories and subordinate 
categories as an organised global picture, highlighting content structure.  
Finally, focus groups were employed as a way of interpreting Phase Two and Three 
outcomes towards responding to the study’s research questions. The chapter also 
presented the analytical approaches employed to draw out results to be carried forward 
from Phase to Phase within the study. This included a discussion on the various research 
instruments developed and utilized to achieve individual Phase outcomes. Finally, 
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research ethics were discussed and study limitations were acknowledged within the 
chapter to ensure that the study considered both concerns of ethics when engaging with 
human participants and its own methodological limitations.  
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Chapter 5: Pilot study 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the pilot study, defined by Martin (2000, p. 13) as a small-scale 
version of a planned study. The aim is to test the proposed methodology and 
procedures, and make necessary changes to enhance the primary study. It also enables 
the researcher to develop a clear understanding of the study where “the pilot becomes 
the guide for the formal study”. The chapter is divided into discrete sections 
representing different phases of the study. Section 5.2 presents Phase One of the study: 
a literature extraction using a word count analysis to identify salient knowledge concept 
categories for the field of physical security.  
Section 5.3 presents Phase Two: knowledge concept category validation by expert 
interviews. Included in this section is participant information, interview analysis and 
interpretation as well as phase limitations. Section 5.4 presents Phase Three, the 
descriptive phase of the study undertaken via MDS survey. This section includes the 
MDS cluster analysis, dimensional interpretation and findings. The chapter also 
presents Phase Four of the study in Section 5.5 in which a focus group is used to 
evaluate the physical security knowledge categories and supporting learning objectives 
identified throughout earlier phases of the pilot study. Section 5.6 provides an 
interpretation of the pilot study findings, Section 5.7 includes a reflective analysis and 
the chapter concludes with Section 5.8.  
5.2 Phase One: Annotated bibliography 
There exists a growing number of security domain knowledge texts. Some are focused 
towards specific categories of security such as aviation security, maritime security, or 
water security. However, other texts are more focused towards broader concept 
understanding and specific practice areas within the non-traditional domain. Such texts 
have groundings in criminology, engineering and management sciences. For the 
purposes of this pilot study, the annotated bibliography focused on texts that considered 
the broader concepts within security with specific focus towards the physical security 
knowledge area. Specifically books were drawn from the ASIS requisite knowledge 
base as a knowledge priori.  
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For each text, the contents pages and chapter text (Section 3.3.1) were used to find 
repeated themes through key words (Kumar, 1996, p. 30) as core and supporting 
knowledge subject areas of physical security. These were then assigned values 
accordant with occurrences within the text (Section 3.3.1) and in each text synonymous 
terms were combined (Manunta, 1999; Brooks & Corkill, 2012) (Appendix G) and the 
count of occurrences conducted again. In addition, some frequently occurring words 
were dropped from the analysis. For example, international as a category word was 
removed, part was also removed as a category term, as was time. For each text this 
produced a tabulated matrix highlighting its salient physical security knowledge concept 
categories. Each individual text’s bibliographic extractions provided the initial 
knowledge category inputs towards establishing a phase knowledge matrix as a shared 
paradigm for physical security professionals.  
The bibliographic extractions uncovered the repeated themes (Eden, 1988, p.2) (Section 
1.8) presenting the initial data for establishing a preliminary taxonomic structure as a 
knowledge system for physical security professionals. This system stemmed from the 
extracted knowledge categories and supporting knowledge units (subordinate 
knowledge), including theories, concepts, principles and facts according to the author’s 
thesis or central claim, the repetition of key terms or ideas and the texts message and 
structure.   
5.2.1 Phase One: Bibliographic data extraction 
Text 1: Garcia, M., L. (2008). The design and evaluation of physical protection systems 
(2nd ed.). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
The first security text reviewed in the data corpus is a textbook written by Mary Lynn 
Garcia from Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA. Ms. Garcia’s 
biography explains that she is a Senior Member of the Technical Staff at Sandia 
National Labs. She has over 20 years' experience in science and engineering research, 
development, application, teaching, and project management experience of security 
systems and technology. Ms Garcia has been a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) 
since 1997. In addition, Ms. Garcia is the sole author of two significant texts within the 
security domain. Her first book, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection 
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Systems was initially published in 2001 and is now in its second edition (2008). Her 
second book, The Vulnerability Assessment of Physical Protection Systems was 
published in 2006. Ms Garcia’s books have become embedded into many security 
teaching programs globally and her first book is listed as a core text for ASIS’s 
Certified Protection Professional (CPP) program.  
The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems (2nd ed.) as a text articulates 
that the basic principles of security are the same regardless of application and that it is 
their adaption to context that is of salient importance. Such a statement is supportive of 
the body of knowledge concept. This text strongly emphasizes a systematic approach to 
security through the articulation of a physical protection system (PPS). The PPS 
combines technical, physical and procedural elements into a barrier system to achieve 
contextual protection objectives. Its salient purpose is to describe how individual 
elements that collectively make up an effective security system achieve this through 
their integration (p. xvii). This text stresses security needs to have a systems approach 
within a problem solving paradigm, defining and understanding the protection problem 
accordant with risk, prior to designing the system. The text also emphasizes the 
importance of evaluating the design before and after implementation, along with 
ongoing review.   
On the basis of a count analysis, using key terms representative of synonymous words 
where necessary (see Appendix G), Table 5.1 was developed as the knowledge concept 
categories for the reviewed text.  
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Table 5.1 Pilot study: Phase One: Text 1 thematic knowledge category data 
Physical Security 
System Threat Security Detection Analysis 
and 
evaluation 
Response Delay 
Facility 
procedures 
Target 
identify-
cation 
Entry 
control/Acc
ess control 
Alarm 
assessment 
Risk Communi-
cations 
Safety 
Closed 
circuit 
television-
CCTV 
Barriers 
 
Training Intrusion 
detection 
 
Interruption 
 
Doors 
 
Access 
delay 
Walls EASI Model Lighting View Windows Facility 
characteriza
tion 
Risk 
assessment 
Resolution Probability 
of detection 
Surveillance Security 
principles 
Fences Communica
tions 
security 
Adversary 
sequence 
diagrams 
Locks Alarm 
communi-
cation and 
display 
Neutraliz-
ation 
Entry 
control 
credentials 
Protection 
in depth 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Physical 
protection 
system 
design 
Balanced 
protection 
Vulner-
ability 
assessment 
process 
Use of force 
 
Adversary 
paths 
Roofs/ 
Ceilings 
 
Network 
supervision 
Legal issues 
Text 2: Fischer, R. J., Halibozek, E., & Green, G. (2008). Introduction to security (8th 
ed.). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
The second text in the data corpus is a textbook written by three authors within the 
security domain. Robert Fischer’s biography highlights that he is a member of the 
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and holds a PhD. He is currently the President of 
Asset Protection Associates Inc, a security consulting company. Robert Fischer is a 
former Director of Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Institute and a Professor of Law 
Enforcement and Justice Administration at Western Illinois University. Edward 
Halibozek is the former Chairperson for the Aerospace Industries Association’s 
Industrial Security Committee and is currently a member of the Board of Directors for 
the Chief Special Agents Association in Los Angeles in addition to being a corporate 
director of security for a fortune 100 Company. Gion Green is noted in the book to be a 
twentieth century security pioneer.  
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The text forms part of the ASIS international knowledge corpus and seeks to establish 
for the reader the basic concepts of security. In addition, the text introduces learners to 
the depth and breadth of the security domain in the non-traditional sense. Furthermore, 
the text has sought to articulate the current problems within the basic frameworks of 
security theory in response to the changing global posture in a post-September 11 
environment. Current problems include terrorism, a new emphasis towards securing 
information, identity theft, transportation, contingency planning and piracy concerns. 
The text aims to introduce security concepts and approaches to those new to the 
industry as well as serving as a reference text for professional problem solving within 
the security domain. This text is divided into three sections; Section One presents the 
security domain:  its history, employment options and professional development. 
Section Two presents the basics of defence and Section Three focuses towards specific 
threats and solutions within security context areas. Of significance for this study is that 
the text (p. 173) highlights that while every security program must be an integrated 
whole, and that individual elements must grow out of the needs dictated by the 
circumstances, the first basic line of defence is still physical security (Section 3.1).  
On the basis of a count analysis, using key terms representative of synonymous words 
where necessary (Appendix Z), Table 5.2 was developed as the knowledge concept 
categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 5.2 Pilot study: Phase One: Text 2 thematic knowledge category data 
Physical Security 
Security Law Fire The facility Response Terrorism Threat 
Doors Locks Loss 
prevention 
Surveillance Electric 
power 
Reviewing 
reports 
detection 
Perimeter 
security 
Crimes Traffic Fire 
protection 
Construction Keys Lighting 
Arrest Security 
surveys 
Safes and 
vaults 
Barriers Closed 
circuit 
television 
CCTV 
Windows Walls 
 
Alarm 
systems 
Risk analysis Fences 
 
Gates 
 
Theft 
controls 
 
Probability Drugs 
 
Delay Inner 
defences 
Outer 
defences 
Criticality 
 
Common 
law 
 
Mitigation 
 
Biometrics 
 
Traffic 
controls 
Technological 
surveillance 
Seizure 
 
Detention Use of force Searching Occupational 
safety 
 
P a g e  | 160 
 
Text 3: Fennelly, L. (2003). Effective physical security (3rd ed.). Elsevier. Burlington. 
The third text in the data corpus is a textbook written by Larry Fennelly whose 
biography explains that he is a retired Director of Security for a Harvard Museum and 
former Harvard University Police Department Officer with more than 40 years’ 
experience in the security domain. He attended the National Crime Prevention Institute 
at the University of Louisville, Kentucky and has been extensively involved with ASIS 
International. To date, he has written or edited 29 books collectively and is a well-
known author and internationally accepted knowledge source within the security 
industry (crime prevention domain). Fennelly conveys that the book contains his 
combined knowledge and experience from his professional years. Each chapter is 
designed to assist a security practitioner resolve a particular and immediate dilemma 
and come up with practical knowledge to help solve the problem.  
The book includes discrete yet interwoven themes emphasizing influences in the design 
of physical security including strategies within individual knowledge areas. These areas 
include physical barrier considerations and building fabrics, the use of technology to 
provide surveillance and control access as well as fire life safety. These are supported 
by an introduction into standards and regulations in the American context and security 
officers and equipment considerations. The overall theme of the text is controlling 
physical access to ensure that only authorized persons gain access to a facility and 
property.  
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Key theories, themes, phrases and words accentuating this author’s salient thematic 
knowledge categories are included in Table 5.3 as a result of a word count analysis, 
managing synonymous terms as appropriate (see Appendix G).  
Table 5.3 Pilot study: Phase One: Text 3 thematic knowledge category data 
Physical Security 
Security Locks Doors Risk Surveillan
ce 
Detection Closed-circuit 
television/CC
TV 
Fire Lighting Windows Keys CPTED Guards Glass 
Walls Barriers Response Gates Law Entrances Analysis 
Containers Recordin
g 
Fences Lock 
Cylinders 
Lock bolts Security 
surveys 
Cameras 
Reporting 
procedures 
Key 
control 
Sensors Padlocks 
 
Threats Manipulati
on 
Hinges 
Picking Entry 
/Access 
controls 
Communicatio
ns 
 
Security 
searches 
Safes Physical 
design 
Natural 
surveillance 
Identificati
on system 
Badges 
 
Alarm systems 
 
Transmissi
on 
 
Illuminati
on 
 
Floors 
 
Files 
 
 
5.2.2 Phase One: Findings 
Phase One sought to respond to the question: What are the explicit knowledge concept 
categories for physical security as represented through repeated themes printed in 
security texts and their structure? 
The extracted data and count analysis, combined with the merging of synonymous 
terms, presented the top 49 key concepts, principles and theories as words or phrases 
forming the salient thematic knowledge concept categories for the cultural domain of 
physical security. This analysis included core subject and supporting knowledge areas 
providing a summative benchmark across all text sources, establishing a preliminary 
knowledge concept category table (Table 5.4).   
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Table 5.4 Pilot study: Phase One: Data corpus thematic knowledge categories  
Physical Security 
Security Threat Detection 
systems 
System Response Delay Analysis 
and 
evaluation 
Fire protection Law Doors Locks Surveillance 
 
Facility 
characterization 
Closed 
circuit 
television 
(CCTV) 
Entry 
control/access 
control  
Risk Lighting Barriers Windows Walls Facility 
procedures 
Terrorism Target 
identification 
Fences Loss 
prevention 
Communications Use of force Alarm 
assessment 
Electric power Reviewing 
reports 
Perimeter 
security 
Security 
surveys 
Safety Crimes Traffic 
control 
Training Intrusion 
detection 
Interruption Safes and 
vaults 
CPTED Guards Glass 
Field of view Construction Risk 
assessment 
Resolution Probability of 
detection 
Security 
principles 
Drugs 
The sequential phase objective was to deductively establish a taxonomic analysis, or 
folk taxonomy, accordant with the writings of Spradley (1979, pp. 138-139). This 
taxonomy included (Table 5.5) superordinate and subordinate categorical theories, 
concepts and principles, along with their underpinning elements from Table 5.4. Folk 
taxonomies are a set of categories organized on the basis of a single semantic 
relationship, showing local relationships accordant with their different relational levels. 
The taxonomic analysis developed an initial localized cultural domain knowledge 
structure (Table 5.5) for physical security. This was achieved through a deductive 
analysis accordant with Section 4.4.3 (Figure 4.1) drawing on the precedent of Coole 
and Brooks (2011) as a peer reviewed code priori. 
Table 5.5 led to the final Phase One outcome, which was to produce a literature-based, 
research-centered graphical representation – a heuristic map (Figure 5.1) -of physical 
security’s knowledge structure. Figure 5.1, facilitated through inductive then deductive 
analysis, presents physical security’s organized knowledge structure established through 
literature critique.  
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Table 5.5 Phase One: Hierarchical taxonomic knowledge table (adjusted from Spradley, 
1979, p. 137) 
Security 
Facility Characterization
A
na
ly
si
s &
 E
va
lu
at
io
n 
Threat 
Terrorism Law Crimes 
Target identification
Safety Loss Prevention 
Risk 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Su
rv
ey
s 
R
ev
ie
w
in
g 
R
ep
or
ts
 
D
et
ec
tio
n 
Sy
st
em
s 
El
ec
tri
c 
Po
w
er
 
Security Principles 
Perimeter Security 
Intrusion Probability Detection 
Alarm 
assessment 
 
Drugs Probability Detection 
  
Fire    
Lighting 
   
   
   
Surveillance 
CCTV Field of View  
 Resolution  
CPTED   
Communications 
   
   
   
Delay 
Entry Control 
CPTED  
Locks  
Doors  
Barriers Construction 
Safes/Vaults 
Walls 
Fences 
Glass 
Windows 
 
Response Guards   
Interruption  
 Use of Force 
Neutralization Training 
Fire Protection 
   
   
   
Facility Procedures 
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Figure 5.1 Phase One: Preliminary physical security knowledge content heuristic  
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5.3 Phase Two: Expert enrichment 
Accordant with Section 4.3 of the study, Phase Two aimed to elicit implicit knowledge 
held by security professionals which they considered essential for practice at the 
professional level of physical security yet not extracted through the literature critique. 
This phase also facilitated the merging of synonymous terms and the elucidation of 
more ambiguous terms. The outcome was the development of phase tables (5.6, 5.7, 
5.8) and knowledge heuristic (Figure 5.2) representing superordinate and subordinate 
knowledge concept categories, along with their supporting content elements that make 
up a physical security professionals’ knowledge system.  
5.3.1 Participants 
Phase Two sought to enhance the outcomes of Phase One by presenting the current 
iteration of knowledge requisites (Table 5.4, 5.5 and Figure 5.1) to participants (Table 
5.6) and seeking their input to enhance these findings through a series of questions 
(Table 5.7) embedded into a semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix A). The objective 
was to draw out requisite knowledge participants believed was essential for 
jurisdictional practice, yet currently missing from the taxonomy. 
Table 5.6 Phase Two: Expert’s profiles 
Name Profile 
Bruce Provides protective security leadership, advice and management across numerous 
sectors at a senior leadership level within companies and corporations. With over 
30 years’ experience Bruce holds a Master of Arts (Security Management), 
Master of Science (MSc) Risk Management, Graduate Certificate Strategic Risk 
Management, and is a PhD candidate, and holds Certified Protection Professional 
status with ASIS International, Certified Security Consultant (International 
Association Professional Security Consultants), and Project Management Institute 
(PMI) Risk Management Professional.   
Peter Peter has over 25 years’ experience providing protective security advice across a 
range of sectors including customs and border protection, maritime security, 
correctional and state infrastructure environments. Peter holds a Bachelor Degree 
in Security Science, and a Diploma in Project Management.   
Frazer Provides protective security leadership, advice and management across numerous 
sectors both as a consultant and at a senior leadership level for companies and 
corporations including mining operations, offshore oil and gas platforms, and 
government facilities both within Australia and overseas. His qualifications 
include a Bachelor of Science (Security, Comms and IT), Certificate of Data 
Communications and Certificate of Organisational Behavior and Management.  
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5.3.2 Administration of expert interviews 
Interviews with the physical security professionals took approximately 90 minutes each, 
and comprised sequenced questions (Table 5.7) (Appendix A) to guide the phase 
outcomes. The questionnaire sought participant’s thoughts relating to requisite 
knowledge within the domain of physical security accordant with their professional 
experience, along with clarification of ambiguous terms. It also sought their opinion of 
the knowledge structure to date, and provided them the opportunity to recommend 
adjustments to the hierarchical table and supporting heuristic. 
Table 5.7 Phase Two: Expert interview questions 
No. Interview questions 
1 The table shows the literature extractions top 49 thematic knowledge categories and 
subordinate concepts. This table was produced through the synergizing of three text’s 
salient knowledge categories and subordinate concepts. This required a number of 
synonymous terms to be combined towards producing a phase table of knowledge 
categories and subordinate concepts. Could you please indicate your 
agreement/acceptance or disagreement of the following combined terms? 
2 Within these knowledge categories are some physical security themes that are 
unambiguous in what they represent. However, there are some themes representing more 
ambiguous term, can you please tell me what you believe the following themes represent 
in terms of knowledge required for physical security professionals? 
3 This table lists the salient 49 knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts for physical 
security’s body of knowledge, do you agree with these? 
4 Do you believe any of the knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts should be 
removed and why? 
5 The top 49 knowledge categories have been organised into a hierarchical concept map to 
illustrate both the structure of physical security’s body of knowledge including core and 
supporting concepts and their relations. This map aims to highlight the knowledge and 
structure of physical security’s knowledge base towards the diagnosis, inference and 
treatment of security or loss coupled threat concerns manifested through unlawful access 
and/or crime enablers towards the protection of assets including people, information and 
property. Do you support this overall goal for physical security, and based on this goal do 
you support the structure of this map?
6 Do you believe the whole structure captures the ideas underlying physical security? 
7 Do you feel that any of the knowledge concepts or subordinate concepts needs relocating 
and why? 
8 From your knowledge of physical security, do you believe that the table and knowledge 
map captures the knowledge requirements for a physical security professional, and if not, 
what knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts are missing and why? 
9 What do you feel are the three most important knowledge concepts for physical security? 
10 The methodology drew on a 7 × 7 matrix to identify, categories and present core and 
subordinate knowledge themes and concepts resulting in the top 49. Do you believe this is 
sufficient or do you feel this would be best expanded to a 9 × 9 matrix to capture further 
subordinate knowledge concepts? 
11 Do you have any further comments to enhance the tabulated knowledge categories and 
subordinate concepts, the heuristic map or methodology to enhance the study? 
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5.3.3 Interview analysis 
This phase of the study sought to enhance the development and interpretation of the 
superordinate knowledge categories, theories and principles and their subordinate 
content areas representing core content units of security knowledge and supporting 
knowledge areas and skills for the cultural domain of physical security. As different 
words and terms are used to refer to the same entity in the security domain (Manunta, 
1999; Brooks & Corkill, 2012) the first part of the semi-structured interview 
questionnaire sought participant’s thoughts and feeling towards the combining of 
synonymous security terms to produce individual overarching (superordinate) or 
subordinate knowledge categories from the literature extraction. This approach 
reconciled the combining of synonymous terms from Phase One literature extraction, 
drawing on participants to partake in developing a phase table of knowledge categories 
and subordinate concepts.     
5.3.3.1	The	fusing	of	synonymous	or	similar	categories	
This phase sought to establish the validity of merging synonymous or similar terms. 
This facilitated the construction of concept categories representing the knowledge 
domain of physical security. Participants agreed that threat and threat assessment was 
both a valid and essential category for physical security professionals. As Fraser 
responded “it’s the threat you are talking about and you look at assess the threat which 
might be assault, burglary or whatever; then you have the threat source”.  
In addition, participants supported the fusing of similar terms relating to analysis and 
evaluation to produce the combined category of analysis and evaluation. Fraser saw this 
as an essential component of professional practice stating:  
From a consulting point of view, analysis and evaluation is probably one of 
the most important parts, you look at it as a process, you have got to do it 
upfront, you have got to be able to firstly understand what it is you are 
trying to protect; if you are looking at a criticality assessment, if we are 
doing a risk assessment, or identify assets and criticalities, the first thing 
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you classify are the critical components or items you need to protect, all that 
for me forms part of all the analysis and evaluation. (Frazer)  
Frazer also stated, “if you put in a system, then you need to analyse and evaluate it to 
make sure that the system is working as it was specified to be installed, but more 
importantly, does it do what it is supposed to do”? Frazer made the point this is not just 
quantitative analysis, but also qualitative, expressing that some industries do 
quantitatively assess, but for others it is more about its criticality in terms of what it 
contributes to the system, regardless of aspects such as costs, analysis also considers the 
concept of contextually critical.  
This view was supported by Bruce who stated that assessing the efficacy of a physical 
control system requires skills in analysis and evaluation in terms of technologies and 
also in terms of security management, as it is hard to completely separate the two. 
Bruce’s view is congruent with Figure 3.6 (Section 3.1), where in the reviewed 
literature Talbot and Jakeman (2009, p. 55) highlighted that jurisdictional knowledge 
overlaps do exist.   
Facility contextualization was another category developed through the fusing of similar 
terms. This category commenced as facility characterisation which was considered an 
essential security diagnosis component of professional practice. As Bruce pointed out: 
We are talking about the ability of practitioners or professionals to be able 
to fully grasp the contextual nature of what we are talking about. So to use 
for example, the approach to physical security within a diamond mine is a 
whole lot different to the approach to physical security within the university 
campus. And so the facility characterization is driven by the environmental 
requirements, but it is really important for the practitioner to grasp the real 
contextual boundaries. (Bruce)  
Asked what was encompassed by this category Fraser responded, “you need to have an 
understanding of the intent, the purpose or whatever it is you are trying to achieve. Then 
the facility characterization is part of that, it’s just a subset of the bigger picture”. 
Furthermore, Bruce noted that “nowhere did the word context actually appear, as it has 
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so much influence”. Bruce considered facility characterization to be part of 
understanding the security context, but expressed that it does not go far enough, stating, 
“facility characterization is driven by environmental requirements, but it is also really 
important for the practitioner to be able to grasp the real contextual boundaries”.  
Peter considered this to refer to the geographical location, but also the inputs and 
outputs of the organization, the physical as well as the cultural. Frazer expressed this 
relates to understanding what the facility does, “as depending on industry context it is 
going to have different requirements. If you’ve got a critical facility, what makes it 
critical”? Thus, this category was adjusted to reflect the emphasis of establishing the 
context, congruent with the AS/NZS ISO 31000 (2009) and Standards Australia HB 167 
Security Risk Management Handbook’s (2006) focus, adopting the category of facility 
contextualization. Characterization was considered an American term and for the 
Australian context of this study facility contextualization was adopted.  
The adoption of an overarching category of law to encompass related terms was also 
supported by the group. As Bruce noted, “law is most often understood as legal 
requirements that a body or person or whatever would have to abide by, whereas legal 
issues may be slightly different in terms of its matter of trying to put in a process or a 
control. Legal issues may be difficulties of fulfilling legal requirements rather than law, 
which I see more as the overarching sort of legal controls”.  Peter supported Bruce’s 
view stating: 
At the end of the day everything is subject to it. You have got the outside 
influences of Acts, there is always legislative compliance that has to be 
adhered to, it might not be directly security but it will be some form of 
legislation compliance that an organization must adhere to, usually safety is 
probably the most applicable one. So they are laws and probably that is the 
easiest way to describe it. (Peter)  
Furthermore, the group supported the adoption of a broader thematic category of 
movement control. For example, Fraser expressed that movement control was a better 
overarching category than traffic controls, stating, “I think movement control is more 
encompassing, that to me would cover all the aspects associated with it as well, 
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particularly talking about vehicle transportation rather than any other types as well”. 
Bruce supported the adoption of this category stating:  
It is part of our crime prevention process, control of people’s movement is a 
control that we can institute to increase the level of protection over our 
assets; it is control of traffic in and out of facilities, but also within facilities. 
(Bruce)  
The adoption of safes and vaults as a single category was also supported by the 
participants, as was the adoption of loss prevention as a category. Loss prevention 
combined theft controls and loss prevention into a single category. However, Bruce 
made the point that in engineering risk the term loss prevention is different to security, 
so jurisdictional boundary needed to be clearly understood. Both Peter and Frazer also 
agreed with loss prevention as broader thematic category, although Frazer pointed out 
this again refers to context stating, “although the underlying principle might be the 
same, what you do and how you apply it for change is contextual”. Participants also felt 
some categories should be kept separate such as the terms neutralization and use of 
force. For instance, Peter considered use of force as a sub-category of neutralization, 
stating: 
Neutralization defines how you address or what end result that you are 
wanting to attain, you want to neutralize any threat either before, during or 
after the event has occurred. But use of force may not be what is utilized to 
neutralize the threat so you may not have a physical neutralization, you may 
have neutralized the threat through your defence in depth, or deterrence. 
(Peter) 
In addition, Peter expressed the opinion that use of force is probably a misleading way 
of explaining what the function is, because, to another person if you’re from a 
professional perspective trying to explain that to another person without background 
knowledge, “use of force will emphasize certain words in that phrase and they will 
emphasize force, and they will see force as guns, things like that. So it’s probably not a 
good descriptor to use in a corporate environment”. Frazer agreed with Peter’s 
perspective stating “you can neutralize the situation without necessarily using force, but 
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I suppose it could be broken down and that could be a sub-set of that category itself, but 
that’s a difficult one”.  
Finally, the group supported the removal of some categories which related more to the 
practice area of security management. For example, the category of investigations 
ranked numerically high in the word extraction, yet all participants supported the 
exclusion of this category within the context of the study.     
5.3.3.2	Understanding	ambiguous	categories	
While the embodiment of some categories was self-evident, others remained less 
defined in terms of what they encompassed for physical security professionals. For 
instance, clarification for the thematic category of system was sought from participants. 
Peter expressed that this relates to the more general systems theory, rather than 
individual systems such as electronic systems. Peter stated, “it is the physical, 
electronic, procedural elements that go into a security system, so a system at a particular 
site within an organization, it is the sum of the whole of all those parts”. Bruce 
expressed the view that this relates to a broader thinking style, stating:  
The practitioner needs to have an understanding of how the physical 
security pillar fits into the remainder of a security management system and 
what requirements would be to satisfy the systematic approach. (Bruce)  
Frazer concurred stating “it is the systematic approach to physical security…or a 
framework so to speak, under that framework you have different subsets, it relates to 
components or an approach”.  
In considering the reviewed literature (Section 3.1) and the participant’s responses, 
System as a category was deemed to reflect systems thinking in the broader sense, and 
so the thematic category of systems theory was adopted. Furthermore, terrorism was 
another category that appeared often in the reviewed texts and clarification regarding its 
meaning was sought from the experts. Bruce expressed that many younger, less 
experienced security professionals had the wrong perception of terrorism, believing they 
see it as purely Islamic Jihadistic in nature. Bruce highlighted that terrorism includes a 
vast range of threat groups. Stating, “it includes the IRA, through to animal rights 
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activists…it is a sub-category of threat”. This view was also expressed by Peter, who 
stated “I would rather put things into threat groups, to a threat context because most of 
your mitigation strategies address all threats”.  
According to Peter, “you can’t deal with every group, you have got to put it into 
context; it may not even matter for some organisations”. Agreeing with these views 
expressed by Bruce and Peter, Frazer expressed that too many people use the term 
terrorist as an off-the-cuff threat comment, “but is it a politically motivated or an issue 
motivated group as they are completely different to me”?  Frazer explained that when 
you look at individual acts they are crimes and “for the physical security professional it 
is about how you treat the threat”. Thus, terrorism was acknowledged as a sub-category 
of threat within this broader body of diagnosis knowledge.  
This theme was also expressed for the category of crime. For instance, Bruce as with 
terrorism saw crime relating to establishing threat context, stating, “This goes back to 
your practitioner to be able to fully understand and grasp the context”. Bruce explained 
that he would have this as “crime prevention” rather than crime, stating, “in terms of 
physical security that is what we are trying to do, prevent crimes”. Peter as with Bruce, 
thought this should relate more to the threat context. Frazer supported Bruce’s position 
stating, “a security professional should be more about crime prevention, being proactive 
rather than reactive”. These views reflect the category of crime prevention in Table 3.1 
from ASIS International (Section 3.1). As such, the study adopted the thematic category 
of crime prevention, to replace the category of crime. 
Security principles was another ambiguous knowledge category and participants were 
asked what they believed this encompassed. Bruce responded that security principles 
refer to “the basic principles of security, which apply regardless, but are adjusted to 
context, such as the principle of controlling access, this is a principle, but applied very 
differently in different contexts”. Peter stated that, “principles are like having an 
overarching set of protocols”. Frazer took the stance that security principles could refer 
to the theoretical and practical side of things, “it could refer to defence in depth, 
situational crime prevention and CPTED theory, all those types of things”.  
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Frazer further believed that security principles represents a subset of planning and 
design - a category not extracted from the literature - "where you would put certain 
principles and practices in place, to me the bigger picture of saying CPTED, situational 
crime prevention those types of things; it includes the theory behind what you are 
doing”. Thus, the category of security theories and principles was adopted for the 
purposes of the study.  
This discussion around the category of security principles led to the identification of 
additional knowledge categories which were included that were not reflected in the 
literature explicitly. These included situational crime prevention, defence in depth, and 
planning and design.   
This phase also sought clarification for the knowledge category of drugs. Again, Bruce 
related this back to security’s context, “it could relate to protecting drugs, say for a 
pharmaceutical company, or for a security manager trying to prevent the use of drugs”. 
Conversely, Frazer saw drugs as a management concern rather than a physical security 
concern per se, stating, “from say a resource perspective it is part of their management 
system, part of their workforce management system is like employee governance 
requirements”. Frazer was of the view that drugs form part of an organisation’s threats, 
but more specifically towards safety in terms of fitness for work. As such, this category 
was adjusted to drug detection to reflect it is a subordinate category related to threats.    
5.3.3.3	Physical	security’s	knowledge	categories	and	structure	
The interview questionnaire also sought participants’ views relating to the extracted 
knowledge categories and the supporting hierarchical Tables (5.4 & 5.5) and heuristic 
(Figure 5.1). Participants were asked if they believed any of the concept categories 
should be removed and why, or what they felt was missing for professional practice. 
Bruce responded that he agreed with the representations and believed they were 
reasonable as presented. Although Bruce did question the category of safety, asking, 
“why is safety here”? It was explained that safety was a category that kept coming 
forward in the physical security literature extraction (count analysis), in the context of 
preventing harm to people. The question was posed to Bruce, “where do you think on 
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the structure safety should be located”? Bruce responded that he thought it should be 
sitting on the same level as terrorism and crime as a threat, stating: 
I would have it as a third threat; just my thoughts. If you look at an 
organisation’s approaches and philosophies and their missions and their 
goals and values, most of them support that their most important asset is 
their people…their people and safety around their people. So I see it as 
being right up there (indicating to Figure 5.1). Otherwise, I think this is a 
pretty good map…yeah that is my only comment, I think that safety needs 
to be further up the tree as a threat. (Bruce)   
Peter responded that the knowledge categories were “pretty self-explanatory, although, 
it wouldn’t make a lot of sense to somebody who didn’t have a background 
knowledge”. Peter was asked if he felt that any of the categories or subordinate concepts 
in the map (Figure 5.1) should be relocated, and he replied that:  
Where you have got your threat and it’s a personal thing, I think that it 
should feed straight into threat groups, as they are interconnected, 
highlighting that in reality terrorism is a criminal act….if you have got 
specific threats then you will put in specific measures into place, however, 
for simplicity threat should feed into threat groups. (Peter)  
The interviewer requested that Peter clarify where he thought that target identification 
should sit in relation to threat and in response Peter stated, “target identification is part 
of (subordinate to) your threat assessment process”. Finally Frazer supported the 
representations (Tables 5.4 & 5.5; Figure 5.1), responding:  
Yes, because it breaks the different elements down of physical security. You 
can’t rely on one thing, it’s a combination or a systematic approach to 
achieving the outcome, it might be different elements in there, they all form 
part of that overall system, there are a lot of components in there that makes 
up the overall focus of physical security. (Frazer)  
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All participants supported the structure and believed it captured the systematic aspects 
of what physical security aims to achieve. Although Peter expressed that he believed 
physical security professionals needed to understand infrastructure; Peter stated:  
Infrastructure is a part that feeds into, you’ve got here your detection 
systems and then you have electrical power, and you have all these elements 
that go into, ultimately what they are. Those elements, all feed into your 
facilities infrastructure systems. So I think that without having that as an 
actual core body of knowledge it often gets missed. (Peter)  
Peter affirmed that infrastructure is different to construction, “construction is about 
building so the physical building itself, infrastructure makes the building or facility 
function, like water or roads”. Peter felt that infrastructure should be a category itself, 
arguing that professionals have to understand this, such as the bitumen road links into 
your access control. “If you don’t understand infrastructure then I think this is a key 
flaw, quite often in security professionals, to be honest they don’t understand 
infrastructure”.  
Furthermore, Peter also expressed that construction is a misleading category, expressing 
that security professionals can’t be insular and must be able to communicate with other 
disciplines. Peter stated, “I don’t think construction is the right word, I think it is 
something I will need to get back to you on”. Peter did respond back that this should 
reflect structural strengths as a category, stating:  
As structural links security professionals knowledge to that of other relevant 
disciplines…these include architect, engineer and builder. You will have 
structural drawings, architectural drawings of buildings that define that 
building like walls etc. like that, doors those things so they go on the 
structural side of it. (Peter)  
As such, the knowledge category of construction was adjusted accordant with these 
views to the category of structural strengths, and the category of infrastructure was 
added to the knowledge table as part of the phase outcomes. 
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This part also explored if participants believed any of the knowledge categories in 
Figure 5.1 should be relocated and why. However, in response to previous questions 
this was responded to with salient focus towards threat as a concept and its location as 
an overarching category and its subordinate group drivers. Then question eight asked 
participant’s thoughts and feelings towards the captured knowledge requirements for a 
physical security professional. Initially Bruce responded that he did not see reference to 
statistical analysis, but then acknowledged that statistical analysis sits within the 
analysis and evaluation category. Bruce acknowledged this is subordinate to the 
broader category of analysis and evaluation, an all-encompassing knowledge category. 
Bruce was asked if he thought this to be an important part of professional practice, and 
responded stating:  
Yeah, I think it has got to the stage now where security professionals need 
to have at least basics of the ability to conduct some scientific analysis…we 
have moved on so far in the world now. I think that it is really important that 
the people that are sitting in these sorts of positions are able to hold their 
own against, well with their peers, and I talk about engineers, accountants, 
lawyers, those sort of things. And so in the physical security world where 
we are talking about technological systems big capital costs at times, I think 
security needs to have some scientific capability. (Bruce)  
Peter believed that communications, both written and verbal, as well as presentation 
skills were missing. To be a professional the person should be able to articulate 
information to a broad audience including executives. Bruce also raised this point, 
stating:  
It is really important that the security program is able to communicate its 
goals, objectives etc., across the organization because without that you are 
not going to get buy in or support or whatever and in regards to the 
principles of risk management. One of the main principles of risk 
management is communication, communication and consultation. It hasn’t 
come out yet, but that is one of the most important. (Bruce)  
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These expert’s views are congruent with the writings of Gillespie (1981) who stated, “a 
professional that cannot verbally and publically express him/herself is in a bad way”. As 
such, the knowledge category of communications: written and verbal was added to the 
knowledge category requirements for a physical security professional. 
Peter also thought the broader category of door furniture should be included which is 
superordinate to, and includes locks and hinges which are subordinate to this knowledge 
category. He further emphasized that infrastructure was a salient thematic category and 
that electrical systems, closed circuit television, lighting, detection systems, fire systems 
etc., were elements of infrastructure and were subordinate to this broader knowledge 
category. Frazer considered that response was an important category but that different 
levels of response needed to be considered according to context. So again, 
understanding context appeared as a salient element of knowledge for physical security 
professionals. Thus, the knowledge category of door furniture was added to the 
knowledge table to reflect the terminology used by other professionals such as 
architects, to which locks and hinges etc. are subordinate.  
The interview also sought what participants believed were the three most important 
knowledge concepts or categories for physical security? Bruce considered that risk 
assessment, analysis and evaluation and communication were the three most important 
areas of knowledge for physical security professionals (Core and general knowledge 
and skills). Peter considered understanding the facility (facility contextualization) was 
essential. He also considered understanding technological approaches to security as 
vital, and concluded with the category of communications (Core and general knowledge 
and skills). Frazer stated that this relates to knowledge of mitigation techniques you are 
going to use as part of your system for the protection of your assets or whatever (core 
treatment knowledge). This includes understanding how they work stating, “how can 
you say that you need to have microphonic fence mounted detection system if you don’t 
understand how a microphonic detection system works”?  
Anyone could do a risk assessment, to say that, like you need guards, you 
need process, unless you understand how they are actually going to mitigate 
those threats. To me it is coming back to that having an understanding, 
theory of a science behind why you are doing it, why we are protecting 
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things. It really comes down to having an understanding of the theory or 
science behind what we are trying to do and why we are trying to do it, to 
me is probably the most important thing. (Frazer)  
Frazer’s views emphasized a knowledge requirement for security professionals of the 
science that underpins the professional advice rendered.  Frazer’s stance is congruent 
with the writings of Freckelton and Selby (2013) (Section 2.3). Frazer considered that 
the academic knowledge was important, and then from there the professional 
development in industry was essential to develop professional thinking and practice.  
Finally, participants were asked if they felt the methodology could be improved or if the 
knowledge categories and their supporting content areas needed to be numerically 
expanded. To this question all participants responded no, with Bruce stating, “what you 
have got here is pretty well encompassing and I fear that making it bigger is that the 
study starts to become onerous, too detailed and granular”. Peter expressed that it was 
detailed enough as you did not want to lose the emphasis on the key points (areas). 
Frazer expressed this same view stating:  
You might just get information overload so to speak. The main thing is that 
you capture the main processes and all these things other things fall and 
hang off of that, but you don’t need to capture everything, you need to 
capture the trigger points that everything hangs off of. (Frazer)  
Such a view is congruent with Figures 1.1 (Section 1.4) and 3.3 (Section 3.1) accordant 
with the work of Abbot (1988, p. 8), which highlighted that the techniques themselves 
may in fact be delegated to other workers. Finally, question eleven asked participants if 
they had any further information that may enhance the tabulated knowledge categories 
and subordinate concepts, the heuristic map or the methodology? Bruce stated:  
I think it is a well-constructed methodology and I think it will deliver some 
very interesting results…it will set the foundation for some further more 
detailed research in particular areas that should show themselves as being 
those that need further attention. (Bruce)  
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Frazer also replied that he did not have any further comments to add, except that a 
difficulty for security and therefore this study is achieving a common language.  
5.3.4 Phase Two: Findings 
Phase Two sought to respond to the question: 
What are the implicit knowledge category areas, and instinctive structure used by 
security experts in achieving physical security risk mitigation not extracted from the 
literature critique?  
Participant’s highlighted 16 additional categories (Table 5.8) as well as the renaming of 
some categories to be included into the physical security professional’s knowledge 
corpus. In addition, in achieving this phase outcome, Phase Two also sought support for 
the merging of synonymous terms towards developing a priori for the primary study and 
sought knowledge category areas that participants believed based on their professional 
experience what was missing from the literature critique analysis.  
Table 5.8 Phase Two: Participant centred knowledge concept categories 
 Physical Security 
Door Furniture Defence in Depth Situational crime 
Prevention 
Infrastructure 
Structural 
Strengths 
Safes & Vaults Electric Power Delay 
Surveillance Windows Glass Walls 
Drugs Interruption Field of View Security Surveys 
Movement control    
 
5.3.5 Phase Two: Interpretation 
Findings from the pilot study indicate that implicit knowledge concept categories areas 
that physical security experts draw on to achieving security risk mitigation include a 
further 16 concept categories (Table 5.8) in addition to those extracted in Phase One 
(Table 5.4). Table 5.8 lists core security theories including Situational crime prevention 
and Defence in depth along with the very notion of surveillance as essential knowledge 
requisites. It also highlights that key concepts such as the control of movement are 
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essential in achieving a state of security. Furthermore, Table 5.8 highlight that physical 
security professionals require broader construction knowledge of areas such as 
infrastructure, structural strengths for control measures such as walls, doors and safes 
and vaults. They also require knowledge of openings including windows and glass, and 
the ability to assess their vulnerability to the threats formally through security surveys.  
Phase Two results indicate that physical security’s knowledge base includes a minimum 
of 56 knowledge categories and distinct, yet interrelated theories, concepts, principles 
and facts which includes those knowledge category concepts (Table 5.9) which are 
connected according to their relationship with the professional goal, and organized on 
the basis of a single semantic relationship, represented by the word security (Table 5.10 
& Figure 5.1).  
Table 5.9 Pilot Study: Phase Two: Physical security knowledge concept categories  
Physical Security 
Security Threat 
Assessment 
Detection 
systems 
Systems 
Theory 
Response Delay Analysis and 
Evaluation 
Fire 
protection 
Law Doors Locks Surveillance 
 
Facility 
Contextualiz
ation 
Closed 
circuit 
television 
(CCTV) 
Entry 
Control  
Risk Lighting Barriers Windows Walls Facility 
procedures 
Terrorism Target 
identificatio
n 
Fences Loss 
prevention 
Communicat
ions 
Technologie
s 
Neutralizatio
n 
Alarm 
assessment 
Electric 
power 
Reviewing 
reports 
Perimeter 
security 
Security 
surveys 
Safety Crime 
prevention 
Movement 
control 
Training Intrusion 
detection 
Interruption Safes and 
vaults 
CPTED Guards Glass 
Field of 
view 
Structural 
Strengths 
Risk 
Assessment 
Resolution Probability 
of detection 
Security 
Theory and 
Principles 
Drug 
Detection 
Use of Force Communicat
ions: 
Written/ 
Verbal 
Planning & 
Design 
Situational 
Crime 
Prevention 
Infrastructur
e 
Door 
Furniture 
Defence in 
depth 
Phase Two highlighted that physical security has a system of knowledge that can be 
explicitly captured including core content and supporting professional knowledge 
(Tables 5.9 & 5.10). In addition, Phase Two also highlighted that this content has 
internal relations as a systemized structure that can be mapped and presented for 
reception learning (Figure 5.2).  
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Table 5.10 Phase Two: Hierarchical taxonomic knowledge table 
Security 
Law
A
na
ly
si
s &
 E
va
lu
at
io
n 
Facility Contextualization
Target Identification 
Threat Assessment 
Terrorism Safety Crime Prevention Loss Prevention 
Risk
Risk Assessment 
Planning & Design 
Security Theories & Principles 
In
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Su
rv
ey
s 
R
ev
ie
w
in
g 
R
ep
or
ts
 
Si
tu
at
io
na
l C
rim
e 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n 
D
ef
en
ce
 in
 D
ep
th
 
El
ec
tri
ca
l P
ow
er
 
D
et
ec
tio
n 
Sy
st
em
s 
Perimeter Security 
Intrusion Probability Detection 
Alarm assess  
Drugs Probability Detection 
  
Fire    
Lighting 
   
   
   
Surveillance 
CCTV Field of View  
 Resolution  
CPTED   
Communications: 
Written & Verbal 
Technologies 
   
   
   
M
ov
em
en
t c
on
tro
l Delay Structural strengths 
Entry Control 
CPTED  
Door 
furniture Locks 
Doors  
Barriers 
Safes/Vaults  
Walls  
Fences  
Glass  
Windows Locks 
  
Response Guards   
Interruption  
 
Use of 
Force 
Neutralization Training 
Fire Protection 
   
   
   
Facility Procedures 
Systems Theory 
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Table 5.10 led to the development of Figure 5.2, a physical security professional’s 
knowledge heuristic representing core knowledge areas, their subordinate elements and 
their qualitative derived local structural relations. Figure 5.2 indicates that physical 
security’s knowledge structure is hierarchically organized around the methodologies 
and tasks required to diagnose and prescribe protective security theories and concepts, 
along with their operational elements to achieve the appropriate, functional levels of 
control within an environmental context.  
Figure 5.2 Phase Two:  Physical security knowledge structure heuristic 
 
 
Phase Two of the study identified core and supporting knowledge content areas that 
combine to achieve a predictable state through physical security (Table 5.9). This phase 
highlighted that when linked through hierarchical relations there exists a focused 
knowledge structure (Table 5.10 & Figure 5.2) that can be explicitly captured.  
P a g e  | 183 
 
5.3.6 Phase Two: Limitations 
This phase of the study experienced a number of methodological limitations that may 
have affected the findings. First the synergy of synonymous terms, as while the study 
attempted to address variations in language and category meanings, the interpretations 
and selection of language represented a snap shot of the reviewed literature and expert 
participant’s views rather than a consensus across the broader security domain. Another 
limitation was the deductive analysis of category relationships rather than a statistical 
analysis of a larger population sample.  
Phase Two highlighted some disagreement as to core and subordinate concepts, 
specifically with regards to Threat, and Facility Contextualization, along with 
subcategories of threat including terrorism and crimes. Thus Phase Three aimed to 
overcome these specific limitations and describe the relationships and macro structure 
through a larger statistically representative sample of security experts and professionals. 
However, it must be acknowledged that variations in language and category meaning 
will not be addressed in Phase Three and may be further explored in Phase Four (focus 
groups).  
5.4 Phase Three: Macro structure analysis (MDS survey questionnaire) 
Phase Three involved the administration of a survey questionnaire (Appendix B) with 
the results then used for an MDS analysis, a mathematical procedure for uncovering 
relationships between concepts. The survey was preceded by a set of instructions 
providing a summary overview of the study and survey completion instructions. 
Concepts were rated by participants (N= 14) according to their perceived dissimilarity 
on a ten point rating scale, where ten indicates they are highly dissimilar and therefore 
further apart, and one indicated they are very similar or highly related and therefore 
closer together. These measures were then averaged (mean) and standard deviations 
examined as a method for understanding shared (group) perceptions. 
Not all concept categories identified in previous phases were carried forward as this 
would result in a survey questionnaire beyond achievable limits. Therefore, the 
completion of this phase required concept reduction to reduce the 56 knowledge 
categories and subordinate content areas to a more manageable 30 (Table 5.10). This 
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issue was addressed in Brooks (2008, p. 82), where it was acknowledged that such 
questionnaires could become too large for completion. As such, the lower order, more 
operational, subordinate concepts were removed for later mapping in separate studies. 
The aim of this phase of the study was to establish the broader content areas and their 
macro level structural organization rather than to map the concentrated operational 
connections within each category content area.  
Concept reduction was achieved through a deductive analysis of superordinate and 
subordinate relationships. Operational level content would arguably be represented in 
occupational groups within the physical security knowledge strata (Figure 1.1, Section 
1.4 & Figure 3.3, Section 3.1). As such, lower strata categories were removed to 
identify the prominent broader knowledge content for a physical security professional. 
For instance, Law was found to be qualitatively subordinate to Security as accordant 
with the writings of Beccaria (1775), Cotterell (1984) and Misiuk (2011) the law is a 
means of providing a state of security or the “feeling of being secure;” by regulating 
people’s behavior. In addition, law was indicated as being superordinate to all other 
knowledge categories.  
For obtaining functional security there emerged other strata of superordinate and 
subordinate concepts. Subordinate to Defence in Depth was Electrical Power as a means 
towards facilitating the functional electrical mechanisms of control that combine to 
achieve a state of security. Then, subordinate to this was the category of Detection 
Systems, and subordinate to this were Intrusion Detection and Drug Detection, with the 
subordinate primary of Probability of Detection (PD). Also subordinate to Detection 
Systems were Fire Detection, and Surveillance, which themselves had subordinate 
principles of alarm assessment, resolution and field of view. Furthermore, CPTED as a 
crime prevention theory was also included as subordinate to the concept of surveillance, 
as a major underpinning of CPTED relates to natural surveillance. Finally, 
Communications Technologies was also considered a subordinate content category for 
the broader thematic category of Detection Systems.   
The thematic category of Delay was found to be subordinate to the broader concept of 
Movement Control, which also embodied the subordinate category of Barriers. Barriers 
encompassed its own subordinate content areas including Walls, Fences, Windows and 
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Glass. Furthermore, the thematic category of Delay also included the subordinate 
category of Entry Control, which included its own subordinate area of Doors and Door 
Furniture, which encompassed the subordinate category of Locks. The thematic 
category of Response, also subordinate to Defence in Depth, was shown to be 
superordinate to the categories of Guards, which was superordinate to Neutralization 
that was superordinate of Use of Force.  
These strata of categories were found to be subordinate to the thematic category of 
Facility Procedures, which guides the response function. Finally, the thematic categories 
of Communications Skills: Written and Verbal, Analysis and Evaluation, and Systems 
Theory were considered persuasive across all professional knowledge elements for 
physical security professionals. Concept reduction developed Table 5.11: Superordinate 
knowledge concept categories for the domain of physical security. 
Table 5.11 Phase Two: Superordinate knowledge categories 
 Physical Security 
Security Law Facility 
contextualization 
Threat  Risk 
Planning & 
design 
Infrastructure Analysis and  
evaluation 
Systems  
theory 
Security theory 
and principles 
Defence in 
depth 
Crime 
prevention 
Communications 
Skills: Written & Verbal 
Detection Delay 
Response Structural  
strengths 
Barriers Lighting Surveillance 
 
Door Furniture Safes and  
vaults 
Movement control Electric 
 power 
Entry control 
Detection 
systems 
Fire protection Reviewing 
 reports 
CCTV Target  
identification 
Concept reduction knowledge categories were tested for reliability using Cronbach’s 
Alpha. This is a test of internal consistency assessing the extent to which questions 
within a questionnaire tapping a single underlying construct (physical security) covary 
(Allen & Bennett, 2012, p. 211). Cronbach’s Alpha produced a high reliability value (α 
= .945) indicating a strong relationship between knowledge concept categories from 
Table 5.11 and physical security. 
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5.4.1 Phase Three: Findings 
Figure 5.3 presents the SPSS output MDS spatial map capturing the global structure of 
the physical security domain by locating each physical security concept in an N-
dimensional space accordant with proximity correlations. For Figure 5.3 the calculated 
distances between concept points represent participant’s averaged psychological 
proximity of physical security’s knowledge concepts.  
Figure 5.3 Phase Three: MDS spatial representation of physical security concepts 
 
The interpretation of the MDS map requires a key (Table 5.12) relating mapped 
concepts to those presented in Table 5.11.  
  
Cluster 1 
Cluster 4 
Cluster 3 
Cluster 2 
Cluster 5 
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Table 5.12 MDS survey key 
MDS Key 
Securi = Security Plande = Planning & design DiD = Defence in depth 
Respon = Response Doorfu = Door furniture Detsys = Detection systems 
Law = Law Infras = Infrastructure Crimep = Crime prevention 
Strucs = Structural strengths Analev = analysis & 
evaluation 
Commsk = Communications 
skills 
Barrie = Barriers Safeva = safes & vaults Firepr = Fire protection 
Fccont = facility 
contextualization 
MoveCo = Movement 
control 
RevRep = Reviewing reports 
Threat = Threat SysThe = systems theory Detect = Detection 
Light = Lighting ElecPo = Electric power CCTV = closed circuit 
television 
Risk = Risk SecPri = Security principles Delay = Delay 
Surv = Surveillance EntCon = Entry control TargetId = Target 
identification 
A two-dimensional MDS map was developed consistent with the writings of Davies and 
Coxon (1982, p. 6),  who express the need for a spatial solution of three or preferably 
fewer dimensions so that the structure of the entire configuration can be visually 
interpreted. This view is shared by Shepard (1972, p. 4) who pointed out that finding 
interpretable axes becomes considerably more difficult and uncertain when the number 
of dimensions exceeds what can be immediately apprehended in a picture or model.  
The goodness-of-fit was evaluated according to Kruskal’s Stress Formula 1 and the 
Squared Correlations. The data presented a high Stress score of 0.36351 and an RSQ of 
.25314 (Squared correlations in distances), which according to the MDS Stress measure, 
not all concepts were in their ideal spatial locality. Nevertheless, a stress score of 
0.36351 was within the 0.54 stress score tolerances of Rakshit and Ananthasuresh 
(2008, pp. 293-294). Rakshit and Ananthasuresh demonstrated that a stress score of 
0.54 was acceptable for a valid MDS analysis. By utilizing a graph of alternate 
dimensional settings and stress scores Rakshit and Ananthasuresh (2008, p. 293) were 
able to demonstrate that a stress score of 0.54 best fitted the correlational model; where 
both higher and lower dimensional increases in paired amino acid relations increased 
stress. Thus, a two dimensional map with a stress score of 0.54 was the most 
appropriate means of visually presenting the hidden structure in their data set.  
The MDS map was interpreted using both clusters and dimensional analysis accordant 
with the work of Davies and Coxon (1982, p. 6) who emphasized that for interpreting 
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such an MDS solution, any interpretable feature of the spatial configuration, for 
instance clusters and dimensionality, including circular and linear orderings could be 
considered. Therefore MDS provided for two modes of interpretation, being clustering 
of concepts based on their close or distal proximity and their dimensional locality 
according to their cultural separation.  
5.4.2 MDS Clusters 
5.4.2.1	Cluster	One		
Clusters are identified from One to Five (Figure 5.3) with Cluster One including the 
concepts of crime prevention, entry control, surveillance, threat, infrastructure, analysis 
and evaluation, and detection systems. Central in Cluster One was crime prevention, 
which was closely related to entry control with a relationship mean of 1.93 and a 
standard deviation of 0.73, indicating that participants collectively perceive these two 
concepts as similar. In addition, crime prevention and threat were also considered highly 
related with a mean of 2.07 and a standard deviation of 1.79, indicating a reasonable 
degree of consensus across the sample for this pairing. Crime prevention and 
surveillance were also considered closely related, with a mean of 2.14 and a standard 
deviation of 0.66, indicating consensus for this pairing.  
Crime prevention was considered related to, but slightly dissimilar from Analysis and 
evaluation, with a mean of 3.07. However, consensus diverged for this pairing with a 
standard deviation of 2.53, indicating varied perceptions of their relatedness. Crime 
prevention and infrastructure were also related in proximity, but slightly dissimilar, with 
a mean of 3.83 and a standard deviation of 2.59, again reflecting divergence across the 
sample for this pairing. Furthermore, Detection systems, as a concept was an outlier 
within this cluster, but was considered related to Crime prevention with a mean of 2.43 
and a standard deviation of 1.79. The inclusion of detection systems within this cluster 
is interesting as it was also considered close to defence in depth, with a mean rating of 
1.64 supported by a standard deviation of 0.74 indicating strong consensus for this 
pairing.  
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5.4.2.2	Cluster	Two	
Cluster Two displayed further spread than other clusters, with reviewing reports 
somewhat central within this cluster. Reviewing reports was located very close to 
electric power; however, their similarity rating was 5.23 with a standard deviation of 
2.59. This measure indicated they were considered dissimilar by the sample, and ought 
to have been separate spatially. Reviewing reports and systems theory were spatially 
slightly apart within the cluster with a mean of 3.86 and a standard deviation of 2.35, 
indicating diverging perceptions in their dissimilarity. In addition, reviewing reports and 
risk were clustered with a mean similarity rating of 2.38 supported by a reasonable 
standard deviation of 1.26 indicating a degree of consensus for their relatedness.  
Reviewing reports and facility contextualization were also visually separated, with a 
mean dissimilarity rating of 4.64 and a standard deviation of 3.1, again reflecting 
divergence across participants for this pairing. Reviewing reports and movement control 
were also considered somewhat dissimilar and visually they were separated but part of 
cluster two, with a mean rating of 5.69 and a standard deviation of 3.15, again 
indicating a substantial degree of divergence in perceptions of dissimilarity across the 
participants. Finally, reviewing reports and communication skills were part of cluster 
two, although separated visually they recorded a mean rating of 3.19 therefore were 
considered related with a standard deviation of 2.23 showing a reasonable degree of 
consensus for this proximity distance. 
5.4.2.3	Cluster	Three	
Cluster Three grouped tighter than other clusters and included the concepts of security, 
detection, security principles, structural strengths, closed circuit television (CCTV), 
barriers and as outliers law and target identification. Central to this cluster appeared to 
be detection. Detection was considered closely related to security with a dissimilarity 
rating of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 0.78 indicating strong consensus for this 
pairing. Detection and structural strengths were visually located in close proximity, yet 
their mean dissimilarity rating was 5.36 with a standard deviation of 3.15, indicating a 
high degree of dissention across the sample for this pairing. In addition, detection and 
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security principles were considered closely related with a dissimilarity rating of 1.79 
and a standard deviation of 0.89 indicating strong consensus for this pairing.  
Detection and barriers also indicated a degree of separation with a mean dissimilarity 
rating of 3.71 and a standard deviation of 2.3, yet were visually located in close 
proximity. Detection and CCTV were located in close proximity and were considered 
highly related across the group with a mean dissimilarity rating of 2.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.24. Detection and target identification were distal visually yet considered 
related, with a mean dissimilarity rating of 2.5 supported by a standard deviation of 
1.99. Detection and law were spatially separated, which was supported by their mean 
dissimilarity rating of 5.21, however, again the participants indicated divergent 
perceptions of dissimilarity with a standard deviation of 3.09.       
5.4.2.4	Cluster	Four	
Cluster four included the concepts of defence in depth and delay, with a mean 
dissimilarity score of 1.36 suggesting the concepts were highly related, with a standard 
deviation of 0.5 suggesting consensus was strong for this pairing by participants. In 
addition, defence in depth and safes and vaults were considered highly related with a 
mean of 2.79, however, the standard deviation for this pairing was 2.35, suggesting a 
small divergence in perceptions across the sample. Defence in depth and lighting were 
also considered highly related with a mean of 2.79 with a reasonable degree of 
consensus across the sample as the standard deviation was 1.89. The cluster also 
included defence in depth and fire protection with a mean dissimilarity rating of 3.4, 
and a standard deviation of 2.9, indicating a spread of thoughts in terms of similarity 
across the sample. Defence in depth and door furniture was another pairing within the 
cluster, with a mean of 3.86; however, again divergence emerged in perceptions of 
similarity with a standard deviation of 3.86. Within this cluster a review of door 
furniture and delay also shows a close relationship, even though door furniture appears 
further from the main cluster, the mean dissimilarity rating was 1.57, supported by a 
standard deviation of 0.76 indicating that participants strongly agreed that these two 
concepts were highly related.   
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5.4.2.5	Cluster	Five	
Cluster five was a small clustering of response and planning and design as it was 
visually separated from clusters two and four, yet sat on the dimensional border 
between these two clusters. Response and planning and design were considered as 
similar concepts, with a dissimilarity rating of 2.57 supported by a standard deviation of 
1.09, indicating consensus across the sample for their relatedness. Nevertheless, 
response and defence in depth (Cluster 4) were considered related with a dissimilarity 
rating of 1.71 and a standard deviation of 1.41, indicating these concepts are considered 
close in proximity across the sample. In addition, planning and design and defence in 
depth were also considered closely related with a dissimilarity rating of 1.71 supported 
by a standard deviation of 0.83.  
5.4.3 Dimensional interpretation 
Informed by the writings of Davies and Coxon (1982, p. 6) the study also drew on an 
analysis of the dimensions (Figure 5.4). Dimensional analysis aimed to understand the 
broader spatial relationships between individual concepts and clusters, as the 
dimensions defining the space are premised to represent the main properties along 
which concepts within the domain are organized (Gonzalvo, Canas & Bajo, 1994, p. 
601).  
The work of Schiffman, Reynalds and Young (1981, p. 253) highlighted that when 
interpreting the stimulus space the researcher can relate the results to a specific theoretic 
model. As such, defining the dimensions of the MDS solution represented 
mathematically in Table 5.13 and graphically in Figure 5.4 was achieved through an 
analysis of the results of Phase One and Two as well as the literature informing the 
study (Chapters 2 & 3).  
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The dimensions were analyzed and labeled as Diagnosis and Treatment accordant with 
the work of Abbott (1988, p. 40) (Section 3.3) who articulated that professional 
knowledge is focused towards three salient tasks of practice: diagnosing, inferring and 
treating. Abbott conceded, however, that inference is often included in the diagnostic 
process unless a problem is particularly complex and so inference was not included in 
this two dimensional model. This view was also evident within the context of the 
extracted category data with physical security as a jurisdictional domain being 
concerned with the diagnosis, inference and treatment of security or loss-coupled risk 
concerns manifested through unlawful access or criminogenic enablers in the protection 
of people, information and property.  
For instance, in the security domain, the professional task of diagnosis was expressed as 
security risk management and its associated tasks. Subsequently the treatment included 
the use of physical and technological measures combined with procedural processes that 
as integrated components provide a physical protection system (PPS).  
The PPS components combine to sequentially deter, or detect, delay and respond 
against, or facilitate recovery from security events. Systematically they reduce 
opportunities to offend or provide a greater level of difficulty to overcome through their 
design facets and processes (Section 3.3). Therefore accordant with the work of Davies 
and Coxon (1982, p. 6) a quasi-circular dimensional space was utilized for interpreting 
this aspect of the MDS analysis. The quasi-circular dimensional space is argued to 
represent the tasks of diagnosis and treatment, with inference sitting in dyadic 
relationship between these two elements accordant with Section 3.3.  
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Table 5.13 MDS physical security dimensional data 
 
 
  
Item No. Item Name Dimension 1 
Treatment 
 Dimension 2 
Diagnosis 
1 Security .6823 ‐1.5232 
2 PlnDesi .0750 1.3412 
3 DiD 1.2313 .7540 
4 Response .0455 1.3311 
5 DoorFurn 1.7691 .4489 
6 DetectSys ‐1.4080 ‐.1653 
7 Law 1.7263 ‐.9658 
8 Infrast ‐1.4994 ‐.7315 
9 Crime pre ‐1.1607 ‐.8540 
10 StrucStr .3609 ‐1.1956 
11 AnalEval ‐1.7756 ‐.8628 
12 CommSkil ‐1.3018 .3065 
13 Barriers .8974 ‐.9281 
14 Safevaul 1.0721 .7526 
15 FireProt 1.2713 1.0039 
16 FcContext ‐1.5105 .4803 
17 MoveCont ‐.1186 1.0457 
18 RevRepor ‐.8507 1.3756 
19 Threat ‐.7245 ‐1.0959 
20 SysTheor ‐.5593 .7744 
21 Detectio .6054 ‐1.3606 
22 Lighting 1.1011 .7578 
23 ElectPow ‐.8477 1.3223 
24 CCTV .6351 ‐1.0357 
25 Risk ‐.3056 .9837 
26 Secprin .6247 ‐1.0148 
27 Delay 1.1460 1.0389 
28 Surveill ‐.7236 ‐.7939 
29 EntCont ‐.7256 ‐.7409 
30 TargetId .2681 ‐.4587 
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Figure 5.4 Physical security’s knowledge structure in two-dimensional space  
 
 
 
5.4.3.1	Dimension	One	Treatment	
Dimension One of the MDS analysis was considered more related to the notion of 
problem treatment. As such, it was deduced that higher scores relating to this dimension 
are indicative of that category area being saliently focused towards the professional 
practice of security risk treatment, and would therefore be located numerically higher 
along this scale. This is supported through Table 5.14, which presents the five 
uppermost correlational scores for this dimension.  
Door furniture (DoorFurn) was rated as the highest treatment knowledge category. In 
Section 5.2.5 door furniture was considered as subordinate to movement control, and 
superordinate to locks. Door furniture was said to include fittings such as the hinges, 
hinge bolts and locks (Peter); along with other fittings used on doors to secure building 
openings for the purpose of restricting unauthorised entry into a protected area. This 
Cluster 2 
Cluster 1 
Cluster 5 
Cluster 4 
Cluster 3 
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treatment element represents one of the most common means of securing an asset, 
where it was acknowledged in Section 3.1 that evidence of such means of achieving 
security date back to Egyptian tombs. Accordingly, this is a very accepted treatment 
option and its N-dimensional place along with its rating as the highest treatment element 
is logical.  
Table 5.14 Treatment dimension  
Dimension 1 
DoorFurn 1.7691 
Law 1.7263 
FireProt 1.2713 
DiD 1.2313 
Delay 1.1460 
The second highest rating for treatment was the concept of law (Table 5.14), and this 
could be due to the point made by the American Institute of Architects (2004, p. 2) that 
safety aspects of a building are addressed by building codes which establish minimal 
standards. Whereas decisions about security are left to the discretion of building owners 
stating, “it is for the owner to assess security threats, determine risks, and set final 
priorities for security aspects of a project” (p. 19).  As the work of Sarre and Prenzler 
(2009) allude to in the Australian context, the legal system is more interested in the 
reasonable treatment of security threats according to the principle of duty of care, often 
only post event, unless mandated by context, which would then fall into compliance. 
Eburn (2005) highlights this principle, duty of care, relates to a duty to act reasonably in 
the circumstances, accordant with the principles of Donoghue v Stevenson. Where Lord 
Atkin said that we owe a duty of care to our neighbor and for the purposes of the law, 
our neighbor is: 
Persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. 
(Eburn, 2005, p. 38) 
Eburn (2005, p. 38) highlights that if a reasonable person would realize that what you 
are planning to do, or not do, may affect a particular person, or class of persons, then 
you may owe a duty of care to that person or persons Accordingly, risk treatment 
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options including security risk treatment must be considered reasonable, and it is this 
aspect that the law is most interested in, rather than problem diagnosis, as owner’s 
treatment of risk must be considered reasonable for the context. As Tooma (2008, p. 2) 
expresses, in practice safety, security, health and environment risks are managed 
through management systems, which are underpinned by a risk management 
methodology.   
The third highest knowledge area for treatment was fire protection (FireProt), which is a 
control measure (treatment) mandated in building codes (American Institute of 
Architects (2004, p. 2), and is subordinate to law, and subordinate to the thematic 
category of detection systems, representing another important and common operational 
element of built environment risk treatment.  
Defence in depth (DiD) was the fourth highest treatment category, which was 
considered subordinate to crime prevention (Section 5.2.5) but superordinate to its 
embodying element categories of detection, delay and response. Thus accordant with 
Section 3.3, Defence in depth as a security theory represents a foremost methodological 
means of treating security risk concerns. The fifth highest treatment category was 
barriers, which again are often a salient means for treating unauthorized access risk 
concerns. Therefore its rating as a salient means of risk treatment is also logical. As the 
American Institute of architects (2004, p. 4) point out, “the most obvious protection 
from the effects of a hostile act is any barrier that can prevent or delay an adversary 
from reaching a target…Generally, physical security may be seen as a means of 
providing more time to ensure safety” (p. 13).  Such a focus on barriers as a means of 
delay is congruent with the rating of barriers as a dominant treatment knowledge 
category for physical security professionals. 
5.4.3.1	Dimension	Two	Diagnosis	
Dimension Two related to the notion of problem diagnosis and as such higher scores 
relating to this dimension are indicative of the knowledge areas being saliently focused 
towards the professional practice of diagnosing security risk concerns. Table 5.15 shows 
that for this dimension reviewing reports was the highest rated category. Reviewing 
reports was considered significant for understanding the security or crime problem to be 
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addressed and was deduced as subordinate to planning and design and infrastructure. It 
was acknowledged that for many security professionals the ability to critically review 
documentation is essential in order to establish the security risk context, prior to 
treatment planning.  
Table 5.15 Diagnosis dimension 
Dimension 2 
RevRepor 1.3756 
PlnDesi 1.3412 
Response 1.3311 
ElectPow 1.3223 
MoveCont 1.0457 
Planning and design was the second highest diagnosis category, yet was also located 
dimensionally as high in treatment, perhaps due to the interrelationships with all other 
aspects of security problem treatment, as planning and design is a very broad term. It is 
logical that without clear planning, problem articulation is not possible; however, the 
design aspect of this category could also be considered a treatment element. This may 
explain why this broad term sits numerically high in terms of diagnosis, but is 
dimensionally located as a treatment.  
Furthermore, Response was the third highest diagnosis category in terms of problem 
definition. This is perhaps due to the role of detection and delay in providing enough 
time to facilitate the response plan (Garcia, 2001, 2009), and therefore many security 
professionals approach their security planning cognizant of this. Consequently many 
security professionals want to understand the response aspects and then work 
backwards, articulating the detection, and delay elements accordant with response 
planning. As Garcia (2001) explained, detection must occur before delay in a PPS, and 
the delay time after detection must exceed the response time for the system to be 
effective. It is acknowledged that physical security aims to provide a means of delay, 
after detection to facilitate a response. Therefore, one means of articulating the amount 
of physical security (diagnosis) is to understand the delay time required in relation to 
response, as delay measures are expensive.  
Electric power (ElectPow) was another diagnosis means, and this is perhaps due to the 
dominance of electronic security measures used to achieve functional security in 
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contemporary times.  Movement control was the fifth diagnostic knowledge category; a 
broad conceptual security category, which directly relates to a core principle of physical 
security, to control access to protected assets and also egress from facilities. This 
category is superordinate to Barriers and Door furniture, and other content areas such as 
walls, fences, windows and glass. Thus, understanding the requirements to control 
movement is a major diagnostic aspect of risk treatment.  
5.4.4 Phase Three: Interpretation 
Phase Three of the study sought to respond to the research question: 
What is physical security’s knowledge content structure as measured by 
multidimensional statistical scaling?  
Phase Three, through Figure 5.4, highlights that physical security’s knowledge content 
structure relates to clusters of knowledge categories and subordinate concepts circularly 
banded, then dimensionally organized around the professional tasks of diagnosis, 
inference (reasoning about) and treatment of contextual security or crime prevention 
problems. These problems relate to the manifestation of harm to people, information or 
property through malicious actors achieved through unlawful access or crime enablers 
(Section 3.3). Figure 5.4 provides an iterative blue print for establishing a knowledge or 
curriculum framework for physical security professionals indicating, for curriculum 
ordering purposes, that physical security’s knowledge content should be presented and 
taught in a manner that reflects these professional tasks.  
5.5 Phase Four: Expert focus group 
5.5.1 Physical security knowledge evaluation 
Phase Four incorporated a qualitative analysis of a focus group interview, from a 
purposive sample of security experts (n=4), utilizing a discourse analysis. This phase 
drew on the writings of Barnett (1994, p. 46) who articulated that the identification, 
selection and ordering of identified knowledge elements along with supporting learning 
outcomes represents an epistemic framework or curriculum.  
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Phase Four sought to understand the knowledge content and structure identified in 
previous study phases, within the context of an ideal curriculum for future physical 
security professionals. As such, in response to Phase One, Two and Three outcomes 
(Figures 5.2, 5.3 & 5.4), Phase Four sought to respond to the question: what are the 
learning objectives and knowledge requisites for physical security professionals as an 
organised knowledge system? 
5.5.1.1	Participants	
Four security experts were included in the focus group: Dave, Jeff, Cliff and Kevin. 
Their profiles can be viewed in Table 5.16. 
Table 5.16 Phase Four: Expert profiles 
Name Profile 
Dave A security educator with 33 years of experience within the security domain, having 
been employed in the Military, Corporate Security and Private Security sectors. 
Qualifications include a PhD, Masters by Research, Bachelor of Science, an 
Advanced Diploma in Engineering and trade certificates. Dave has presented 
research works at numerous security conferences, as well as publishing over 18 
International Journal articles, five book chapters and four books in the area of 
security and security science. 
Jeff A former army officer who served in a variety of security and intelligence roles 
over the course of his career. After serving 20 years in the military Jeff moved into 
the precious minerals resource sector, concentrating on meeting the security 
intelligence needs of this sector. Jeff currently works in academia where he 
coordinates and teaches in the area of intelligence and terrorism at an Australian 
university. 
Cliff Consultancy focus includes the design and analysis of physical protection systems, 
security risk analysis and security risk management for strategic facilities, the 
security of national infrastructure facilities, and the application of access control 
systems and intelligent CCTV. Qualifications include a BSc (Applied Science), 
Graduate Diploma in Applied Science, Master of Applied Science (Physics), 
Doctor of Philosophy, Teachers Certificate, and a Teachers Higher Education 
Certificate. 
Kevin A Primary consultant and the Security Risk Team Leader in a Western Australian 
annexed Central Building Engineering group. Kevin’s qualifications include, a 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) (Security Science), Bachelor of Science (BSc) 
Honours, (computer Science). Kevin is also a Certified Biometrics Professional. 
Kevin also has a background in research and development, having published his 
security research in the world’s highest ranked peer-reviewed Optics Express 
Journal, and presented at national and international security conferences. 
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5.5.1.2	Administration	of	focus	group	
The focus group interview took approximately one hour, and comprised questions 
(Table 5.17) to guide the phase outcomes (Appendix C). The questions sought 
participant’s thoughts relating to requisite knowledge and teaching structure within the 
domain of physical security accordant with their professional experience and supporting 
learning objectives. It also sought their final opinion of the knowledge structure, and 
provided them the final opportunity to recommend adjustments to the hierarchical table 
and supporting heuristic. 
Table 5.17 Phase Four: Expert focus group questions 
No. Interview questions 
1 What is the higher education learning objective/s for a physical security 
professional? 
2 In terms of articulating a formal knowledge system, based on these maps what do 
you see as the foundation content requirements to be learned by physical security 
professionals before qualification? 
3 Higher education students should learn or know the science or knowledge of which 
their future domain is built. Based on this view, what is the scope of higher education 
knowledge? 
4 How should these units be organized? 
5 Do you believe these maps capture the knowledge concepts required for a physical 
security professional? 
6 What are the strengths and perhaps weaknesses of these maps in terms of 
establishing a physical security professional’s knowledge system? 
 
5.5.2 Focus group analysis 
This phase highlighted that the knowledge requisites for a physical security professional 
include core security concepts along with the sciences and models of learning (social 
sciences) that underpin them, as well as the supporting academic skills that are 
professional enablers within a protective security or crime prevention role. As Kevin 
expressed, it is important to keep the end game in mind; stating:  
I actually hired a graduate from a university security terrorism and 
counterterrorism course, and his learning units did not relate to his tasks 
occupationally, the course materials must relate to the professional tasks. 
(Kevin) 
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During this phase Dave expressed that in terms of identifying knowledge unit requisites 
to be learned by physical security professionals before qualification, “it is what you’ve 
got listed here (Tables, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8, and Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4), but at a more 
restricted level though”. However, Dave also noted that foundational elements such as 
strength and materials, physics, should be included stating, “they need to understand 
these aspects, understand the limitations, so when they go to the structural engineer to 
formally do the final calculation they understand it...but this is missing from the tables”.  
This phase acknowledged that most security professionals are not generally engineers. 
Acknowledging this, Jeff voiced that the role is focused towards the diagnosis and then 
the selection and implementation post diagnosis of those appropriate physical security 
elements that go into the security system or program, not actually putting them together. 
Therefore the scope of their professional education is diagnosis of the problem and 
articulation of controls (treatment), not assembly expertise; although they may hold this.  
As Jeff expressed:  
The ability to diagnose is critical, so each of those elements that allows 
them to diagnose the problem is what they need to have as a graduate, along 
with graduate attributes of communication, research and the like, because at 
the end of the day if they can’t diagnose the problem, they are no use to 
anyone. (Jeff)  
In terms of fundamental knowledge the group considered that the knowledge tables and 
heuristics accurately captured the salient occupational knowledge for a physical security 
professional. As Kevin noted, “they have got the main ones”. Nonetheless, some 
category areas did raise critical discussion. For instance, the inclusion of fire protection 
raised questions. However, it was explained that as a knowledge area this kept occurring 
in the literature extraction. To this point Kevin, responded “that’s right, we need to 
know the fundamentals, but I was just wondering how you got it in here”. Jeff made the 
comment that “security is about protection, there is a logical fit”. Cliff also raised the 
observation that some inputs were physical such as door furniture, whereas others were 
ideas such as systems theory. This highlighted and formally acknowledged that the 
knowledge maps sought to understand what the knowledge areas are, and their 
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relationships. This included theories, concepts and principles based on superordinate 
and subordinate stipulations, where some inputs sit under category themes as 
operational deliverables.  
In addition, because of concept reduction (Phase Three) some operational elements 
stayed, whereas some were removed based on word count analysis and Phase Two 
input. Kevin acknowledged these problems as security wide issues.  
CCTV and risk have their own body of knowledge all together, and I have 
worked with people who see security as a subset of risk, not the other way 
around. But physical security professionals, accordant with the research to 
date, must hold this knowledge as part of their broader body of knowledge, 
but they may not be specific area experts. (Kevin) 
The final category which stimulated considerable discussion was law which could be 
considered as both a diagnosis and a treatment in many cases. Dave noted that on the 
MDS map, law is clustered with the treatment elements “more to the explicit type areas, 
instead of at the more diagnostic”. Jeff responded with “You consider law when you get 
to treatment, but in terms of diagnostic you don’t need to give it any 
consideration…diagnosis can exist without worrying about law”.  
Jeff’s view separated diagnosis from compliance, a view supported in the American 
Institute of Architects’ Security planning and design text. They clearly make the 
distinction between building safety and security, highlighting that the safety aspect of 
buildings is addressed by building codes, which establish legally binding minimum 
standards. However, security decisions are left to the discretion of building owners and 
their managers and operators (2004, p. 2). Kevin also concurred with this point, 
highlighting that law is a treatment, and that there is legislation sitting around the use of 
treatment options such as CCTV. These views are consistent with Section 5.4.2 
(Dimensional Interpretation).  
An analysis of the group’s discussion saw the foundational knowledge emerge as per 
the outcomes of the earlier phases of the pilot study.  Knowledge was seen as saliently 
focused towards the diagnosis of the problem and articulation of treatment elements, but 
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not necessarily expertise in their installation and operation, as accordant with Abbott’s 
work these may be delegated to other workers. This is congruent with Figure 1.1 of the 
study, which saw the security professional sitting above the occupational category 
operators such as alarm installers who undertake the assembly and maintenance roles 
yet sit subordinate to the security professional. However, it also highlights a limitation 
with this Figure (1.1) as the physical security professional would also sit parallel with, 
rather than above, other professionals undertaking their part of the risk treatment 
process such as engineers. 
Furthermore, Cliff made the point that these knowledge units must epistemically be 
organised hierarchically in terms of skills, stating: 
It’s got to be in terms of skills, hierarchy of skills, so define the skills as 
needed in a particular unit of study…the skills will be cognitive skills, but 
they could also be application skills, but in a higher degree, you would 
expect them to be cognitive skills in the main. (Cliff)   
From an educational standpoint elements should be organised and taught in terms of a 
combined science and arts (social sciences) approach to diagnose first and then treat 
security concerns, ordered based on prior knowledge competencies, as per Table 5.10 
and Figure 5.2. Furthermore, the scope of learning concerns the relationships between 
knowledge areas, how each knowledge category or unit fits systematically with the 
others to provide a sound diagnosis and optimal treatment strategy. Therefore the scope 
of security higher education in this context needs to focus on the relationship between 
concept units and the arts and science underpinnings on which their future domain is 
built. For example, Dave articulated “there has to be a strong relationship between 
concepts, basically what you are doing (tables and figures), so where does CPTED fit 
into physical security, where does physical security fit into threat, and that sort of 
relationship knowledge”?  
This analysis highlights that the epistemic scope therefore relates to teaching the 
systematic structure of the domain, the purpose or aim of individual knowledge 
category areas, along with their underlying sciences and how individual knowledge 
category areas fit together with other areas to achieve the desired outcome. Participants 
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believed that students need to learn core knowledge within their domain to practice 
however recognised that as graduates there is a need for further development. That is, 
once students separate from educational institutions and go into professional practice, 
moving into their employment context streams they then learn more focused skills. 
This discourse highlighted that after graduating and gaining practical experience with 
their core knowledge, graduates need to learn additional higher-level management 
skills, such as those taught in a Masters of Business Administration (MBA). For 
instance, Dave made the point that, “they learn very high technical skills, then, as they 
progress they move into more of a business management role”. At this stage the 
interviewer confirmed, “so we leave the management knowledge to much later and 
teach the technical skills that they practice first”? Dave responded, “yes, but when I say 
technical skills I am referring to risk management, business continuity, all those 
(categories), not technology”.   
Kevin agreed with Dave’s view, emphasising that his role is managerial with a focus 
towards bringing in work and overseeing and quality controlling outputs. He further 
noted that his subordinates’ roles are focussed on systems analysis and development in 
terms of physical protection systems. Such a view introduced a stratum within the 
security professional’s group, specifically for those working in large multinational 
organisations. At its core, this strata hierarchically includes graduates, experienced 
practitioners and managers or experts (Figure 5.5). However, consultants working for 
themselves logically must be within some level of this strata, either as experienced 
practitioners or specific area experts.  
Figure 5.5 The security professional’s stratum 
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The pilot study also sought interim learning objectives for physical security 
professionals graduating from university programs. A focus on university-level study is 
vital given that it is recognised by the literature, the broader public and indeed the legal 
arena that this is the minimum requirement for a professional study program in an 
Australian context. In response to this Cliff raised a maturation concern at the 
undergraduate level and drew on the University of Western Australia’s (UWA) medical 
program as an example, stating: 
In first year undergraduates do not touch a medical laboratory until their 
second year. First year is in fact first year science, chemistry, physics 
biology and whatever else, in order to give them some maturity…is that an 
issue for physical security? (Cliff)  
This point leads back to the notion of subject ordering with the emphasis on learning the 
science that underpins the professional domain and allowing for a process of maturity 
for school leavers. Informing the learning objectives for graduates, it may be that the 
underpinning sciences for physical security ought to be taught in the first year of a 
learning program (sequencing). With this in mind Dave expressed that for the higher 
educational learning, the key objective we want them (students) to get out of a 
university education is the systems approach, stating:  
So they understand the components that make up the individual elements of 
physical security, and how those systems integrate and that foundation of 
knowledge. However, when you say broader goals, it comes back to you are 
trying to bound this into physical, so do they need to understand risk, do 
they need to understand business continuity, do they need to understand 
communication? (Dave)  
However, Jeff pointed out that if focusing purely on the physical security, then he 
would be looking at engineers. Acknowledging such views, deference was made to the 
definition of physical security; as a device, system or practice of a tangible nature 
(Section 3.1). Therefore physical security practices would include the technical, 
physical and procedural elements of the system. A view supported by Kevin who added 
that in professional consultancy he does not separate physical security from the other 
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functions of security risk assessment, threat assessment or vulnerability assessment, “I 
try to do all as one exercise”. Kevin’s comments highlight the necessity for physical 
security professionals to understand the purpose or drivers. At this stage the researcher 
drew their attention to the knowledge tables and heuristics and made the statement that 
this very notion is encapsulated in the extracted knowledge system, stating, “So when 
you talk about diagnosis, the diagnosis is security risk management”. Kevin responded 
with a statement emphasizing his point:  
To take a very simple example, there is a camera outside of this room, so if 
you gave the plans of this building to an electrical engineer and said please 
give me CCTV coverage; what thought process will that electrical engineer 
go through to put a camera outside of this room, and what would be the 
different mindset and thought process if you gave the same task to a security 
consultant or a security science graduate? (Kevin), “So you are looking at 
the broader problem solving process in relation to the context” 
(Interviewer)? Yes. (Kevin)  
This was a view agreed to by Cliff, highlighting that learning objectives in higher 
education reflect attributes such as independent learning and problem solving stating 
“these I reckon are higher education learning objectives”. Jeff added:  
It comes back to the general attributes, and the discussion we’ve had 
previously about the significance of graduate attributes, that are generic 
attributes for the university such as ethical thinking, diagnostic thinking, 
communications, all of those basic things…those core graduate attributes 
actually apply in all professional domain spaces. (Jeff)  
Directly responding to Jeff’s view, Cliff stated, “I’d say that is a good starting point”. 
This point in the focus group highlighted that security professional’s learning objectives 
must include those general academic attributes embedded in all higher education 
courses, such as the ability to problem solve, communicate and so on. These are 
embedded into learning the underpinning sciences that the domain practices. As Jeff 
states:  
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I think back to my domain space of intelligence, we don’t care what the 
specific qualification is, it is those core attributes that we are actually 
interested in, and the fact that the graduate is in the top percentile of all 
other graduates…As this means they can adapt to whatever environment we 
put them in. (Jeff) 
“So you are saying the learning objectives remain the same, but it is within 
that context of diagnosis, inference and treatment of physical access 
problems”? (Interviewer)… 
Yes…an outstanding intelligence analyst is the one that can communicate 
his diagnosis to the decision maker and get an appropriate decision made; 
whereas, the person who can understand the theory and understand what the 
problem is, but cannot communicate that effectively to somebody to make a 
decision, then they are a complete and utter waste of time. (Jeff)  
Dave’s views took the position that learning objectives need to focus on outcomes from 
technical knowledge, stating:  
Where you sit vertically in your organization will define what you want as a 
learning objective, plus what you want to get out of any education. At the 
lower level as a graduate there is a lot of high technical skills, whereas as 
you sort of move up it becomes about higher management, and 
communication, and you don’t need those technical skills because you are 
managing a broader group. (Dave)  
Jeff supported this view interjecting,  
A doctor goes out and becomes an intern, an accountant goes out and 
becomes a junior accountant, a manager goes out and becomes an advisor or 
something like that, they go into graduate jobs and then they progress 
upwards, but security does not do that…the profession needs to have staged 
hierarchically that allows them (employers) to take graduates and develop 
them. (Jeff) 
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This discourse highlighted the need for learning objectives to include professional 
knowledge and skills required for entry-level positions, on which a graduate can 
develop further expertise through experience and professional mentoring. Further 
guiding the development of physical security learning objectives was the recognition of 
professional accreditation, and where a university program should end and other 
training be pursued. For instance, Jeff stated, “in other professions the degree is only the 
first step, you’ve got to get registration within that”. Dave acknowledged Jeff’s point, 
stating that “registration is professional development…but such development does not 
give the foundation”, that is education’s role.  
Dave expressed “I know it’s probably not a learning objective, but they [students] need 
to know the elements that make up a system and understand how to apply those 
elements”. Cliff considered this to emphasize content rather than an outcome, stating, 
“that is content structure though”. Dave acknowledged Cliff’s view stating, “yeah I 
know, otherwise the learning objective becomes an abstract - good communication, 
ability to work in teams focus”. Dave considered that from a learning perspective 
students must be given the technical skills of what physical security professionals need, 
for example, CPTED, Defence in depth, Path analysis, all the elements, and how they 
go together.  The interviewer responded, “so you need to expose them to the depth and 
breadth of that theory as it relates to the domain area”? Dave responded, “yes, what is a 
PIR, the physics that underline PIR and how PIR fits into the system, and how you are 
going to contextualize it”. Kevin added: 
Yes…but this is technical knowledge, at the end of the day you are giving a 
person a report, and so you can be very good technically, but your report 
writing skills also have to be excellent as well. That is something that I see 
lacking in some people coming out of universities. (Kevin)  
 
5.5.3 Phase Four: Findings 
Phase Four of the study sought to respond to the question: Based on the extracted 
knowledge system; what are the knowledge requisites and supporting learning 
objectives for physical security professionals? 
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Nevertheless, an exact learning objective or set of learning objectives was not provided 
by the panel. However, an analysis of their discourse lead to an understanding that the 
learning objectives for future physical security professionals must relate to teaching the 
knowledge content areas and structure uncovered throughout this study as represented 
through Tables, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10, and Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. Additionally there was 
an emphasis on understanding the uncovered epistemic relationships: how each 
knowledge category or unit fits systematically with the others to provide physical 
security outcomes.  
Phase Four emphasised that a knowledge system for future security professionals should 
be a combined science arts approach due to the broad scope of the domain and the 
breadth and depth of its knowledge base. The knowledge sitting within this system 
relates to diagnosis, reasoning about and treatment of contextual physical security or 
crime prevention problems These provide the why and how in terms of problem solving 
for security diagnosis and treatment; how this knowledge is applied for physical 
security related concerns. Furthermore, this learning must be underpinned by traditional 
academic attributes such as communications skills, analytical ability, capacity to work 
in teams and so on. It is argued that such learning underpins a future professionals’ 
ability to work with others to diagnose, reason about (infer) and deduce treatment 
options accordant with the physical security context.  
The nature of professional work was addressed during this phase where it was supported 
that security professionals do not need the capacity to undertake installation and 
operational work. Rather, it was acknowledged that security professionals must 
understand theoretically how individual treatment measures work, and how their 
integration achieves an optimal treatment strategy and be able to prescribe the most 
appropriate strategy for the context. This highlights important behavioural outcomes 
necessary for physical security professionals and the importance of a graduate’s 
capacity to apply academic knowledge.  
Consequently the learning objective for a physical security professional could be 
specified as a combined cognitive and behavioral outcome, For instance:  
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Apply an educated body of knowledge to diagnose physical security 
requirements for a facility, and develop a logical treatment plan (system) 
attuned with control measures underpinning sciences, and communicate this 
evaluation verbally and in writing.  
Nonetheless, this can only be considered an inferred learning objective, as the group 
was unable to directly articulate this. Therefore, such an assertion needs to be tested in 
the primary study.  
Irrespective of the learning objectives associated with university programs the group 
acknowledged the importance of ongoing development and professional mentoring 
post-qualification for graduates to progress in their career and their capacity to be expert 
physical security specialists. 
5.6 Interpretation: Can the study meet its objectives?  
The reviewed literature highlighted that to date an explicit formal body of knowledge 
showing content, structure and relationships for institutions of higher education does not 
exist for the domain of physical security (Section 3.9). Such a dearth of understanding 
exists in light of the reviewed works of Abbot (1988, pp. 52-54), Wilensky (1964); 
Eraut (1994), Griffiths, Brooks & Corkill (2011) and Freckelton & Selby (2013, 
Chapters 2 & 3), which emphasise that formal academic knowledge legitimizes 
professional work. Therefore steering the interpretation of the pilot study’s data is the 
works of Eraut (1994, p. 103) and Griffiths, Brooks and Corkill (2011, p. 3) which 
combined emphasize that such understanding (higher education curriculum) is based on 
maps of propositional knowledge that are both theoretical yet functional. Such maps 
include both content and structure, emphasising systematic connections (Bruner, 1977, 
p. 2) that are hierarchical or organised in some other way, but force the expression of 
broader themes, and tie the specifics together (Posner & Rudnitsky, 1982, pp. 8-39).  
The feasibility of this study is based on the ability to link its individual phase outcomes 
to the study’s overarching research question: What is a desirable knowledge system for 
physical security professionals as conveyed through the published literature and 
accessible professionals?  
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Phase One of the study sought to develop an initial cultural map of the key concepts and 
organisational structure of relevant knowledge within the domain of physical security. 
Using three printed texts, a count analysis was undertaken to identify key themes. These 
themes were then hierarchically ordered using a process of deductive analysis. During 
Phase Two, physical security experts, validated these knowledge frameworks (Tables 
5.4, 5.5 and Figure 5.1) developed in Phase One and provided additional input and 
enhancements in the context of a semi-structured interview. The final outcomes of this 
stage were a list of key concepts (Table 5.9) identified through the initial literature 
review as well as additional concepts provided by the experts not uncovered previously. 
These key concepts were structured hierarchically and presented in Table 5.10 and 
Figure 5.2. Accordant with the work of Krimsky and Golding (1992, pp. 9-10) (Section 
3.10) Table 5.10 and Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 offer a conceptual net or template of 
cultural order and structure towards making the knowledge system explicit, or more 
conscious. 
Phase Three saw the salient knowledge concept categories tested for macro-structure 
using multidimensional statistical scaling. This process provided an objective analysis 
of how concept categories are related. The outcomes of this procedure supported the 
cultural taxonomy developed via Phase One and Phase Two. The MDS analysis also 
highlighted the broader dimensions of diagnosis and treatment of security concerns 
within the physical security knowledge corpus. 
Through discourse analysis using a focus group, Phase Four sought validation of earlier 
phases as well as articulating an ideal higher education curriculum for security 
professionals. Research participants agreed that the knowledge maps presented in 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 along with Figure 5.2, derived through the study’s methodology, 
represented a desirable body of knowledge for physical security professionals, 
providing clarity and coherence concerning what is to be taught (see Section 3.10) for 
professional practice before qualification. 
Thus an ideal curriculum, based on the knowledge frameworks would provide a mixture 
of core theories, concepts and practice principle content areas for the domain of physical 
security. Core concepts include the very concept of security, along with the concepts of 
surveillance, risk, law and crime prevention. Also included are core theories such as 
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Defence in depth and crime prevention through environmental design. These are 
supported by core practice principles such as detection, delay and response principles, 
and their underpinning occupational means. Also included are general security 
principles including entry control, facility contextualization, and target identification 
along with fire protection. These are further supported by occupational practice 
components such as security lighting, safes and vaults, detection systems, door furniture 
systems, and electric power delivery.  
Pilot study findings stress that such core domain knowledge is fused with general 
academic concepts, theories and professional practice principles, which combine to 
produce a graduate’s system of knowledge. These included analysis and evaluation as 
general concepts employed in all professional practice domains. Then systems theory 
was found to be a general academic theoretical frame essential for achieving a 
professional security solution. This knowledge was further supported by general 
professional practice principles such as planning and design and understanding 
synergies across infrastructure. These were further braced by professional occupational 
practice elements such as the ability to clearly communicate, verbally and in writing, 
along with the capacity to critically review reports.  
The pilot study supported that a desirable knowledge system for physical security 
professionals can be developed applying the study’s methodology. The system of 
knowledge captured through the pilot study led to the development of a number of body 
of knowledge assertions to be tested in the primary study.  
1. Heuristics representing the propositional knowledge and distinct networks of 
relations amongst the various theories, concepts, principles and practice components or 
elements for physical security professionals can be developed for enhancing reception 
learning; 
2. A desirable knowledge system for physical security professionals relates to core 
foundational physical security and crime prevention knowledge, braced by general 
academic knowledge that underpins professional work;  
3. The course learning objective and therefore educational goal for a physical 
security professional can be represented as: an ability to apply scientific knowledge and 
critical thinking techniques to diagnose physical security or crime prevention 
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requirements for a risk context, and develop a systematic treatment plan and 
communicate their evaluation to clients; and 
4. Physical security education needs to include both a science and arts approach to 
include the physical and social sciences that underpin the higher strata tasks of the 
professional domain.  
These assertions include the foundational technical knowledge (the science or learning) 
that makes-up or underpins each discrete yet interrelated area, and that formal 
articulation and acknowledgement of the science and learning precedes the professional 
label. For example, Table 5.9 presents the knowledge category or risk, where according 
to Talbot and Jakeman (2009, p. 130) risk arises out of uncertainty (p. 130) and risk can 
be conceptualised qualitatively through descriptive terms, or quantitatively through 
mathematics.  
To understand risk, security professionals need to understand it quantitatively and 
descriptively, and therefore require both qualitative analysis skills along with 
mathematical comprehension to conceptualise risk and communicate messages 
accordingly. Thus, mathematics is a subordinate concept of risk, therefore security 
professionals must understand how to evaluate risk using historical or calculated data 
(p. 143). In addition, detection technologies work of physics principles and therefore 
security professionals must understand the physics that underpins these technologies in 
order to employ them appropriately. As Cliff said, “we need to hammer home this 
point”, thus in the engineering approach physics is a supporting area of detection 
technologies which needs to be taught to an understanding level to physical security 
professionals.  
5.7 Pilot study reflection 
Informed by the writings of Martin (2000, p. 136) the pilot study sought to trial the 
study’s proposed methodology, collection instruments and methods of analysis. In 
addition, the pilot study also sought to gain an interim understanding of physical 
security’s knowledge system. Therefore, the objective was to identify and overcome 
major problems before proceeding with the larger, more resource-intensive primary 
study.  
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A major difficulty for the study to address was the language variances used within the 
security domain. Often many terms can define explicitly different concepts or 
principles, or communicate the same concept or principles in different ways. This was 
an issue acknowledged for the security domain in the work of Manunta (1999) and was 
highlighted in the Phase One literature extraction and Phase Two interviews, and again 
in the Phase Four focus group interviews. During his interview Peter pointed out 
(Participant 2) that discussing merged terms in security “is a study in and of itself”. 
Peter expressed the position that, “rather than get too bogged down in the granular 
details at this stage what you need to do is capture the broader terms and their general 
understanding to capture an initial body of knowledge which can be refined over time”. 
Brooks (2008, p. 154) acknowledged this issue also in his study of the knowledge 
domain of security risk management, making the point that the study did not attempt to 
provide precise concept definition, allowing the experts to define their own 
understanding through relationship of concepts or knowledge structure. This lead to the 
view that the exploratory stage of the study would highlight what it is we need to define, 
whereas the descriptive and explanatory phases would provide the context in which 
such definitions need to be based.    
Exploration of language variations in the security domain resulted in expert interviews 
taking longer than anticipated with each interview lasting 90 minutes rather than the 
planned 60 minutes.  This issue was raised by Peter who suggested that from a 
professional’s standpoint the ideal time would be around 45 minutes due to work 
schedules. In addition, participants suggested that it would be helpful to be able to 
review the interview questions and supporting materials prior to the interview taking 
place. 
To address these concerns in Phase Two of the primary study, interview questionnaire 
changes were made where participants were asked prior to commencing if any study 
terms needed to be clarified, and the security lexicon was used if terms were ambiguous 
to provide clarification. This aimed to overcome some language ambiguity within the 
study and shortened the questionnaire thus reducing interview time. Further, knowledge 
system information was sent to participants prior to their formal interviews taking place. 
While it is acknowledged that not all participants may have reviewed the material it 
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provided the opportunity for them to do so and as a result, enabled a stronger participant 
centred analysis.  
Methodological changes were also identified for Phase Three. During the data reduction 
CPTED was considered subordinate to planning and design and therefore not included 
in the MDS analysis. This was considered a mistake on reflection, as CPTED is a major 
theoretical planning consideration for physical security and crime prevention. 
Therefore, in conducting the data reduction in the principal study attention will be 
towards the quantitative concept results, and where salient numerical representation 
found, the concept or theory retained for the MDS analysis. This also applied to the 
merging of synonymous terms, where Detection was merged with alarm systems which 
was supported in Phase Two interviews, yet on reflection detection is a broader concept 
and the alarm system is a functional means to achieve security and so are separate 
aspects in the body of knowledge.  
The MDS questionnaire itself was deemed too long by interview participants. 
Therefore, as with the writings of Giguere (2006, p. 29) the survey questionnaire for the 
primary study was broken into two conditions where participants were randomly 
assigned to respond to a set of questions, distributing the dissimilarity rating for the 
study over the two  survey questionnaires.  
A number of changes were also made to the focus group procedure (Phase Four) with 
the questionnaire and knowledge tables and heuristics sent to participants prior to the 
focus group taking place. In addition, the order of questions was changed to reflect a 
building process in participant responses. This included moving question one, “what are 
the higher education learning objectives for future physical security professionals” to 
question 8, being the last question as this proved difficult to respond to as a first 
question in the pilot study.  
Finally, focus group participants gave input regarding the selection of expert 
participants for the primary study. There was an acknowledgement of a stratum of 
professionals in the security industry including graduates, competent professionals, 
senior managers and experts (Figure 5.5).  Pilot study participants suggested including 
professionals working in the ‘competent professional’ strata or as direct physical 
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security consultants as these would be most up-to-date with regards to technical skills. It 
was suggested that graduate professionals were still developing and higher managers 
have a focus towards different skill sets. The pilot study therefore leads a number of 
changes to the primary study’s methodology and procedures Table 5.18.  
Table 5.18 Study methodology and procedures changes  
Phases Changes 
Phase One Key words only, excluding phrases were used to extract physical 
security’s explicit knowledge base.  
Phase Two The interpretation and defining of ambiguous categories removed from 
the study, as per Brooks participants were left to define the terms as 
they understood them and discussion and clarification offered if 
requested. 
The semi-structured interview questionnaire was reduced in size to 
meet time restrictions for participants (Appendix D).  
Phase Three Phase Two saw the MDS survey questionnaire divided into two 
questionnaires to reduce the length and time required to complete the 
survey (Appendix E). 
Phase Four Participants were asked at the completion of the focus group to write 
down what they believed the learning objectives should be, or relate 
for physical security education (Appendix F). 
With minor changes to data collection instruments and procedures and participant 
sampling the pilot study supported the mixed methods research methodology as a valid 
means of extracting physical security’s explicit knowledge system and supporting 
educational objectives. It highlighted that the data extraction and analysis techniques 
could deliver maps of propositional knowledge representative of that knowledge 
required by professionals to work in the physical security domain, thus meeting the 
study’s objectives.  
5.8 Conclusion 
To advance the physical security domain, a cohesive body of knowledge must be 
identified and then used to develop learning objectives as a basis for university 
programs. To achieve such outcomes, a complex, multiphase, mixed methods research 
study, based on constructivist principles, was devised. To test the methodology, 
research tools and analytical techniques a pilot study was undertaken. 
This chapter presented an overview of the pilot study including the pilot study’s trial 
methodology broken into the four discrete phases. Phase One of the study involved a 
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literature extraction based on three published texts to provide key knowledge concept 
category areas for the physical security domain which were then hierarchically ordered. 
In Phase Two expert interviews provided validation and enrichment of the knowledge 
category frameworks delivered. An MDS analysis of the domain space was conducted 
in Phase Three further supporting findings. During Phase Four a focus group was 
conducted to define learning objectives for higher education courses in the security 
domain. 
Initial findings suggest that physical security contains identifiable, consensual, core 
concept knowledge areas which can be epistemically organised. This body of 
knowledge can be best taught to students using a science and arts based approach, 
focusing on the key areas of diagnosis, inference and treatment, underpinned by 
graduate attributes such as communications skills, working in a team and so on. 
As a result of the Pilot Study some minor changes were identified for the Primary 
Study. Despite this, outcomes from the pilot study suggest that the methodology 
employed could reliably and validly be used to generate a body of knowledge for 
physical security and to identify learning outcomes.  
Participants were fully engaged with the process and were supportive of the study. As 
one participant said “the results will be very interesting”. Certainly the results of the 
study will have significant implications for the professionalisation of the physical 
security domain. 
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Chapter 6: Study Phase One: Knowledge category exploration 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents Phase One of the study, the development of an explicit knowledge 
corpus for physical security professionals organized hierarchically accordant with local 
connections between data elements. This phase of the study sought to make explicit 
physical security’s dispersed knowledge system as represented in security specific 
printed texts.  The annotated bibliography data extraction is divided into two security 
thematic stages, initially presenting text books specifically titled towards physical 
security and physical protection systems (Stage 1). The second stage analysed broader 
security texts with an asset protective focus including crime prevention theories, 
concepts and principles within the non-traditional security domain stream (Stage 2). 
Combined, this approach sought to capture the salient concepts, ideas, principles, and 
theories representing an ideal physical security knowledge system. The chapter is 
divided into discrete discourses demonstrating the building of knowledge based on 
previous knowledge congruent with the principles of constructivism (Section 1.8).  
Section 6.2 introduces the annotated bibliographic data extraction as the means for 
uncovering repeated themes within physical security’s shared paradigm. Then Section 
6.3 presents the individual texts’ data extractions, commencing with Text One and 
concluding with Text Fifteen. Section 6.4 presents the concept categories derived from 
the literature analysis (Table 6.16), combined with expert concept categories carried 
forward from the pilot study (Table 6.17) to produce a Phase knowledge table (Table 
6.18). This table is, through deductive analysis, ordered hierarchically to represent 
physical security knowledge concept categories and their local relationships (Table 
6.19). Following this, Section 6.5 interprets the findings from this phase. Section 6.6 of 
the chapter acknowledges limitations within the phase and Section 6.7 discusses the 
reliability and validity for Phase One’s outcomes, and the chapter concludes in Section 
6.8.    
6.2 Phase One: Annotated bibliography 
Evidence supports the existence of a security domain data corpus embodied within 
security textbooks that can be drawn on to explore explicit knowledge elements for the 
cultural domain of physical security (Chapter 5). The knowledge corpus for this phase 
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of the study stemmed from a literature critique of security texts utilizing a count 
analysis technique. Texts were selected due to their salient focus towards the domain 
practice area of physical security, primary crime prevention or security risk mitigation 
emphasis. Initial texts across the data corpus, texts 1 through to 9, discuss physical 
security and the associated knowledge requisites including technical knowledge 
underpinning physical protection systems (PPS) representing Stage 1 of the 
bibliographic extraction.  Other texts consider security’s non-traditional broader domain 
practice areas with groundings in criminology, engineering and management sciences. 
These texts, 10 – 15, represent Stage 2 of the data extraction. 
Combined these texts formed an initial knowledge system (Table 6.16) based on 
extracted knowledge concept categories and supporting knowledge units (subordinate 
knowledge). These concept categories included concepts, theories, principles and fact 
elements selected according to the text’s author’s thesis or central claim, the repetition 
of key terms or ideas and the texts message and structure.    
Included in the literature critique were prescribed texts from the ASIS requisite 
knowledge base, along with the International Foundation for Protection Officers (IFPO) 
course text, as knowledge priori. Such selection sought to ensure holistic capture of 
requisite knowledge areas for the non-traditional practice domain of physical security 
including technical, physical and procedural elements. 
Consistent with Eden’s (1988, p. 2) work, (Sections 1.8 & 4.2.1) extracted data from the 
selected texts provided repeated themes representing core and supporting knowledge 
requisites for physical security professionals as means of exploring a dispersed yet 
explicit knowledge base for physical security. For each text, the contents pages and 
chapter text (Section 3.3.1) were used to find repeated themes through key words 
(Kumar, 1996, p. 30) highlighting its salient superordinate and subordinate knowledge 
concept categories, content and units as they relate to theories, facts, principles and 
concepts as core and supporting knowledge subject areas of physical security. These 
were then assigned values accordant with occurrences within the text (Section 3.3.1) 
and in each text synonymous terms were combined (Manunta, 1999; Brooks & Corkill, 
2012) (Appendix H) and the count of occurrences conducted again.  
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In addition, some frequently occurring words were dropped from the analysis. For 
example, international as a category word was removed, part was also removed as a 
category term, as was time. The word function was also removed during the analysis 
occurrences, as was physical. Furthermore, the category of management was removed 
from the word analysis due to jurisdictional conflict. For each text this produced a 
tabulated matrix highlighting its salient physical security knowledge concept categories. 
Each individual text’s bibliographic extractions provided the initial knowledge category 
inputs towards establishing a phase knowledge matrix as a shared paradigm for physical 
security professionals.  
6.3 Phase One: Bibliographic data extractions 
6.3.1 Stage 1: Bibliographic extraction 
Text 1: Garcia, M. L., (2008). The design and evaluation of physical protection systems 
(2nd ed.). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
The first security text forming part of the data corpus is a textbook written by Mary 
Lynn Garcia from Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA. Garcia’s 
biography explains that she is a Senior Member of the Technical Staff at Sandia 
National Labs. She has over 20 years’ experience in science and engineering research, 
development, application, teaching, and project management of security systems and 
technology. Ms Garcia has been a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) since 1997. 
In addition, Ms. Garcia is the sole author of two texts within the security domain. Her 
first book The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems, first published in 
2001, is now in its second edition (2008). Her second book, The Vulnerability 
Assessment of Physical Protection Systems was published in 2006. Ms Garcia’s books 
have become embedded into many security teaching programs globally and her first 
book is listed as a core text for ASIS’ Certified Protection Professional (CPP) program.  
The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems (2nd ed.) articulates that the 
basic principles of security are the same regardless of application and that it is their 
adaption to context that is of salient importance. Such a statement is supportive of the 
body of knowledge concept. This text strongly emphasizes a systematic approach to 
security within a problem solving paradigm through the articulation of a Physical 
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Protection System (PPS), which combines technical, physical and procedural elements 
into a barrier system to achieve contextual protection objectives. Its salient purpose is to 
describe how individual elements that collectively make up an effective security system 
achieve this through their integration (Garcia, 2008, p. xvii). This includes defining and 
understanding the protection problem, accordant with conceptions of risk, prior to 
designing the treatment system. The text also emphasizes the importance of evaluating 
the design before and after implementation, along with ongoing review. On the basis of 
a count analysis, using key terms representative of synonymous words where necessary, 
Table 6.1 was developed as the knowledge concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.1 Thematic knowledge category data: The design and evaluation of physical 
protection systems 
Physical Security 
System Sensors Detection Protection CCTV Alarm Adversary 
Design Facility Response Security Access Assessment Force 
People Delay Threat Information Control PPS Intrusion 
Communication Doors Analysis Entry Target Assets Lighting 
Barriers Data Attack Fields Signal Devices Guard 
Measurement Equipment Probability Identification Risk Technology Fences 
Display Functions Zones Nuisance Computers Level EASI 
 
Text 2: Walsh, T. J., Healy, R. J., Williams, T. L., Aggleton, D. G., Moritz, M. E., 
Hodge, M., Sherizon, S., Knoke, M. E., & Garcia, M. L.  (2012). Protection of assets: 
Physical security. United States of America. ASIS International.  
The next text in the physical security data corpus was ASIS International’s Protection of 
assets: Physical security. ASIS International is a prominent, specialized society for 
security professionals, originally founded in 1955 as the American Society for Industrial 
Security. The Protection of assets series has been in existence since 1974, and is broadly 
recognized as a primary reference source for security professionals. The intention of the 
Protection of assets is to locate current, accurate and practical security treatment options 
across the broad range of asset protection subjects, strategies and solutions in a single 
reference source.  
The text emphasizes the growing size and frequency of all forms of asset losses, 
coupled with the related increasing cost and complexity of countermeasures selection, 
and demands a systematic and unified presentation of protection doctrine across all 
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relevant practice areas (Walsh, et al, 2012). The Protection of assets sought to draw 
upon a large qualified source base to discuss salient elements of physical security in the 
protection of assets. On the basis of a count analysis, using key terms representative of 
synonymous words where necessary, Table 6.2 was developed as the knowledge 
concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.2 Thematic knowledge category data: Protection of assets: physical security 
Physical Security 
System Security Design Facility Protection CCTV Sensors 
Alarms Assets Access Detection Lighting Equipment PPS 
Control Response Assessment Analysis Information Locks Threat 
Performance Delay Maintenance Doors Cost Building Crime 
Risk Adversary Barriers Personnel Image Devices Lens 
Contractor Technology Process Procedures Testing Power Assets 
Digital Surveillance Fire CPTED Exterior Construction Standards 
 
Text 3: Fennelly, L. J. (2013). Effective physical security (4th ed.). Boston: 
Butterworth-Heinemann.  
The third reviewed text was written by Larry Fennelly who is a retired Director of 
Security for a Harvard Museum and former Harvard University Police Department 
Officer with more than 40 years’ experience in the security domain. He attended the 
National Crime Prevention Institute at the University of Louisville, Kentucky and has 
been extensively involved with ASIS International. To date, he has written or edited 29 
books collectively and is a well-known author and internationally accepted knowledge 
source within the security industry (crime prevention domain). Fennelly conveys that 
the book contains his combined knowledge and experience from his professional years. 
According to Fennelly, each chapter includes the current necessary specifics to ensure 
that practitioners can reference this text with a particular and immediate dilemma and 
come up with a practical amount of knowledge to help solve the moment’s crisis.  
The book is divided into discrete yet interwoven themes emphasizing influences in the 
design of physical security including strategies, along with individual knowledge areas. 
These areas include physical barrier considerations and building fabric, the use of 
technology to provide surveillance and control access, and fire life safety. These are 
supported by an introduction into standards and regulations in the American context and 
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security officers and equipment considerations. The theme of the text is about 
controlling physical access to ensure that only authorized persons gain access to a 
facility and property. On the basis of a count analysis, using key terms representative of 
synonymous words where necessary, Table 6.3 was developed as the knowledge 
concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.3 Thematic knowledge category data: Effective physical security 
  Physical Security  
Security System CCTV Doors Locks Access Alarms 
Keys Protection Lighting Control Data Design Devices 
Bolts Fences Building Windows Sensor Fire Risk 
Crime Facility Pin Barriers Safes Combinations Network 
Attack Cylinder Standards Glass Images Lens Tumbler 
Signal Threat Line Scene Assessment Personnel Interior 
Costs Digital Process Badges Guards Exterior Electrical 
 
Text 4: Baker, P. R., & Benny, D. J. (2013). The complete guide to physical security. 
Boca Raton, FL. CRC Press.  
The next reviewed text was co-written by Paul Baker and Daniel Benny. Paul Baker 
holds a Bachelor of Science in Administration of Justice, a Masters of Business 
Administration, a Master’s of Science in criminal justice and a Doctorate of Strategic 
Leadership and is Certified Protection Professional (CPP). His employment history 
includes the United States Marine Corps, Maryland Police Department, the MITRE 
Corporation, Institute for Defence Analysis and the RAND Corporation. Dr Baker is an 
adjunct professor for the University of Maryland University College in the homeland 
security field and an adjunct professor for Southwestern College in its security 
management curriculum.  
Daniel Benny holds a Bachelor of Arts in Security Administration, Associate in Arts in 
both Commercial Security and Police Administration, a Master of Arts in Security 
Administration, Master of Aeronautical Science and a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in 
criminal justice. He is the security discipline chair at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University. Dr Daniel Benny has authored books including General aviation security: 
aircraft, hangars, fixed base operations, flight schools; and Airports and cultural 
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property security: protecting museums, historic sites, archives, and libraries; as well as 
over 3oo articles on security administration, intelligence, aviation security, private 
investigation, and cultural property security topics. His professional career includes 
service as a US Naval intelligence officer, Central Intelligence Agency employee, 
Director of Protective Service Pennsylvania Historic and Museum Commission, and as 
a US Navy police chief.       
The text both recognizes and emphasizes the need to train the newly recruited members 
of the physical security trade and make them aware of the nuances of this occupational 
field. The text premises that the knowledge base for the field of physical security which 
pulls into place access control, closed-circuit television, intrusion detection and 
environmental controls is partly technical and partly physical. In addition, the text 
expresses that decisions concerning the application of the physical security body of 
knowledge cannot be made in a vacuum, they are made cognizant of the business 
context for which the controls are facilitating the achievement of objectives. Therefore 
the text states that it will address each topic from the standpoint of common-sense in 
relation to business dynamics and security leadership. On the basis of a count analysis, 
using key terms representative of synonymous words where necessary, Table 6.4 was 
developed as the knowledge concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.4 Thematic knowledge category data: The complete guide to physical security  
Physical Security  
Security System Protection CCTV Control Access Leadership 
Facility Building Design Guards Costs Doors Organization 
Biometric Locks Alarms Devices Surveillance Entry Lighting 
Technology Information People Identify Planning Fire Keys 
Business Threat Level User Sensors Detection Force 
Images Application Card Risk Visitor Network Procedures 
Assessment Intrusion Project Process Emergency Monitoring Response 
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Text 5: Garcia, M. L. (2006). The vulnerability assessment of physical protection 
systems. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann 
The next security text forming part of the data corpus is another textbook written by 
Mary Lynn Garcia from Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA who 
also authored the first text reviewed. Text 5 describes the entire vulnerability 
assessment process for a physical site from the start of the planning through to final 
analysis and then briefing components to senior management. The text is described as 
an extension of The design and evaluation of physical protection systems (Text 1). The 
underlying premise of this text is that overall system effectiveness is the prime objective 
for a physical security system, also referred to as a physical protection system (PPS). 
Mary Lynn expresses that the goal was to write a thorough, but not overly detailed, 
description of the common vulnerabilities of physical protection systems. The text is 
divided into discrete chapters with chapter one providing an overview of risk 
management, vulnerability assessment and systems engineering principles. The 
following chapters describe the PPS and articulate how to assess for adversary 
vulnerabilities. On the basis of a count analysis, using key terms representative of 
synonymous words where necessary, Table 6.5 was developed as the knowledge 
concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.5 Thematic knowledge category data: The vulnerability assessment of physical 
protection systems  
Physical Security  
Sensors System Alarms CCTV Response Assessment Detection 
Facility Personnel Analysis Subsystem Delay Adversary Control 
Project Security Protection Assets Attack Evaluation PPS 
Data Information Doors Threat Entry Testing Personnel 
Intrusion Report Fences Barriers Communication Functions Design 
Display Equipment Vehicle Installation Maintenance Materials Components 
Signal Access Lighting Exterior Probability Portal Vulnerability 
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Text 6: Khairallah, M. (2006). Physical security systems handbook: The design and 
implementation of electronic security systems. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-
Heinemann.  
The next text in the reviewed data corpus is one written by Michael Khairallah. 
Khairallah premises that the text is written as a comprehensive guide to identifying the 
human-centred threats to an organization, determining the vulnerabilities of the 
organization to those threats, specifying security products to mitigate said threats and 
acquiring and implementing the recommended solutions.  
Khairallah states that the depth of detail in the book assumes the reader is a security 
professional and has both experience and the technical skills necessary to create a basic 
security system design. The main emphasis of the text is to provide the security 
professional with a guide for doing the right things at the right time throughout all 
phases of a physical security process. The text is divided into discrete chapters 
including threat assessment, and vulnerability analysis, preliminary system design, 
presenting solutions and system acquisition and implementation. On the basis of a count 
analysis, using key terms representative of synonymous words where necessary, Table 
6.6 was developed as the knowledge concept categories for the reviewed text.  
Table 6.6 Thematic knowledge category data: Physical security systems handbook: The 
design and implementation of electronic security systems 
Physical Security  
System Security Doors Vendor Control Access Installation 
Bid Devices Equipment CCTV Cards Alarm Lock 
Costs Design Threat Planning Project Opening Recommendations 
Electrical Employees Requirements Identify Process Meeting Cable 
Protection Facility Power Perimeter Assets Drawings Response 
Information Monitoring Assessment Reports Vulnerability Acceptance Review 
Testing Document Reader Evaluation Data Level Lighting 
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Text 7: Pearson, R. L. (2007). Electronic security systems: A manager’s guide to 
evaluating and selecting system solutions. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
This text is focused towards imparting the knowledge required for implementing and 
managing technical security components as a holistic system. The author notes that 
while the technical sophistication of security systems has increased, many security 
professional’s knowledge of these aspects has not kept pace. Pearson highlights that in 
the early days the physical security profession focused on the physical aspects of 
security as the available electronic systems possessed only very rudimentary 
capabilities. However, now broader system philosophies and technical understandings 
are required, especially in terms of how individual technologies operate with other 
system elements to achieve system objectives.  
The focus of this text is therefore to enable the security professional understand the 
various electronic security functional components and the ways these components 
interconnect, as well as provide a guide to a holistic approach to solving security issues 
with various technologies. The text discusses issues of integrating electronic security 
functions, developing a system, component philosophy, long-term system issues, and 
the culture within a corporation which will impact the final system design. The author 
premises that electronic solutions are as much an art form as a science, stating “there is 
not just one solution to a given problem”. On the basis of a count analysis, using key 
terms representative of synonymous words where necessary, Table 6.7 was developed 
as the knowledge concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.7 Thematic knowledge category data: Electronic security systems: A manager’s 
guide to evaluating and selecting system solutions 
Physical Security  
Security System Alarms Badges Electrical Control Access 
CCTV Fields Panel Cables Data Sensors Technology 
Fire Database Doors Devices Costs Detectors Operator 
Installation Functions Level Software Building Employees Standards 
Maintenance Design Computer Applications Project Integration Reader 
Lighting Automation Information Location Server Facility Protection 
Code Biometric Testing Wireless Communication Power Monitoring 
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Text 8: Norman, T. L. (2007). Integrated security systems design: Concepts, 
specifications and implementation. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
This text is about designing convergence-based integrated security systems and 
enterprise integrated security systems. Technological advances have seen both 
components and functions in the security management plan integrated to achieve a 
desired level of security. The text premises that many in the security domain fail to 
comprehend the technological advances and requirements of contemporary ethernet 
infrastructure security systems. Norman states that since 2003 the security industry left 
behind the ‘old technology’, now security technology is information technology (IT) 
based, and many in the security industry are afraid of it. Therefore this text is written for 
new and experienced system design consultants, designers, and project managers who 
build these complex systems and for building owners, security directors and facilities 
directors who operate them.  On the basis of a count analysis, using key terms 
representative of synonymous words where necessary, Table 6.8 was developed as the 
knowledge concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.8 Thematic knowledge category data: Integrated security systems design: 
Concepts, specifications and implementation 
Physical Security  
System Security CCTV Doors Design Control Access 
Alarms Networks Devices Switching Digital Locks Data 
Interface Cards Building Guards Project Electrical Server 
Detectors Technolog
y 
Intercom Console Power Signal Communicatio
n 
Monitoring Reader Functions Software Fire Detection Hardware 
Configuratio
n 
Code Transmissio
n 
Contracto
r 
Informatio
n 
Field Drawings 
Integrated Barriers Environment Electrified Antenna Specification
s 
Infrastructure 
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Text 9: Contos, B. T., Crowell, W. P., DeRodeff, C., Dunkel, D, & Cole, E. (2007). 
Physical and logical security convergence: Powered by enterprise security management. 
Burlington, MA: Syngress.  
Brian Contos holds a Bachelor of Science and is currently in the position of Chief 
Security Officer, ArcSight Inc. In this role he advises government organizations and 
Global 1, 000 Companies on security strategy related to Enterprise Security 
Management (ESM) solutions. Dan Dunkel is an information technology (IT) sales 
executive and operates his own consultancy firm, New Era Associates; a private 
consultancy specializing in sales strategy and business partner development between IT 
and physical security vendors and integrators. He is a frequent speaker at security trade 
shows in the United States and writes a twice monthly column for Today’s Systems 
Integrators, (TSI), an online publication of Security Management and BNP Publishing.  
William Crowell is an independent consultant specializing in information technology, 
security and intelligence systems. An expert on network security issues, Crowell served 
as President and Chief Executive Officer of Santa Clara and then California-based 
Cylink Corporation a leading provider of e-business security solutions after a substantial 
period with the National Security Agency (NSA). Since 9/11 he has served on Markle 
Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. Colby DeRodeff is 
the manager of Technical Marketing at ArcSight. His expertise is focused towards the 
insider threat and the convergence of physical and logical security, as well as enterprise 
security and information management.  
Eric Cole currently works in research and development to advance the state of the art in 
information systems security. He holds a Masters in Computer Science and a PhD with 
a concentration in Information Security. He has authored a number of books including 
Hackers beware, Hiding in plain sight, as well as Insider threat. He is an inventor with 
over 20 patents to his name along with being a researcher, writer and speaker for the 
SANS Technology Institute.  
The text premises that the convergence between physical and cyber security affects 
contemporary security solutions. This is a single source text aimed at linking the two 
traditional domain knowledge bases of physical and cyber security stressing that 
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corporate security must understand and implement converged security or be left 
vulnerable. As such, the text is marketed towards anyone who wishes to be a leader in 
the security field, IT or physical security as the text takes an in-depth look at how the 
issue of convergence is impacting enterprise security, particularly from the insider threat 
perspective. On the basis of a count analysis, using key terms representative of 
synonymous words where necessary, Table 6.9 was developed as the knowledge 
concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.9 Thematic knowledge category data: Physical and logical security 
convergence: Powered by enterprise security management 
Physical Security  
Security System Networks Log Technology Access Information 
Data Syngress Control CCTV Process Attack Analysis 
User Protection Devices Critical Policy Infrastructure Deployed 
Threats Assets Server Standards Communication Detection Integration 
Model Response Internet Logical Identity Monitoring Leadership 
Level Sensors Environment Vendors Surveillance Analyst Applications 
Intelligence Computers Governance People Software Trusted Source 
 
6.3.2 Stage 2: Bibliographic extraction 
Text 10: Broder, J., & Tucker, E. (2012). Risk analysis and the security survey (4th 
ed.). Waltham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
The analysis of this work represents the commencement of stage two of the literature 
extraction in which texts based security’s non-traditional broader-domain practice areas 
are reviewed.  
This text was written for security and risk management professionals and is the fourth 
edition of the original text published in 1984. It provides an understanding of the 
principles of risk analysis for security students and professionals including the two 
elements of risk control: (1) the protection of assets by identifying, analysing, and 
prioritizing the risk, and (2) contingency and disaster recovery planning. The authors 
state that “when security fails, as it occasional does, recovery becomes paramount and 
security professionals must understand the vital role they play if they are to fully meet 
their responsibilities”.  
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James Broder is a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent and US 
State Department employee. Combined he has more than forty years’ experience in 
security and law enforcement, having worked as a security executive, instructor and 
consultant. Eugene Tucker is the head of Praetorian Protective Service and a past 
member of the board of directors for the Business recovery Managers association in the 
United States. On the basis of a count analysis, using key terms representative of 
synonymous words where necessary, Table 6.10 was developed as the knowledge 
concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.10 Thematic knowledge category data: Risk analysis and the security survey 
Security  
Security Risk System Survey Analysis Recovery Response 
Employees Control Planning Emergency Identify Report Loss 
Organization Information Hazards Continuity Fire Data Costs 
Building Equipment Incident Protection Crime Threat Damage 
Disaster Facility Procedures Preparedness Prevention Impact Operations 
Plans Consultant Method Strategies Standards Crisis Materials 
Safety Level Training Policy Testing Flood Evacuation 
 
Text 11: International Foundation for Protection Officers (IFPO) (2012). The 
professional protection officer: Practical security strategies and emerging trends (8th 
ed.). Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
The International Foundation for Protection Officers (IFPO) is a not for profit 
organisation established in 1988, headquartered in Tampa, Florida in the United States.  
As an organisation it seeks to provide education and certification to protection and 
security officers in the United States of America, Canada, and throughout the world, 
develop and maintain security training standards that improve the quality of job 
performance of protection and security officers, establish standards of ethics for 
protection and security officers and to encourage adherence to these standards and also 
fund research projects that will further educational opportunities for protection and 
security officers. 
The purpose of this text is to provide what the International Foundation for Protection 
Officers (IFPO) consider are the ‘need-to-knows’ or knowledge requisites for protection 
officers and students throughout the security industry and is a course text for the 
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Certified Protection Officer program (CPO) through the International Foundation for 
Protection Officers (IFPO). The book is premised on the view that the principles of 
security always apply though the contexts differ, but that those principles need to be 
adapted to meet local needs. Therefore this text serves as a research resource for those 
looking to develop insight into an array of security topics. On the basis of a count 
analysis, using key terms representative of synonymous words where necessary, Table 
6.11 was developed as the knowledge concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.11 Thematic knowledge category data: The professional protection officer: 
Practical security strategies and emerging trends 
Physical Security  
Security Officer Protection Crime People Control System 
Risk Law Information Employees Organization Training Safety 
Alarms Threat Assets Access Incident Response Force 
Communication Prevention Work Hazards Emergency Services Detection 
Patrol Personnel Terrorism Violence Facility Loss Level 
Property Costs Drug Equipment Report Planning Identify 
Technology Theft Keys Crowd Procedures Weapons CCTV 
 
Text 12: Fischer, R. J., Halibozek, E., & Green, G. (2008). Introduction to security (8th 
ed.). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
The next text in the security data corpus is a textbook co-written by three authors within 
the security domain. Robert Fischer whose biography highlights that he is a member of 
the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, and holds a PhD. He is currently President 
of Asset Protection Associates, Inc, a security consulting company. Robert Fischer is a 
former Director of Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Institute and a Professor of Law 
Enforcement and Justice Administration at Western Illinois University. Edward 
Halibozek is the former Chairperson for the Aerospace Industries Association, 
Industrial Security Committee and is currently a member of the Board of director for the 
Chief Special Agents Association in Los Angeles in addition to being a corporate 
director of security for a fortune 100 Company. Gion Green is noted in the book to be a 
twentieth century security pioneer.  
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Together these professionals wrote Introduction to security (8th ed.). This text forms 
part of the ASIS international knowledge corpus and sought to establish for the reader 
the basic concepts of security. In addition, the text introduces learners to the depth and 
breadth of the security domain in the non-traditional sense. Furthermore, the text has 
sought to articulate the current problems within the basic frameworks of security theory 
in response to the changing global posture in a post September 11th, 2001 environment. 
Especially in the areas of terrorism; this included a new emphasis also focusing towards 
securing information, identity theft, transportation, contingency planning and piracy 
concerns.  
The text aims to introduce security concepts and approaches to those new to the 
industry along with serving as a reference text for professional problem solving within 
the security domain. This text is divided into three sections; Section one presents the 
security domain, history, employment options and professional development. Section 
two presents the basics of defence and Section three focuses towards specific threats 
and solutions within security context areas. Of significance for this study is that the text 
(p. 173) highlights that while every security program must be an integrated whole, and 
that individual elements must grow out of the needs dictated by the circumstances, the 
first basic line of defence is still physical security (Section 2). That is, the physical 
protection of the facility through the meticulous attention to detail. On the basis of a 
count analysis, using key terms representative of synonymous words where necessary, 
Table 6.12 was developed as the knowledge concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.12 Thematic knowledge category data: Introduction to security 
Physical Security 
Security People System Terrorism Protection Law Crime 
Control Information Computer Loss Reports Theft Facility 
Planning Alarms Prevention Locks Costs Building Training 
Drug Risk Response Access Devices Doors Work 
Threat Safety Keys Emergency Violence Property Policy 
Standards Force Attack Cards Level Lighting Data 
Technology Surveys Procedures Internal Design Equipment Contract 
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Text 13: Smith, C., L. & Brooks, D., J. (2013). Security science: The theory and 
practice of security. Waltham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
The next text in the reviewed data corpus is a text which emphasises the multi-
disciplined practice areas of security into a single structured body of knowledge. Clifton 
Smith is a physicist and currently an honorary professor with Edith Cowan University 
(ECU) in Western Australia. Clifton Smith initiated the establishment of the Australian 
Institute of Security and Applied Technology at ECU in 1987, and developed research 
profiles in in security imaging, biometric imaging, ballistics identification, and infrared 
sensing. He also developed the first Bachelor of Science (security) honours degree, a 
Masters’ of Science (Security science) research degree, and doctor of philosophy 
(Security science) research degree. David Brooks (PhD) has over 33 years’ experience 
in the security domain with the U.K. Royal Air Force, Australian Department of 
Defence, as a professional consultant and security educator. David maintains a role as a 
security research leader within Edith Cowan University’s Security Research Institute 
(SRI).      
Within this text each chapter takes an evidence-based approach to one of the core 
knowledge categories. Unlike many security texts the authors provide the underlying 
scientific basis supporting underlying theories, principles, models or frameworks within 
the domain of security. Demonstrating the relationships and underlying concepts, they 
present an approach to each core security function within the context of both a national 
and organizational security perspective. The text provides a rational basis for complex 
decisions and begins the process of defining the emerging discipline of security science. 
On the basis of a count analysis, using key terms representative of synonymous words 
where necessary, Table 6.13 was developed as the knowledge concept categories for the 
reviewed text. 
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Table 6.13 Thematic knowledge category data: Security science: The theory and 
practice of security 
 
     Physical Security  
Security Risk System Organization Planning Data Detection 
Process Technology People Facility Threat Assets Environment 
Control Protection Barriers Intelligence Assessment Access Strategy 
Response Application Design Critical Biometric Concepts Devices 
Testing Fire Attack Functions Analysis Crisis Standards 
Decisions Science Equipment Principles Context Safety Theory 
Identification Integrated Costs Resources Intruder Probability Evaluation 
 
Text 14: Atlas, R. (2013). 21st Century security and crime prevention: Designing for 
critical infrastructure protection and crime prevention (2nd ed). Taylor & Francis. Boca 
Raton, FL.  
Randall Atlas is an architect and criminologist. He is president of Counter Terror 
Design Inc; and vice president of Atlas Safety & Security Design, holding a Bachelor’s 
Degree in Architecture and Criminal Justice, a Master’s Degree in Architecture, and a 
Doctorate in Criminology. Randall Atlas is a nationally recognized speaker in the 
United States and has worked professionally for the National Crime Prevention 
Institute, the American Institute of Architects, and the American Society of Industrial 
Security (ASIS). He is a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) with ASIS and a 
member of the Security Architecture and Engineering Council. Randall also serves on 
the American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM), f33 Committee on Corrections and 
Detention Facilities, and the ES4 Committee on Homeland Security. In addition, Atlas 
has contributed to the Protection of assets manual and written for security interest 
magazines including: Access Control & Security Systems, Security Technology & 
Design, and Security Management.  
The text discusses the competing needs framed by the American culture of openness 
and access versus the need for protection from threats to security and safety. Atlas 
acknowledges that many architects do not recognize the requisite to design security into 
the built environment because it does not relate to them. Premising that many architects 
have never studied security approaches such as crime prevention through environmental 
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design (CPTED) in their educational courses. Atlas expresses the need for balanced 
security, stating that the real issue is what level of inconvenience will be tolerated by the 
imposition of security before people just avoid the activity or space. On the basis of a 
count analysis, using key terms representative of synonymous words where necessary, 
Table 6.14 was developed as the knowledge concept categories for the reviewed text. 
Table 6.14 Thematic knowledge category data: 21st century security and crime 
prevention: Designing for critical infrastructure protection and crime prevention  
Physical Security  
Security Building Lighting Design CPTED Access Crime 
Facility System People Control Risk Design Level 
Environment Community Threat Prevention Surveillance Natural Doors 
Safes Standards CCTV Assets Property Assessment Safety 
Windows Architectural Criminal Landscaping Codes Infrastructure Fences 
Exterior Critical Costs Terrorism Vulnerability Glass Zones 
Employees Alarms Planning Walls Emergency Information Energy 
 
Text 15: Fennelly, L. (2012). Handbook of loss prevention and crime prevention (5th 
ed.). Butterworth-Heinemann. Waltham, MA. 
The final text in the data corpus is a security textbook written by Larry Fennelly who 
also wrote Text 3. Fennelly considers that crime is a fact of life and that security is a 
process which must be part of the ongoing business practice. The text is premised to 
assist the security professional determine the goal of the security process, to control 
access, to protect assets and inventory, to prevent robberies and burglaries, to monitor 
life safety systems, to reduce potential liability, to reduce insurance premiums and to 
ensure business continuity. He expresses the view that there are layers in every security 
program designed to protect people, buildings and property and that the more valuable 
or vulnerable the subject being protected the more layers required in the security 
process. The text focuses towards traditional security element topics as they help 
achieve security layers including access control, security barriers, risk management and 
the dynamic security environment. This text has been written towards what Lawrence 
Fennelly believes today’s security practitioner needs to practice. On the basis of a count 
analysis, using key terms representative of synonymous words where necessary, Table 
6.15 was developed as the knowledge concept categories for the reviewed text. 
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Table 6.15 Thematic knowledge category data: Handbook of loss prevention and crime 
prevention 
Physical Security  
Security People System Protection Locks Crime CCTV 
Doors Control Building Keys Procedures Facility Information
Design Planning Alarms Access Lighting Risk Threats 
Reports Emergency Devices Data Identification Fire Response 
Attack Theft Property Level Cards Safety Loss 
Bolts Assets Detection Fences Standards Combination Guards 
Cylinder Vehicles Analysis Network Entry Interior Barriers 
 
6.4 Phase One: Findings 
Consistent with the theoretical framework set forth in Section 1.8, Phase One of the 
study sought to understand the explicit knowledge domain of physical security as 
expressed by repeated themes (constructs or concepts) as depicted across a selection of 
relevant security texts.  
Phase One sought to respond to the question: What are the explicit knowledge concept 
categories for physical security as represented through repeated themes printed in 
security texts and their structure? 
Repeated themes were extracted using a word count analysis accordant with the work of 
Kumar (1996) (Section 4.2.2), and then sorted according to frequency count from 
highest to lowest. As Kumar (1996, p. 26) expressed, the print (published) domain 
represents a large trove of data. In addition, the work of Guest, MacQueen and Namey 
(2012, p. 6) explained that a mathematical analysis of word occurrence from such texts 
is a legitimate form of analysis (See Section 4.2.2).  
Accordant with the frequency count across the sampled texts, salient knowledge 
categories and concepts emerged which were tabulated into a final seven by seven 
matrix from highest to lowest occurrence representing the top 49 knowledge categories, 
concepts and principles to develop Phase One’s bibliographic knowledge concept 
categories (Table 6.16). Consistent with Kumar’s (1996, p. 30) work, Table 6.16 is 
organized according to their summated occurrence from highest to lowest as an interim 
cultural taxonomy.   
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Table 6.16 Phase One: Data corpus thematic knowledge categories 
Physical Security  
Security System CCTV People Control Access Design 
Alarms Facility Doors Crime Building Risk Information
Lighting Threat Sensors Detection Response Data Locks 
Assets Planning Device Lenses Analysis Technology Assessment 
Emergency Costs Attack Standards Keys Report Safety 
Equipment Fire CPTED Network Barriers Procedures Fencing 
Prevention Loss Adversary Property Terrorism Guard Law 
 
Table 6.16 highlights that the most frequently occurring theme from the data extraction 
was the word security. That is, the very concept of security overarched all others. Such 
an outcome is congruent with the work of Spradley (1979) (Section 1.5) who expressed 
the view that a cultural domain’s knowledge structure is based on isolating the 
fundamental units of cultural knowledge accordant with a single semantic relationship 
with their cover term. For this study the cover term was premised, and subsequently 
found to be, the term security (Section 2.2). Following the concept of security were 48 
additional fundamental units of cultural knowledge represented through their knowledge 
concept category cover terms. Each of the knowledge concept categories within the 
cultural table (Table 6.16) represents a cover term for an area of relevant domain 
knowledge with its own body of literature, which is essential for professional practice 
within the occupational domain of physical security.  
The knowledge concept category table (Table 6.16) is supported by a word cloud 
(Figure 6.1) developed using Nvivo software based on all texts from the data corpus 
using the top 100 results from the word frequency query. Word clouds provide a visual 
representation of frequently occurring themes or concepts across analysed texts where 
font size and colour intensity increases proportionally based on the weighted percentage 
of each item extracted. The most salient term is placed at the centre of the cloud, at the 
largest font size and brightest colour, and subsequent terms are placed in sequence 
around this using a font size, location and colour intensity determined by their weighted 
percentage.  
The word cloud developed for this study supports that the word security is the most 
salient concept within the data corpus, closely followed by system and systems. Also 
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appearing as salient concepts are control, access and protection. Then concepts such as 
risk, alarm, design, physical and information follow, emphasizing their significance 
within the domain of physical security.   
Figure 6.1 Nvivo word cloud of key words and concepts for the cultural domain of 
physical security. 
 
Drawing on the writings of Maher and Burke (1991, p. 13), Kumar (1996, p. 30) and 
Bernard and Ryan (2010, p. 8) (Sections 4.2.1 & 4.2.2) Phase One used the outcomes of 
the pilot study as a new priori. Accordant with the principles of constructivism (Section 
1.8), knowledge categories from the pilot study experts (Table 6.17) were bought 
forward for use in Phase One. These included 18 categories, not uncovered in the 
literature extraction, but articulated by participants in the pilot study as important 
knowledge areas for physical security professionals. 
Table 6.17 Pilot study: Carried forward knowledge concept categories 
 Physical Security 
Door furniture Defence in depth Situational crime 
prevention 
Infrastructure 
Structural strengths Safes & vaults Electric power Delay 
Surveillance Windows Glass Walls 
Drugs Interruption Field of view Security surveys 
Movement control Communication   
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The combination of the Phase One literature extraction along with the concept 
categories brought forward from the pilot study provided inputs for an enhanced 
cultural domain knowledge concept category table (Table 6.18) and hierarchical 
knowledge concept category table (Table 6.19) accordant with the writings of Spradley 
(1979) (Section 4.2.3).   
Table 6.18 Phase One: Physical security knowledge concept categories 
 
Physical Security  
Security System CCTV People Control Access 
control 
Planning & 
design  
Alarms Facility 
contextualization 
Doors Crime Building Risk Data & 
Information 
Lighting Threat Sensors Detection Response Locks Assets 
       
Device Lenses Analysis 
& 
evaluation  
Technology Emergency Costs Attack 
Standards Keys Reports Safety Equipment Fire CPTED 
Network Barriers Procedures Fencing Prevention Loss Adversary 
Property Terrorism Guard Law Door 
furniture 
Defence in 
depth 
Situational 
crime prev 
Infrastructure Structural 
strengths 
Safes & 
vaults 
Electric 
power 
Delay Surveillance Windows 
Glass Walls Drugs Interruption Field of 
view 
Security 
surveys 
Security 
theory & 
principles 
Movement 
control 
Resolution      
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The premise of the study was that Physical Security, as a sub-domain of non-traditional 
security, has its own knowledge base that can be formally codified. Such knowledge 
may stem from other domain disciplines including engineering, physics, architecture, 
criminology, law, psychology and sociology, along with other domains that can 
contribute to a fused knowledge system.  Such domain knowledge can be fused to 
develop a single codified taxonomic framework (Table 6.19) accordant with the work of 
Eden (1988) (Section 1.8). Many domains are understood through taxonomic structure 
(Anderson & Sosniak, 1994, p. 11).  
Eden’s (1988, p. 2) work expressed that man seeks to make sense of his world through 
the detection of repeated themes and the construal of them using a construct system 
such as a taxonomy. Tables 6.18 and 6.19 along with Figure 6.2 represent such a 
taxonomic construct system. As Spradley (1979, p. 137) explains, taxonomies are 
subsets of domains; tangible sets of content classifications organized on the basis of a 
single semantic relationships which articulate the core knowledge and broader 
educational outcomes as a system reflective of that knowledge required to practice at a 
professional level.  
Table 6.19 and Figure 6.2 support that the cultural domain of physical security is based 
on, and organized hierarchically from the word and overarching concept of security, as 
it appeared the most frequently in the summated word extraction of all texts. Table 6.19 
and Figure 6.2 further highlight that the relations in a knowledge system can be revealed 
through the use of heuristics as useful tools for providing a conceptual net or template 
of order and structure to the domain (Krimsky and Golding, 1992, pp. 9-19) (Section 
3.10) of physical security. 
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Table 6.19 Phase One: Hierarchical knowledge concept category table 
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Figure 6.2 Phase One: Physical security knowledge structure heuristic 
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6.5 Phase One: Interpretation 
The combined works of Horrocks (2001), Axt (2002) and Smith and Brooks (2013) 
(Section 1.6) highlight that for physical security to emerge as a profession, it must be 
based within a generalizable curriculum. Such a curriculum would, as a shared 
paradigm, explicitly state the various practice areas’ knowledge content, its structural 
properties, and include interrelations. It would also demonstrate how it is supported by 
broader academic attributes essential for professional practice.  
The current findings of the study suggest that Tables 6.18 and 6.19 along with Figure 
6.2 present, as iterations, such a knowledge system. Table 6.18 provides a phase list of 
core and supporting knowledge concept categories as requisites for professionals to hold 
in their endeavours to treat society’s security loss or risk concerns manifested through 
unlawful access or crime enablers in the protection of assets that includes people, 
information and property (Section 3.3). 
Such knowledge is expressed by Abbott (1988) as abstract knowledge which culturally 
relates to the diagnosis, inference or reasoning about and treatment of particular 
problems based on domain specific concepts, principles and theories (1988, pp. 36-41). 
Fitting with the combined works of Kelly (1955), Bruner (1977), Eden (1988) Fraser 
(1993), McLucas (2003) and Fosnot (2005), Tables 6.18 and Table 6.19 collectively 
form a knowledge system or body of knowledge built on the academic disciplines on 
which the domain’s content areas are constructed from. This knowledge can be 
organised in ways that enhance understanding for novice learners, facilitating the 
remembering of ideas, materials or phenomena. Such organisation also facilitates the 
integration of new knowledge into existing knowledge structures. Phase One of the 
study sought to respond to the question: What are the explicit knowledge concept 
categories for physical security represented as repeated themes printed in security texts 
and their structure? 
Phase One of the study indicates that the published knowledge concept categories 
include those presented in Table 6.16. These were collated from Tables 6.1 through to 
6.15 representing salient knowledge categories from each reviewed text and represent 
Phase One’s data corpus of knowledge concept categories for physical security 
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professionals. However, these data were integrated with Table 6.17 which presented 
knowledge concept categories carried forward from the pilot study (Chapter 5). 
Accordant with the principles of constructivism, combining Tables 6.16 and 6.17 lead to 
the development of Table 6.18. 
From this, through the analytical procedures of Spradley (1979), Johnson and 
Christensen (2004) and Bernard and Ryan (2010) (Section 4.2.3), Table 6.19 was 
developed depicting hierarchical relationships showing relations and connections 
revealing significant knowledge requisites. Table 6.19 led to the development of Figure 
6.2 to produce an interim heuristic symbol for communicating concept categories and 
their relations forming a physical security body of knowledge as a shared paradigm 
(Section 1.8).  
Bruner’s (1977, p. 12) work highlighted that teaching and learning of structure, rather 
than simply mastery of facts and techniques is at the centre of enhanced knowledge 
transfer. Knowledge structure is especially important when explaining the relations 
between concepts encountered earlier and later when establishing new knowledge. Such 
structure can be presented taxonomically, for instance, Table 6.19 supports that 
knowledge structure for the domain of physical security can be represented through a 
taxonomy, organised based on a single semantic relationship with its cover term. Such 
taxonomies (Table 6.19) can be illumed through cognitive or conceptual maps (Posner 
& Rudnitsky, 1982, pp. 8-39) (Figure 6.2) as these are concerned with the relationships 
among ideas, based on organising them in some reasonable pattern or structure 
depicting relationships in both simple and complex terms. As with Figure 6.2 they can 
be organised hierarchically, or in some other way that forces the expression of broader 
themes.  
In addition, Table 6.19 and Figure 6.2 support the propositions that knowledge is 
constructed not discovered (Section 1.8) and that it is built on the foundations of 
previous knowledge which may include printed domain knowledge or that offered by 
those working in the field. Furthermore, specific cultural knowledge is constructed from 
the detection of repeated themes (Tables 6.16, 6.17 and 6.18) organised hierarchically 
through contrast and similarity (Table 6.19) (Eden, 1988). These constructs indicate 
how physical security’s literature base along with experts’ knowledge can fit together. 
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For example, Figure 6.2 highlights that some knowledge is used to diagnose the security 
or crime problem, other knowledge is focused towards professional inference or 
reasoning about the problem. Then more technical knowledge is focused towards 
treating the problem, and all this is supported by professional enabling attributes.  
Eden’s (1988, p. 8) work expressed that man seeks to develop meaningful patterns of 
constructs of his world. Tables 6.18 and 6.19 along with Figure 6.2 provide another 
iteration of a literature centred, expert enriched construct of meaningful patterns 
representing physical security’s knowledge base. From an educational standpoint, 
consistent with the works of Ausubel (1968) and Novak (1993) (Section 1.8) they are 
also useful tools for drawing out expert understanding of their world and building on the 
knowledge system through their lived experience. Phase One findings will be used to 
provide the means for security professionals working in the field to visualise the 
concepts and interim structure and add to this explicit knowledge system their implicit 
knowledge accordant with their lived experiences within the domain of physical 
security.      
6.6 Phase limitations 
This phase of the study experienced a number of research limitations that influenced the 
findings. These include: 
 Variations in security language, or rather variations in how terms are used to 
express meaning. Security does not have a domain discipline dictionary of agreed terms. 
Language variations in the security domain have been recognized by Manunta (1999) 
and these cannot be ignored as potential comprehension biases in forming knowledge 
categories from the literature extraction; 
 The synergy of synonymous terms also represented a potential limitation within 
the study. While the study attempted to address variations in language and category 
meanings, the interpretations and selection of language represented a snapshot of the 
reviewed literature and expert participant’s views rather than a consensus across the 
broader security domain; and 
 The selection of texts was another limitation within the study. A data corpus of 
15 books provided a small snapshot of available security texts, presenting sources 
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limitation. Nevertheless, the selection of salient texts for physical and the broader non-
traditional security domain including those from the ASIS knowledge base sought to 
minimize this limitation.   
6.7 Reliability and validity 
Textual data are, in principle, reliable sources for analysis (Silverman, 2002, p. 229). In 
addition, to enhance validity of the count analysis, the software program Nvivo was 
used providing objective categories external from the researcher. The use of software 
tools for qualitative analysis is supported in the writings of Liamputtong and Ezzy 
(2006, p. 274). In addition, the data extraction and knowledge structure is to be tested 
through expert interviews (Phase Two) providing an additional degree of validation to 
Phase One outcomes.  
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented Phase One of the study, the development of a literature-informed 
and expert enriched, knowledge taxonomy for the sub-domain of physical security. 
Section 6.2 of the chapter discussed the use of, and methodology used to undertake the 
annotated bibliographic extraction which formed the initial data corpus for this phase of 
the study. Section 6.3 saw the reviewing, and extracting of concepts accordant with 
their occurrence measures in texts as representations of repeated themes. Following this 
Section 6.4 presented the initial findings of Phase One. This included introducing the 
outcomes of the Pilot Study’s Phase Two findings (Table 6.17) to be integrated with the 
annotated bibliography’s findings. Combined this data corpus presented Table 6.18, a 
taxonomy of physical security knowledge concept categories.  
In addition, the chapter also presented Table 6.19 and Figure 6.2, which organise these 
knowledge concept categories hierarchically to show local connections and structure 
accordant with the works of Spradley (1979), Eden (1988), Johnson and Christensen 
(2004) and Bernard and Ryan (2010) (Section 1.8). Section 6.5 provided an 
interpretation of this Phase’s findings. Then Section 6.6 of the chapter acknowledged 
limitations and Section 6.7 discussed the reliability and validity for Phase One’s 
outcomes. Phase One provided a data corpus and structure to be taken into Phase Two, 
expert enrichment.  
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Chapter 7: Study Phase Two: Knowledge category expert enrichment 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents Phase Two of the study, expert enrichment of Phase One’s 
knowledge corpus for physical security professionals. This phase of the study sought to 
overcome some of the limitations within the extraction of repetitious key terms or ideas 
by augmenting the existing knowledge tables (Tables 6.18 & 6.19) and heuristic (Figure 
6.2) with knowledge category concepts, principles and practices considered essential for 
professional work by experts within the physical security field. Consistent with the 
principle of constructivism, the objective of this phase was to integrate security 
professional’s new knowledge into the existing knowledge system (Table 6.18). It also 
sought to make explicit new local connections, integrating their views into the existing 
hierarchical table (Table 6.19) and knowledge heuristic (Figure 6.2). This chapter 
defines the concepts, principles and theories representing an ideal physical security 
knowledge system from those working in this occupational area.  
The chapter, presented as distinct sections, demonstrates the building of knowledge 
based on previous knowledge accordant with constructivism (Section 1.8). Section 7.2 
presents the participants for Phase Two of the study. Section 7.3 presents the analysis of 
participant’s interviews, including their responses to the methodology and procedure 
(7.3.1), newly extracted physical security knowledge concept categories (7.3.1) along 
with knowledge structure (7.3.3) using as much as possible the participant’s own words 
providing descriptive and interpretative validity and consideration of the relevance of 
the taxonomy to the physical security graduate (7.3.3). Phase findings are presented in 
Section 7.4, including domain knowledge categories (7.4.1) along with their 
hierarchical structure (7.4.2). Phase Two is interpreted in Section 7.5; then Section 7.6 
discusses the reliability and trustworthiness towards the data analysis and reporting 
within Phase Two. Limitations within Phase Two were acknowledged and discussed in 
Section 7.7, where the chapter concludes with Section 7.8.    
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7.2 Participants 
Phase Two sought to enhance the outcomes of Phase One, by presenting the current 
iteration of knowledge requisites (Tables 6.17 & 6.18) along with its interim structure 
(Table 6.19 & Figure 6.2) to participating experts. Participants included Des, Kerran, 
John, Brian, Sharne, Braden, Wayne and Brad (Table 7.1). The procedure sought 
participant’s input to enhance earlier findings through a series of questions (Table 7.2). 
The objective was to draw out requisite knowledge participants believed was essential 
for jurisdictional practice yet currently missing from the taxonomy, plus enhance the 
initial structure of the knowledge taxonomy. As Cohen, Manion and Morrisson (2000, 
p. 267) state, knowledge is often something generated between people, through 
conversation (Section 4.3). Accordingly this phase of the study used the research 
findings to date, along with a semi-structured interview questionnaire to kindle a 
purposeful conversation regarding the knowledge required to practice at a professional 
level within the physical security sub-domain or practice area, and its supporting 
cultural structure.  
Table 7.1 Phase Two: Expert’s profiles 
Name Profile 
Des 
(Participant 8) 
A client relationship manager for a large security engineering 
organization with over twenty (20) years’ experience in the design and 
evaluation of security risk treatment systems (PPS). His expertise 
includes security risk management and the technical design of physical 
and procedural security controls. Des holds an electrician’s qualification, 
electrical technician’s qualification and a Diploma of Applied Science. 
Kerran 
(Participant 9) 
Senior security consultant with over thirty three (33) years’ experience 
consulting in high level capital works projects. Kerran holds professional 
qualifications as an electrical engineer and building services engineer, 
along with formal qualifications in security including Certified Protection 
Professional (CPP) designation. He has lectured for sixteen (16) years in 
general facility security at Edith Cowan University (ECU), holding a post 
as Associate Professor of Security Science. 
John 
(Participant 
10) 
Security practitioner for over 25 years, now specializing in expert witness 
assessments for lawyers and their clients in the areas of security 
negligence and liability. He holds a Bachelor of Science (Security), a 
Master of Criminology and a Master of Occupational Health and Safety 
along with certification designations as Certified Protection Professional 
(CPP) and Physical Security Professional (PSP). 
Brian 
(Participant 
11) 
Qualified locksmith, security consultant, agent and installer, and lecturer 
in intrusion and access control systems for a university. He brings 40 
years’ of security expertise to the study, holding qualifications including 
Certificate III in Investigations, Certificate IV in Security and Risk 
Management, Certificate IV in Training and Assessment, a Diploma of 
Engineering Technology Security Engineering, and an Associate Degree 
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in Training and Development. 
 
 
Garrhett 
(Participant 
12) 
A senior engineering security consultant, providing security related 
planning advice during the early stages of major projects. He worked as a 
Science Officer for the UK Home Office where he tested and evaluated 
security technology and is a sessional lecturer for a university. 
Sharne 
(Participant 
13) 
Security consultant with over 15 years’ of experience in the security and 
consulting industry.  He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Security and 
currently specialises in the design of high security technology systems 
such as access, intrusion - including Type 1 alarms - and CCTV. 
Braden 
(Participant 
14) 
A security consultant in the Perth and Dubai offices of a large 
engineering consulting organisation with over 9 years’ of security 
consultancy experience and is an Australian government endorsed 
security zone consultant. 
Wayne 
(Participant 
15) 
Holds a Bachelor’s degree in Security Science and has over 5 years’ 
experience working in the security consultancy field for a large 
engineering firm and has carried out projects for both government and 
private clients across Australia. 
Brad 
(Participant 
16) 
A security consultant for 21 years, with electronic technician 
qualifications he specialises in technology. Brad has worked on large 
capital works projects across the Middle East, Asia & Australia, and also 
runs an independent security technology test laboratory and associated 
infrastructure. 
 
7.2.1 Administration of interviews with professionals 
Participant interviews took approximately 60 minutes, and comprised 6 sequenced 
questions (Table 7.2) to guide the phase outcomes. The questionnaire sought 
participant’s thoughts relating to requisite knowledge within the domain of physical 
security accordant with their professional experience. It also sought their opinion 
towards the initial knowledge structure (Figure 6.2), and provided them the opportunity 
to recommend adjustments to the hierarchical table and supporting heuristic.  
Phase Two participants were presented with Tables 6.17 (Pilot study: Carried forward 
knowledge concept categories) and 6.18 (Phase One: Physical security knowledge 
concept categories) and Table 6.19 (Phase One: Hierarchical knowledge concept 
category) along with Figure 6.2 (Phase One: Physical security knowledge structure 
heuristic) to facilitate the interview process. Table 6.18 provided a matrix of physical 
security knowledge concept categories and their embedded subordinate elements 
ordered based on their occurrences from texts. All experts were emailed the semi-
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structured questionnaire a week prior to their interview (Appendix D), providing time 
for them to consider the objectives of the interview, questions and supporting tables and 
figures. The interview discussions were transcribed for later analysis (Appendix K). 
Table 7.2 Phase Two: Expert interview questions 
No. Interview questions 
1 The table shows the literature extractions top 49 thematic knowledge categories and 
subordinate concepts. This table was produced through the synergizing of 15 text’s 
salient knowledge categories and subordinate concepts. Is there any knowledge 
category concepts you would like clarified before we begin? Could you please 
indicate your support or disagreement with these terms and what you believe the 
category should be labelled? 
2 The knowledge table lists the 49 salient extracted knowledge concepts and 
subordinate concepts for physical security’s body of knowledge, do you agree with 
these, and if not, what knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts are missing and 
why? 
3 Do you believe any of the knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts should be 
removed and why? 
4 The top 49 knowledge categories have been organised into a hierarchical concept 
map to illustrate both the structure of physical security’s body of knowledge 
including core and supporting concepts and their relations. This map aims to 
highlight the knowledge and structure of physical security’s knowledge base towards 
the diagnosis, inference and treatment of security or loss coupled threat concerns. Do 
you support the structure of this map based on the overall goal for physical security? 
5 Do you feel that any of the knowledge concepts or subordinate concepts needs 
relocating and why? 
6 What do you feel are the three most important knowledge concepts for physical 
security? 
 
7.3 Interview analysis 
7.3.1 The methodology and procedure: Participant commentary 
While it was not intended for participants to make comment on the study’s methodology 
and procedure, participants were very interested in the study and a number of them 
made comment on the process in response to the findings presented to them.  
At the commencement of his interview Des (Participant 8) expressed a view, from a 
methodological standpoint, that the literature extraction technique which provided the 
data to develop Table 6.18 was “pretty good”, stating “it does a pretty good job picking 
up a lot of the key points, some of the them are there because they are common words 
and not as important, but in order of others it’s pretty good”. This view was also 
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supported by Sharne who stated “everything in the chart is relevant”. Braden also 
expressed such a view, making the comment “everything you have captured, most 
things, every category that you’ve identified here is something that we have come 
across in what we do”. Accordingly, from the beginning of their interviews several 
participants provided an unintended degree of validity to the phase results to date.  
Nevertheless, some participants found the general matrix complicated (Table 6.18) and 
preferred to work from the hierarchical knowledge table (Table 6.19) which they found 
useful for understanding the knowledge and its organization. For instance, Sharne 
expressed that Table 6.18 had limited value as the categories, while relevant, had no 
particular order. He instead saw value in Table 6.19 and Figure 6.2 commenting “they 
make sense…this is more logical to me”. This opinion was also voiced by Brad who 
stated, “I find this (Table 6.19) easier to read”. Participants generally found both the 
hierarchical table (Table 6.19) and the knowledge heuristic (Figure 6.2) very useful in 
terms of understanding the knowledge requisites and how they fit together within the 
domain. Both Brad and Kerran supported these representations and further noted that 
they had not previously encountered anything similar in the security literature. In 
addition, participants felt the security terms provided were self-explanatory, although 
Brian expressed that it was difficult to fully comprehend what was contained within the 
cover term of some of the categories, stating, “as in security we use the terms 
differently”.   
7.3.2 Physical security expert’s knowledge concept categories 
An analysis of the interviews shows that while the experts largely supported the 
knowledge requisites presented, the majority also put forward additional knowledge 
category areas often distinct to those offered by other participants. This indicates a 
range of educational and workplace experiences resulting in a diversification of 
professional knowledge.  
John offered the additional categories of utility, fit for purpose and aesthetics. He 
suggested that security must provide protection while also providing access and use 
expressing the view that “it is no good having a product and putting it away in a safe so 
no one can use it, if the security level is such so that nobody can use it (the item), there 
P a g e  | 253 
 
is no utility in the security product…you may as well not have it”. John considered that 
utility is often forgotten by security people, emphasizing that “you don’t want to have 
so much security that you can’t use it”.   
Fit for purpose was another concept John felt should be understood well by security 
professionals. John stated “there was no point having a lock etc. of some sort if it is not 
fit for the specific purpose”. Through further discussion John was asked “are you 
looking at efficacy for the context, or are you referring to the efficacy of the individual 
controls”? John explained that he was referring to the efficacy of the individual security 
components in relation to the context. He suggested that efficacy was a concept hidden 
in standards but needed to be more explicit and “teased out a bit more in its own right”.  
I think it is hidden, because when you start talking standards people think 
Australian standards or a level. I think it deserved being teased out a bit 
more in its own right. Because it seems to me so many security systems they 
have in place either prevent you from using, or take away utility of the 
product, all you have bought to use and you may as well not have had it. Or 
they have got some sort of security product that is not fit for purpose, it 
doesn’t work. Yes it’s a security product, but it is not really satisfactory and 
it might be putting closed circuit TV in a bank rather than have a guard on 
the door… Sometimes these words are not the right word but we don’t have 
the right word in our vocabulary. (John) 
John also felt aesthetics was another concept category missing from the table, stating 
for example, “while you want your place to be a prison, you don’t want it looking like a 
prison…that then flows into things like quality of life”. In considering Johns views, 
both the utility and aesthetic aspects of physical security has been discussed in the work 
of O’Shea (2009, p. 41) who articulated these points as transparent or invisible security. 
According to O’Shea (2009, p. 41) transparent security means unobtrusive, 
unrestrictive, and not readily visible, technologies, systems and approaches which 
address security in the built environment effectively, but in ways that are not readily 
apparent to the public eye. These categories were supported by environment and review 
as key aspects of achieving sound physical security where John felt that many people 
saw security as “a set and forget item”.  
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Finally John felt the cover term devices should be removed from the Tables, but this 
was not fully supported across all participants.  
During his interview Braden stated that convergence of information technology (IT) 
infrastructure is an essential knowledge requisite area, as this is a large part of physical 
security in contemporary times; especially in terms of enterprise access control. 
Braden’s views were emphasized in reviewed text nine (Section 6.2.1), Physical and 
Logical Convergence. Accordingly, Braden felt that contemporary physical security 
professionals must know the fundamentals of networks and perhaps the principles of 
cyber security, although recognized these as distinct knowledge areas, stating: 
Network fundamentals is essential for a security consultant and for what we 
do because we need to understand how do networks work and what sort of 
infrastructure do we need to put in to make sure our systems can 
communicate. The fundamentals are what we need to know. Do we need to 
know about cyber security when we are putting those things together – 
probably not; do we need to understand the fundamentals – yeah? (Braden) 
Braden also recognized the role both project management and contract management 
have in achieving professional work for physical security professionals, and therefore 
saw the necessity to include them as categories within the knowledge system. 
A client will come to us and they want to roll out a security project and then 
we become almost the project manager for that project. On behalf of the 
client we go out to tender and select contractors, we do an evaluation on 
behalf of the client and then we will recommend what contractor should do 
the work. Then when it is being implemented we manage them and make 
sure they have a program of works that meets the client’s expectations and 
then follow up and make sure it is installed as per specifications… So then 
that generally includes contract management as well (Interviewer)… Yes, 
contract management, being subordinate. (Braden) 
The necessity for knowledge and skills associated with project management within a 
physical security professional’s repertoire was also raised by Wayne who explained that 
this represents a massive component of professional practice, particularly as a 
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consultant. Wayne stated that “if you get into that field…it’s pretty well what you are 
essentially” and identified core skills within the project management domain including 
tendering, coordinating with occupational groups who install and integrate systems and 
further liaising to ensure the project elements are completed as per the specifications. 
It can be so diverse, it can be one on one with a client where you are just 
giving them a report. You can go out individually to tender, that’s another 
big part of it, that whole tender process and managing a contract so contract 
management. But then a lot of the time, and most of what you do is we are 
part of a design team with a bunch of other engineers under the builder and 
architects, and that is probably the biggest aspect of it, delivering projects, 
that you’ve been awarded. One on one, but coordinating with all these other 
facets of design engineering to get a set of documents out to market that can 
be built essentially. That would have to be in my view the biggest aspect of 
what we do is being part of a design team. Coordination and liaison. 
(Wayne) 
Furthermore, Wayne felt that physical security graduates needed to be able to read and 
understand engineering drawings, to have knowledge in ergonomics and also know 
about software programs for security including building management systems (BMS) 
and security management systems (SMS). In addition, Wayne also expressed the 
requirement for sound understanding of electrical theory and switches. 
I find that (electrical knowledge) is another area that it took years to come 
up to speed with really in terms of how to draw a system up yourself; 
especially when you need to interface with relays and all those kinds of 
things. It was very foreign to me when I came here… It becomes so 
important when you are trying to hand-over or manage a job, that you need 
to know what has been delivered reflects what is actually on that drawing 
that you have been given because it might show end of line resistors on that 
drawing but if you don’t know what that equates to in real terms it is hard to 
justify that it is there or know that it is not there… almost being a contractor 
versus a consultant and that knowledge. Not necessarily where the wires are 
going and screwing them in but whether the wool has been pulled over your 
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eyes, but, you need to learn a bit to not expose yourself and your company 
to additional risk. (Wayne) 
During his interview, Sharne recognized the requirement for clear jurisdictional 
knowledge and boundary articulation, to capture what a physical security professional 
is. Sharne felt that the functional elements in achieving security and its requisite 
knowledge to be an engineering role, stating “there are plenty of people out there that do 
risk analysis on theoretical statistical analysis, but wouldn’t know the first thing about 
how to protect something; the whole criminology side is a totally different stream in 
itself, due to the knowledge required to understand how to protect something”.  
Sharne explained that the team in which he works includes people from engineering 
backgrounds as well as those, such as himself, from generalist security backgrounds 
who need to learn the engineering on the job, “it would make sense to have a degree 
stream as a physical security professional…if you employ just engineers they don’t 
understand the fundamentals such as crime prevention, environmental design (CPTED), 
defence in depth, all those principles, they have to learn that on the job”. However, 
Sharne also explained that security isn’t simply an engineering discipline, arguing it is a 
science discipline per se, as unlike engineering there is no specific standard, but rather 
scientific knowledge to understand the problem and work out a solution.   
One of the issues I think engineering firms struggle with is the first thing 
they come to us and say where is the standard that tells me how to do this, 
and when you say there isn’t a standard and the answer is I believe this, they 
struggle with that concept. Because everything they do comes out of a 
standard, and as long as they are within the guidelines of those standards 
then they are okay which then relates back to what you’ve touched on 
already in terms of if you don’t have the theory behind you in terms of how 
to analyse risk, how to analyse threat, if you don’t have the knowledge of 
how security operations or security management work, again you haven’t 
looked at the risk and you can’t analyse a problem then you will never come 
up with the security solution because you can only see from an engineering 
point of view.  
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We come across that daily with some of our engineer graduates where 
literally until it is at design development stage where all the concept and 
scoping have been done and you give them a problem and say right here’s 
the problem this is the solution or come up with a solution to this, not a 
problem. Go away come up with the schematics, come up with a design – 
done. But give them that initial problem without all that background and 
without having solved what we believe the solution should be, they just look 
at you and can’t understand what they are designing. (Sharne) 
While Sharne acknowledged diagnosis of the security problem to be fundamental to 
being a physical security practitioner, he declared that it is just the beginning, as they do 
everything in his team, from risk, threat assessment, scoping through to detailed 
engineering. However, when it comes to detailed engineering issues such as vehicle 
ratings and penetration testing “I am not a structural engineer”, so we will engage the 
requirements of a structural engineer. “but we would like to think the security 
consultant has been with, and carries the design through all the way, and doesn’t just 
rely on the engineer”. Sharne explained that, in the designs they put forward, security 
(the team) takes the lead, and seeks input from the engineers, architects and others to do 
their specialized tasks.  
Other consultants are different, plenty of consultants that are out there and 
call themselves physical security professionals, yet in some cases their 
primary role, and a lot of our clients can be that way, they will do the initial 
risk assessment but when it comes to technical design they will get 
somebody else to do it. That is for professional reasons, for commercial 
business reasons for a whole range of skill limitations. There are other 
consultants that will do a design up to concept level and get the contractors 
to design and do all the calculations and all of that. I don’t think that is the 
right way to go, if it is a developing profession, which it is, we should be 
setting up training and educating our graduates to understand all of that 
information and to produce all of the calculations they need to do whether it 
is, designing a CCTV system or understanding the broad calculations for 
vehicle and bollard protection. (Sharne) 
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Supporting clear jurisdictional boundary or focus for security professionals, Sharne 
believed that physical security professionals need the capacity to take the security 
project from risk diagnosis right through to the treatment implementation phase. He also 
expressed additional knowledge requisites to include the fundamentals of project 
management, stating “without it you will never implement anything successfully”. In 
addition, emergency management fundamentals were required, acknowledging this is a 
separate profession, but stating “it makes you aware of the codes (building), emergency 
procedures, what you should do, what you shouldn’t do, you need those fundamentals”.  
You need those core fundamentals, you don’t need to know any more than if 
you are providing physical security measures for a building well you better 
make sure you have thought about the emergency and the BCA (Building 
Codes Australia) requirements and fire. You need to know enough to know 
when you are stepping into somebody else’s realm or to bring those people 
in where appropriate. If you don’t have that fundamental background how 
do you know that. (Sharne) 
Sharné’s view of the nexus between emergency management and security has been 
discussed in Craighead’s (2003, p. 21) text High-Rise Security and Fire Life Safety, 
which acknowledges that while security and emergency management are two different 
disciplines at times these subjects are so closely interwoven that they appear to be the 
same. Sharne also saw the necessity for fundamental knowledge in the realm of cyber 
security…“at a fundamental level you have communications and networks and they 
become rudimentary to what we do. In our industry (physical security) we are seeing 
more and more convergence, primarily due to do the fact that electronic security 
systems that we spend most of our time designing are now sitting across networks”. 
Sharne also proposed the requirement to monitor what is occurring within the treatment 
system as an essential capability to have, adding it to his list of missing knowledge 
items.   
Further adding to the list of knowledge inclusions, Garrhett commented that 
management, not project management or security management but professional process 
management, was important knowledge to have within a consulting practice cover term. 
According to Garrhett, many graduates from security programs do not actually know the 
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process which consultants go through, from the proposal stage all the way through to 
commissioning a product.  
There is the proposal stage but all the way up to commissioning, like writing 
the design brief, doing the detailed design, what are the different stages you 
can do, a concept or a master plan and then you do a 50% design then you 
have a 100% design and then you’ve got reviewing shop drawings from the 
actual installers and then you’ve got commissioning and things like the ‘fac’ 
test, the factory acceptance test. So all that process is really beneficial to 
already have an understanding of because even if you are not a consultant 
like us but if you are working in a firm you are, or will be communicating at 
that level, if you are designing a system yourself and then engaging the sub 
contractor yourself, you are still going to go through that process… I’m just 
talking about the process and the different processes.  
There is another one called FEED, which is Front End Engineering Design 
then there is EPCM (Engineering Procurement Construction Management), 
and we have to deal with all these different processes that do share 
similarities but also differences and fit in our program and what we do into 
that and what the client wants. I think having an understanding of the 
different engineering processes that we have to go through could be 
beneficial… And they are different across different industries as well. If you 
do a FEED for resources and power and do a FEED for the built 
environment they have different gates that the project has to go through so 
they have different drivers. I found that really interesting. So you are 
applying your security knowledge and then you’ve got a different industry 
and they treat the process differently. (Garrhett) 
Garrhett explained that this refers to knowledge of the engineering process or consulting 
practice. For physical security professionals, Garrhett expressed it is essential to 
understand in principle the industry processes and where their knowledge fits in.  
Garrhett provided two tools to emphasize his view pertaining to such knowledge 
requisites. First, Table 7.3 indicates his version of sequential phases and process 
undertaken to achieve a physical project outcome. This is supported by Figure 7.1 
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presenting graphically the project design phases from project initiation through to 
decommission.  
Table 7.3 Garrett’s front end engineering design process phases 
Front End Engineering Design (FEED) Process 
Phases Themes Outcomes 
Phase One:   
 
Enabling works  
Phase One(A) Security Survey Undertake a security survey for the XXX where this 
interfaces with the construction of the XXX expansion and 
provide recommendations 
Phase One(B) Enabling Works 
Plan 
Provide a plan on how to divert existing security services at 
the XXX to allow the enabling works for the XXX expansion 
to be carried out. 
Phase One(C) Temporary Works 
Plan 
Provide a plan on how to provide temporary security services 
for the XXX during the construction phase of the XXX 
expansion 
 
Phase Two Security Risk 
Assessment 
Update the security risk assessments for the XXX and XXX 
to accommodate the XXX new expansion areas. 
 
Phase Three Concept Validation Prepare these concept designs, based on tried and proven 
security concepts, which will provide the 'building blocks' for 
future stages. 
Phase Four Schematic Design Prepare these schematic designs based on the approved 
concept designs. 
Phase 5 Detailed Design 
 
Provide a detailed design with updated specifications and 
drawings. 
 
Phase 6 Tender / 
Construction Docs 
Prepare tender documents for XXX to issue to the market, 
carry out a tender assessment of proposals submitted by 
contractors and provide a report 
Phase 7 Construction 
Administration 
 
 
Phase 8 Security Procedures Update the existing XXX security procedures which have 
been affected by the XXX expansion. 
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Figure 7.1 Garrhett’s front end engineering design process heuristic 
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Combined these tools show additional professional knowledge required by persons 
working within the higher level physical security domain in addition to their core 
security knowledge. Such views were also expressed by Des who considered it 
necessary to know the design process, and that such knowledge is a significant requisite 
knowledge area for physical security professionals.  
It becomes quite important to a grad to understand that you come in and get 
given a job. The management and the process of delivering that job is 
something they need to learn. There is a point with a task, we write a 
proposal, we win a job, it lands on someone’s desk it’s the management of 
process. Understanding how I get from the point of having this (proposal) to 
actually achieving the deliverable. If you’re talking about teaching someone 
the education process of how to work in this industry there is a general 
process around, you are going to be working either for a business or for a 
client, you are going to be providing a service in house for that business, 
you might be employed by or on the security team, and you are working in 
there or you are working for someone that is outside providing that service 
to that organisation. Either way, at some point you are given a project and 
there is a process, there is a way of managing, I suppose it’s almost around 
time management and understanding how to achieve a deliverable, it’s 
really difficult to put some wording around that. 
You must know and understand all these sorts of things, if you don’t know 
how to, it’s almost like you give someone an assignment, how do they plan 
and managing the delivery and the output of that assignment. In itself I think 
it is something that, it is being able to get that context around what it is your 
being asked to do, understanding from the early days of what is the key 
point… what are the deliverables? You do not run off and do what you think 
needs to be done, but actually delivering what you have been tasked to do. 
That in itself, from a security point of view, is absolute, because if you 
haven’t got the context and don’t understand the task we end up, the other 
word the term I use a lot its around mitigation, security is around what we 
do and have I achieved, we talk about mitigation strategy in the end we want 
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to look back and measure, and did we actually mitigate that risk, did we 
actually achieve what the client needed done? (Des)  
“So you are looking at what is the objective, do we understand the objective”? 
(Interviewer): 
Yes, do we understand the objective, do we know how to plan to achieve 
that objective, do we know how to implement the process to achieve the 
object and do we know how to deliver it? To me that is a really important 
thing. Otherwise you can quite often give a person or client an outcome that 
doesn’t necessarily meet their needs. It’s a bit like, if I have a person with a 
security issue and if you sat down at a table and someone said we should 
start talking about cameras here and access controlling this door and I’d sort 
of go well can we move the plan out of the way, can we talk to you about 
what actually is the problem, it is caused by what risks, what’s your threats 
and risks. So going back to understanding, you get an outcome that delivers 
on that… Its then understanding if the problem has been diagnosed then 
what’s the plan, so your doctor might say well we’re not going to put you on 
aspirin because your blood is already thin, so it’s a matter of how do you 
interpret, its understanding the process that you need to go through, to 
interpret that evaluation and know how to plan the way to get to the point 
that you have got the correct treatment process in place and therefore you 
get the desired outcome. (Des)  
Des and Garrhett both considered that the engineering design process should be a major 
knowledge category area covered in security education as graduate physical security 
professionals must understand this. This position is congruent with the written work of 
Smith and Brooks (2013) within their security science text (Text 13, Section 6.2.1). 
These authors explained that physical security science uses both scientific method and 
its extended methodology – the engineering design process - to achieve security related 
objectives. They show the correspondence between the two methodologies through 
Table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4 Scientific method versus engineering design process (Smith & Brooks, 2013, 
p. 5)  
Scientific Method Engineering Design Process 
State a question or problem Define a problem or need 
Gather background information Gather background information 
Formulate hypothesis; identify variables Establish design statement or 
criteria 
Design experiment, establish procedure(s) Prepare preliminary designs 
Test hypothesis by doing experiment Build and test a prototype(s) 
Analyse results and draw conclusions Verify, test, and redesign as 
necessary 
Present results Present results 
      
Bracing the knowledge base of physical security professionals, Garrhett highlighted the 
fundamentals of mathematics and physics that underpin the security solution as an 
enabling knowledge requisite for physical security professionals.  
Having an understanding of the physics, of how this technology works, 
really gives you an understanding of if it’s going to work or not, and how it 
is going to integrate with all the other engineering services. “So they don’t 
necessarily need to be engineers but they need to understand the principles 
behind what the engineer is telling them” (Interviewer). Yes, and that will 
let you communicate with the product suppliers as well, because the product 
suppliers generally are very knowledgeable as far as the science and math 
goes because they and the installers, generally have a really good foundation 
on the physics behind their technology, either because they are installing it 
or selling it. And when they are trying to explain some new thing that their 
product does and why it is better than the other product, they have to prove 
it almost and you can do that through testing, but if you know the science 
behind it you can sort of understand how that works or its limitations.  
  
P a g e  | 265 
 
 
So when you are looking at a bit of technology, without just reading the 
sales pitch to it and knowing actual the mechanics of it, it is really 
beneficial, because then you can ask questions and say well with this last 
product did xyz because of this wave or this bit of technology, or use this 
theory or whatever, and how does that differ from here, and you just add to 
that foundation as the technology develops and I think that is really 
important…for me I think that technical, the pure fundamental science in 
physics and technical knowledge is the most important trait to have and I 
would be looking for someone who had that skill first because I think it is 
easy to teach the theories (Security) on top of that than it is to teach 
someone the science behind it. (Garrhett) 
Des recognised the importance of safety as a knowledge category, stating that “security 
and safety are inextricably linked, you can’t talk about one without the other”. This 
view was supported by Wayne who stated that “safety is such a huge component 
now…everything starts off with safety, every discussion, your safety and design is one 
of the biggest requirements around projects; you have to show how your design is 
inherently considering safety, so you don’t have a panel up at 4 meters on the wall it’s 
at 1.8 so you don’t have to bend, ergonomics all those sort of issues”.  
Within the printed domain, the nexus between security and safety is well documented 
for example, Tooma (2011, p. 1) asserts their connection lies in their underpinning 
principles of well-being, along with the risk management approach used to achieved 
their outcomes. While recognizing security and safety as distinct disciplines, Tooma’s 
(2011) work asserts that rarely does a major incident in one context not impact on the 
other (p. 1), even though this nexus through occupational security law is still in its 
embryonic stage (p. 50).  
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Des also emphasized the requirement to understand the basic philosophy of security, 
expressing that  
You can learn all you like about CCTV and access control, but if you don’t 
understand the actual basic philosophy of security and its application then 
the rest of it becomes irrelevant. Because to me the technology and all a lot 
of these other things that we have got in here are (Table 6.19), basically 
outcomes that fall off that process so I have seen clients that have spent an 
inordinate amount of money and not fix the basic problem that they have. 
(Des)  
Des’s views correspond with the American Institute of Architects’ (2004) security 
design planning framework. In their text, the Institute (p. 40) emphasizes the theoretical 
elements of CPTED, situational crime prevention and spatial zoning principles along 
with the functional elements of deterrence, detection, delay and response (defence in 
depth) to form a design framework or philosophy for security planning. Within this 
framework the individual security products merely achieve the broader goals.    
Des expressed that physical security professionals need to understand where their 
specific knowledge and skills fit in the broader context of a security solution. They then 
need to be able to communicate clearly “in an up and down manner” with different 
people regarding the various knowledge inputs. Des expressed the requirement to be 
able to write and communicate (verbally) technically with the structural or civil 
engineer, yet also communicate in a non-technical way to the client, and other 
stakeholders that have got to be involved in a project control level.  
Let’s just use that as an example, let’s say we are talking about a secure 
fence, I as a security consultant, will talk to our client about the type of 
delay we need to achieve by that fence and we will define that in three ways 
- under, through and over, simply as that. So each one of those has to be 
treated, the through bit is, but it still has to be physically strong enough to 
withstand the environmental conditions that it is in, whether that be wind, 
lightning, whatever, so you’ve got your structural engineer and your civil 
engineer, they become critically important to the design of the fence. 
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You’ve got your fence manufacturer that has a product that you want to use 
and understand that.  
So what I see, we set a criteria around the performance of the fence, I want 
the face of that fence to be anti-scalable, so I will talk to the potential 
architect or the person that is designing the fence about how we achieve 
that, we know that we want limitation penetration and that is around the 
fence material so we talk to, we know the fence has to stand up and it either 
has to have some sort of cowl or topping so from your civil engineer, your 
structural engineer, your fence manufacturer and your fence installer, all of 
those sorts of people in here, the knowledge that I need to have is not only 
the objective of what I want, but who do I need to talk too?  
So in the process I need to be talking to a structural engineer, civil engineer 
about the ground finish, how do we stop the anti-tunneling, how do we get 
the water away for the longevity of the fence, electrical engineer, we’ve got 
the lightening protection issues associated with the fence, the manufacturer 
– how do we detail so we get an anti-climb finish on the fence so that nice 
smooth finish and then the installers. In terms of the body of knowledge, I 
suppose what I’m trying to get to is that I have an objective, my way of 
knowing how to get to that objective is quite complex and it needs to 
involve other people so I need to know who I need to involve and at what 
stage of that process to actually achieve the outcome. (Des)    
The views of Des and other participants enhanced the occupational strata graphic 
(Figure 1.1), adding horizontally other professional participants into the occupational 
system required to achieve a high level security solution. For example, as a reconfigured 
diagram, Figure 7.2 shows how Phase Two’s participant’s views add to the system of 
professionals and occupations that functionally achieve a Physical Protection System 
(PPS).  
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Figure 7.2 Security professionals/consultants and their supporting occupational strata 
 
 
 
Des’s articulation of a broad stakeholder engagement to achieve professional security 
outcomes is consistent with Freidson’s (1970, p. xvi) and Abbott’s (1988, p. 8) 
discourse on medicine and other professions. Freidson notes that drawing on the 
sciences, medicine has developed into a very complex division of labour, organizing an 
increasingly large number of technical and service workers around its central task of 
diagnosing and managing the ills of mankind. Abbott’s (1988, p. 8) work conveyed a 
similar view, expressing that the physical techniques of the professions may in fact be 
delegated to other workers but the knowledge sitting around the process is of abstract 
nature and the role of the cultural professional. Such articulation may indicate a 
progression in professional maturity for physical security in terms of a higher 
occupational role, one that diagnoses the concern, and then through abstract knowledge 
coordinates the design and implementation of the treatment plan. 
During his interview Brian did not like what he believed to be the incorrect use of door 
furniture as a category. According to Brian: 
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There are three things on a door, not in any order, there are locks then there 
is furniture, then there is hardware - that is it. Now locks can incorporate the 
physical lock as well as the cylinder, which is a subject on its own, furniture 
being handles. Then the hardware is everything else on the door that is not 
the lock and the handles, therefore hinges, door closes...So hardware, and 
that also comes down to door numbering, identification or signs and if you 
look to go to a scheduler who looks after a building, when it comes down to 
locks and things like that there is hardware, furniture and locks. (Brian) 
Brian’s professional standing as a security professional and qualified locksmith saw the 
categories changed to reflect his expertise. Brian also expressed the necessity to have a 
category called utilities. 
Power is important but under that, rather than power put utilities, because if 
you knock out any utility to a building, they might rely on gas, water, the 
water escaping, you do any of those things then the company is not 
functioning, depending on what the company is, so rather than putting it 
down as one thing like power… Instead of electric power make it broader, 
and say utilities… then break it up to define what utilities are. (Brian)   
According to Brian utilities need to include gas, water and electrical, along with its 
facilitating infrastructure. Kerran’s views concurred with Brian’s comments, making the 
point that security graduates need to understand how to thread engineering services 
through a building. Stating, “every time you thread these through a building you are 
creating apertures for those to go through, light fittings in ceilings, mechanical ducts 
and the like, all of those (apertures) are weak links in the chain”. Kerran also noted that 
there needs to be some basic concepts in here relating to structural strengths (delay), it is 
not only the strength of the barriers themselves but all the fixings and managing the 
apertures. To a limited degree these issues are discussed by Craighead in his text High-
Rise Security and Fire Life Safety (2003). However, Kerran is expressing a requirement 
for deeper knowledge beyond what this text offers.  
Kerran also stressed that security teaching should adopt a narrative approach, that is 
using contextual examples, to demonstrate key points. He then used the narrative 
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approach to emphasise how physical security professionals must understand the 
compatibility of design elements, as the compatibility of design elements are 90% of 
where physical security falls down. The way the locks are fixed to the walls, the way 
hinges are bolted into the walls needs to be understood by physical security consultants. 
Kerran gave the example of Oak Park Heights, to demonstrate his point. 
Very late in the process they decided to build this secure wing, so they put 
the block up there and built a basement with 20 cells in it, it had a big open 
area in it…. What happened was they needed it done in a hurry and the 
architects building it were so busy they bought another firm in to design it, 
they got pieces of drawings and goodness knows what from other people but 
they didn’t understand what they were doing, the 20 crims walked in, 
looked at the door hinges and said thank god I’m here. So they all one by 
one ordered paperbacks from the library and then one particular afternoon 
they all came in and put three paperbacks in the jam of each door and when 
you slam the door the hinges go like that, the door could no longer be 
locked and closed because the door doesn’t fit in the frame anymore coz the 
hinges had been sprung. (Kerran)   
According to Kerran, much of physical security is about experience, being exposed to 
testing and then dissecting what has worked and what hasn’t. Testing was also a 
knowledge area raised by Brian, including project acceptance testing and compliance 
with technical specifications testing, where, consistent with the writings of Smith and 
Brooks (2013), such testing requires the application of the scientific method. This was a 
theme strongly supported by Brad. Brad expressed the necessity to recognize and teach 
scientific method, stating “if I had to go and look at the material resistance of something 
I would start by talking to a concrete contractor, getting some reo and having a dirty 
great hunk of concrete poured into my back yard that I’d hammer my way through over 
a period of time and I’d try a number of different tests.  That is what I would do” 
(Brad). Kerran supported this stance, pointing out the requirement for a clear 
methodology to solve the problem, be it global or micro: 
You have got to look at the global problem and then you work your way 
down in your solutions so you can’t ignore the bolts and nuts but you don’t 
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start off with the bolts and nuts, you start off with the context. The whole 
facility contextualization, and then you reduce it down to each element that 
you are doing and then you look at those in detail but unless you get that bit 
right you will never get this bit right and that can be taught (method) in the 
body of knowledge. (Kerran)   
Again, consistent with Smith and Brooks’ (2013) text, the necessity for comprehension 
of the scientific method and the engineering design process as knowledge categories for 
future physical security professionals was a well-supported theme. Kerran’s 
professional process view, in principle, supports the general structure of the hierarchical 
table, where knowledge areas are hierarchically divided into diagnosis, inference and 
treatment, specifically stating, “you don’t start down here, you start up there… It is 
actually a methodology; it’s an approach, a concept of conceptualising security 
solutions almost”.  
Following on from this, Kerran also believed audits needed to be added to the 
knowledge categories stating: 
Audits are about establishing a set of base levels, you are not just looking at 
against a threat, but you are seeking base levels, this thing here does this 
comply with this, will that deliver this, that is a security audit where you are 
going in micro detail and assessing, reviews are a much more high level of 
process that is being undertaken, surveys tend to apply more to management 
than the physical security, audits look at everything and reviews look at 
what have we got relative to the threats that apply. (Kerran) 
Brian also expressed the desire to change the category of safes and vaults to reflect 
security containers more broadly, arguing for the category of security containers to 
include drugs safes, and secure envelopes as well, stating: 
If we are talking safes and vaults then, rather than safes and vaults, there are 
different types of safes and vaults, one of the terms we have been using was 
security containers. As well as being security containers it will also look at 
for example fire security and it will take care of drugs, it will take care of 
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money, bullion, there are different types of construction and types of safes, 
depending on what you are trying to protect and how. For arguments sake, if 
you have a fire safe, there are two different types of fire safes – one for 
paper and one for data because the humidity is different, so if you had a 
title, security containers, then that would cover them all. (Brian) 
Brian further indicated that as a security professional within his area of expertise he 
deals with the possible threat of espionage, yet this was not an extracted threat category. 
Thus Brian advocated for its inclusion.  
A category refinement which was suggested by both Brad and Kerran was that planning 
and design should be called security planning and design to reflect the specific nature 
of the security role within any broader project context.  
Additional categories arising from the interviews are presented in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5 Phase Two: Participant centred concept categories  
Physical Security Knowledge Category Areas 
Utility Quality of life Fit for Purpose Aesthetics 
Environmental 
conditions 
Review Context Proportionate Level 
Building services Emergency 
management 
Project management Monitoring 
Network 
fundamentals 
Contract management Material ratings Security management 
plans 
Security design 
process 
Physics Computing 
fundamentals 
Acceptance testing 
Consulting practice Engineering principles Engineering 
drawings 
Electrical theory 
Ergonomics Building Systems- 
management systems 
/Security management 
systems (MS-SMS) 
Professional liaison Fixings 
Integration Design compatibility Security planning 
and design 
Utilities: 
Hydraulic/Power/ 
Mechanical/Gas/Water 
Ducting systems Openings/protrusions Security containers Drug safes 
Fire safes Secure envelopes Technical 
specifications 
Espionage 
Door Hardware Cyber security Mathematics  
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7.3.3 Physical security expert’s hierarchical structure 
Participants reflected on the hierarchical structure of the knowledge concept categories 
as presented in Table 6.19 and where appropriate recommended the placement of their 
additional categories and the movement of existing categories to reflect an order more 
meaningful to them.  
For instance, Braden thought that locating CPTED near technology was incorrect 
suggesting it was more related to situational crime prevention and defence in depth. 
Kerran clarified this further stating “it’s not (CPTED) a physical environment, it’s a 
planning environment…You’re planning and designing here, CPTED should be linked 
to the planning and design because it’s a planning exercise, you can’t apply CPTED 
after the event, CPTED is applied at that time… It has to be built in”. 
It is physical but the principles are applied at the time of design, if you don’t 
then what you will be doing is building, one of the classics is architects like 
to put reveals in buildings because they give shadows, but then people stand 
in them and they can’t be seen and they are a threat, so what you end up 
doing is building a wall in there or putting something to stop people going 
in after the event, so all of the context CPTED in two parts but it is through 
environmental design, it really should be up at the design process rather than 
the physical process because once you’ve got those principles right the 
physical element falls out. That definitely should be up here because it is a 
design process it is not, when you read the book on CPTED, very rarely 
does this book give you detail of physical construction attributes, it’s all 
these are the principles. (Kerran) 
Again, Kerran’s view reflects in principle the American Institute of Architects’ (2004) 
framework for security design. As expressed, the Institute’s (p. 40) text emphasizes a 
design framework or philosophy for security planning through the coupling of CPTED, 
situational crime prevention and spatial zoning principles along with the functional 
elements of deterrence, detection, delay and response (defence in depth). Braden also 
saw security surveys and risk to be associated stating “usually if you are doing a survey 
it is part of the risk process that you are undertaking”. Noting the place of risk within 
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the hierarchical table, Braden stated, “I see you have risk up the top; that sort of 
includes everything so that is probably right; it all makes sense”. This positioning is 
consistent with Somerson’s (2009, p. 61) work, which explained that while some people 
confuse a security survey as being synonymous with the total function of risk 
assessment, it is actually an ingredient in performing a risk assessment.  
John expressed that utility as a category would sit beneath law in the hierarchy along 
with aesthetics and efficacy. This saw these knowledge categories sit within the 
planning elements of the knowledge corpus, as John stated, “they are fundamental 
planning principles”.  
Nevertheless, John noted that there may not be a single place for such knowledge to be 
located, as it may sit in multiple places. In addition, John acknowledged that this study, 
due to its uniqueness, is the first iteration, and therefore “much knowledge placement 
will be provisional”. He also did not know where to locate environment as he perceived 
this as spanning many categories, but ultimately saw it as a planning category. John 
stated that “physical security is not a linear process…and we don’t really know in 
hierarchical terms where everything sits…at the moment we have just got them all in a 
big bundle, in a big bucket and they are only sitting where they are by virtue of 
something sitting over or under it, not because it is placed by order of importance…this 
sort of thing (study) is well overdue…we (security) don’t have a framework to work 
from”.    
Brian noted that espionage as a category should be located under threats and that review 
should be a superordinate category as it covers almost every aspect of the security 
concern, stating “I would just review everything”. He also expressed that utilities should 
be a broad category then falling underneath that, the specific utilities such as gas, water 
and power. Kerran considered that audit needed to be added with survey and located 
together as part of the broader planning side of things, stating “together they are 
different things but all have the ability to influence what comes out of it”.  
All of them are analysis of the existing stuff that is in place relative to a 
threat, what they do is these are underpinned by different outcomes, the 
audits are you establish a set of base levels, you are not just looking at 
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against a threat, but you are seeking base levels, this thing here does this 
comply with this, will that deliver this, that is a security audit where you are 
going in micro detail and assessing, reviews are a much more high level of 
process that is being undertaken, surveys tend to apply more to management 
than the physical security, audits look at everything and reviews look at 
what have we got relative to the threats that apply. (Kerran) 
 
7.3.4 The physical security graduate 
An analysis of the Phase Two interviews highlighted that graduates require fundamental 
understanding across the various knowledge category areas, as well as an understanding 
of how the various knowledge categories relate to each other, to produce a constructed 
outcome to mitigate risk. 
However, further professional development within an employment context is essential 
prior to reaching a competent level of practice. Wayne experienced such development 
and stated that “as a graduate you come in very much at an apprentice level, you are 
starting right at the bottom, you won’t be doing design and client liaison to start with. 
You are probably going to be doing colouring in and counting”. The professional 
apprentice theme continued throughout the interview process. Kerran explained that 
when he ran a large security engineering company, graduates had to do four years 
before they could see a client, “in case you said the wrong thing”. However, according 
to Kerran it usually took five years before a graduate was allowed out on their own 
stating that “they need the acquired knowledge of an old tradesman, they need 
mentoring”. 
This was a theme encountered earlier in the pilot study where participants articulated 
that the focus of physical security education should be towards producing graduate level 
persons not competent professionals. For instance, Jeff (Participant 5) expressed that the 
profession of security needs to have a staged hierarchy that allows graduates to be 
developed further post-graduation; stating “a medico goes out and becomes an intern, 
and accountant goes out and becomes a junior accountant, a manager goes out and 
becomes an advisor or something like that. They go into graduate jobs and then they 
progress upwards…if security is going to progress as a profession we must prepare 
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people for graduate jobs”. This discourse again supported the security professional’s 
stratum Figure 7.3 (5.5 in the Pilot study) which sees knowledge and experience in 
graduates build over time, and with these professional progression.  
Figure 7.3 The security professional’s stratum 
 
 
Brad expressed that graduates required fundamental knowledge of the category areas 
represented in Tables 6.18, 6.19 and Figure 6.2, stating: 
Fundamental knowledge is really important, and when I say fundamental 
knowledge, if you sit someone down and you say -  you put a lens on a 
camera, you connect the camera to a wire and power supply, you connect 
the wire to a monitor and you get a picture out the other end, the take home 
message from that, a lens, a camera, a wire and a monitor will give you a 
picture from there to there but when you change the technology that wire 
may not exist anymore and you might have a camera that has a built in lens 
and you might not have a monitor you might have a computer and all of a 
sudden the wheels fall of. I think it needs to get down to a more 
fundamental understanding, which is – we take a picture, we break it up 
however we break it up, it gets reassembled at the other side and it gets 
displayed, and that transfers across all generations of technology, current 
and future. 
The best part about that fundamental knowledge is the person can then turn 
around and say well I actually don’t understand how that picture gets from 
Managers/Experts
Experienced 
practitioners 
Graduates
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there to there but I know that fundamentally it gets broken up and it gets 
reassembled so I need to go and learn how this bit of technology works to 
get this bit to this bit, whereas if you just say lens, camera, wire, monitor, 
they say hang on we don’t have monitors anymore and we don’t have wires 
any more I’m lost. I saw a specification not that long ago that said you shall 
use 5 mega pixel digital cameras and record them on SVHS video recorders. 
Fundamentally incompatible technologies. It just needs to be that more 
fundamental understanding, it’s like an alarm system, you’ve got a switch, 
or a detector but fundamentally it’s just a little circuit and once you 
understand that it’s transferrable to all future technologies. (Brad) 
This was also supported by Garrhett who stated that the fundamental knowledge of the 
underpinning mathematics and physics for physical security was really important. 
According to Garrhett, “if you take someone who has a really good understanding of the 
science behind these technologies, they will do very well because then they can just add, 
they have got that underlying understanding of the technology, because at the moment 
we are very technical system based, having that grounding is very important”. Garrhett 
stated that as an employer of graduates for a large engineering organisation “I think that 
technical, the pure fundamental science in physics and technical knowledge, is the most 
important trait to have and I would be looking for someone who had that skill first 
because I think it is easy to teach the theories on top of that than it is to teach someone 
the science behind it”.  
Sharne supported this stance also, stating that graduates need the knowledge 
fundamentals and this includes the fundamental knowledge to take the project from risk 
level right through to the implementation phase, stating: 
There are people who will consider themselves a physical security 
professional but under physical security they are talking in the risk-threat 
assessment sphere…if you are going to be a physical security professional 
you need to be able to take it from risk level right through to the 
implementation phase. (Sharne)    
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Across the interview participants, the most important knowledge requisites for graduate 
physical security professionals were the risk based approach (Des), along with setting 
the appropriate level of security in the planning phase (John & Kerran). Then 
understanding the technology (Des) including the physics that underpin technology 
(Garrhett) and the methodology that is embedded into all stages of the security project, 
from diagnosing the real risks and articulating the strategy and design (Kerran) through 
to commissioning the solution (Brad). An analysis of each participant’s interview 
transcripts highlighted that physical security graduates need to have a broad 
fundamental knowledge basis, from security or facility project conception through to 
commissioning and that this knowledge is braced by excellent communications skills, 
both verbal with the ability to speak clearly and technically with clients, as well as the 
ability to communicate clearly in writing to produce high quality reports. It was also 
highlighted by Kerran that individual graduates may not use all they learn at university, 
it is about a holistic base:  
I’ve always said to the graduates when you come out with the degree, if you 
use 5% of what you did in your degree, doesn’t matter if its engineering, 
security whatever, you use 5-10% if you are lucky, and in my notes my 
degree if I use 5-10% of that, but what I did was I learnt the theory to take a 
problem and come up with a solution. (Kerran)   
 
7.4 Phase Two: Findings 
Phase Two investigated knowledge concept category areas that, accordant with their 
professional experience, participants believed were missing from Phase One’s analysis 
(Tables 6.18, 6.19 & Figure 6.2) and the Pilot Study findings. Phase Two sought to 
respond to the question: 
What are the implicit knowledge category areas, and instinctive structure used by 
security experts in achieving physical security risk mitigation not extracted from the 
literature critique?  
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7.4.1 The domain knowledge categories for physical security 
Participants highlighted an additional 43 knowledge concept category areas or subjects 
within categories (Table 7.5) they considered essential knowledge for future physical 
security professionals. These additional 43 knowledge requisite categories combined 
with those from Table 6.18 led to the development of a Phase knowledge concept 
category table (Table 7.6) and their supporting knowledge elements. This process 
resulted in a matrix of 98 knowledge concept categories for inclusion as a system of 
knowledge for physical security professionals. 
Table 7.6 Phase Two: Physical security knowledge concept categories 
Physical Security  
Security Law Facility 
contextualiza
tion  
Assets People Data & 
Information  
Property 
Infrastructure  Attack Adversary  Threat Terrorism  Crime Safety 
 
Loss 
 
Espionage 
 
Risk 
Security 
surveys/ 
reviews/audit
s 
 
Prevention 
 
Control  
Security 
planning & 
design 
Architectural 
drawings 
 
Aesthetics 
& utility 
Environment
al conditions 
Security 
theory & 
principles 
CPTED Situational 
crime prev 
 
Defence in 
depth 
 
Security 
management 
plans 
Security 
Level 
Consulting 
practice 
Movement 
control 
Engineering 
design 
process 
Engineering 
principles 
Services & 
utilities  
Electrical 
power theory 
& principles 
Gas Water  
Surveillance 
 
Technology 
Detection Alarms 
Facility/Buildi
ng Security 
Equipment Sensors Intrusion Fire Lighting CCTV 
Field of view Lenses Resolution Contraband 
Drugs 
Integration Network 
fundamentals 
Security 
management 
systems 
Cyber security Building 
systems 
Openings/ 
protrusions 
Ducting Delay Structural 
strengths 
Walls 
Windows Access 
control 
Barriers Fencing Glass Fixings Doors 
Door 
hardware 
Door 
furniture 
Locks & 
cylinders 
Security 
containers 
Vaults & 
safes & 
envelopes 
Standards & 
technical 
specification
s 
Response 
Guards Procedures Interruption Force Ergonomics Design 
compatibility 
Efficacy 
Analysis & 
evaluation 
Mathematic Physics Factory 
acceptance 
testing 
Site 
acceptance 
testing 
Emergency 
management 
Systems 
theory 
Costs Report 
writing 
Review Monitoring Project 
management 
Contract 
management 
Professional 
liaison 
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7.4.2 The hierarchical structure of physical security’s knowledge  
Phase Two’s knowledge concept categories (Table 7.6) were used to develop Table 7.7, 
a Phase hierarchical table of superordinate and subordinate knowledge concept 
categories along with their local connections. Facilitated through inductive then 
deductive analysis of participant interviews, Table 7.7 presents physical security’s 
hierarchically organized knowledge structure. This knowledge system includes core 
content and supporting professional knowledge to facilitate professional work in the 
area of crime and loss prevention within the domain of physical security.  
Phase Two findings indicate that physical security’s knowledge base includes a 
minimum of 98 superordinate and subordinate knowledge concept categories as distinct, 
yet interrelated theories, concepts, principles and elements (Table 7.6). In addition, 
these separate areas of requisite knowledge are connected, that is, they have internal 
relations according to their contribution with the professional goal, and organized on the 
basis of a single semantic relationship, represented by the word security (Table 7.7). 
Such findings support that this content has internal relations that as a systemized 
structure can be mapped and presented for enhanced reception learning (Table 7.7).  
Table 7.7 led to the development of Figure 7.4, a physical security professional’s 
knowledge heuristic representing core knowledge areas, their subordinate elements and 
their qualitative derived local structural relations. Figure 7.4 represents the latest 
iteration in the development of a domain symbol for communicating concept categories 
and their relations forming a physical security body of knowledge heuristic as a shared 
paradigm (Section 1.8). For novices and security educators, Figure 7.4 highlights the 
requisite individual knowledge elements within a physical security professional’s 
knowledge system, their connections and structural relations with other knowledge 
elements. Such a heuristic informs of the requisite knowledge elements within a 
physical security professional’s knowledge system necessary for professional practice. 
In addition, it enables novice learners to understand how individual learning areas 
facilitate their future work, how they relate to other learning areas and also acts as tool 
for problem reasoning in their early professional development.   
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Table 7.7 Phase 2: Hierarchical knowledge concept category table 
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Figure 7.4 Physical security knowledge structure heuristic 
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7.5 Phase Two: Interpretation 
Findings suggest that a broad and complex system of knowledge, or body of knowledge, 
(Table 7.6 and Figure 7.4) exists for physical security professionals. This knowledge 
basis includes as a minimum 98 knowledge areas which are required to be held by 
physical security professionals to be able to practice at a professional level. Thus 
reflecting back on the work of Abbott, professionals are premised to hold abstract 
bodies of knowledge that are not applied in a routine fashion, but require revised 
application, case by case (p. 7). Thus, Tables 7.6 present, as an iteration, such an 
abstract knowledge system. Within these tables each knowledge category has its own 
supporting body of literature that is applied by the professional or his delegate on a 
case-by-case basis. In addition, using Table 6.19 participants guided the integration of 
knowledge categories into the existing hierarchical Table (Table 6.19) to produce a new 
iteration hierarchical Table (Table 7.7) and cultural knowledge structure (Figure 7.4).   
An analysis of Figure 7.4, based on the reviewed literature and pilot study findings, 
considers that, consistent with the three principles of professional practice (Diagnosis, 
Inference & Treatment) (Sections 3.1 & 3.3), physical security’s knowledge system is 
hierarchically ordered to facilitate the initial diagnosis of the security problem, then 
reason about it towards developing a cost efficient treatment system. For example, 
knowledge located at the top of Figure 7.4 is specifically focused towards diagnosing 
the security problem. Consistent with Section 2.2, the knowledge structure commences 
with the very notion of security being pursued where diagnosis ends in risk articulation. 
Then professional inference or reasoning is engaged to articulate a desired level of real 
and perceived control to achieve security within the risk context. Such undertaking 
commences at prevention and finalises once the desired level is expressed. From this 
point the development of the security management system or physical protection system 
(PPS) becomes an engineering design and implementation task. At this stage, technical, 
physical and procedural elements are integrated to achieve contextually effective, yet 
proportional PPS as a risk treatment system.  
Figure 7.4 demonstrates that such a knowledge structure comprises discreet sets of 
professional tasks, each with its own knowledge and procedures. However, these task 
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sets have a degree of inter-relatedness which stems from the premises and principles of 
the underpinning systems theory. This shared paradigm, represents what Fraser (1993, 
p.25) refers to as a body of knowledge. Also demonstrated in Figure 7.4 is a clear 
hierarchy within this body of knowledge where knowledge moves from a broader 
overview down to individual areas of occupational experts. 
In principle such structural segregation of knowledge is supported through a percentage 
analysis of the first three salient physical security texts reviewed for Phase One of the 
study (Section 6.2.1). Text one was The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection 
Systems where content percentage analysis indicates that knowledge to diagnose the 
security problem represents 21% of the text’s information. In contrast, 79% of the text’s 
contents are focused towards engineering treatment knowledge. Text two was the 
Protection of Assets, where a content percentage analysis saw 20% of its information 
focused on diagnoses of the security problem and 76% of its works towards more 
technical or engineering knowledge required to treat. Similar findings was also found 
for text three, Effective Physical Security where 25% of the information is focused 
towards diagnosing or reasoning about the security problem, whereas 75% is focused 
towards more engineering or technical treatment category knowledge. Moreover, all 
texts’ information was hierarchically organised from diagnosing and reasoning 
(inferring) about the security concern, to technical knowledge for understanding how to 
treat the problem. 
Furthermore, this structure is also arguably supported within Garcia’s (2008) physical 
security planning heuristic (Figure 7.5). In her text, Garcia (2008, p. 3) explains that an 
effective PPS design commences with gathering information about the facility to be 
protected, its operations, conditions, operating states and defined threat. This forms a 
risk profile of the facility which steers the objectives of the PPS, as now the designer 
knows what to protect from whom. The next step is then explained as articulating the 
design for the new system, or re-design for an existing system, emphasizing that each 
facility is unique, so the process should be followed each time there is a need. Thus, 
once the risks are established the next step is to determine how best to combine the 
functional security elements to mitigate the threats which pose a risk such as fences, 
sensors, procedures, communications and so on. It is at this stage in the process that 
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professional inference is drawn on, utilizing a security design framework or philosophy 
to articulate a strategy and level of security.  
Treatment is then more consistent with the engineering design process to articulate a 
design solution. Once the PPS is designed, Garcia expresses that an analysis and 
evaluation of the proposed PPS is conducted and where necessary a re-design 
undertaken. According to Garcia (2008, p. 9) without a methodical, defined analytical 
assessment, the PPS might waste valuable resources, provide unnecessary protection, or 
worse, fail to provide the adequate protection. This process is emphasised in her design 
heuristic (p. 15) (Figure 7.5) which indicates the relationship between risk and 
engineering design methodology utilized to achieve an effective PPS.  The knowledge 
Table (Table 7.7) and heuristic (Figure 7.4) are congruent with Garcia’s works. 
However, from an andragogical standpoint, they highlight in detail the occupational 
knowledge required to arrive at the commissioned solution.        
Figure 7.5 Garcia’s (2008) PPS design and evaluation heuristic 
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The physical security knowledge heuristic is supported by broader knowledge and skills 
that facilitate such a professional undertaking. Such skills include communication skills, 
or the ability to critically analyse and evaluate information and then communicate this 
to all stakeholders in a project. Figure 7.4 indicates that educationally some knowledge 
is taught to students for the purposes of professional diagnosis, some towards 
establishing proportional control or influence (inference), while other more technical 
knowledge is engineering based, towards the design and development of the appropriate 
PPS. This is supported by general graduate level occupational skills that facilitate 
professional practice.  
Throughout this phase of the study there was an emphasis on the need for 
communication skills, engineering process and fundamentally that students of physical 
security must learn and understand the sciences (mathematics & physics) that underpin 
the treatment components and the principles of systems thinking that integrate 
individual elements into the barrier system. Students must also be formally schooled in 
the professional skills that facilitate professional practice, such as the ability to critically 
analyse data, to communicate clearly and effectively their analysis, to communicate 
with other professionals, to plan and coordinate activities and problem solve along the 
way to ensure treatment systems are commissioned accordant with technical 
specifications. Finally, there was consensus among the security professionals that 
graduates not only require the knowledge requisites included within the tables, but also 
on the ground experience. 
7.6 Phase Two: Reliability and trustworthiness 
To enhance the trustworthiness of the data, all interviews were recorded and fully 
transcribed enabling close and repeated analysis of the data (Schensul, LeCompte, 
Nastasi & Borgatti, 1999). This provided step one in establishing trustworthiness and 
validity in Phase Two’s outcomes. From this point further reliability of Phase two stems 
from the view that qualitative data itself is not what is questioned, but rather the 
inferences drawn from them (Maxwell, 1992, p. 283). For qualitative research Maxwell 
(1992, p. 284) explains that validity is not a sole product of any methodology, rather it 
pertains to the data accounts, or conclusions reached. Therefore, both descriptive and 
interpretative validity techniques were employed within Phase Two.  
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Descriptive validity was achieved utilizing a narrative account of what participants said, 
which along with the transcripts provided trustworthiness; where the narrative 
supported by the transcripts provides such validity. Descriptive validity was supported 
by interpretative validity, using participant’s own language, relying as much as possible 
on participant’s own words and concepts (Maxwell, 1992, p. 289). Then, where 
possible, knowledge categories provided by participants were validated through 
knowledge categories derived from textbooks thus, providing a degree of triangulation 
in the data (Creswell & Miller, 200, p. 126).  In addition, consistent with Phase One’s 
reliability and validity, where possible outcomes were taken to other participants within 
the phase providing a degree of verification through member checking (Creswell & 
Miller, 2000).  
7.7 Phase limitations 
Phase Two of the study did experience a number of research limitations that influenced 
the findings which must be acknowledged. These include: 
 Variations in security language, or rather variations in how terms are used to 
express meaning. Security does not have a domain discipline dictionary of agreed terms. 
Language variations in the security domain have been recognized by Manunta (1999) 
and these cannot be ignored as potential comprehension biases in forming knowledge 
categories. The pilot study sought to provide priori categories through synonymous term 
merging and clarity but not all knowledge categories could be subjected a detailed 
language analysis; 
 The population sample was small relative to the amount of practitioners working 
within the physical security and broader security advisory fields. However, the study 
sought a first iteration ideal knowledge system not a perfect one, where Rundblad’s 
(2006) work highlighted that for such qualitative research few participants are required 
(Section 4.3.1); 
 Interviews were limited in time as participants interviewed could only spare 
around one hour for the interview process. Therefore this time frame restricted the depth 
of knowledge that could be generated in this Phase;  
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 The deductive analysis of category relationships based on the work of Spradley 
(Section 4.3) to form Tables 7.7 and Figure 7.5 was also a limitation within the study. 
This produced a qualitative analysis of relationships based on similarity and 
dissimilarity rather than a statistical analysis of a larger population sample. While 
participants were used to check the researcher’s analysis to overcome relationship 
concerns, participants brought their own biases to this aspect of the study; and    
 This phase also highlighted some variation in location of core and subordinate 
concept, as John stated, “not all relations between concept categories will be linear”. 
Again, such limitations influence the outcomes of Phase findings.   
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodological process (Section 7.2) and interview analysis 
(7.3) towards the articulation of a system of knowledge for physical security 
professionals. Section 7.4 presented the findings for Phase Two. Phase Two upheld the 
principles of constructivism, showing that knowledge is constructed based on previous 
knowledge (Novak, 1993, p. 167). For instance, Table 7.7 and Figure 7.4 support the 
proposition that knowledge is constructed (Section 1.8), based on the foundations of 
previous knowledge (Tables 6.17, 6.19 & 7.5) and that this applies to the cultural 
domain of physical security. This phase found that cultural knowledge for the domain of 
physical security can be constructed and that consistent with Fosnot’s (2005, pp. 27-28) 
work, such cultural knowledge is a whole larger than the sum of its individual 
cognitions; it has a structure of its own. Table 7.5 and Figure 7.2 uphold this view.  
Section 7.5 presented Phase Two’s interpretation explaining that for higher education 
Table 7.7 and Figure 7.4 highlight that novice students in the physical security domain 
require hierarchically the knowledge and its facilitated skills to diagnose the security 
problem. This includes as a minimum 98 knowledge areas, each with its own supporting 
body of literature that must be held by physical security professionals to be able to 
practice at a professional level. This requires the scientific process or method of 
considering the contextual threats, engaging in a level of analysis to articulate an 
accurate as possible depiction of the risks, then communicating this risk effectively so 
that a level of security can be set to overcome the problem. This phase also showed that 
students of physical security also require fundamental knowledge of the relevant 
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security theories and principles that enable them, based on the risk context, to develop a 
management plan that effectively mitigates the risk accordant with the economic law of 
diminishing returns (Section 2.2). Phase Two’s reliability and trustworthiness was 
discussed in Section 7.6, followed by phase limitations in Section 7.7.  
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Chapter 8: Study Phase Three: MDS knowledge description 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents Phase Three of the study, the quantitative mapping of physical 
security’s macro knowledge structure to depict broader relationships between concept 
categories. The chapter commences with concept category reduction, as it was not 
feasible to measure all physical security concept proximities due to the length required 
for a multidimensional statistical scaling (MDS) questionnaire. The chapter therefore 
begins with Section 8.2, explaining knowledge concept category reduction rationale. 
The MDS survey questionnaire was divided into two separate questionnaires to increase 
participation and reduce withdrawal rates. Section 8.3 of the chapter presents the 
survey’s research findings, such as cluster and dimensional analysis of the MDS 
graphical maps. The findings are interpreted in Section 8.4, where a response to this 
phase’s research question is presented. Section 8.5 discusses the reliability and validity 
for this phase of the study; however, its limitations are acknowledged in Section 8.6. 
The chapter concludes in Section 8.7.  
8.2 MDS knowledge concept category reduction 
The findings from Phase Two uncovered a broad range of knowledge category concepts 
and their supporting elements, together with their localised structure to form a new 
iteration physical security knowledge system. Phase Two’s structure was developed 
using a qualitative ethnographic analysis technique accordant with the work of Spradley 
(1979). This technique produced Table 7.7 and Figure 7.4, which highlight a large 
number of superordinate or subordinate knowledge concept categories and their 
structure (N=98) within the cultural domain of physical security. Nevertheless, as John 
stated in his interview, “not all elements will be linear and locating some of the relations 
is very difficult as all persons bring a different experience to the study”. This 
individualised bias could only be overcome through a psychometric map providing a 
group summation of concept locality, achieved using a multidimensional statistical 
survey questionnaire. 
However, when developing the multidimensional statistical scaling (MDS) 
questionnaire there was an inability to take forward and map all 98 knowledge 
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categories. As established in the methodology (Chapter 4), such an approach would 
result in a survey questionnaire beyond achievable limits. Therefore, the completion of 
this phase required concept reduction to reduce the 98 knowledge categories and 
subordinate content areas (Table 7.6) to a more measurable 24. The notion of 
superordinate and subordinate knowledge categories, as depicted in Table 7.7 and 
Figure 7.4, facilitated a level of concept reduction to develop the survey questionnaire. 
Using this approach lower-order, more operational, subordinate categories were 
excluded for later mapping in separate studies. The aim of this phase of the study was to 
establish the broader content areas and their macro level structural organization rather 
than to map the concentrated operational connections within each category content area.  
Concept reduction was deductively achieved through a superordinate and subordinate 
relationships analysis accordant with the professional tasks of diagnosis, inference and 
treatment. This approach saw subordinate content excluded that was more 
representative of lower strata processes undertaken by professionals or occupational 
tasks within the physical security knowledge system (Figure 1.1 & Figure 3.3). For 
instance, the top section of Table 7.7 saw the retaining of the cover term security, 
subsuming the underpinning yet lower principles of prevention and control as these 
were considered subordinate to and embodied within the broader cover term security 
(See Section 2.1). Context was another superordinate category taken forward into Phase 
Three, as Table 7.7 highlighted it as superordinate to law, facility contextualization and 
buildings, as the context is something that must be established prior to more focused 
analysis. As Bruce stated in the pilot study (Chapter 5), context is extremely important, 
it must be established before anything else. This very point was also emphasized in 
Section 2.2.1 of the reviewed literature, where drawing on the work of Baldwin (1997, 
p. 8) concept definition embedded into contextualisation facilitates tailored attainment.  
Threat was also displayed as a salient diagnosis category in Table 7.7, as consistent with 
the reviewed literature (Section 2.2.1) security’s foci is towards managing malicious 
centred human acts, articulated as threats rooted in conceptions of risk. As Manunta 
(1999) said, if there are no threats there is no risk, and security’s roles have been 
articulated to manage the threats which pose a risk. Therefore threats was considered 
superordinate to categories including risk, adversary, attack and its embodying contexts 
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including crime, safety, terrorism, espionage, loss and fire and therefore taken forward 
as a prominent concept category. In addition, buildings was considered subordinate to 
facility contextualization which was subordinate to context and thus not taken forward 
as an individual category. This review resulted in a reduced list of knowledge categories 
more associated with the professional task of diagnosing the security problem (See 
Section 3.3). The deductive analysis procedure led to the development of Table 8.1, the 
superordinate diagnosis knowledge concept categories for physical security 
professionals. 
Table 8.1 Physical security’s superordinate diagnosis knowledge categories	
Diagnosis knowledge categories 
Security Threat Context 
Consistent with Section 3.3 of the reviewed literature and the findings of the pilot study 
(Chapter 5) the next professional practice task was inference or reasoning about the 
problem. As such, a number of categories were taken forward into Phase Three based on 
their prominent focus towards reasoning about the treatment of the security problem. 
This included security planning and design, because it was considered superordinate to 
aesthetics, utility, architectural plans and security theories and principles. In addition, 
the category of environmental conditions was one which required specific additional 
professional knowledge and was therefore also carried forward. Furthermore, specific 
security theoretical approaches were also considered core knowledge in the inference 
process and therefore carried forward into Phase Three’s analysis. These categories 
included CPTED, situational crime prevention and defence in depth. Combined these 
approaches aimed to develop a security management plan that ultimately set a desired 
level of control or influence accordant with the risk context. This analysis led to the 
development of Table 8.2, physical security’s superordinate inference process 
knowledge categories. 
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Table 8.2 Physical security’s inference focused knowledge categories 	
Inference knowledge categories 
Security planning & design Environmental conditions CPTED 
Defence in depth Situational crime prevention  
Following inference, the final professional practice task is considered problem 
treatment. Therefore a number of knowledge category areas were taken forward into 
Phase Three accordant with their prominence as treatment categories. For instance, 
movement control was displayed in Table 7.7 as a salient treatment concept, 
superordinate to the lower strata category of access control. Surveillance as a concept 
was also considered a superordinate treatment category, as was detection, albeit, 
subordinate to surveillance. Technology as a prominent category was also taken forward 
into Phase Three. Supporting surveillance and detection were the prominent categories 
of sensors, lighting and CCTV, which have been highlighted as major areas of 
knowledge for contemporary physical security professionals.  
Delay was another superordinate concept category embodying a number of subordinate 
yet essential knowledge areas. This knowledge area also included the broader categories 
of barriers along with an understanding of structural strengths as underpinning elements 
in achieving contextual delay. Barriers supported by structural strengths were 
considered superordinate categories embodying the subordinate categories of walls, 
glass, windows and fences. Security containers was emphasised by Brian to be a 
discrete knowledge area that was superordinate to categories of containers such as safes 
and vaults and security envelopes. Locks and cylinders was also carried forward as a 
significant category. Furthermore, response was another superordinate concept category 
in achieving effective security. This prominent category included the subordinate 
categories of guards, interruption, neutralization, procedures and force. This analysis 
saw the development of Table 8.3 highlighting physical security’s treatment focused 
knowledge categories. 
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Table 8.3 Physical security’s treatment focused knowledge categories 	
Treatment knowledge categories 
Movement control Surveillance Detection 
Technology Lighting Sensors 
CCTV Delay Structural strengths 
Barriers Security containers Locks/cylinders 
Response   
The deductive analysis also highlighted a number of knowledge category areas which 
provide knowledge and skills that facilitate professional security practice. For instance, 
professional practice was considered superordinate to the categories of project 
management, communications and report writing. Analysis and evaluation was also 
considered a prominent professional enabling category. This was pointed out in the pilot 
study by Frazer (Section 5.3.1.1), the ability to critically analyse and evaluate 
information in professional practice of diagnosing, reasoning about and treating security 
problems is considered essential. Finally, engineering design process, superordinate to 
engineering principles and scientific method was also considered an essential 
professional enabling category. This concept reduction analysis led to the development 
of Table 8.4, physical security’s professional enabling categories. 
Table 8.4 Physical security’s professional enabling knowledge categories  
Professional enabling knowledge categories 
Professional practice Engineering Design process Analysis & evaluation 
Combined the hierarchical table (Table 7.7) facilitated the extraction of prominent 
knowledge areas for diagnosing the security risk concern, inferring about it for design 
purposes, and the design and commissioning (treatment) of a suitable protection system 
braced by professional enabling knowledge areas. The concept reduction analysis saw 
the development of Tables 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. In support, concept reduction 
knowledge categories were tested for reliability using Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s 
alpha is a test of internal consistency assessing the extent to which questions within a 
questionnaire tapping a single underlying construct (physical security) covary (Allen & 
Bennett, 2012, p. 211). Cronbach’s Alpha produced a high reliability value (α = .913) 
indicating a strong relationship between knowledge concept categories from Tables 8.1. 
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8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 and physical security. Such analysis led to the final development of 
Table 8.5, Phase Three’s 24 prominent physical security knowledge concept categories 
to be subjected to an MDS survey questionnaire analysis.  
Table 8.5 Phase Three: Superordinate knowledge categories  	
Phase Three salient physical security knowledge categories 
Security Threat Context 
Security planning & design Environmental conditions CPTED 
Defence in depth Movement control Surveillance 
Detection Technology Lighting 
Sensors CCTV Delay 
Structural strength Barriers Security containers 
Locks/cylinders Response Professional practice 
Engineering design process Analysis & evaluation Situational crime prevention 
 
8.3 Findings MDS survey questionnaire 
The MDS survey instrument (Appendix E) embedded Table 8.5’s prominent knowledge 
concept categories and subordinate content areas into a survey questionnaire for paired 
comparisons to uncover global knowledge structure for the domain of physical security. 
Phase Three sought to respond to the question: What is physical security’s macro 
knowledge content structure? MDS enabled a response to this question based on 
aggregated perceptions of dissimilarity amongst physical security concepts. The survey 
was preceded by a set of instructions providing a summary overview of the study and 
survey completion instructions. Concepts were rated by participants according to their 
perceived dissimilarity on a ten point rating scale, where ten indicates they are highly 
dissimilar and therefore further apart, and one indicated they are very similar or highly 
related and therefore extremely closer together. These measures were then averaged 
(mean) and standard deviations examined as a method for understanding shared (group) 
perceptions.  
Figure 8.1 presents the MDS two-dimensional spatial map analysis produced using 
SPSS. This map is accordant with the writings of Davies and Coxon (1982, p. 6) who 
express the need for a spatial solution of three or preferably less dimensions so that the 
structure of the entire configuration can be visually interpreted. This view was shared by 
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Shepard (1972, p. 4) who pointed out that finding interpretable axes becomes 
considerably more difficult and uncertain when the number of dimensions exceeds what 
can be immediately comprehended in a picture or model. The initial MDS ALSCAL 
analysis produced Figure 8.1 highlighting macro spatial representation of physical 
security concepts.  
Figure 8.1 Phase Three: MDS spatial representation of physical security concepts  
 
	
The interpretation of the MDS map requires a key (Table 8.6), relating mapped concepts 
to those presented in Table 8.5.  
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Table 8.6 MDS survey key	
MDS Key 
Security = Security Threat = Threat Context = Context 
SecPlanDes = Security 
Planning & Design 
EnvirnCond = Environmental 
conditions 
CPTED = CPTED 
DiD = Defence in depth MoveCont = Movement 
control 
Surveillance = Surveillance 
Detection = Detection Technology = Technology Lighting = Lighting 
Sensors = Sensors CCTV = CCTV Delay = Delay 
StructStren = Structural 
strength 
Barriers = Barriers SecContain = Security 
containers 
LockCyl = Locks/cylinders Response = Response ProfessPract = Professional 
practice 
EnginDesignP = Engineering 
design process 
AnalEval = Analysis & 
evaluation 
SitCrimPrev = Situational 
crime prevention 
Nonetheless, a further analysis of the MDS output analysis was undertaken, specifically 
in relation to concept locality and their relations to other concepts (Figure 8.2).  
8.3.1 MDS cluster analysis 
The MDS map captured global structure by locating each concept in an N-dimensional 
space accordant with proximity correlations. For Figure 8.1 the calculated distances 
between concept points represent participant’s averaged psychological proximity of 
physical security’s knowledge concepts. The analysis undertaken was based on the 
work of Davies and Coxon (1982, p. 6) who emphasized that for interpreting such an 
MDS solution, clusters and dimensionality, including circular and linear orderings, need 
to be explored. Therefore MDS provided for two modes of interpretation, primarily 
clustering of concepts based on their close or distal proximity identified as Clusters1 to 
5 (Figure 8.2) and their dimensional locality (Figure 8.3) according to their cultural 
separation.  
For Phase Three, primary interpretation was achieved through a cluster analysis, as 
Brooks acknowledged and McAleese (1999) expressed, experts cluster together similar 
concepts, and separate unlike concepts, therefore clustering of like concepts should 
produce what McAleese termed “knowledge arenas”.  
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Figure 8.2 MDS physical security knowledge clusters	
 
 
8.3.1.1	Cluster	One:	Security	
Central to the MDS spatial map was the cover term security, representing the desired 
state to be functionally achieved from the body of knowledge. Security, as the 
innermost category within the MDS spatial map, is consistent with the premises of a 
cultural domain. A cultural domain’s knowledge structure is based on isolating the 
fundamental units of knowledge accordant with a single semantic relationship with its 
cover term, and organized according to relationships in terms of similarity and 
differences (Section 1.5). The central position of security is consistent with this premise 
and further supports the overarching seating of security for Table 7.7 and Figure 7.4. 
Clustered with security was the theory of defence in depth, an influential theory used to 
achieve an effective state of security with a distal mean of 1.4 and a standard deviation 
of 0.74, indicating participants collectively perceived these two concepts as highly 
Cluster 1
Cluster 2 
Cluster 3 
Cluster 4Cluster 5
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similar. Also closely correlated to security was threat as the driver or reason for security 
with a mean of 1.94 and a standard deviation of 1.00, again reflecting a high degree of 
consensus across participants for these associations. The position of threat within the 
spatial map was consistent with its MDS spatial position in Brook’s 2008 study.   
The next associated relationship within Cluster One was security and context, 
representing the concept used for understanding the specific security problem with a 
distal mean of 2.13 and a standard deviation of 1.41. Again, indicating consistent 
perceptions of correlation. Security planning and design as the means of reasoning 
about the security for a built environment was also clustered with the notion of security, 
with a mean of 2.33 and a standard deviation of 1.35 reflecting consensus perceptions 
amongst the sample. Cluster One saw knowledge requisites from the top section of 
Figure 7.4 centrally clustered together, in primary supporting the upper structure of 
Figure 7.4, physical security’s knowledge heuristic.  
8.3.1.2	Cluster	Two:	Delay	
Cluster Two saw high similarity ratings for those physical security measures that aim to 
protect through their material strengths and design facets (Section 3.3) with concept 
categories reflecting delay or physical difficulty measures within physical security’s 
knowledge base. Central within this cluster was the notion of structural strengths, and 
highly correlated with this was barriers with a distal mean of 1.79 indicating the 
concepts are highly similar, with a standard deviation of 1.12 indicating that all 
participants saw these concepts to be associated. Locks and cylinders were also highly 
similar to structural strengths with a mean of 2.0 and a standard deviation of 0.96. This 
measure of association reflects a strong consensus with this pairing. Delay was also 
highly correlated with structural strengths, with a mean of 2.21 and a standard deviation 
of 1.48; again reflecting a high degree of consensus across the sample for this 
relationship measure.  
This cluster also included security containers as strongly associated to structural 
strengths, with a mean of 2.29 and standard deviation of 1.64, reflecting consistent 
perceptions across the sample for this pairing. Cluster Two saw knowledge concept 
categories from the delay aspect of Figure 7.4’s treatment section grouped together, 
with MDS spatial localities consistent with local connection proximities. This again, in 
principle supports both the placement of, and local connections within Figure 7.4 and 
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indicates how cultural knowledge is associated with other cultural knowledge within the 
physical security sub-domain.  
8.3.1.3	Cluster	Three:	Technology						
Cluster Three included the concepts of technology, environmental conditions, 
movement control, sensors, detection and response. With the exception of response, 
within this cluster concepts are related to the issues influencing technology in the 
protection of assets which is supported by the literature. For example Garcia (2001, p. 
173) expressed that entry control systems aim to achieve broader movement control of 
personnel and contraband into and out of a facility are nowadays technology based with 
the aim of detecting and delaying unauthorized movement. This point of view was also 
highlighted in the work of Walker (1988, p. 4 & 21). The inclusion of environment in 
this technology cluster may seem counter-intuitive however as Walker (1988, p. 21) 
notes, weather and other environmental factors have an impact on the efficacy of 
security technology, a point is also noted by Garcia (2001, p. 80).  
Findings indicate that technology represents the pivotal category within this cluster. 
Technology and sensors reported a mean dissimilarity rating of 2.36. This association 
indicates these concepts are similar with a standard deviation of 1.22, suggesting 
general consensus. In addition, technology and detection were also closely correlated 
with a mean of 2.36 and standard deviation of 1.5, again indicating consensus with this 
pairing. Environmental conditions and technology were considered more distal; these 
concepts resulted in a dissimilarity mean of 3.17 and a standard deviation of 2.34, 
indicating broader perceptions of this pairing.  
Technology and movement control presented a mean dissimilarity rating of 4.64 with a 
standard deviation of 1.78, and was located in close proximity to the delay treatment 
elements, indicating that participants felt that consistent with Figure 7.4 movement 
control, while technology based in contemporary times, is a broader security knowledge 
category representing a key security principle in the protection of assets. The final 
category within this group was response, with a mean rating of 5.5 and a standard 
deviation of 3.06, suggesting some divergence in perceptions of relationship with other 
technology focused elements. Response represented a single category from the human 
security categories and, on reflecting on other clusters, appeared difficult to locate in 
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relation to other categories. Perhaps with supporting elements it may have been better 
located.  
8.3.1.4	Cluster	Four:	Surveillance									
Cluster Four saw the grouping of those security knowledge categories associated with 
surveillance within a controlled or protected environment.  Central within this cluster 
was the very notion of surveillance with technology based categories that help achieve a 
surveilled environment. For instance, surveillance and CCTV reported a mean 
dissimilarity rating of 2.29 with a standard deviation of 1.64, indicating that participants 
consistently saw these two categories as highly similar. Surveillance and lighting were 
also perceived as similar with a mean 2.71 and a standard deviation of 1.86. CPTED 
was also in the same quadrant, although separated from this tighter cluster. 
Nevertheless, due to the natural surveillance element within CPTED it reported a mean 
similarity rating with surveillance of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 1, indicating 
strong support for this association. However, CPTED was grouped with cluster 5 due to 
proximal locality and similarity with other inference related planning categories. 
8.3.1.5	Cluster	Five:	Diagnosis,	Inference	and	Treatment			
Cluster five included analysis and evaluation, engineering design, professional practice 
and CPTED clustered around a central category of situational crime prevention. This 
cluster appeared to incorporate those knowledge categories more associated with 
understanding the security concern and treatment approach, or in the words of Abbott 
(1988, p. 40) to classify, reason, or - more formally infer - about the security problem. 
For instance, central within this cluster is situational crime prevention, a guiding 
theoretical framework for treating protective security problems. This cluster was located 
relatively closely to engineering design process, as a salient category in developing the 
treatment system, with a mean of 3.33 and a standard deviation of 2.3. Such spread 
indicates a reasonable consensus for this pairing. In addition, situational crime 
prevention and analysis and evaluation had a mean rating of 2.71 and a standard 
deviation of 1.64, indicating participants collectively felt these two categories were 
highly related.  
CPTED – despite proximity to the surveillance cluster – was included with the 
diagnosis and treatment cluster due to its inherent planning aspects which influenced its 
P a g e  | 302 
 
proximity with situational crime prevention, analysis and evaluation, professional 
practice and engineering design process. As Kerran stated, CPTED as a security/crime 
prevention theory is considered at the planning stage of the problem (Table 7.7), and 
includes natural access control, territoriality along with natural surveillance to mitigate 
security risk (Atlas, 2008). However the co-location of CPTED with surveillance is 
consistent with both Table 7.7 and Figure 7.4 along with earlier versions of the 
knowledge heuristic (Table 6. 19 & Figure 6.2) which saw CPTED proximally 
associated with access control and surveillance rather than with planning and design. 
This supports John’s earlier statement that relationships will not always be linear. 
Such complexity of relationships is also evidenced in the links between situational 
crime prevention and security planning and design as well as context which were not 
located within Cluster 5 but still within the same quadrant. Security planning and design 
recorded a mean rating of 2.53 and a standard deviation of 1.25 when compared to 
situational crime prevention indicating that participants perceived these to be closely 
related. Context (Cluster 1) and situational crime prevention (Cluster 5) were also 
considered highly related with a mean of 2.8 and a standard deviation of 1.93, indicating 
a strong degree of relationship.  
This clustering also saw other relationships, for example, analysis and evaluation when 
compared to professional practice recorded a mean rating of 2.64 with a standard 
deviation of 1.45, indicating participants perceived these knowledge categories to be 
highly related.   
An analysis of the clusters within the MDS space (Figure 8.2) indicates proximal 
relationships between concepts in N-dimensional space (Gonzalvo, Canas & Bajo, 
1994). The clusters indicate concepts are spatially close or separated based on culturally 
perceived distances between all pairs of concepts (Gonzalvo, Canas & Bajo, 1994, p. 
602). In addition, many of the cluster proximities between concept pairs support the 
localized structure presented in Figure 7.4 as a result of cultural connections from Table 
7.7. Nevertheless, clusters on their own provide limited clarification of the domain’s 
macro spatial relationships. As such, informed by the writings of Davies and Coxon 
(1982, p. 6) there is a need to search for spatial configuration-including dimensional 
orderings.  
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8.3.2 Dimensional interpretation 
Dimensional analysis sought to understand the broader spatial relationships between 
individual concepts and clusters. Using this approach, the dimensions defining the space 
are premised to represent the main properties along which concepts within the domain 
are organized (Gonzalvo, Canas & Bajo, 1994, p. 601). Consistent with the pilot study 
analysis, dimensional interpretation focused on the salient dimensions of diagnosis and 
treatment. These are based on Abbott’s (1988) identification of three salient tasks of the 
professional – diagnosis, inference and treatment, along with his view that inference is 
undertaken only when the connection between diagnosis and treatment is obscure or 
distal (p. 49). 
Table 8.7 presents the calculated dimensional rating for each physical security concept 
and its relationship to the professional tasks of diagnosing a security problem or treating 
it. Higher scores indicate a greater degree of relatedness to a given dimension.  
Table 8.7 MDS physical security dimensional data	
Concept Diagnosis (Dimension 1) Treatment (Dimension 
2) 
Security -.1597    -.0557 
Threat -.2985     .1120 
Context -.1454     .0359 
SecPlanD -.0246    -.0961 
EnvirnCo .4864     .7484 
CPTED .6914   -1.2884 
DiD -.2134     .0456 
MoveCont .2325    1.2165 
Surveill 1.6694    -.4132 
Detectio 1.4164     .4347 
Technolo .8169    1.0276 
Lighting    1.9757    -.5399 
Sensors 1.4228     .9720 
CCTV 1.8823    -.2432 
Delay -1.4045     .2137 
StructSt -1.9866     .1970 
Barriers -1.0665     .4929 
SecConta -2.2802     .0620 
LockCyl -2.1519     .4484 
Response .3083    1.2854 
ProfessP    -.4426   -1.8577 
EnginDes -.3031    -.8977 
AnalEval -.2283    -.7612 
SitCrimP -.1970   -1.1391 
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Figure 8.3 Physical security’s knowledge structure in two-dimensional space  
 
 
Figure 8.3 represents the SPSS output two-dimension MDS spatial map based on the 
values provided in Table 8.7. 
8.3.2.1	Dimension	Two‐	Treatment		
For this analysis, physical security concepts most strongly related to the Treatment 
dimension were identified and listed in Table 8.8 ranked according to degree of 
relatedness. 
Table 8.8 Treatment dimension	
Dimension 2 
Response  1.2854 
MoveCont 1.2165 
Technolo 1.0276 
Sensors .9720 
Barriers .4929 
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Response was found to be the physical security concept most strongly related to 
treatment. This differs from the pilot study findings, but as Garcia (2001, p. 5) 
highlights, the primary functions of a physical protection system are the detection and 
delay of an adversary long enough to facilitate response by security personnel. 
Response according to Smith and Brooks (2013, p. 108) is the actual deployment of a 
system variable that either apprehends or drives away the adversary. Thus, the goal of 
the system is to provide enough time after detection, for a response element to take 
action (Garcia, 2001).  This treatment category represents an essential means of 
securing an asset, as without response, detection and delay system variables are 
arguably inconsequential. Accordingly, this is an essential treatment option and its N-
dimensional place along with its numerical rating as the highest treatment variable is 
arguably sound.  
The second highest treatment category was that of movement control (MoveCont). This 
reflects the role of physical security being to prevent unauthorized access or egress 
(Garcia, 2001; Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 105), which ultimately translates to controlling 
movement.  
Technology was the third highest treatment category and in contemporary times, the use 
of technology in the protection of assets is standard practice and therefore a major 
knowledge area for the treatment of security concerns. According to Smith and Brooks 
(2013, p. 139) security technology associated with intrusion and access control and is 
concerned with the authorization, identification, and detection of people in 
circumstances that may provide a threat to an organization. Electronic security is a vital 
aspect of any security program (Pearson, 2007, p. Ix). According to Pearson enhanced 
sophisticated electronics is part of virtually every electronic security functional system 
(p. vii).  
For a contemporary security professional to be effective they need to understand the 
electronics and the interactions of various electronic security functions to a high level, 
as they are integrated into a total security system solution (p. ix). Accordingly, sensors 
followed this category; these react to a stimulus and initiate an alarm (Garcia, 2001, p. 
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55), again a salient treatment element within any electronic security system (Smith & 
Brooks, 2013, p. 139). Barriers were also considered a salient treatment knowledge area 
for security professionals and as a category represent a pivotal means of treating 
security concerns, as Walker (1998, p. 19) states, the physical or fortress concept of 
protection has been with us from earliest times. Barriers provide the delay function of 
defence in depth to retard the progress of an adversary to provide   the necessary time 
for an effective response (Garcia, 2008, pp. 60-61). Dimension Two straightforwardly 
related to those categories which afford physical treatment of protective security 
concerns.     
8.3.2.2	Dimension	One	Diagnosis		
For this analysis, physical security concepts most strongly related to the Diagnosis 
dimension were identified and listed in Table 8.9, ranked according to degree of 
relatedness. The concepts most related to diagnosis are lighting, CCTV, surveillance, 
sensors and detection.  
Table 8.9 Diagnosis dimension 	
Dimension 1 
Lighting    1.9757    
CCTV 1.8823    
Surveill 1.6694    
Sensors 1.4228     
Detection 1.4164     
Further examination of Figure 8.3, the MDS spatial map visually representing the 
location of the physical security concepts across the dimensions of diagnosis and 
treatment, shows that some concepts rate highly across both dimensions. The work of 
Abbot can be drawn on to explain such an outcome. Abbott’s (1988, p. 40) work 
conveys that in terms of diagnosis, inference and treatment, professionals often run 
these modalities together, stating the three are modalities of action more than aspects 
per se, and they relate to problem complexity (Section 3.3). According to Abbott, 
professionals vary their temporal structuring of diagnosis and treatment (p. 48) whereas 
in many cases the two coincide (diagnosis & treatment) (p. 45). Abbott states that where 
diagnosis is clear and treatment obvious, the path or time frame between the two is 
short, and formal inference omitted.  
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Furthermore, according to Abbott the professional may commence with treatment rather 
than diagnosis (p. 40), or may diagnose by treating, as doctors often do (p. 49). 
However, deeper professional reasoning (inference) is undertaken when the connection 
between diagnosis and treatment is obscure or distal (p. 49), and relates to, and draws 
on domain professional knowledge (p. 48) (Section 3.3). This means that security 
professionals may in fact see a number of knowledge categories as being associated 
with both diagnosing and treating the security problem. Abbott’s (1988) views are 
expressed through Figure 8.4 which indicates the potential overlap for the modalities of 
diagnosis, inference and treatment of professional security problems and how this 
overlapping may obscure dimensional interpretation.  
Figure 8.4 The overlap between diagnosis, inference and treatment of professional 
problems 
 
	
In addition, for the practice domain of physical security, diagnosis represents a small 
subset of skills, where the majority of the technical knowledge is focused towards 
problem treatment and thus, such categories would logically dominate the two 
dimensional space. Dimensional interpretation for diagnosis was less conclusive than 
dimensional interpretation for treatment. Nevertheless, the dimensional space indicates 
how clusters of knowledge relate to other clusters of knowledge across the professional 
modalities of diagnosis and treatment and how due to the dual meaning of security 
terms knowledge concepts may be used to refer to diagnosing the problem and treating 
it.  
  
DiagnosisInference
Treatment
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8.4 Phase Three: Interpretation  
Phase Three of the study sought to respond to the research question: 
What is physical security’s knowledge content structure as measured by 
multidimensional statistical scaling?  
Phase Three provided some valuable insights into the study’s findings to date. For 
instance, a comparison between Figure 7.4 (Phase Two) and Figure 8.2 shows 
congruence with knowledge category organization. Figure 8.2 saw major knowledge 
concept categories clustered together at the top of Figure 7.4 for the professional tasks 
of diagnosis and inference. For example, Figure 8.5 shows that Cluster One in Figure 
8.2 included the notion of security, the context in which security is being pursued, 
threats to security, security planning and design and defence in depth clustered together. 
These knowledge categories are also located together, although hierarchically at the top 
of Figure 7.4.  
Figure 8.5 Comparison of diagnosis focused knowledge categories 
 
          
	
In addition, MDS Cluster Two (Figure 8.2) included major knowledge areas focused 
towards delaying an adversary’s advancement. These included the concept categories of 
delay, structural strengths guiding the efficacy of delay, barriers, security containers and 
locks to functionally achieve delay. These knowledge categories form an engineering 
arm within the treatment section of Figure 7.4 (Figure 8.6), again showing consistency 
across the two knowledge models.  
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Figure 8.6 Comparison of delay focused knowledge categories 
 
    
	
Furthermore, MDS Cluster Three (Figure 8.2) included movement control and response, 
overarching security goals which again both sit within the treatment section of Figure 
7.4. However, it also located technical knowledge areas of elements employed to 
achieve security clustered together. These included technology, detection of the threat 
and sensors employed to detect the threats which pose a risk (Figure 8.7). Again, these 
knowledge categories form a technology arm within the treatment section of Figure 7.4. 
This group also included environmental conditions as these have a major influence in 
selecting security technologies and sensors for a context.   
Figure 8.7 Comparison of technology focused detection knowledge categories 
 
   
	
Cluster Four within Figure 8.2 saw three knowledge areas associated with surveillance 
or observation clustered tightly together. This included the concept of surveillance, 
supported by lighting and CCTV, the technical means to help achieve surveillance. In 
the same quadrant was also CPTED, as an element within CPTED aims to achieve 
natural surveillance (Atlas, 2008). Again, these knowledge areas clustered together also 
formed a logical surveillance arm within the treatment section of Figure 7.4 (Figure 
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8.8). In addition, the co-location of CPTED within this quadrant is supportive of 
CPTED’s location within this section of Figure 6.2 (Phase One), supporting John’s view 
that there will be knowledge overlaps.     
Figure 8.8 Comparison of surveillance focused knowledge categories 
 
   
	
Cluster Five saw the clustering of knowledge concept categories associated with 
facilitating professional practice. These included the categories of professional practice, 
engineering design process as well as analysis and evaluation. These are all knowledge 
concept categories which frame the treatment section of Figure 7.4; supporting the 
requirement for facilitating knowledge in the physical security professional’s body of 
knowledge to achieve efficacious treatment. Interestingly, this cluster also saw 
situational crime prevention (SCP) within it; SCP is a major theoretical frame work for 
considering physical security and crime prevention within a defined context.  
The clustering of knowledge (Figures 8.2 & 8.3) did support to a degree dimensional 
segregation according to diagnosis, inferring or reasoning and treatment as also depicted 
in Figure 7.4 showing local connections. This phase of the study saw a high degree of 
concordance between the taxonomy (Table 7.7), graphically presented in its supporting 
heuristic tool (Figure 7.4) and the MDS analysis (Figures 8.2 & 8.3). Such consistency 
provides validity towards the results for each phase of the study and facilitates a 
response to Phase Three’s research question.   
Phase Three’s findings indicate that physical security’s knowledge content structure 
relates to clusters of similar or related concept knowledge categories and subordinate 
concepts proximately organized in relation to the both the functional objectives the 
system aims to achieve, and the cognitive tasks required to realize the system’s output 
functions. The cognitive tasks relate to knowledge categories focused towards diagnosis 
of contextual security or crime prevention problems and inferring about them to treat 
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them with suitable system variables. These problems relate to the manifestation of harm 
to people, information or property through malicious actors achieved through unlawful 
access or crime enablers (Section 3.3). For instance, Figures 8.2 and 8.3 highlights that 
the central concept is the notion of security, and clustered with this is the context being 
considered and the threats that poses a risk within that context. Such a cluster of concept 
knowledge guides the pursuit, and enables the achievement of a secure facility. 
These concepts are highly related to security planning and design, which guides the 
evaluation and selection of treatment elements. Figures 8.2 and 8.3 support the structure 
of Table 7.7 and Figure 7.4 expressing the notion that physical security’s body of 
knowledge is concentrated towards, and organized around diagnosing the security or 
crime concern, reasoning about it towards ascertaining the appropriate measures and 
levels of control, then planning and designing security strategies and practices that 
functionally achieve environmental control and therefore treat risk. As Abbott (1988, p. 
44) states, treatment is organized around a classification system and a brokering 
process, where brokering gives results to the client. Phase Three provides a blue print 
(Figures 8.2 & 8.3) for establishing a knowledge or curriculum framework for future 
physical security professionals.  
In terms of curriculum ordering principles, these figures indicate that physical security’s 
knowledge content should be presented and taught in a manner that reflects physical 
security’s professional tasks. These tasks include diagnosis, reasoning about (problem 
solving…inferring) then identifying, planning and designing and implementing 
treatment measures. For instance, the MDS spatial map indicated concept proximity for 
knowledge concepts relating to understanding the threats which pose a contextual risk 
driving the need for security (Cluster 1). It also indicated proximal relations for physical 
resistance treatment concepts (Cluster 2), electronic or technology based treatment 
options (Cluster 3), security surveillance elements (Cluster 4) and professional enabling 
knowledge and skill requisites (Cluster 5) that help produce the client’s desired result. 
The structural similarity between Table 7.7 and Figure 7.4 (Phase Two) and Figures 8.1, 
8.2 and 8.3 (Phase Three) support the validity of cultural domain mapping process as a 
means of expressing both knowledge requisites and structural relationships with other 
knowledge categories in the protection of assets. These figures show similarity in 
concept grouping according to hierarchical and linear relationships.  
P a g e  | 312 
 
8.5 Reliability and Validity    
As an analysis methodology MDS has the advantage of being low in experimenter 
contamination (Schiffman, Reynolds & Young, 1981, p. 30) and therefore results of the 
MDS analysis represent a reliable outcome. This was supported by the consistent spatial 
location of threat in Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 with Brook’s 2008 MDS security risk 
management knowledge structure findings. Nevertheless, reliability was considered 
through a goodness-of-fit evaluation. This was evaluated according to Kruskal’s Stress 
formula 1 and the Squared Correlations. The data analysis presented a Stress score of 
0.24399 and an RSQ of .70566 (squared correlations in distances) indicative of reliable 
results for proximal interpretation. However, according to the MDS Stress measure, not 
all concepts were in their ideal spatial locality. Nonetheless, a stress score of 0.24399 is 
well within the 0.54 stress score tolerances argued by Rakshit and Ananthasuresh (2008, 
pp. 293-294). By using a graph of alternate dimensional settings and stress scores 
Rakshit and Ananthasuresh (2008, p. 293) were able to demonstrate that a stress score 
of 0.54 was acceptable for a valid MDS analysis, as it best fitted the correlational 
model; where both higher and lower dimensional increases in paired amino acid 
relations increased stress.  
Thus, a two dimensional map with a stress score of 0.54 was the most appropriate 
means of visually presenting the hidden structure in Rakshit and Ananthasuresh’s data 
set. This literature supports the view that a stress measure of 0.24399 was indicative of 
reliable results for proximal interpretation. Furthermore, validity was also tested against 
the MDS source data, using Cronbach’s Alpha. This measures reliability through an 
alpha coefficient between 0 and 1. A measure of 0 for Cronbach’s Alpha means that the 
source data are unreliable, whereas a measure of 1 represents perfectly reliable source 
data (Allen & Bennett, 2012, p. 211). Cronbach’s Alpha produced a high (α=.913) 
value, indicating sound reliability and validity for the Phase Three survey questionnaire.  
8.6 Phase Limitations 
This phase of the study experienced a number of research limitations that influenced the 
findings, which must be acknowledged. These include: 
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As with previous phases, variations in security language, or rather variations in how 
terms are used to express meaning may have influenced participant’s perceptions of 
how dissimilar and similar security concept categories were; and 
The population sample was small relative to the amount of practitioners working within 
the physical security and broader security advisory fields. This phase of the study fell 
short of the desired MDS sample (N=30), analyzing 29 complete surveys.  However, the 
analyzed surveys achieved 97% of the targeted sample producing a sound statistical 
outcome for matched dissimilarity and results indicated concordance with Phase Two 
pairings.  
8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented Phase Three of the study, the multidimensional statistical scaling 
analysis of prominent knowledge concept categories for the domain of physical 
security. The analysis sought to capture a psychometric map of knowledge structure for 
the cultural domain of physical security based on their similarity or dissimilarity to each 
other. Section 8.2 presented the first stage of achieving such an outcome, concept 
reduction of physical security categories. Then the Phase objective was achieved, using 
a proximity matrices questionnaire that asked participants to rate relations, or 
proximities, between content items from Table 8.5; where people judge the 
psychological distance or closeness of the stimulus to produce geographical 
representations. Section 8.3 presented findings from the MDS survey questionnaire, 
through Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3; indicating how participants perceived the individual 
knowledge concept categories and subordinate concepts were considered to each other, 
uncovering macro cultural structure.  
Section 8.4 presented the interpretation for this phase of the study, highlighting that 
physical security’s knowledge content structure relates to clusters of similar or related 
concept knowledge categories and subordinate concepts or elements proximately 
organized in relation to the professional tasks of diagnosis of contextual security or 
crime prevention problems, inferring about them to treat them with suitable system 
variables. Phase findings indicate that physical security’s knowledge content should be 
presented and taught in a manner that reflect the physical security professional tasks of 
diagnosis, inferring and treating physical security associated concerns. Nevertheless, 
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there were some limitations within the phase methodology and procedure which were 
presented in Section 8.6.   
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Chapter 9: Study Phase Four: Physical security knowledge evaluation 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents Phase Four of the study, explaining what the knowledge concept 
categories and their cultural structure mean for the future of physical security education 
based on a focus group discussion extending on the findings from Study Phases Two 
and Three. Phase Four sought to understand what the knowledge requisites and 
supporting learning objectives are in terms of a desired curriculum for future physical 
security professionals. This phase also sought to explain how the knowledge requisites 
should be epistemically organised for adult learners, the depth and scope of the subject 
matter and the strengths and weaknesses in the knowledge heuristics for novice learners. 
Finally, this phase compared the body of knowledge as represented in the qualitative 
concept map (Figure 7.4) and MDS solutions (Figures 8.2 & 8.3) in relation to a desired 
curriculum framework through a discourse analysis. 
The chapter is divided into a series of distinct sections presenting the sequential 
building of knowledge towards responding to the phase research question What are the 
knowledge requisites and supporting learning objectives for physical security 
professionals?  Section 9.2 presents Phase Four’s participants, highlighting the depth of 
physical security knowledge each member of the focus group brought to the study. 
Section 9.3 presents the focus group analysis, organised thematically according to what 
the experts revealed as the desirable curriculum attributes for future physical security 
professionals.  Section 9.4 presents an interpretation of Phase Four’s findings, 
responding to Phase Four’s research question through a series of assertions brought 
forward from the pilot study. The Section 9.5 discusses the reliability and 
trustworthiness of Phase Four’s findings and the chapter concludes with Section 9.6.  
9.2 Participants 
Phase Four incorporated a purposive sample of physical security experts (n= 7), 
including Clint, Peter, Frazer, Brian, Garrhett, Nicholas and Brad (Table 9.1). Based on 
the pilot study experience, each participant in Phase Four is actively practicing in an 
operational consulting capacity within the sub-domain of physical security. That is, each 
participant’s occupational focus is saliently towards providing physical protection 
advice to clients due to their expertise in the sub-domain of physical security. 
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Combined, participants brought a rich depth of experience and thorough understanding 
of the professional knowledge requisites for graduates seeking entry into the physical 
security professional domain.    
Table 9.1 Phase Four: Expert profiles 
Name Profile 
Clint A security and public safety consultant to public, local and state authorities. 
He also provides technical security and telecommunications training for 
security practitioners. Clint holds a Bachelor of Science (Security) and a 
Certificate III in Telecommunications.  
Peter Peter has over 25 years’ experience providing protective security advice across 
a range of sectors including customs and border protection, the maritime 
domain, correctional and state infrastructure environments. Peter holds a 
Bachelor’s Degree in Security Science, and a Diploma in Project 
Management. 
Frazer Provides protective security leadership, advice and management across 
numerous sectors both as a consultant and at a senior leadership level for 
companies and corporations. This includes mining operations, offshore oil and 
gas platforms, and government facilities both within Australia and overseas. 
Qualifications include a Bachelor of Science (Security), (Commas and IT), 
Certificate of Data Communications, Certificate of Organisational Behaviour 
and Management. 
Brian 
 
Qualified locksmith, security consultant, agent and installer, and lecturer in 
intrusion and access control systems. He brings 40 years of security expertise 
to the study, holding qualifications including Certificate III in Investigations, 
Certificate IV in Security and Risk Management, Certificate IV in Training 
and Assessment, a Diploma of Engineering Technology Security Engineering, 
and an Associate Degree in Training and Development. 
Garrhett 
 
A senior engineering security consultant, providing security related planning 
advice during the early stages of major projects. He worked as a science 
officer for the UK Home Office where he tested and evaluated security 
technology and is a sessional university lecturer. 
Nicholas A lecturer with the International Academy of Law Enforcement and Security 
Training group. He holds a Bachelor of Arts (Justice Studies), a Graduate 
Diploma in Education (Tertiary and Adult Education), a Graduate Certificate 
of Emergency Management, and is a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) 
and holds Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) endorsements. 
Brad 
 
A security consultant for 21 years. With electronic technician qualifications he 
specialises in technology. Brad has worked on large capital works projects 
across the Middle East, Asia and Australia, and also runs an independent 
security technology test laboratory and associated infrastructure. 
 
9.2.1 Administration of focus group 
The focus group interview took approximately two hours, and comprised seven 
questions (Table 9.2) (Appendix F) to achieve the phase outcomes. The questions 
sought participants’ thoughts relating to requisite knowledge, teaching structure and 
supporting learning objectives in response to previous phase findings, based on their 
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professional experience. It also sought their final opinion of the knowledge structure, 
and provided them the final opportunity to recommend adjustments to the hierarchical 
table and supporting heuristic. All experts were emailed the focus group questionnaire 
along with supporting figures and tables a week in advance, providing time for them to 
consider the objectives of the interview, questions and supporting tables and figures. 
The focus group was recorded and transcribed for later analysis (Appendix L). 
Table 9.2 Phase Four: Expert focus group questions 
No. Interview questions 
1 In terms of articulating a formal knowledge system, based on these maps, what 
do you see as the foundation knowledge unit requirements to be learned by 
physical security professionals before qualification? 
2 Do you believe these maps capture the knowledge concepts required for a 
physical security professional, if not what do you consider is missing? 
3 It is argued that higher education students should learn or know the science or 
knowledge on which their future domain is built. Based on this view, what is the 
depth of scope or focus for security higher education knowledge? 
4 What should be learned after qualification, in professional practice? 
5 Based on learning principles how should these knowledge units be organised? 
6 What are the strengths and perhaps the weaknesses of these maps in terms of 
establishing a physical security professional’s knowledge system? 
7 Based on what has been discussed so far and the knowledge heuristics, what are 
the higher education learning objectives for future physical security 
professionals?  
At the commencement of the focus group the study’s jurisdictional objectives were 
contextualised to all participants. It was explained that the focus for the study was 
steered towards a graduate who, having completed a tertiary security program, was 
seeking to work in the physical security field; diagnosing security problems and 
designing and commissioning a system to mitigate these.  
9.3 Focus group analysis  
9.3.1 Physical security foundational unit requisites 
Phase Four findings strongly support that both the qualitative knowledge heuristic 
(Figure 7.4) and the MDS analysis (Figures 8.2 & 8.3) capture the foundational 
knowledge requisites for graduate physical security professionals. Participants 
supported the requirement for all knowledge areas presented in Table 7.6 and Figures 
7.3, 8.2 and 8.3 to be learned during their initial education, with Garrhett making the 
comment that the figures were “a good outcome”. The content and structure of the 
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heuristic (Figure 7.4) was further validated by Brad, who made the comment that the 
foundational knowledge requisites were, pointing at Figure 7.4, “basically everything 
that is on this piece of paper”. 
As a central theme all participants felt that the foundational knowledge requisite 
commences at the top of Figure 7.4, with the ability to clearly analyse and communicate 
risk based on threats. Garrhett noted that “every security professional needs to have an 
understanding of risk”. Nick supported this stance explaining that for him risk is the 
most essential element, stating “I am not talking about a basic level of risk, I am talking 
about risk where you produce a report based on tangible evidence to tell me what is 
going on, or what could go wrong, or whatever. Then how we can treat it, to me that is 
the number one thing I am looking at”. The risk view resonated throughout the focus 
group participants, with Frazer adding (while pointing to Figure 7.4 in the risk 
discussion) that one of the most essential attributes that is required to be taught is 
analysis, “it is a core element...you need to teach it early on to people because it applies 
to all elements, it applies to risk, it applies to identifying what it is that you don’t know. 
If you can’t analyse yourself you are not going to actually analyse what information that 
you need to apply, and that develops the person’s attributes in themselves, their 
confidence etc.” 
Consistent with Figure 7.4, following the knowledge requisites of risk was the 
acknowledgement of the necessity for a strong grounding in security theories and 
principles. These sat within the inference section (Figure 7.4) as planning guides for 
articulating the security solution, and their co-location and structural placement was 
supported across the group. Garrhett stated that “they are going to have to know the 
security concepts and theories like defence in depth, CPTED, as grounding.” Again, this 
view resonated across the group with Brad pointing out that “they lead to core element 
breakdown in terms of teaching detection etc.” Nick concurred with this position, seeing 
this and the knowledge in this section (inference) as the start of treatment within the risk 
management framework. According to Nick “treatments are things like your CPTED, 
situational crime prevention, defence in depth, followed by the physical security 
elements including security electronics, physical security (barriers), going through all 
that stuff, it is treatment”.  
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Again reflecting on Figure 7.4 and the knowledge clusters within Figure 8.2, the group 
saw the requirement for core engineering-focused knowledge underpinning the 
treatment of security risks for those within the physical security stream. For example, 
Frazer made the point that it is very important for graduates to have an understanding of 
the technical side of security treatment. Frazer stated “it’s great to do a risk assessment, 
but unless you understand how the systems work and know the practicalities of them, 
what the challenges are with them and installing, and how they work to operate, if they 
don’t understand that as well, how can someone say they need to implement that as a 
mitigation strategy”?  
I would love to see all security consultants have a very good foundation in 
how the technology actually works. I think it is more important that they 
have the knowledge of what is possible and what is not, and how to apply it, 
and they can go to someone else to get the information on how it works. 
Because a lot of guys that understand the technology in detail can’t look at it 
from the top down, and therefore they don’t get the risk that they are trying 
to mitigate. (Frazer)  
Frazer’s view triggered agreement across the group with Peter pointing out that “when 
you talk about the risk treatment, unless you understand what each of these elements 
(engineering solutions) is in the physical security environment you can’t do efficient 
treatments. Because you don’t know whether the treatment is going to be in line with 
what the threat is, so it has got to balance the threat with what the you would treat it 
with”. Frazer agreed, adding that graduates need to have an understanding of technical 
variables, locks, access control, CCTV, perimeter detection, their supporting standards 
and how they tie together.  
Brian supported the taxonomy of knowledge, specifically as it relates to security 
treatments, and stressed that physical security graduates need to understand the goal of 
individual subsystems, as well as how that subsystem works, how it can be defeated and 
how quickly this can be achieved. Garrhett concurred and added that graduates also 
need to know about how subsystems can add value to an organisation and how to impart 
this information to a client. Garrhett extended this idea using access control as an 
example “they might be able to say this access control system can actually link into 
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your human resource management (HR) system, and your building management system 
so by swiping on here you can turn all your lights on, or by deleting my access rights on 
this card, or from the HR system then my access is blocked…this card can save you 
money, time and business process”. 
Underpinning the engineering requisite knowledge was the requirement for graduates to 
have a fundamental understanding of the laws of physics and the mathematical 
principles behind the engineering solution. This point was emphasised by Frazer, Brad 
and Garrhett. Brad explained that a fundamental understanding of the laws of physics as 
they apply to light, sound, vibration, movement and inertia was necessary, and related 
this knowledge to detecting the threat.  
Fitting across this knowledge basis was the requisite for sound comprehension of 
systems theory. Frazer and Peter both strongly emphasised the requirement to teach 
systems theory as the means for articulating what physical security is about, and how all 
these individual elements fit together to create a risk mitigation system. Peter stated that 
“you would have to put systems theory up very high on your criteria”. 
Probably one of those foundation units, I think if you taught systems theory 
like the structure of the degree you come into it and 101 is systems theory. It 
will help for all these other things (pointing to Figure 7.4) to actually fall 
into place and be more readily understood by students. (Peter)  
Furthermore, the experts also supported the necessity for professional enabling 
requisites to be clearly articulated in any body of knowledge and taught within a 
curriculum to ensure students comprehended how broader academic knowledge is used 
to achieve occupational outcomes. Tied to this supporting knowledge was the 
engineering design process, or as Garrhett states “the management of the design 
process”. Students need an understanding of the phases that consultants go through to 
create the end product and also need to understand master planning, concepts, schematic 
detail design along with how to interact with clients.  
Peter noted that this is the same for engineering graduates and that a physical security 
curriculum should draw from this, “it’s the same knowledge, and therefore that 
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academic knowledge already exists in that (engineering) domain”. Frazer also saw the 
necessity for such knowledge requisites and added other professional practice requisites 
that were included in Table 7.6 and Figure 7.4. Frazer explained that students needed to 
learn how to communicate, especially with clients within an engineering function or for 
general business. He commented about staff who are “fantastic at sitting behind a desk 
designing the voltage drop between this and this or whatever, but put them in front of a 
client they are clueless...out of their comfort zone”.  
There was strong evidence to support the core and supporting knowledge requisites 
presented in Tables 7.6 and 7.7, along with Figures 7.4 and 8.2 as, according to the 
experts, all knowledge presented was relevant towards achieving jurisdictional 
occupational outcomes. The combined phase findings to date highlights a broad and 
complex body of knowledge for the practice sub-domain of physical security which is 
characterised by a degree of abstraction in achieving protective security outcomes. 
However, some knowledge areas already have an extensive body of knowledge and 
therefore the next consideration is the scope of such knowledge in terms of novice 
higher education teaching.    
9.3.2 Depth and scope of physical security education 
The experts all agreed that new graduates were not required to be highly competent 
professionals and that they should learn the foundations of this broad knowledge base. 
Given the breadth of learning requisites all agreed that a shallow broad brush approach 
is the best for educational scope, and consistent with the premises of andragogy 
(Section 3.7) this needs to be directly focused towards the knowledge necessary to 
practice. Participants considered that students required grounding in the various subject 
areas that could be further developed later in professional practice. Peter made the 
comment that what is needed is a very high level overview, “so somebody can 
undertake a conversation and contribute to decision making”. Brad supported this 
stance, emphasising the necessity to understand the security theories and principles.  
The group strongly believed that the knowledge areas needed goal focus, teaching what 
students need to practice. For example, sitting within the risk locality within Figure 7.4 
was the knowledge category of law. Participants agreed that legal knowledge was a 
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requisite for physical security professionals, but it needed to be clearly focused. For 
instance, Garrhett made the comment that it is not necessary to know how the legal 
system works in fine detail and how to enact a law. What is needed is the ability to 
interpret legislation or regulations within the security context they are operating within. 
Nick and Frazer supported this stance, emphasising the requirement to understand 
legislation, regulations, policies and standards as a legal framework. Garrhett also 
considered criminology as an area requiring specific scope explaining that he needed to 
know what his threats are, but not necessarily the criminological basis behind that, such 
as what motivates them.  
I am not going to be able to influence that they come from a poor family or 
they have got these other mental problems. I don’t need to know any of that. 
So from my perspective understanding what makes up threat, their 
motivation and everything else, yes I need to know what makes it up, but I 
don’t need to know the in-depth of what my adversaries are...I don’t need to 
know why people are committing the crime, I don’t need to know the root 
causes, social implications and how we can treat that, I’m not interested in 
how society can treat that, as a physical security consultant I am not trying 
to change societies to help them. (Garrhett)  
Again Garrhett’s views are consistent with the reviewed andragogy literature (Section 
3.7) where Knowles (1980, p. 47) work highlighted that for adult education the focus is 
towards those subjects or topics they see the need to learn, accordant with the 
knowledge demands of the occupation or profession. An analysis of the group’s 
discussion supports the view that at the undergraduate-novice level, students need the 
broad fundamental knowledge and how it relates to achieving business objectives 
securely.  As Brad stipulated, “they need a very shallow but broad brush of basically 
everything that is on this piece of paper” (Figure 7.4).   
Nevertheless, Peter did raise the issue of older graduates, explaining that a young 
graduate is afforded reduced professional expectations than their older counterparts. 
Peter explained that somebody who already had a working history is expected to operate 
at a far higher level of professional competence. Peter’s views support the embedding of 
broader professional practice attributes within any undergraduate level program where 
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school leavers as part of their studies are given their first exposure to professional 
requirements and how to combine general attributes with core knowledge to operate at a 
professional level within the paid workforce. According to Peter those students who 
have already been working in an occupational field would be expected to be 
demonstrating these attributes in their place of employment, regardless of their graduate 
status.    
9.3.3 Organisation of physical security learning units 
The experts were also asked how these knowledge units should be organised. Responses 
supported a top down approach; Frazer stated “it should be from the top down, first of 
all you need to understand the risks you are mitigating, and then if you look at it from 
the other end (lower end) of the spectrum all you are looking at are the laws of physics”. 
Furthermore, Frazer explained that the heavier math or science may be something to 
deliver later in the course, “in the early stages students should learn the writing side, 
written communications. Then if somebody needs to pick up their knowledge in math or 
science you can guide them to do that”. Brad added that in the early stages there was the 
necessity to teach critical and logical reasoning skills as these underpin the scientific 
process (method)...“if they develop these skills they can teach themselves anything else 
that is on this paper”.  
Nick expressed the view that the structure or order of the security course and therefore 
the learning units should follow the risk management frameworks. So phase one of the 
course would look at understanding security context, then risk identification and 
analysis. Treatment would follow including theories and principles including situational 
crime prevention, CPTED and defence depth, then the treatment elements, detection, 
delay and response along with project management and other supporting practice 
knowledge requisites.  
Generally there were congruent views that the ordering or course structure of learning 
units should follow a top down approach accordant with Figure 7.4 and the risk 
management standards. For example, Figure 9.1 shows the knowledge heuristic sitting 
side-by-side the risk management framework and process from Standards Australia 
HB167 Security and Risk Management Handbook. Consistent with Figure 7.4, HB167 
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presents the diagnoses elements and process within the top section of the framework. 
Then treatment elements as options are considered at the bottom of the framework. 
Consensus supported such an approach with focus on the written communications skills 
early along with mathematics and sciences necessary for understanding the treatment 
stage of the learning units. Further learning units should be tied to professional practice 
including project management, contract management and client liaison.  
Figure 9.1 Hierarchical ordering for learning units accordant with Figure 7.4 and 
Standards Australia HB167 Security and Risk Management Handbook process 
(See Appendix M) 
 
 
Consistent with the literature informing the study the experts advocated towards the 
subject form approach in physical security education. This approach sees knowledge 
requisites segregated according with their occupational practice of diagnosis, inference 
or reasoning and treating security problems. Furthermore, more generic concepts and 
principles combine with core knowledge to form a distinct occupational network of 
relations. Such findings are consistent with Anderson and Sosniak’s (1994) work in 
terms of sequence and scope of knowledge content. This approach also sits well with 
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Bloom’s work, which according to Anderson and Sosniak (1994, p. 60) expressed that 
learning should be based on the structure of the domain being learned.                
9.3.4 Physical security higher education learning objectives 
Further supporting the subject form approach, the consensus across the group was that 
the learning objectives for physical security should relate to the distinct knowledge 
areas and how they tie to the overall goal of the sub-domain. Such views support the 
necessity for an overarching physical security course learning objective, supported by 
compartmentalised learning objectives across the subjects that make up the body of 
knowledge. Consistent with the reviewed literature this includes the knowledge of 
(cognitive), and the ability to apply (behavioural) at a fundamental level, relevant 
academic knowledge to solve protective security problems.  
Furthermore, the learning objectives appeared to follow the top down approach 
accordant with the organisation of physical security learning units (Section 9.3.3). This 
approach saw salient learning categories emerge accordant with the work of Abbott and 
Figure 7.4 (Table 9.3) in terms of the professional practice tasks of diagnosing, inferring 
about or reasoning, and treating the physical security problem. In addition, a further 
category emerged that covered knowledge requisites associated with employing 
academic knowledge to achieve client objectives in a professional setting, this category 
was labelled professional practice. Accordingly, Table 9.3 presents the relationship 
between the professional’s occupational task, its underpinning physical security 
knowledge content areas and their associated learning objectives as indicated by the 
experts.   
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Table 9.3 Relationship between the professional tasks, knowledge areas and associated 
learning objectives  
Professional 
Practice Task 
Knowledge Requisites Objectives 
Diagnosing Concept of security Understand what is denoted by the word 
security  
Law  Interpret legislation (Acts & regulations) 
Security Risk Management 
Security assessments: 
Surveys/audits/reviews  
 
 
 
Identify, analyse and evaluate security risks 
Communicate risk 
Inference Role and objectives of physical 
security 
Macro system objectives: Understand how to 
reduce opportunity, increase difficulty and 
neutralize threat 
Prevention approaches : 
Security theories: defence in 
depth, CPTED, situational crime 
prevention, zoning, protection in 
depth/layers; 
detect/delay/respond, systems 
theory  
Understand how protection can be achieved 
Comprehend physical security theories and 
principles 
Human factors in security Understand how people interact and influence 
security 
Physical security planning and 
design  
 
 
 
Understand how to develop and present a 
security management plan and concept design 
Treatment Sub-system technical knowledge Goals of sub-system components 
Electronic security sub-systems: 
Detection, access control, 
surveillance  
Understand how they: Operate (math & 
physics, electrical theory), how they are 
defeated and how long/difficult, what this 
means for planning and design, when to use 
what and why, and how to apply technical 
standards to sub-system components 
Physical sub-systems: 
Delay/difficulty 
Understand how they: Operate (math & 
physics), how they are defeated and how 
long/difficult, what this means for planning 
and design, when to use what and why, and 
how to apply technical standards to sub-system 
components 
Response:  
Procedural sub-system 
 
 
 
Understand how system components integrate 
through procedures and practices to achieve 
objectives  
Professional Practice Information analysis Be able to critically analyse information 
Business communication skills Be able to produce written reports 
Be able to present information verbally 
Design management 
Project management 
Contract management 
Understand how to plan, organize, monitor and 
communicate to achieve deliverables 
Research skills To know when to seek , and how to find 
further information 
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Table 9.3 highlights that physical security’s learning objectives relate to the knowledge 
requisites to contextualise and diagnose the security risk problem, the theories, practices 
and principles used to plan for managing the threats that pose a risk and the engineering 
knowledge requisites to design, implement and commission a protection system. Table 
9.3 also highlights that professional practice knowledge is required for graduates to 
understand how functional outcomes are achieved in the professional setting.  
9.4 Phase Four: Interpretation 
Phase Four sought to test a number of key assertions developed from the pilot study and 
respond to the question: What are the knowledge requisites and supporting learning 
objectives for physical security professionals? 
Assertion 1 of the pilot study proposed that heuristics representing the propositional 
knowledge and distinct networks of relations amongst the various theories, concepts, 
principles and practice components or elements for physical security professionals can 
be developed for enhancing reception learning. In principle, Assertion 1 was supported; 
however, the experts highlighted some limitations with the current knowledge heuristic 
(Figure 7.4), commenting that while they find it very useful, novices would have trouble 
interpreting what it actually means for physical security education. Peter explained that 
students would benefit from a flow chart that actually breaks the hierarchical system 
down (Figure 9.2). Garrhett supported this approach highlighting that in the engineering 
firms, as part of their graduate programs, they have flow charts that show how the 
program ties together and that the intentions of this study would benefit from such an 
approach.  
Therefore, the group recommended the development of a simpler flow chart that clearly 
communicated the professional knowledge task roles, their knowledge content and 
supporting learning objectives. Such views and an analysis of the focus group discourse 
led to the development of Figure 9.2 a physical security body of knowledge flow chart. 
This chart indicates how the occupational task roles and their underpinning educational 
knowledge category requisites relate to compartmentalised learning objectives, how 
they are segregated, what they encompass and how they serve the achievement of the 
broader professional outcomes post-graduation for novice learners when considered 
against a holistic course learning objective.     
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Figure 9.2 Physical security knowledge system flow chart 
 
 
 
• Concept of security
• Law 
• Security Risk Management
• Security assessments:
• Surveys/audits/reviews 
Diagnosis
• Role and objectives of physical 
security
• Prevention approaches:
• Security theories: defence in 
depth, CPTED, situational crime 
prevention, zoning, protection in 
depth/layers; 
detect/delay/respond, systems 
theory 
• Human factors in security
• Physical security planning and 
design
Inference
• Sub-system technical knowledge
• Electronic security sub-systems:
• Detection, access control, 
surveillance
• Physical sub-systems:
• Delay/difficulty
• Response:
• Procedural sub-system
Treatment
• Information analysis
• Business communication skills
• Design management
• Project management
• Contract management
• Research skills
Professional 
Practice
Understand how to 
contextualise and diagnose 
security risks for a built 
environment 
Comprehend protection 
system objectives and its goal 
and understand how to apply 
security and crime prevention 
theories and principles to 
plan the design of a 
protection system 
Be able to recommend and 
design sub-system components 
and their integration and 
manage physical protection 
system commissioning 
Understand how to employ 
academic knowledge and 
achieve client’s objectives 
in a professional setting 
Physical security professionals’ course learning objective: 
To be able to (ability) apply scientific knowledge and critical thinking techniques to diagnose physical 
security or crime prevention requirements for a risk context, and develop and communicate a systematic 
treatment plan and oversee its installation, commissioning and acceptance on behalf of their clients .  
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Assertion 2 of the pilot study proposed that a desirable knowledge system for physical 
security professionals relates to core foundational physical security and crime 
prevention knowledge along with general academic knowledge that underpins 
professional work. Accordingly, the focus group questionnaire asked participants a 
distinct question relating to the make-up of the qualitative heuristic (Figure 7.4) and 
MDS map (Figure 8.2). Findings from Phase Four support Assertion 2 and as an 
iteration found that Tables 7.6 and 7.7 along with Figures 7.4 and 8.2 represent such a 
knowledge system. The experts agreed that Figures 7.4 and 8.2 iteratively present 
compelling foundational knowledge structures. As Brad stated earlier, “the knowledge 
and skills requisites are a very shallow but a broad brush of basically everything that is 
on this piece of paper” (Figure 7.4).    
Assertion 3 of the pilot study proposed that the course learning objective and therefore 
educational goal for a physical security professional can be phrased as “an ability to 
apply scientific knowledge and critical thinking techniques to diagnose physical 
security or crime prevention requirements for a risk context, and develop a systematic 
treatment plan and communicate their evaluation to clients”. However, based on the 
expert’s views, assertion 1 was only partially supported as the experts in Phases Two 
and Four of the study highlighted the requirement for professionals to be able to project 
manage the installation, commissioning and acceptance testing of the system on behalf 
of their clients. This led to the deductive development of a broader course learning 
objective: 
To be able to (ability) apply scientific knowledge and critical thinking techniques to 
diagnose physical security or crime prevention requirements for a risk context, and 
develop and communicate a systematic treatment plan and oversee its installation, 
commissioning and acceptance on behalf of their clients.  
In addition, the experts indicated that physical security’s knowledge basis should be 
supported through subject specific knowledge requisites relating to professional practice 
roles and sub-system goals. Drawing on the works of Abbott, participants’ responses to 
the order and structure of the knowledge system and the analysis techniques of 
Spradley, this thematically related to diagnosis, inference, treatment and professional 
practice requisite knowledge. Such a structured learning curriculum is indicated in 
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Table 9.3, which highlights how the sub-domain’s knowledge structure is 
compartmentalised according to these thematic occupational roles matching with the 
subject form approach.   
Assertion 4 of the pilot study proposed that physical security education needs to include 
both a science and arts approach to include the physical and social sciences that 
underpin the higher strata tasks of the professional domain. This assertion was 
supported by the experts in Phase Four. For instance, Garrhett made the comment that 
he has observed two different types of personality in security consulting, those who 
prefer technology and those who prefer report writing.  
You’ve got people who just like technology and come from a technical side 
and you’ve got  people who prefer report writing and writing frameworks 
and management procedures and it is not just in security. It is almost like a 
different personality or trait of the individual and trying to merge them 
together into one person, it is very difficult to find someone to hire who has 
both those skills in their personality who is willing to do that. In our team 
we will basically hire technical people and we’ll hire report writers and put 
them into the same team because they need to bounce off each other’s skills. 
(Garrhett) 
Frazer supported this view explaining that report writing should be developed early on 
in the course, then as the students’ progress, introduce them to the more technical 
mathematics and physics focused subjects. This emphases the importance of 
communication in the physical security domain. Such a position is congruent with the 
organisational of physical security learning units (Section 9.3.3) discussion emphasising 
a top-down approach. There was strong support from the experts that physical security’s 
curriculum should be a combined arts and science approach where the arts approach is 
emphasised initially, throughout the teaching of risk and security theories and 
principles. This would include critical thinking skills, analysis techniques and written 
and verbal communication skills. Then as the course moves into the treatment focused 
learning units students should be exposed to the science and math underpinning 
treatment variables.        
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9.5 Phase Four: Reliability and trustworthiness 
The focus group discussion was recorded and transcribed as per the writing of Schensul, 
LeCompte, Nastasi and Borgatti (1999), enabling close and repeated analysis of the data 
for interpretation. In addition, participants were asked to write down their own learning 
objectives on note pads, which were later scanned in (Appendix I) for further analysis, 
providing a chain of research evidence. Furthermore, an independent note taker was also 
included in this phase, whose notes (Appendix J) were used for cross referencing key 
themes emerging from this phase of the study. Combined these approaches established 
trustworthiness and validity in Phase Four’s outcomes.  
Reliability of Phase Four also embedded Maxwell’s (1992, p. 283) work, where 
descriptive and interpretative validity combined provided confidence in the focus group 
analysis. For qualitative research Maxwell (1992, p. 284) explained that validity is not a 
sole product of any methodology, rather it pertains to the data accounts, or conclusions 
reached. Descriptive validity was achieved again using a narrative account of what 
participants said, supported by the typed transcripts to instill trustworthiness. Then, 
interpretative validity was again achieved through the use of participant’s own 
language, relying as much as possible on participant’s own words and concepts 
(Maxwell, 1992, p. 289).  
Furthermore, reliability and validity were broadly embedded into the mixed-methods 
design as it applied methodological triangulation using different methods and/or types 
of data to study the same research question. In this approach the strength of one method 
offset potential weakness within others (Fraenkel, Wallen & Hyun, 2012, p. 559) where 
data was continually taken back to the experts for validity of interpretation. For 
instance, experts’ opinions explaining the structural map of physical security’s body of 
knowledge was drawn on to explain and validate the structural representations towards 
articulating a shared, desirable body of knowledge within the participant sample. 
9.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented Phase Four of the study, explaining what the knowledge concept 
categories and their cultural structure (mean for the future of physical security 
education. Section 9.2 introduced Phase Four’s participants, highlighting the depth of 
physical security knowledge each member of the focus group brought to the study. Then 
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Section 9.3 presented an analysis of the focus group’s discussion. This section 
highlighted what the experts believed the desirable curriculum attributes were for future 
physical security professionals based on the individual phase findings.  Section 9.4 then 
presented an interpretation of Phase Four’s findings, responding to Phase Four’s 
research question through a series of assertions brought forward from the pilot study. 
The interpretation of Phase Four was supported by a discussion of phase reliability and 
trustworthiness in Section 9.5, and the chapter concluded in Section 9.6.  
 
Phase Four highlighted that physical security has a complex, yet abstractly structured 
system of knowledge. This system is made up of discrete knowledge concept categories 
and supporting professional level skills which combine with other knowledge requisites 
to produce the sub-domain of physical security’s work. Each core knowledge category 
has its own body of knowledge, underpinned by a structured model of learning or 
scientific basis which must be learned by novices as it provides the academic basis for 
the sub-domain’s knowledge system. Such knowledge is organised accordant with 
professional role tasks including diagnosing, reasoning about or inferring, and treating 
society’s protective security problems and is supported by discrete learning objectives 
which are tied to a broader sub-domain learning objective. Such learning objectives 
represent what is desirable for graduates to know prior to graduating and recognise that 
deeper learning occurs during professional development post-graduation.      
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Chapter 10: Study interpretation, limitations and recommendations 
10.1 Introduction 
The study sought to conceptualise the knowledge requisites and their cultural structure 
for the emerging profession of physical security. Such concept reduction was achieved 
through a series of iterations embedded into distinct research phases. This chapter 
presents an interpretation of the study (Section 10.2), presenting a response to the 
study’s overarching research question, supported by individual phase outcomes Section 
10.3 then links the study’s finding to its research objectives set in Chapter 1 (Section 
1.6). This section is supported in Section 10.4 through a discussion of the study’s 
findings and explaining their significance for security professionalism. The chapter also 
presents, in Section 10.5, a number of research limitations that may have had an impact 
on the findings across the various phases.  
The chapter also discusses reliability and validity (Section 10.6) across the study, 
presenting measures embedded into each phase to increase the value and 
generalizability of findings. Section 10.7 then presents future research recommendations 
including the need for research into a consensual language base for security and also the 
need for further body of knowledge research to provide cross cultural replication for the 
study’s findings. Also discussed is the necessity for a comparative analysis of physical 
security course curriculum and this study’s findings to overcome inconsistencies to 
produce a more mature knowledge system. Outcomes of this study suggest that the 
recognition of physical security as a specific jurisdictional occupational category for 
security professionals should be supported. The chapter and study then concludes with 
Section 10.8.         
10.2 Interpretation of the study 
The study was developed to overcome the dearth of knowledge pertaining to physical 
security as a sub-domain practice area or cultural paradigm within the professional 
sector of security’s occupational stratum. Through a review of pertinent literature 
physical security as a distinct sub-domain was acknowledged as a jurisdictional practice 
area within the broader security domain (Section 3.3). Yet little research has been 
undertaken to highlight the knowledge requisites, how they should be communicated 
structurally and their supporting learning objectives to produce a group of persons in 
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command of a dependable body of knowledge to solve society’s protective security 
problems.  
10.2.1 Overarching research question and study outcomes 
The study’s design and methodology, through a series of phase research questions, 
sought to respond to the question: What is a desirable knowledge system (body of 
knowledge) for physical security professionals as conveyed through the published 
literature and accessible professionals? 
In response to the study’s research question findings support that a desirable knowledge 
system for physical security professionals relates to core foundational physical security 
and crime prevention knowledge (as listed in Tables 7.6 & 7.7 and Figures 7.4 and 8.2) 
braced by general academic attributes that underpin professional work. Congruent with 
Abbott’s (1988) work, these tables and figures present a complex, abstract, yet 
systemised body of knowledge. This body of knowledge comprises individual 
categories of knowledge which are interdependent yet interrelated with all other 
categories related to the cover term security. Each category has its own distinct body of 
literature that when combined facilitates the physical security sub-domain’s work.  
The study’s overarching research question sought to develop a shared paradigm for the 
cultural domain of physical security. The study found that a physical security 
professional’s body of knowledge is made up of categories of knowledge associated 
with diagnosing the security or crime problem, core security theories and principles to 
plan and design a protection strategy (inference). It also includes engineering or more 
technically focused knowledge to design a treatment system, including product selection 
along with other professional knowledge to undertake the project through to 
completion. Such professional knowledge includes professional liaison and project 
management requisites. This combined knowledge system enables physical security 
professionals to liaise and coordinate with other professionals and specialists to achieve 
the security outcome. Consistent with Figure 10.1 this includes liaising with architects, 
planners and engineers, along with occupational security providers (See Table 1.2) to 
achieve their work goals (Figure 10.1). As Abbott (1988, p. 8) asserted, for 
professionals the techniques themselves may be delegated to other workers, and it is this 
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delegation which, accordant with Abbott’s (1988, p. 9) views, makes the physical 
security professional a professional.  
Figure 10.1 Physical security professional’s liaison and coordinating roles with other 
professionals and specialists to achieve security outcomes 
 
Figure 10.1 indicates that the body of knowledge for a physical security professional is 
that which facilitates the achievement of the treatment system including the linking 
together of various stakeholders to achieve the security solution, but not its ongoing 
operational management. The operational management would be considered the role of 
security management (See Chapter 3). This interpretation of physical security’s 
knowledge system is congruent with the reviewed literature informing the study 
(Chapters 2 & 3) and specifically Abbott’s (1988) work which stated that “only a 
knowledge system governed by abstraction can redefine its problems and tasks, defend 
them from interlopers, and seize new problems…Abstraction enables survival in the 
competitive system of professionals (p. 9). 
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10.2.2 Individual study phase research questions  
By means of a constructivist design, the combined research phase sub-questions and 
their supporting objectives sought to sequentially build knowledge to facilitate a 
response the study’s overarching research question. 
10.2.2.1 Phase One: Knowledge category exploration 
Phase One of the study was the initial exploratory phase and extracted the salient 
knowledge concept categories from physical security and non-traditional (general) 
security’s printed domain to respond to the question: What are the explicit knowledge 
concept categories for physical security represented as repeated themes printed in 
security texts and their structure?  
A response to this question saw the development of Table 6.18 presenting Phase One’s 
salient knowledge concept categories. This included both core physical security and 
some supporting professional enabling knowledge categories.  
This phase also sought to develop an initial ethnographic structural table representing a 
folk taxonomy as a form of spatial knowledge indicating cultural structure to be used 
for the development of a knowledge domain heuristic. This aspect of the study drew on 
the work of Spradley (1979), incorporating his ethnographic analysis technique which 
displays the relationships among all concept categories in a domain, illuminating 
subsets and the way these subsets are related to the domain as a whole. For this study 
such analysis revealed internal, local structure that is often tacitly below the surface 
within a culture.  
Therefore, a response to Phase One’s research question also saw the development of 
Table 6.19 and Figure 6.2 presenting a first iteration systematic knowledge structure for 
the sub-domain of physical security organised based on a single semantic relationship 
with the cover term security.  
Phase One highlighted that physical security, and security more generally, does have a 
broad albeit dispersed, knowledge corpus and cultural structure. However, this 
knowledge base lacks both unanimity and does not link to clear educational outcomes 
with only one reviewed text - Security science: The theory and practice of security 
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(Smith & Brooks, 2013) - having clear chapter outcomes that could be considered 
educational objectives. This text presented a clear intent, “to help facilitate regularity 
and internal consistency within the knowledge domain of security science by bringing 
theories and principles from other disciplines into the security domain’s knowledge 
corpus”.  However, while each chapter in the book clearly outlines an objective or set of 
objectives for security professionals or students, these objectives relate only to that topic 
included within that chapter. There is no single overarching set of educational 
objectives for the entire text. Consequently, Phase One presented the first step in this 
research endeavour to link physical security knowledge, its structure and supporting 
learning objectives to an overarching learning goal or objective as a system within a 
clear jurisdictional context.  
10.2.2.2 Phase Two: Knowledge category expert enrichment 
Phase Two of the study was an additional exploratory phase aimed to enhance the 
knowledge category corpus (Table 6.18) and further develop the folk taxonomy and 
(Table 6.19) shared knowledge heuristic (Figure 6.2). Through semi-structured 
interviews, this phase drew on security experts as constructors of knowledge (Section 
4.3), to respond to the question: What are the implicit knowledge categories, and 
instinctive structure by security experts in achieving physical security risk mitigation 
not extracted from the literature? 
The methodology and procedure for this phase stemmed from the work of Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison (2000, p. 267) who emphasised that knowledge is often generated 
between people through conversation and Spradley (1979, pp. 138-142) who advocated 
the use of structural questions to elicit the relationship among parts of a culture and their 
relationship with the whole.  
Phase Two saw the experts identify an additional 43 knowledge concept categories, to 
produce Table 7.5, covering knowledge that graduates would benefit from an 
understanding of prior to commencing their professional apprenticeships. A response to 
Phase two’s research question resulted in the expert’s additional knowledge categories 
being combined with Phase One’s findings. This analysis produced Phase Two’s 
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enhanced knowledge concept category taxonomy (Table 7.6), resulting in 98 desired 
knowledge areas for graduate physical security professionals to be abreast of.  
The experts also provided opinion on the structure of the knowledge base, guiding the 
placement of more ambiguous categories within the folk taxonomy and its supporting 
heuristic and embedding a confidence level towards Phase One’s outcomes.  
A response to Phase Two’s research question saw the re-development of the folk 
taxonomy reflecting the expert’s opinions, which, through the analytical procedures of 
Spradley (1979), led to the development of Table 7.7 a hierarchical folk taxonomy. This 
then led to the development of Figure 7.4, Phase Two’s physical security knowledge 
heuristic. An analysis of Figure 7.4 highlights that from a qualitative standpoint 
physical security’s professional knowledge requisites range from the diagnosis of 
security concerns (diagnosis), through to planning and designing security solutions 
(inference), through to the commissioning of  these physical security solutions 
(treatment). This core knowledge is braced by professional enabling knowledge such as 
communication. As the experts noted, and is highlighted in Figure 7.4, there is a clear 
need for physical security professionals to understand the entire physical security 
process. 
Phase Two of the study also saw the experts highlight that the division of labour 
diagram (Figure 1.1) for physical security professionals must represent the parallel 
professional engagement required to achieve large security projects where physical 
security professionals must sit alongside other professionals, including architects and 
engineers and so on to fulfil the client’s requirements. According to the experts, a body 
of knowledge for a physical security professional must include a holistic knowledge 
basis that embraces a combined arts and sciences approach as the professional must 
understand the science which underpins the engineering solution as well as the social 
sciences illume the problem.    
10.2.2.3 Phase Three: MDS knowledge description 
Phase Three sought to overcome some of the limitations in Phase Two’s qualitative 
analysis by representing prominent concept categories in n-dimensional space. A 
limitation identified in Phase Two was the subjectivity and difficulty in locating 
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spatially some concept categories in relation to other categories. As John stated in his 
interview, “not all relations between concepts will be linear”. This phase of the study 
uncovered the psychometric structure of physical security’s knowledge base in response 
to the question: What is physical security’s knowledge content structure as measured by 
multidimensional scaling? 
To respond to Phase Three’s research question significant concept reduction was 
required as it was acknowledged that all 98 knowledge concept categories couldn’t be 
subjected to an MDS analysis. Accordingly, drawing on the folk taxonomy as a guide 
(Table 7.7) core and some subordinate concept categories were extracted to produce 
Table 8.5, registering 24 salient physical security knowledge categories to be subjected 
to MDS analysis.  
In response to Phase Three’s research question Figures 8.2 (MDS clusters) and 8.3 
(MDS dimensional orderings) were developed. Figure 8.2 highlighted that the 
knowledge basis for physical security is organised based on similarity grouping of 
requisite knowledge for producing the profession’s work. For instance, Cluster One 
(Figure 8.2) related to knowledge used to diagnose and reason about (inference) the 
security problem. Cluster Two co-located knowledge associated with the physical 
retardation of an adversary’s progression, to delay their attack’s headway for a period of 
time. Then Figure 8.3 indicated some congruence with dimensional analysis, locating 
those knowledge categories associated with treatment high on the treatment scale. 
However, this was not as clear for diagnosis, with those knowledge categories clustered 
in the centre. Nonetheless, Figure 8.2 provided a degree of validation for Figure 7.4, 
showing similar clusters of knowledge in n-dimensional space as those co-located in 
Figure 7.4. The similarity between the two Figures indicates congruent validity for the 
different phase outcomes.  
A comparative analysis of Figure 7.4 and 8.2 suggests that physical security’s 
knowledge structure relates to clusters of similar or highly related categories of 
knowledge associated with diagnosis the security problem, reasoning or inferring about 
it about it to produce a conceptual plan to treat the problem, and engineering or 
technical knowledge required to achieve a functional solution on behalf of the client. 
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This core knowledge is braced by more general professional practice knowledge used to 
produce the profession’s work.             
10.2.2.4 Phase Four: Physical security’s knowledge evaluation 
Phase Four of the study sought to understand this uncovered knowledge for physical 
security from an educational perspective, and sought to respond to the question: What 
are the knowledge requisites and supporting learning objectives for physical security 
professionals?  
A response to Phase Four’s research question supported a subject form approach for 
physical security education, tied to an overarching learning objective (Figure 9.2) as a 
systemised educational program. Phase Four indicated that physical security education 
should relate to the distinct knowledge areas that combine to achieve the profession’s 
work and how they tie together. The experts expressed that a curriculum for physical 
security should be organized and taught in subject form as a combined arts and sciences 
underpinning, from a top down approach. Such organisation in subject form should 
include the knowledge required to diagnose the security problem, covering subjects 
including the concept of security, the law as it relates to pursuing security and security 
risk management. Such subjects should be supported by learning objectives that 
emphasize an understanding or ability to undertake diagnosis of the problem and 
communicate their diagnosis to their client.  
The experts also articulated that following risk, professional inference knowledge 
should be taught which relates to core security and security planning theories and 
principles that facilitate a conceptual solution to the security problem. Supporting this 
knowledge were key learning objectives relating to the macro-system objectives 
(treatment), understanding how people interact with security and how to develop and 
present a security management plan. The group emphasised that hierarchically this 
knowledge would predominately follow an arts approach. Then, once students have the 
foundational knowledge they should be presented with the more technical engineering 
knowledge that teaches them how to produce the treatment system. This knowledge 
would include the mathematics and physics underpinning the engineering tools, devices 
and systems used to achieve a functional state of security. The experts conveyed that 
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this part of the curriculum would follow a sciences approach and supported by clear 
learning objectives which demonstrate academic understanding of the subject matter. 
The group also highlighted the necessity of introducing at later stages students to the 
foundational knowledge required for professional practice such as project management. 
They also recognised that some academic knowledge skill sets should be embedded into 
all categories of requisite knowledge teachings. These included general academic 
attributes such as critical analysis skills along with communications skills both written 
and verbal. Phase Four supported both the knowledge requisites as those communicated 
through Figures 7.3 and 8.2 of the study, and that the teaching of subjects should follow 
a systemised structure from diagnosis to treatment along with professional practice to 
form a curriculum template for higher education in the area of physical security.    
10.2.2.5 Phase Four: Test of pilot study assertions 
Phase Four highlighted how knowledge was built on the basis of previous knowledge 
across the distinct phases within the study. Phase Four also provided the ability to test a 
number of key assertions developed from the pilot study. 
Assertion One, that heuristics (Figures 7.4, 8.2 and 8.3) representing the propositional 
knowledge and distinct networks of relations amongst the various theories, concepts, 
principles and practice components or elements for physical security professionals can 
be developed for enhancing reception learning, was supported by the focus group 
experts. A number of experts did, however, express the desire for a simpler flow chart 
connecting the professional task roles, knowledge requisites and supporting learning 
objectives. This request consequently led to the development of Figure 9.2 a flow chart 
of physical security’s knowledge system. Nonetheless, all focus group participants 
supported the ability and suitability of the knowledge heuristic to display the knowledge 
requisites and its internal structure for the domain of physical security.   
Assertion Two considered that a desirable knowledge system for physical security 
professionals relates to core foundational physical security and crime prevention 
knowledge (as listed in Tables 7.6 & 7.7 and Figures 7.4 and 8.2) braced by general 
academic attributes that underpin professional work. Assertion Two was supported by 
the focus groups participants.  
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Assertion Three expressed that the course learning objective and therefore educational 
goal for a physical security professional can be represented as: “an ability to apply 
scientific knowledge and critical thinking techniques to diagnose physical security or 
crime prevention requirements for a risk context, and develop a systematic treatment 
plan and communicate their evaluation to clients”. The principles within this assertion 
were supported; however, minor changes were required to reflect the views of the 
experts throughout the study. Findings support that a more holistic learning objective 
would include that professionals need the ability to oversee, or project manage, the 
achievement of the treatment system. Consequently, the course learning objective was 
changed to reflect this view:  
To be able to (ability) apply scientific knowledge and critical thinking techniques to 
diagnose physical security or crime prevention requirements for a risk context, and 
develop and communicate a systematic treatment plan and oversee its installation, 
commissioning and acceptance on behalf of their clients. 
Assertion Four expressed the view that physical security education needs to include 
both a science- and arts-based approach to include the physical and social sciences that 
underpin the higher strata tasks of the professional domain. Assertion Four was well 
supported across the group, with all experts emphasising such a required approach for 
higher education.   
10.3 Study objectives 
The study met a number of research objectives (Section 1.6). Firstly, through a 
constructive process it developed a first iteration consensual knowledge map (Figure 
7.4) presenting the organisational structure of the physical security domain’s broad 
knowledge concepts. This map can act as a domain heuristic for articulating the 
occupational role concept knowledge areas and their supporting knowledge basis within 
physical security’s body of knowledge. In addition, through Figures 7.4 and 8.2 the 
study provides visual clarity for security practitioners and professionals to understand 
where their individual expertise fits into the physical security domain within a holistic 
systems approach. It also provides the means of explicitly presenting the hierarchical 
knowledge areas and their subordinate concepts of physical security to tertiary students 
towards enhancing their efficiency of learning (reception learning).  
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For educators the findings of Phase Four also highlight desirable learning objectives for 
future physical security professionals, showing a direct link between that to be learned 
and its fit with professional practice. The study highlights a broader desired learning 
objective as a first iteration, supported by subject specific professional competencies for 
physical security educators in institutions of higher learning to draw on in their 
curriculum planning. As Kevin stated in the pilot study, “there must be a direct link 
between the knowledge requisites, the curriculum and the intended work”. 
10.4 The significance of codified knowledge for security professionalisation 
Many new professions are emerging across contemporary society, but their emergence 
and eventual social designation as professional occupational groups is both a 
challenging and extensive undertaking. Emerging professional domains must 
convincingly uncover their knowledge base to persuade the public and legal arenas of 
its complexity and necessity to be a product of higher education along with the requisite 
for it to be recognised in the group phenomenon as a profession.  
Social recognition of a profession is tied to many sociological facets, including the 
degree of consensus or sharing of beliefs pertaining to theory, methodology, techniques 
and problems as these elements represent the very essence of any established 
professional paradigm or cultural domain (Lodahl & Gordon, 1972). As Zipser (1991, p. 
1) points out, professional work is judged according to the standards of a reasonably 
competent qualified person holding that skill. Accordingly, for professionalisation, a 
key element in any paradigm’s maturity is the degree of consensus in its application of 
theory, methodology and techniques underpinned by its content and structure (Lodahl & 
Gordon, 1972, p. 66). Consequently, the work of Lodahl and Gordon (1972, p. 66) 
highlighted that more developed paradigms have more structure and thus more 
predictability than fields with less developed paradigms, with structural maturity related 
to their professional maturity. Physical security as a cultural paradigm is relatively 
unevolved when compared to more traditional academic fields such as physics. The 
indication to date suggests that security and more specifically physical security is 
therefore a long way from becoming formally recognized as a profession.  
From a structural standpoint much of the security domain within the law and order 
paradigm (non-traditional) resides at the operational end of security’s occupational 
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stratum (Figures 1.1 & 10.1), with diminutive recognition for the professional category 
membership or understanding of occupational role. Central to security’s emergence and 
acceptance by both the public and legal arenas for the higher end of the occupational 
stratum as a profession is its evidence of a valid body of abstract knowledge that 
requires formal education through institutions of higher learning. As Axt (2002, p. 142) 
notes, it is not those within the security industry to decide if security is a profession, but 
the beneficiaries and consumers (public). To achieve such recognition evidence must 
support that as with other professional occupations, security requires the employment of 
a dedicated body of structured knowledge underpinned by core academic skills requisite 
of the higher educational system.  
Griffiths, Brooks and Corkill (2011, p. 2) expressed that for professional security 
knowledge to be useful it must be clear in terms of its practices. ASIS divides the non-
traditional security domain within the law and order paradigm into four distinct 
disciplines: physical security, information security, personnel security and information 
security (Horrocks, 2001, p. 218). However, Talbot and Jakeman (2009, p. 55) consider 
security management as an additional, yet distinct overlapping discipline area, and refer 
to these as practice areas. Physical security is recognised by many authors (Section 3.1) 
and experts (Chapter 6) as a clear, distinct jurisdictional knowledge area. However, 
reasonable questions remain, is physical security a distinct sub-domain requiring its 
own knowledge base? Can those focusing in this jurisdictional area be considered 
professionals? Johnston and Warner (2014) allude to the view that it isn’t, but has the 
potential to be.  
Based on the literature informing the study (Chapters 2 & 3), for physical security to be 
a profession there must be a clear academic base (Horrocks, 2001), one of a complex, 
abstract nature (Abbott, 1988); that is built on a transmittable body of knowledge 
(Horrocks, 2001, p. 220) representing content and structure. According to Horrocks 
(2001, p. 224) this provides the mechanisms by which the body of knowledge is 
reviewed, refined and developed. The Hallcrest report on private security and police in 
America acknowledged that security constitutes a specialised area of knowledge, but 
this knowledge base is unclear and requires substantial research. If we accept that, 
consistent with the reviewed literature, physical security is an area of specialized 
practice, then it must have a codified knowledge base that can be generalised and 
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transmitted. The Australian Interim Security Professional’s Task Force (2008) states 
that those considered to be security professionals are required to take responsibility for 
security projects in the far-reaching sense. However, there is a lack of understanding in 
terms of knowledge and competencies required for such persons (p. 4).  
Sennewald (2013, p. 7) stated that “in the security consulting sphere security 
professionals engage in a process, a problem solving process, in which the consultant 
must first identify the problem(s), gather available data pertaining to the problem(s), 
analyse that data, and then offer advice in the form of recommendations that will solve, 
cure or otherwise minimize the problem(s)”. These views highlight that if physical 
security is to be recognised in the group phenomenon as a clear jurisdictional sub-
domain, then it must be supported by an academic basis and associated competencies 
that directly align to the group’s work, that are transmitted to novices through the higher 
educational fraternity. Higher education bears the primary responsibility for the 
development of human resources in all fields, and accordingly, security is no exception 
(Rogers, Palmgren, Giever & Garcia, 2007, p. 1).   
The knowledge based view underpinning professionalism resonates within the literature 
of professionalism (Section 2.3). Accordingly, focused security knowledge can be 
developed from security concepts (Smith, 2002). A way of exploring this knowledge 
base is to understand the knowledge concepts through the detection of repeated themes 
within the sub-domain and broader domain, categorising it based on similarity and 
contrast and organising it hierarchically (Section 1.8) to produce a structure. Formal 
structure provides the means for understanding knowledge requisites in relation to work 
goals, the ordering of knowledge in education for building understanding and 
reinforcement, and competencies to take into professional apprenticeships post-
graduation from institutions of higher learning.  
Prior to the findings of this study, physical security could be located optimistically in its 
pre-paradigmatic stage at best, lacking explicit consensus in its jurisdictional distinction 
of roles, its articulation of theory, methodology and underpinning knowledge basis. 
Consequently this study sought to overcome the lack of evidence in the literature 
regarding physical security knowledge and structure required to be taught by institutions 
of higher learning and mastered by professionals.  
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The investigation was undertaken through a cultural domain analysis. This investigated 
the content and structure of the physical security sub-domain that sat subordinate to the 
cover term security. This was necessary for security to move along the 
professionalisation path within the jurisdictional area of physical security. Informed by 
a significant breadth and depth of literature the study did not seek a perfect solution, to 
the question to the study’s overarching research question. Instead it sought a first 
iteration desirable body of knowledge for future security professionals.  
The study developed a folk taxonomic table (Table 7.7) representing the cultural 
domain of physical security, which led to the development of Figure 7.4, representing 
content along with its local relations as a knowledge heuristic. Such taxonomies are not 
static, they are dynamic and with further focused research they will change, but as Cliff 
said (Chapter 5), “you have to start somewhere”. The study therefore produced a first 
iteration knowledge corpus (Table 7.6) and heuristic structure (Figure 7.4). This 
hierarchical structure was supported by psychometric maps (Figures 8.2 & 8.3) which 
help communicate what makes up the complex abstract knowledge base for physical 
security. The ethnographic table (Table 7.7) and heuristic tool (Figure 7.4) along with 
psychometric maps (Figures 8.2 & 8.3) provide an initial body of knowledge indicating 
the content and structure for the physical security sub-domain.  
The study’s outcomes exemplified a medical model for understanding physical security 
knowledge content and structure. The adoption of a medical model for understanding 
security’s body of knowledge is not a unique approach when considering security 
within the non-traditional-crime prevention paradigm. For instance, Lab (2014, p. 28) 
described crime prevention in terms of a public health model where prevention 
strategies are classified as primary, secondary or tertiary. Lab notes that crime science 
fits well within the public health prevention model, and therefore the use of a health 
model of professional practice for understanding physical security’s knowledge 
structure is logical.    
Such an outcome has important significance for physical security professionalism and 
education. Firstly, professions require a high degree of standardized educational criteria, 
as students require the requisite knowledge to practice upon graduation, and this 
requires uniform educational standards. Furthermore, this must include a broad working 
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knowledge of the entire spectrum of professional practice (Fox, 1994, p. 203). 
Wilensky’s (1964, p. 138) influential work emphasised this point, explaining that the 
success or claim for professional standing is greatest where the society evidences strong 
wide spread consensus regarding the knowledge or doctrine to be applied.  
Professional knowledge standardization involves the substance, or more formally, the 
stored information, which is the body of accepted knowledge in a field, with the 
objective to cover all of the profession’s important content (Lodahl & Gordon, 1972, 
pp. 61-62). In addition, enhanced learning occurs through understanding the structure of 
knowledge within the context of the professional field (Finley, Nam & Oughton, 2011). 
From an educational standpoint All, Huycke and Fisher (2003) explained that the ability 
to put information together in meaningful ways improves both retention and 
understanding. For retention purposes the storage of information in a manner which 
facilitates meaning, and therefore practice, is a cognitive process. Remembrance is 
enhanced by encoding information from short term memory into long term memory. 
Such encoding is reinforced by cognitively constructing concepts, propositions, schema 
and visual images, promoting meaningful learning. Accordingly, Tables 7.6, 7.7 along 
with Figures 7.4 and 8.2 present an initial body of knowledge for the physical security 
sub-domain representing knowledge requisites and epistemological structure that can be 
standardised and taught across a diverse range of institutions of higher learning, with 
teaching organised based on their structural principles consistent with Figure 9.2.  
Figure 9.2 provides clear direction for understanding how knowledge requisites and 
their structure directly relate to the jurisdictional work of this emerging profession. This 
provides clarity for both students to understand how knowledge requisites relate to their 
future employment and helps educators plan course materials, learning sequences and 
competency assessments. According to All, Huycke and Fisher (2003, p. 312) when 
methods of meaningful learning are used, students and teachers report increased ability 
to retain knowledge over time and find ways to connect new information with more 
general previously learned materials. Key factors associated with meaningful learning 
includes: 1) assimilation of new concepts and propositions into existing cognitive 
structures, 2) knowledge organised hierarchically in cognitive structures, and 3) 
subsumption of concepts and propositions into existing hierarchies. Meaningful learning 
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occurs when the learner begins to understand the similarities and differences 
(dissimilarities) in concepts and ideas.  
The background significance of the study (Section 1.6) highlighted that evidence based 
research will play an important role in the professionalisation of security. This discourse 
articulated that professionals must have the requisite knowledge learned through 
training in the arts or science, or both, and supported by clear learning objectives 
commensurate with their area of foci to produce higher strata work. The study produced 
codified representations of cultural knowledge which include the salient important 
content for the sub-domain of physical security (Table 7.6), along with both local 
connections (Figure 7.4) and macro structure (Figure 8.2) as tools for understanding 
knowledge concept categories and their relations with other categories, separated based 
on similarity and differences.  
The development and use of structural tools for enhancing learning in an academic 
domain are supported in the work of Gonzalvo, Canas and Bajo (1994, p. 601), who 
highlighted that research supports the differences between expert’s and novice’s 
representations of knowledge. However, as novice learners study a discipline their 
knowledge of structural arrangements becomes more consistent with the experts 
(Gonzalvo, Canas and Bajo (1994). Therefore presenting the knowledge structure 
(presented learning) rather than requiring students to discover it over time is a more 
efficient means of knowledge transfer (Ausubel, Novak & Hanesian, 1978, p. 26). The 
outcomes of the study therefore significantly contribute to the professionalisation of 
security education. The study’s outcomes offer the means to build consensus and 
ultimately standardise security curriculum, and enhanced instructional means, resulting 
in stronger confidence in graduate’s abilities to undertake their professional roles in a 
competent and professional manner. 
Furthermore, in developing standardised education such structures can be used as 
planning maps to reveal curriculum, course and lesson planning and provide in depth 
study guides for learners (All, Huycke and Fisher, 2003, p. 313). Adult learners have the 
potential to be self-directed, therefore an important teaching task is to develop 
connections between the abstract world of concepts with the real world of experience to 
facilitate such learning (Gitterman, 2004, p. 96). The study findings therefore enhance 
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the security domain’s ability to communicate to society the depth and complexity of 
physical security’s knowledge base, as well as develop structural representations of this 
knowledge to enhance reception learning for novices and provide planning tools for 
security educators.      
There is a vast body of literature supporting the requirement for emerging professions to 
provide such a detailed description of their knowledge base. Such a body of knowledge 
must cover the important subject matter of the domain. This may be in taxonomic 
structure or some other form that enables understanding of the areas of knowledge, tied 
to its jurisdictional work. Security if it is going to emerge as a recognised profession 
must embrace this literature and pursue its knowledge base through targeted research. 
As only once the higher end of the security stratum can demonstrate through research 
and practice the necessity of a formal knowledge system, what this includes (content) 
and associated competency assurances can a case be made for regulation of the industry 
to exclude those who do not possess evidence of such learning. Such a body of 
knowledge as uncovered in this study must be that which can be standardized and 
accepted across pertinent institutions of higher learning. Only then can security progress 
through the professionalisation process and eventually emerge as an accepted 
profession. Therefore the findings of this study significantly contribute to physical 
security’s professional journey, although they must be accepted cognisant of various 
research limitations.   
10.5 Limitations of the study  
It is important to note the methodological limitations of this research. These include the 
lack of clear definitions of security terminology, a limited understanding of what 
constitutes a security professional, small sample sizes in terms of research participants 
and reviewed texts and the use of deductive analysis by the researcher. Despite this, 
measures and considerations were taken to ensure the reliability and validity of research 
results. 
10.5.1 The modern day physical security professional 
There is limited understanding of the modern day physical security professional. As the 
literature informing the study (Section 2.2) highlighted, the very concept of security 
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lacks agreed definition and this lack of clarity permeates through the occupational 
stratum of security. Manunta (1999) pointed out this is due to the concept of security 
meaning different things to different people. Therefore, the study focused on what is 
denoted by the word security to understand its cover term and professional context 
instead of providing a singular agreed definition to guide the research outcomes. An 
analysis of this literature led to the premise that security denotes protection from 
adverse effects of threat, where functionally it is the pursuit of such protection.  
The study then contextualised this understanding to the practice area of physical 
security, articulated as activities directed towards the diagnosis, inference and treatment 
system of security or loss coupled risk concerns manifested through unlawful access or 
crime enablers, or both. Physical security aims to implement control measures in a 
delineated environment to mitigate risk associated with an expressed threat (Section 
3.3). Combined the expression of what is denoted by the word security and the 
designation of physical security as a distinct practice area guided the selection of 
experts. In the absence of clear articulation of what constitutes a physical security 
professional the inductive and deductive analysis underpinning such phraseology and 
the selection of experts based on such articulations may have negatively impacted the 
findings of the study with regards to responder bias, and this must be acknowledged as a 
potential limitation within the study.  
10.5.2 Language 
The use of language within the study, specifically the use of security terms, has a degree 
of subjectivity and must therefore be acknowledged as a limitation within the study. 
Security lacks precise language (Manunta, 1999) and as such clear definitions of 
extracted terms limit the findings of the study. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged 
that in the early days of research we need to know first what it is we seek to define. 
Brooks (2008, p. 154) acknowledged this issue also in his study of the knowledge 
domain of security risk management. Brooks made the point that his study did not 
attempt to provide precise concept definition thus allowing the experts to define their 
own understanding through relationship of concepts or knowledge structure. 
Accordingly, the findings of the study present knowledge concept categories and areas 
P a g e  | 351 
 
suitable for further research including clear operational definitions congruent with the 
context of the security domain.   
10.5.3 Data corpus 
The data corpus for Phase One of the study was limited to 15 published security texts. It 
must be acknowledged that this is a small printed sample and did not include journal 
published papers. However, arguably 15 texts do represent a sound sample for the 
detection of repeated themes when considered from the annotated bibliographic intent 
of these texts. As intended by the methodology, this provided an initial data corpus for 
cuing experts’ stored implicit knowledge towards identifying additional knowledge 
concept categories and supporting content which they believe, on the basis of their 
experience, are important knowledge requisites for security graduates when 
commencing their professional apprenticeships. While the data corpus was small, it was 
focused and captured salient themes that were supported by the experts.    
10.5.4 Expert sample 
Experts were drawn on to provide both raw data and also verify the findings or 
interpretations (member checking) at various stages in the study. However, the sample 
size for each phase could have been larger to improve the findings and the ability to 
generalise these findings. Each sample group within the study introduced a potential 
bias and degree of error into the study’s findings. This was of note in Phase Three of the 
study (MDS analysis) where sample limitations meant only 29 complete surveys were 
analysed due to incomplete questionnaires and poor participation. However, Phase 
Three provided a confidence analysis between the qualitative concept map (heuristic) 
(Figure 7.4) and MDS clusters (Figure 8.2) where this analysis supported the structures 
found in Phase Two and Three with a high degree of similarity in graphical outcomes. 
Nonetheless, findings must be considered in relation to the relatively small participant 
sample sizes within the study’s phases.      
10.5.5 Deductive analysis 
The ethnographic approach required a degree of deductive analysis without the aid of 
mathematical relations. Such analysis is not without its biases and errors. A comparative 
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analysis between the deductive analysis structure (Figure 7.4) and MDS analysis 
(Figure 8.2) indicated a degree of concordance, with similar concepts clustered together 
across both graphical representations. However, there was still a degree of subjectivity 
within the ethnographic analysis which must be acknowledged.  
10.6 Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity of the bibliographic extraction stemmed from the use of 
published in-print text books as the data corpus which according to Silverman (2002, p. 
229) are, in principle, reliable sources for analysis (Silverman, 2002, p. 229). In 
addition, the software program NVIVO9 was used to enhance the validity of the count 
analysis, producing an objective calculation of word occurrences and providing 
objective knowledge concept categories external from the researcher (Liamputtong & 
Ezzy, 2006, p. 274). In addition, this data extraction and knowledge structure was tested 
through expert interviews providing an additional degree of validation (Appendix D).  
Reliability and validity associated with qualitative data derived from interviews and 
focus groups was achieved through both descriptive and interpretative validity 
techniques embedded into the interview analysis process, an approach which stemmed 
from Maxwell’s (1992, p. 283) work. Descriptive validity was established through the 
use of a narrative approach which included using participant’s responses (Appendix K) 
to interview questions as quotes in text. This also led to interpretative validity as 
conclusions drawn relied as much as possible, on participant’s own words and concepts 
(Maxwell, 1992, p. 289). In addition, where possible outcomes were taken to other 
participants within the study providing a degree of verification through member 
checking (Creswell & Miller, 2000). 
Further, all interviews and focus group discussions were transcribed verbatim and 
included in the study’s appendices for reference (Appendix K, L), thus providing 
trustworthiness and validity. The transcription of all interviews and focus groups 
enabled close and repeated analysis of the data (Schensul, LeCompte, Nastasi & 
Borgatti, 1999). 
The focus group validity in the principle was also enhanced through the use of an 
independent note taker, who recorded salient points for later analysis (Appendix F). In 
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addition, participants were asked to write down their learning objectives on note pads 
provided which were later scanned in (Appendix I) for further analysis, forming a chain 
of research evidence. Combined this approach established trustworthiness and validity 
for the focus groups outcomes.  
Validity of the MDS analysis included an assessment of the covariance between 
extracted concepts from the concept reduction process (Table 8.5) and the underlying 
construct of Physical security, providing a validity assessment of the MDS source data. 
For the principal study Cronbach’s Alpha produced a high (α = .913) value, indicating 
sound reliability and validity for Phase Three survey questionnaire knowledge concept 
categories. This was slightly lower than the pilot study measure (α = .945), perhaps due 
to a larger number of concepts analyzed in the pilot study. Reliability was demonstrated 
through the goodness-of-fit. This was evaluated according to Kruskal’s Stress formula 1 
and the Squared Correlations. The data presented a Stress score of 0.24399 and an RSQ 
of .70566 (Squared correlations in distances), which according to the MDS Stress 
measure, not all concepts were in their ideal spatial locality. Nevertheless, a stress score 
of 0.24399 is well within the 0.54 stress score tolerances of Rakshit and Ananthasuresh 
(2008, pp. 293-294).  
Reliability and validity across the study were embedded into the mixed-methods design 
as it applied methodological triangulation (triangulation) using different methods and/or 
types of data to study the same research question. In this approach the strength of one 
method offset potential weakness within others (Fraenkel, Wallen & Hyun, 2012, p. 
559). This included the use of data extraction from texts, expert enrichment supported 
by a qualitative ethnographic technique and MDS analysis. Both the ethnographic 
technique and MDS analysis produced similar results. In addition, during the study data 
was continually taken back to the experts for validity of interpretation. For instance, 
experts’ opinions explaining the structural map of physical security’s body of 
knowledge was drawn on to explain and validate the structural representation towards 
articulating a shared, desirable body of knowledge within the participant sample during 
Phase Four of the study. 
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10.7 Future research 
The literature review highlighted that not all occupational roles will be acknowledged as 
professions. Professions are a social designation, with formal recognition tied to a 
sufficiently complex, abstract body of knowledge. This body of knowledge is 
underpinned by academic materials drawn from science or some constructed model of 
social organisation. This knowledge must have a degree of mystique for the lay person, 
yet crucial for society to function well, and organised based on jurisdictional cultural 
boundary. In considering this body of literature and the findings from the study there are 
a number of research recommendations towards enhancing security’s journey through 
the professionalisation process, to emerge as a recognised profession underpinned by 
robust research and education. 
10.7.1 Security language research  
Security has been acknowledged as a distinct, although diverse field of study (Brooks, 
2007), which, as with other professional fields, draws knowledge from many different 
academic domains. However many of these fields have sought to list and define their 
concepts or terms within the context of their domain’s work to enhance professional 
application of their body of knowledge. Security has not achieved a reliable level of 
concept definition as found in the more mature professions. This lack of clarity impedes 
robust research and ultimately professional consistency in how the domain applies its 
work. Jaques (1989, p. 7) work expressively stressed the necessity for common 
language in order to undertake robust research within academic domains.  Security 
would benefit from an in-depth study reviewing and defining security terms that can be 
published as a single source reference text. Such research would significantly progress 
security along the professionalisation path.   
10.7.2 Cross cultural replication 
The study drew on a research sample of experts who practice as physical security 
consultants (professionals) in Australia, but also provide advice for international 
projects. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the sample may have embedded an 
Australian centric cultural bias when highlighting the knowledge requisites, structural 
properties of the knowledge system and bracing learning objectives. This usage may 
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have manifested in the cultural nuances in thought processes underpinning how the 
knowledge is used. For instance, Figure 8.6 presents the similarities between Figure 7.4 
and Figure 8.2. However, in Figure 8.2 barriers sits numerically higher than delay based 
on summated ratings of dissimilarity in the MDs analysis; whereas in Figure 7.4 delay 
appears before barriers along the physical variables arm of the treatment strategies.  
Nevertheless, the MDS analysis was based on an international sample of participant’s 
summated ratings of perceived dissimilarity and may therefore better represent the 
thought processes in how the knowledge is used to solve security problems. However, 
the security domain would significantly benefit from cross further cultural refinement of 
Figure 7.4, and the testing of all 98 concept categories using MDS. It would also benefit 
from further testing of Assertion Three with a larger, pancultural research sample. This 
would provide another iteration of the knowledge base and add a higher degree of 
generalisability to the knowledge structure.   
10.7.3 Physical security course validity 
The study produced what can be considered as a desirable body of knowledge as 
represented in Figures 7.4 and 8.2 for the sub-domain of physical security. 
Nevertheless, security educators would benefit from a comparative analysis of these 
figures with institutions of higher learning physical security curriculum. This would 
analyse the topics and structure representing the curriculum underpinning their courses 
across the physical security sub-domain and compare these to the findings of this study. 
Such an analysis would highlight any discrepancies between the findings of this study 
and what is being taught towards facilitating a common knowledge base for educators 
and graduates moving into this sub-domain stream. The importance of this should not 
be overlooked. As Edmondson’s (1995) work found, for developing curricula for 
interdisciplinary domains where content from several disciplines must be integrated, 
concept maps are an effective tool.  
From an educational standpoint, concept maps provide the means for mapping the 
content in such a way to facilitate consensus on how to design interdisciplinary courses 
and promote more meaningful learning. According to Edmondson (1995, p. 779) the 
extent to which educators identify specific content to be learned is an important element 
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in the development and implementation of a curriculum as is the extent to which the 
content can be organised. Edmondson expressed that for medical education the concept 
map approach to curriculum development provided an effective conceptual framework 
and theoretical basis for implementing an innovative approach to education (p. 781), 
stating “concept mapping facilitates theory-driven curriculum development that is 
grounded in learning theory and proven in practice” (p. 792). A vast body of literature 
supports the argument that physical security education and the professionalisation 
process for security would benefit from the adoption of such an approach to curriculum 
development, supported by consensual learning objectives. Therefore an in-depth 
comparative study is essential for physical security educational requirements to be 
standardised and accepted across different institutions of higher learning.     
10.7.4 The recognition of physical security as a jurisdictional category 
The notion of the security professional is being pressed by the security industry. 
However in the Australian context this group of individuals is not formally recognised 
in Australia according to Australian Bureau of Statistics (ANS) data, ABS labour force 
data and licensing industry categories (Table 1.2) (Prenzler, Earle & Sarre, 2009, p. 3) 
(Section 1.3). This is in contrast with the Australian Security Professionals Interim Task 
Force’s designation of this group as those persons working at the higher strata of the 
operational sector and in the strategic sector of the security industry (2009). The only 
category of persons fitting with the notion of the security professional is the Security 
Consultant (Table 1.2).  
However, an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) report in NSW 
(2013) noted, the role of the security consultant in achieving security project outcomes 
is poorly defined, and potentially leads to corrupt practices. It is therefore recommended 
that the security professional be formally recognised in the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ANS) data, ABS labour force data and licensing industry categories; where 
inclusion is based on a relevant tertiary qualifications and experience that meets the 
criteria as set by the Australian Security professionals Registry. In addition, Table 1.2 
does not acknowledge physical security barrier providers as an occupational category. 
Yet many in the work force are employed to install physical barriers for security 
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purposes. As such, it is recommended that this group of people are also recognised as 
security occupational persons.     
10.7.5 The development of a crime prevention jurisdictional category for security 
professionals. 
The study highlighted that physical security is a sub-domain requiring specialised 
knowledge, with much of it stemming from the engineering domain. However, the 
reviewed literature and interviewed experts acknowledged there are personnel within 
the professional strata stream of the security domain who engage with clients to solve 
crime problems, yet do not apply such engineering knowledge per se. Accordant with 
the work of Clarke (1992, p. 5) (Section 1.4.1) such persons would diagnose the crime 
problem using a problem centred approach, then identify and test possible solutions.  
Lab (2014, p. 32) (Section 3.7) introduced the notion of such professionals and referred 
to an emerging domain of crime science as their knowledge basis. Lab’s work explained 
the emerging domain of crime science as a discipline that focuses on attacking crime in 
society utilizing a broad range of disciplines, employing an extensive array of tools to 
control, influence or manipulate the social and physical environment in the fight against 
crime.  This introduces another potential sub-domain stream or practice area within the 
security domain. Such a domain appears to encompass a diverse knowledge focus rather 
than more specialised engineering knowledge to solve crime problems in the protection 
of assets. Therefore it is recommended that further research is undertaken to explore the 
potential for this practice area to emerge within the professional strata of the non-
traditional security domain.          
10. 8 Study conclusion 
The literature suggests that for an occupation to be defined as a profession there are a 
number of criteria that need to be met. Alongside social recognition, having a distinct 
body of knowledge and being included as a discipline in the higher education domain 
are part of the requirements of profession recognition. These requirements have not yet 
been met for the sub-domain area of physical security. However, all professions 
including the prestigious ones of medicine and law were practiced for centuries before 
they became codified and formally regulated, set apart from other occupations due to 
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their need for specialised knowledge (Criscuoli, 1988, p. 99). As Criscuoli points out, 
security, as with other occupations, is not just a matter of intuition or common sense, it 
involves a complex body of knowledge, analytical ability, along with the ability to 
prescribe appropriate security measures for individually specific circumstances (1988, 
p. 99). The study therefore undertook a cultural domain analysis of the physical security 
domain to map out the knowledge requisites and its structure, and to determine what 
should be included in a higher education course on physical security and accordingly 
has important implications for physical security education and professionalism.  
The study used a mixed method approach, drawing on qualitative and quantitative 
research techniques in a constructivist paradigm to determine the existence of a body of 
knowledge for physical security. Such a body of knowledge was found to be 
represented through Figures 7.4, 8.2, and 9.2. For physical security, the study has a 
number of implications. The study found that as premised in the reviewed literature, 
there subtly exists a branch of learning relating to the diagnosis of, and reasoning about 
society’s protective security and crime prevention problems. This learning also includes 
the application of validated techniques underpinned by scientific knowledge to treat 
these concerns. Individuals schooled in this jurisdictional branch of knowledge go by 
various names, including among others, security consultants or advisors (Section 1.4) 
and their learning is often enhanced through occupational apprenticeships. The study 
demonstrated their knowledge can be formally codified and therefore consistently 
taught, which as a system of knowledge would include a combined arts (social sciences) 
and sciences approach. Such codification would impart the ability to critically analyse 
available data to diagnose and reason about the methodology drawing on social science 
frameworks and techniques, along with the requisite engineering knowledge required to 
recommend and implement treatment systems, underpinned by mathematics and science 
as a department of learning. Such learning also requires highly developed graduate 
attributes such as communication skills to facilitate professional work. 
Such a model of learning fits with the security science definition offered by Smith and 
Brooks (2013, p. 21), articulated as “a discipline that brings together broader discipline 
concepts into a structured body of knowledge, integrating them into a single domain 
boundary”. However, while this literature alludes to a discipline structured according to 
a single domain boundary, the findings of this study conclude that security science 
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represents a broader domain discipline label, where sitting subordinate to this label are 
various specialised knowledge areas of jurisdictional boundary. One such boundary area 
is the practice domain of physical security, which as Johnston and Warner (2014, p. 13) 
note, is an area in and of itself that can be studied in a rigorous and scholarly manner. 
This study’s findings support this view and found that both the ethnographic qualitative 
technique and MDS concept mapping were valid tools for developing and representing 
physical security’s body of knowledge.   
Johnston and Warner (2014, p. 13) asked “where are the (university) degrees in physical 
security”? The lack of degrees within the knowledge domain of physical security is not 
surprising given the lack of understanding pertaining to the knowledge requisites, its 
structure and supported learning objectives. In the significance of this study it was 
argued that the concept of the security professional will be better understood through 
research driven domain exploration that presents validated higher education curriculum 
and associated competency measures. As an outcome this was premised to increase the 
broader public’s understanding and confidence in physical security professional’s 
knowledge and services and gain such trust towards recognition as professionals. The 
study found through Figure 7.4, Figure 8.2 and Figure 9.2 that a clear jurisdictional 
knowledge corpus exists that can be codified and linked to educational objectives to 
develop such degree courses. Such a course would represent an opportunity to gain 
greater professional recognition for physical security professionals.  
The substantiation of physical security as a jurisdictional sub-domain or cultural 
paradigm within the professional sector of security’s occupational stratum with a 
distinct body of knowledge and learning basis represents the first step towards 
consistency in practice within the security domain. Security is emerging as a new 
profession, and physical security as a new sub-domain, and this study represents a 
significant step forward in this professionalisation journey, helping establish in the 
group phenomenon the physical security professional within the broader group of 
security professionals.   
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Appendix A 
PILOT STUDY PHASE TWO INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Curtin University 
School of Science and Mathematics Education Centre 
 
Participant Information Letter: Semi-structured Interview Research 
Questionnaire Invitation 
 
This research study is being undertaken as part of the requirements towards the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) of Science and Mathematics Education at Curtin University 
in Western Australia. 
 
Aim: To undertake a cultural domain analysis to identify a formal knowledge system 
(body of knowledge) for the domain of physical Security. 
 
Guidelines: This phase of the research enquiry is employing a semi-structured 
interview questionnaire. The purpose of the interview and questionnaire is to to draw 
out implicit knowledge concepts relating to physical security’s body of knowledge, 
which are not presented in the reviewed text, yet considered valuable by experts such as 
yourself.  As such, the core aspects of your role within this study will consist of 
providing experience-based knowledge in response to specific interview questions that 
relate to uncovering physical security’s knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts.  
 
Risks and Discomforts: There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts associated with 
your participation in this study. However, you are requested to provide an hour of your 
time and be willing to have the interview recorded to enhance analysis and for reliability 
validity purposes. 
 
Confidentiality: Information obtained from this study that could identify you will be 
kept private to the extent allowed by law. The information you provide will be kept 
separate from your personal details and only I and research supervisors will have access 
to this. The interview transcript will not have your name or any other identifying 
information on it and in adherence with university policy, the interview tapes and 
transcribed information will be kept in a locked cabinet for at least five years, before a 
decision is made as to whether it should be destroyed.  
 
Consent to Participate: Your involvement in this study is entirely voluntary and you 
have the right to withdraw at any stage without affecting your rights or my 
responsibilities. Once you have signed the consent form, it will be acknowledged that 
you have agreed to participate and allow me to use your data in this research. 
 
Further Information 
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This study has been approved by Curtin University’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Approval Number SMEC-10-13, 2013). The Committee is comprised of 
members of the public, academics, lawyers, doctors and pastoral carers.   If needed, 
verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University 
Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, Curtin 
University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 or by emailing 
hrec@curtin.edu.au 
 
 
 
 
If you would like further information about the study, please contact myself Michael 
Coole; 08 63045123, or email: m.coole@ecu.edu.au or,  
Professor David Treagust; 08 92667924, or email: D.Treagust@curtin.edu.au  or, 
Dr Dave Brooks; 08 63042827, or email: d.brooks@ecu.edu.au  
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Study Consent Form 
 
 
Thank you for choosing to participate in this research study, please read the terms of 
informed consent below.  
 
 I understand the purpose and procedure of the study. 
 I have been provided with the participation information sheet. 
 I understand that the procedure itself may not benefit me. 
 I understand that my involvement is voluntary and I can withdraw at any time 
without a problem.  
 I understand that no personal identifying information such as name and address 
will be used in any published materials. 
 Í understand that all information will be securely stored for at least 5 years 
before a decision is made as to whether it should be destroyed. 
 I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about this research. 
 
 
 
Your signature below indicates that you consent to participate in this study.  
 
I______________________________________ agree to participate in this research 
study. In line with the requirements of informed consent, I provide my consent. 
 
 
 
Signature_____________________ Date_____/____/____. 
 
 
This document was witnessed by Michael Coole________________ 
Date____/___/____. 
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Semi-structured Interview Research Questionnaire 
 
Phase one of the study extracted through literature critique physical security knowledge 
concepts and subordinate concepts. These were subjected to a numerical analysis 
highlighting the top 49 thematic knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts resulting 
in a combined knowledge table. Tabulated data was then subjected to a deductive 
analysis where their inclusion as a concept and their relation with other concepts and 
subordinate concepts were graphically mapped presenting linkages. 
 
1) The table shows the literature extractions top 49 thematic knowledge categories and 
subordinate concepts. This table was produced through the synergizing of three 
text’s salient knowledge categories and subordinate concepts. This required a 
number of synonymous terms to be combined towards producing a phase table of 
knowledge categories and subordinate concepts. Could you please indicate your 
agreement/acceptance or disagreement of the following combined terms? 
 
a) Threat, threat definition and threats were combined to produce the thematic category of 
Threat. 
b) Entry control/access control was combined with Entry/Access control, entrances and 
access delay to produce the thematic theme of Entry control.  
c) Analysis, analysis and evaluation, and EASI model an analysis and evaluation 
approaches were combined to produce the theme Analysis and evaluation. 
d) Closed circuit television (CCTV) was combined with closed-circuit television/CCTV 
and closed circuit television-CCTV to produce the theme Closed circuit television 
(CCTV). 
e) The Facility was combined with Facility characterization to produce the thematic 
theme Facility characterization. 
f) Neutralization, use of force and arrest were combined to produce the thematic category 
of Use of force. 
g) Legal issues were combined with law to produce the thematic category of Law. 
h) Traffic controls and Traffic were combined to produce the thematic category of Traffic 
control. 
i) Theft controls was combined with loss prevention a term used to refer to theft 
prevention to produce the thematic category of Loss prevention. 
j) Detection a salient theme was combined with alarm systems, another salient theme to 
produce the category of Detection systems. 
k) Safes and vaults as a thematic category were combined with safes to produce the 
category of Safes and vaults. 
l) The thematic category of investigations was excluded from the table as it relates to 
management practices rather than the diagnosis, inference and treatment of security or 
loss coupled threat concerns.  
2) Within these knowledge categories are some physical security themes that are 
unambiguous in what they represent. However, there are some themes representing 
more ambiguous term, can you please tell me what you believe the following 
themes represent in terms of knowledge required for physical security 
professionals? 
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a) Analysis and evaluation 
b) System 
c) Facility characterization 
d) Terrorism 
e) Crimes 
f) Traffic controls 
g) Security principles 
h) Drugs 
3) This table lists the salient 49 knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts for 
physical security’s body of knowledge, do you agree with these? 
4) Do you believe any of the knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts should 
be removed and why? 
5) The top 49 knowledge categories have been organised into a hierarchical 
concept map to illustrate both the structure of physical security’s body of 
knowledge including core and supporting concepts and their relations. This map 
aims to highlight the knowledge and structure of physical security’s knowledge 
base towards the diagnosis, inference and treatment of security or loss coupled 
threat concerns manifested through unlawful access and/or crime enablers 
towards the protection of assets including people, information and property. Do 
you support this overall goal for physical security, and based on this goal do you 
support the structure of this map?   
6) Do you believe the whole structure captures the ideas underlying physical 
security? 
7) Do you feel that any of the knowledge concepts or subordinate concepts needs 
relocating and why? 
8) From your knowledge of physical security, do you believe that the table and 
knowledge map captures the knowledge requirements for a physical security 
professional, and if not, what knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts are 
missing and why? 
9) What do you feel are the three most important knowledge concepts for physical 
security? 
10) The methodology drew on a 7 × 7 matrix to identify, categories and present core 
and subordinate knowledge themes and concepts resulting in the top 49. Do you 
believe this is sufficient or do you feel this would be best expanded to a 9 × 9 
matrix to capture further subordinate knowledge concepts? 
11) Do you have any further comments to enhance the tabulated knowledge 
categories and subordinate concepts, the heuristic map or methodology to 
enhance the study? 
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Table 1 Pilot study: Phase 1 combined texts knowledge category data  
Physical Security 
Security Threat Detectio
n 
systems 
System Response Delay Analysi
s and 
Evaluati
on 
Fire 
protection 
Law Doors Locks Surveillance 
 
 
Facility 
characteriza
tion 
Closed 
circuit 
televisio
n 
(CCTV) 
Entry 
Control/Ac
cess control  
Risk Lighting Barriers Windows Walls Facility 
procedu
res 
Terrorism Target 
identificat
ion 
Fences Loss 
preventi
on 
Communicat
ions 
Use of force Alarm 
assessm
ent 
Electric 
power 
Reviewin
g reports 
Perimete
r 
security 
Security 
surveys 
Safety Crimes Traffic 
control 
Training Intrusion 
detection 
Interrupt
ion 
Safes 
and 
vaults 
CPTED Guards Glass 
Field of 
view 
Construct
ion 
Risk 
assessme
nt 
Resoluti
on 
Probability 
of detection 
Security 
principles 
Drugs 
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Table 2 Pilot study: Phase 1 hierarchical taxonomic table of knowledge category themes, 
concepts, subordinate concepts and their elements (Adjusted from Spradley (1979, p. 
137).  
Security 
Facility Characterization
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na
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s &
 E
va
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at
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n 
Threat 
Terrorism Law Crimes 
Target identification
Safety Loss Prevention 
Risk 
Se
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s 
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w
in
g 
R
ep
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ts
 
D
et
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n 
Sy
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s 
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c 
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w
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Security Principles 
Perimeter Security 
Intrusion Probability Detection
Alarm 
assessment 
 
Drugs Probability Detection
  
Fire    
Lighting 
   
   
   
Surveillance 
CCTV Field of View  
 Resolution  
CPTED   
Communications 
   
   
   
Delay 
Entry Control 
CPTED  
Locks  
Doors  
Barriers Construction 
Safes/Vaults 
Walls 
Fences 
Glass 
Windows 
 
Response Guards   
Interruption  
 Use of Force 
Neutralization Training 
Fire Protection 
   
   
   
Facility Procedures 
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Appendix B 
PILOT STUDY MDS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Phase Three Multidimensional Statistical Scaling Survey 
Questionnaire (Page 1) 
 
When compared to 
Si
m
ila
r 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
D
is
si
m
ila
r 
Security  Law           
Security  Facility 
contextualization 
          
Security  Threat           
Security  Risk           
Security  Planning & Design           
Security  Infrastructure           
Security  Analysis & 
evaluation 
          
Security  Systems theory           
Security  Security theory & 
principles 
          
Security  Defence in depth           
Security  Crime prevention 
theory 
          
Security  Communications 
skills 
          
Security  Detection           
Security  Delay           
Security  Response           
Security  Structural strengths           
Security  Barriers           
Security  Lighting           
Security  Surveillance           
Security  Door furniture           
Security  Safes & vaults           
Security  Movement control           
Security  Electrical power           
Security  Entry control           
Security  Detection systems           
Security  Fire protection           
Security  Reviewing reports           
Security  CCTV           
Security  Target 
identification 
          
Law  Security           
Law  Facility 
contextualization 
          
Law  Threat           
Law  Risk           
Law  Planning & Design           
Law  Infrastructure           
Law  Analysis & 
evaluation 
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Appendix C 
PILOT STUDY PHASE FOUR FOCUS GROUP SEMI-STRUCTURED 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Phase 4 Focus Group Semi-Structured Interview 
Questionnaire 
 
The jurisdictional focus for Physical Security is directed towards the 
diagnosis, inference and treatment of security or loss coupled risk concerns 
associated with people, information and property manifested through 
unlawful access plus crime enablers in the protection of assets. Such 
treatment results in a security function as an organised complex of specialised 
technological, physical and procedural elements integrated into a protective 
barrier system.  
 
Phases One and Two provided propositional maps (Figures 1 & 2) for 
understanding the knowledge domain of physical security. These maps have 
drawn out a vast number of theories, knowledge concepts and subordinate 
concepts from the domain of physical security. One map (Figure 1) is derived 
from a qualitative analysis showing local connections, and the second a 
broader map (Figure 2) established through perceived ratings of similarity and 
dissimilarity showing macro structure organised according to clusters of 
knowledge relating to the professional dimensions of practice.  
 
Curriculum development entails the identification, selection and organisation 
of a set of intended learning outcomes. This should be based on educational 
goals in terms of what is to be learned. The goals indicate why it is to be 
learned (Posner & Rudnitsky, 1982, p. 8) 
 
Phase 3 Research Question: What are the learning objectives and 
knowledge requisites for physical security professionals? 
 
Key points: The reviewed literature highlighted a number of salient points for 
professional education: 
a) The need to consider the broader goals; 
b) Units should be planned in context with other units-relationships; 
c) Sequence-planned, where units both precede and follow other learning units; 
d) Should teach the science or knowledge that the domain is built; 
e) Learning of principles and attitudes; 
f) General graduate attributes; 
g) Content- scope- organisation-sequence. 
Accordant with these key points, Eraut (1994, p. 119) highlights three key 
questions for every profession: 
A. What is the professional knowledge base?  
P a g e  | 386 
 
B. What is best learned in higher education? 
C. What is best learned in professional practice, and what is best learned 
through an integrated course involving both contexts? 
D. What has to be learned before qualification, and what is best postponed until 
after qualification? 
 
 
 
Interview Questions: 
 
1. What is the higher education learning objective/s for a physical security 
professional? 
 
2. In terms of articulating a formal knowledge system, based on these maps what 
do you see as the foundation content requirements to be learned by physical 
security professionals before qualification? 
 
3. Higher education students should learn or know the science or 
knowledge of which their future domain is built. Based on this 
view, what is the scope of higher education knowledge? 
4. How should these units be organized? 
5. Do you believe these maps capture the knowledge concepts 
required for a physical security professional? 
 
6. What are the strengths and perhaps weaknesses of these maps in terms of 
establishing a physical security professional’s knowledge system? 
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Appendix D 
PHASE TWO SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Curtin University 
School of Science and Mathematics Education Centre 
 
Participant Information Letter: Semi-structured Interview Research 
Questionnaire Invitation 
 
This research study is being undertaken as part of the requirements towards the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) of Science and Mathematics Education at Curtin University 
in Western Australia. 
 
Aim: To undertake a cultural domain analysis to identify a formal knowledge system 
(body of knowledge) for the domain of physical Security. 
 
Guidelines: This phase of the research enquiry is employing a semi-structured 
interview questionnaire. The purpose of the interview and questionnaire is to to draw 
out implicit knowledge concepts relating to physical security’s body of knowledge, 
which are not presented in the reviewed text, yet considered valuable by experts such as 
yourself.  As such, the core aspects of your role within this study will consist of 
providing experience-based knowledge in response to specific interview questions that 
relate to uncovering physical security’s knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts.  
 
Risks and Discomforts: There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts associated with 
your participation in this study. However, you are requested to provide an hour of your 
time and be willing to have the interview recorded to enhance analysis and for reliability 
validity purposes. 
 
Confidentiality: Information obtained from this study that could identify you will be 
kept private to the extent allowed by law. The information you provide will be kept 
separate from your personal details and only I and research supervisors will have access 
to this. The interview transcript will not have your name or any other identifying 
information on it and in adherence with university policy, the interview tapes and 
transcribed information will be kept in a locked cabinet for at least five years, before a 
decision is made as to whether it should be destroyed.  
 
Consent to Participate: Your involvement in this study is entirely voluntary and you 
have the right to withdraw at any stage without affecting your rights or my 
responsibilities. Once you have signed the consent form, it will be acknowledged that 
you have agreed to participate and allow me to use your data in this research. 
 
Further Information 
This study has been approved by Curtin University’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Approval Number SMEC-10-13, 2013). The Committee is comprised of 
members of the public, academics, lawyers, doctors and pastoral carers.   If needed, 
verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University 
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Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, Curtin 
University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 or by emailing 
hrec@curtin.edu.au 
 
If you would like further information about the study, please contact myself Michael 
Coole; 08 63045123, or email: m.coole@ecu.edu.au or,  
Professor David Treagust; 08 92667924, or email: D.Treagust@curtin.edu.au  or, 
Dr Dave Brooks; 08 63042827, or email: d.brooks@ecu.edu.au  
 
Study Consent Form 
 
Thank you for choosing to participate in this research study, please read the terms of 
informed consent below.  
 
 I understand the purpose and procedure of the study. 
 I have been provided with the participation information sheet. 
 I understand that the procedure itself may not benefit me. 
 I understand that my involvement is voluntary and I can withdraw at any time 
without a problem.  
 I understand that no personal identifying information such as name and address 
will be used in any published materials. 
 Í understand that all information will be securely stored for at least 5 years 
before a decision is made as to whether it should be destroyed. 
 I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about this research. 
 
 
 
Your signature below indicates that you consent to participate in this study.  
 
I______________________________________ agree to participate in this research 
study. In line with the requirements of informed consent, I provide my consent. 
 
 
 
Signature_____________________ Date_____/____/____. 
 
 
This document was witnessed by Michael Coole________________ 
Date____/___/____. 
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Semi-structured Interview Research Questionnaire 
 
Phase (a) one of the study extracted through literature critique physical security 
knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts. These were subjected to a numerical 
analysis highlighting the top 49 thematic knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts 
resulting in a combined knowledge table. Tabulated data was then subjected to a 
deductive analysis where their inclusion as a concept and their relation with other 
concepts and subordinate concepts were graphically mapped presenting linkages. 
 
1) The table shows the literature extractions top 49 thematic knowledge categories 
and subordinate concepts. This table was produced through the synergizing of 
15 text’s salient knowledge categories and subordinate concepts. Is there any 
knowledge category concepts you would like clarified before we begin? Could 
you please indicate your support or disagreement with these terms and what you 
believe the category should be labelled? 
 
2) The knowledge table lists the 49 salient extracted knowledge concepts and 
subordinate concepts for physical security’s body of knowledge, do you agree 
with these, and if not, what knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts are 
missing and why? 
 
3) Do you believe any of the knowledge concepts and subordinate concepts should 
be removed and why? 
 
4) The top 49 knowledge categories have been organised into a hierarchical 
concept map to illustrate both the structure of physical security’s body of 
knowledge including core and supporting concepts and their relations. This map 
aims to highlight the knowledge and structure of physical security’s knowledge 
base towards the diagnosis, inference and treatment of security or loss coupled 
threat concerns. Do you support the structure of this map based on the overall 
goal for physical security? 
 
5) Do you feel that any of the knowledge concepts or subordinate concepts needs 
relocating and why? 
 
6) What do you feel are the three most important knowledge concepts for physical 
security? 
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Table 1: carried forward knowledge concept categories. 
 Physical Security 
Door Furniture Defence in Depth Situational crime 
Prevention 
Infrastructure 
Structural Strengths Safes & Vaults Electric Power Delay 
Surveillance Windows Glass Walls 
Drugs Interruption Field of View Security Surveys 
Movement control    
 
Table 2: Phase 1 combined text knowledge category data. 
Physical Security 
Security System CCTV People Control Access 
control 
Planning & 
design  
Alarms Facility 
contextualization
Doors Crime Building Risk Data & 
Information
Lighting Threat Sensors Detection Response Locks Assets 
       
Device Lenses Analysis 
& 
evaluation  
Technology Emergency Costs Attack 
Standards Keys Reports Safety Equipment Fire CPTED 
Network Barriers Procedures Fencing Prevention Loss Adversary 
Property Terrorism Guard Law Door 
furniture 
Defence in 
depth 
Situational 
crime prev 
Infrastructure Structural 
strengths 
Safes & 
vaults 
Electric 
power 
Delay Surveillance Windows 
Glass Walls Drugs Interruption Field of 
view 
Security 
surveys 
Security 
theory & 
principles 
Movement 
control 
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Table 3: Phase 1qualitative hierarchical knowledge concept category table. 
Security 
Law
A
na
ly
si
s &
 E
va
lu
at
io
n 
R
ep
or
t w
rit
in
g 
Facility Contextualization
Buildings 
Assets 
Threats  
Attack Fire 
Adversary 
Terrorism Crime Safety  Loss  
Risk
Prevention 
In
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
Planning & Design 
Security Theories & Principles 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Su
rv
ey
s 
Si
tu
at
io
na
l C
rim
e 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n 
D
ef
en
ce
 in
 D
ep
th
 
D
et
ec
tio
n 
El
ec
tri
ca
l P
ow
er
 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
Facility/Building Security 
Eq
ui
pm
en
t 
C
os
ts
 
Intrusion Probability Detect 
Alarm 
assess 
Networ
ks 
Drugs Probability Detect 
  
Fire   Networks 
Lighting 
   
   
   
Surveillance 
CCTV Field of View 
Lenses 
 
 
Resolut
ion 
CPTED   
Communicatio
ns 
Technologies 
Networks   
   
   
M
ov
em
en
t c
on
tro
l 
Delay 
Structural  
strengths 
Access Control 
CPTED  
Door 
furniture Locks 
Doors Keys 
Barriers 
Safes/Vault
s  
Walls  
Fences  
Glass  
Windows Locks 
  
Response Guards   
Interruption  
  
Neutralizati
on  
Emergency 
Facility Procedures 
Systems Theory 
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Figure 1 Phase 1structural heuristic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End of Questionnaire 
Thank you for your participation and time. 
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Appendix E 
PHASE 3 MDS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Participant Information Letter: Multidimensional Statistical Scaling Survey 
Questionnaire Invitation 
  
My name is Michael Coole, I am currently undertaking a PhD through Curtin 
University, Western Australia, to highlight and map Physical Security’s knowledge 
system. Occupational domains are structurally understood through the similarity and 
contrast between their knowledge categories. The study is using a mathematical process 
to map the structure of Physical Security knowledge category concepts utilizing two 
survey questionnaires. As participants open the link you will be randomly assigned one 
of two surveys to complete.    
  
Aim: To uncover a knowledge structure for physical Security through a cultural domain 
analysis. 
  
Guidelines: As a security professional it is requested that you spend approximately 15 
minutes completing the linked survey. The survey contains a rating scale questionnaire 
seeking your perceived relationship between matched pairs of physical security 
concepts. I would like you to score in the questionnaire boxes your perceived degree of 
difference where 1 indicates the knowledge concepts are Highly Similar and 10 
indicates they are Dissimilar. 
If you have any questions please contact Michael Coole: 
Michael.coole@student.curtin.edu.au 
 
  
Follow this link to the Survey:  
https://curtin.asia.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_e5wGURy06vh0KAl  
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Multidimensional Statistical Scaling Survey Questionnaire  
When compared to 
Si
m
ila
r 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
D
is
si
m
ila
r 
Security  Threat           
Security  Context           
Security  Security planning 
& design 
          
Security  Environmental 
conditions 
          
Security  CPTED           
Security  Defence in depth           
Security  Movement 
control 
          
Security  Surveillance           
Security  Detection           
Security  Technology           
Security  Lighting           
Security  Sensors           
Security  CCTV           
Security  Delay           
Security  Structural 
strength 
          
Security  Barriers           
Security  Security 
containers 
          
Security  Locks/cylinders           
Security  Response           
Security  Professional 
practice 
          
Security  Engineering 
design process 
          
Security  Analysis & 
evaluation 
          
Security  Situational crime 
prevention 
          
When compared to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Threat  Context           
Threat  Security planning 
& design 
          
Threat  Environmental 
conditions 
          
Threat  CPTED           
Threat  Defence in depth           
Threat  Movement 
control 
          
Threat  Surveillance           
Threat  Detection           
Threat  Technology           
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Threat  Lighting           
Threat  Sensors           
Threat  CCTV           
Threat  Delay           
Threat  Structural 
strength 
          
Threat  Barriers           
Threat  Security 
containers 
          
Threat  Locks/cylinders           
Threat  Response           
Threat  Professional 
practice 
          
Threat  Engineering 
design process 
            
Threat  Analysis & 
evaluation 
Si
m
ila
r 
          
D
is
si
m
ila
r 
Threat  Situational crime 
prevention 
          
When compared to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Context  Security planning 
& design 
          
Context  Environmental 
conditions 
          
Context  CPTED           
Context  Defence in depth           
Context  Movement 
control 
          
Context  Surveillance           
Context  Detection           
Context  Technology           
Context  Lighting           
Context  Sensors           
Context  CCTV           
Context  Delay           
Context  Structural 
strength 
          
Context  Barriers           
Context  Security 
containers 
          
Context  Locks/cylinders           
Context  Response           
Context  Professional 
practice 
          
Context  Engineering 
design process 
          
Context  Analysis & 
evaluation 
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Context  Situational crime 
prevention 
          
When compared to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Environmental 
conditions 
          
Security 
planning & 
design 
 CPTED           
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Defence in depth           
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Movement 
control 
          
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Surveillance           
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Detection           
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Technology           
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Lighting           
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Sensors           
Security 
planning & 
design 
 CCTV           
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Delay           
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Structural 
strength 
          
Security 
planning & 
design 
 Barriers           
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Appendix F 
PHASE 4 FOCUS GROUP SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Curtin University 
School of Science and Mathematics Education Centre 
 
Focus Group Interview Invitation: Participant Information Letter 
 
This research study is being undertaken as part of the requirements for the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) of Science and Mathematics Education at Curtin University 
in Western Australia. 
 
Aim: To undertaking a cultural domain analysis to identify a formal knowledge system 
(body of knowledge) for the domain of physical Security. 
 
Guidelines: Your participation in this research phase will require you to attend a one 
hour focus group interview. If you agree to participate in this study every effort will be 
made to find a convenient date, time and location which suit all participants agreeing to 
participate.  
 
Risks and Discomforts: There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts associated with 
your participation in this study. However, you are requested to provide an hour of your 
time and be willing to have the interview recorded to enhance analysis and for reliability 
validity purposes. 
 
Confidentiality: Information obtained from this study which could identify you will be 
kept private to the extent allowed by law. The information you provide will be kept 
separate from your personal details and only I and research supervisors will have access 
to this. The interview transcript will not have your name or any other identifying 
information on it and in adherence with university policy, the interview tapes and 
transcribed information will be kept in a locked cabinet for at least five years, before a 
decision is made as to whether it should be destroyed.  
 
Consent to Participate: Your involvement in this study is entirely voluntary and you 
have the right to withdraw at any stage without affecting your rights or my 
responsibilities. Once you have signed the consent form, it will be acknowledged that 
you have agreed to participate and allow me to use your data in this research. 
 
Further Information 
This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Approval Number HR xx/2012). The Committee is comprised of members 
of the public, academics, lawyers, doctors and pastoral carers.   If needed, verification 
of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University Human Research 
Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, Curtin University, GPO 
Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 or by emailing 
hrec@curtin.edu.au 
If you would like further information about the study, please contact myself Michael 
Coole; 08 63045123, or email: m.coole@ecu.edu.au or,  
Professor David Treagust on 08 92667924, or email: D.Treagust@curtin.edu.au  or, Dr 
Dave Brooks; 08 63042827, or email: d.brooks@ecu.edu.au 
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Study Consent Form 
 
Thank you for choosing to participate in this research study, please read the terms of 
informed consent below.  
 
 I understand the purpose and procedure of the study. 
 I have been provided with the participation information sheet. 
 I understand that the procedure itself may not benefit me. 
 I understand that my involvement is voluntary and I can withdraw at any time 
without a problem.  
 I understand that no personal identifying information such as name and address 
will be used in any published materials. 
 Í understand that all information will be securely stored for at least 5 years 
before a decision is made as to whether it should be destroyed. 
 I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about this research. 
 
 
 
Your signature below indicates that you consent to participate in this study.  
 
I______________________________________ agree to participate in this research 
study. In line with the requirements of informed consent, I provide my consent. 
 
 
 
Signature_____________________ Date_____/____/____. 
 
 
This document was witnessed by Michael Coole________________ 
Date____/___/____. 
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Focus Group Interview Research Questionnaire 
 
The jurisdictional focus for Physical Security is directed towards the diagnosis, 
inference and treatment of security or loss coupled risk concerns associated with people, 
information and property manifested through unlawful access plus crime enablers in the 
protection of assets. Such treatment results in a security function as an organised 
complex of specialised technological, physical and procedural elements integrated into a 
protective barrier system.  
 
Phases One, Two and Three of the study provided knowledge requisites (Tables 1, 2 & 
3) and propositional maps (Figures 1 & 2) for understanding the knowledge domain of 
physical security. These maps have drawn out a vast number of knowledge concepts, 
principles and theories as core and subordinate concepts from the domain of physical 
security. One map (Figure 1) is derived from a qualitative analysis showing local 
connections, and the second a broader map (Figure 2) established through perceived 
ratings of similarity and dissimilarity showing macro structure organised according to 
clusters of knowledge relating to the professional dimensions of practice.  
 
Curriculum development entails the identification, selection and organisation of a set of 
intended learning outcomes. This should be based on educational goals in terms of what 
is to be learned. The goals indicate why it is to be learned (Posner & Rudnitsky, 1982, 
p. 8) 
 
Phase 4 Research Question: What are the learning objectives and knowledge 
requisites for physical security professionals? 
 
Key points: The reviewed literature highlighted a number of salient points for 
professional education: 
h) The need to consider the broader goals; 
i) Units should be planned in context with other units-relationships; 
j) Sequence-planned, where units both precede and follow other learning units; 
k) Should teach the science or knowledge that the domain is built; 
l) Learning of principles and attitudes; 
m) General graduate attributes; 
n) Content- scope- organisation-sequence. 
Accordant with these key points, Eraut (1994, p. 119) highlights three key questions for 
every profession: 
E. What is the professional knowledge base?  
F. What is best learned in higher education? 
G. What is best learned in professional practice, and what is best learned through an 
integrated course involving both contexts? 
H. What has to be learned before qualification, and what is best postponed until after 
qualification? 
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Interview Questions: 
 
1) In terms of articulating a formal knowledge system, based on these maps, what do 
you see as the foundation knowledge unit requirements to be learned by physical 
security professionals before qualification? 
 
2) It is argued that higher education students should learn or know the science or 
knowledge of which their future domain is built. Based on this view, what is the 
depth of scope or focus for security higher education knowledge? 
 
3) Do you believe these maps capture the knowledge concepts required for a physical 
security professional, if not what do you consider is missing? 
 
4) What should be learned after qualification, in professional practice? 
 
5) Based on learning principles how should these knowledge units be organised? 
 
6) What are the strengths and perhaps the weaknesses of these maps in terms of 
establishing a physical security professional’s knowledge system? 
 
7) Based on what has been discussed so far and the knowledge heuristics, what are the 
higher education learning objectives for future physical security professionals?  
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Appendix G 
PILOT STUDY PHASE 1 MERGED SYNONYMOUS TERMS 
Book Category Merged terms 
Book 
1 
Entry 
control/Access 
control 
Entry control, access control 
 Closed circuit 
television - 
CCTV 
CCTV, closed circuit television 
 Analysis and 
evaluation 
Analysis, analysis and evaluation 
 Facility 
procedures 
Procedures, facility procedures 
 Alarm 
assessment 
Alarm assessment, video alarm assessment 
 Target 
identification 
Targets, target identification 
 Threat Threat, threat definition  
     
     
Book 
2 
Closed circuit 
television - 
CCTV 
CCTV, closed circuit television 
 Fire Fire, fire protection  
     
     
Book 
3 
Analysis and 
evaluation 
Analysis, analysis and evaluation, EASI model and analysis 
and evaluation methodological approach 
 Closed circuit 
television - 
CCTV 
CCTV, closed circuit television 
 Facility 
characterization 
Facility, facility characterization 
 Use of force Neutralization. Use of force, arrest 
 Law Legal issues, law  
 Traffic control Traffic, traffic controls  
 Loss prevention Theft controls, loss prevention 
 Detection 
systems 
Detection, alarm systems 
 Safes and vaults Safes, safes and vaults  
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Appendix H 
STUDY PHASE 1 MERGED SYNONYMOUS TERMS 
Book Category Merged terms 
1 alarm alarm, alarms 
 assessment assess, assessment 
 assets asset, assets 
 attack attack, attacks 
 CCTV camera, cameras, video, CCTV 
 communication communication, communications 
 control control, controls, controlled 
 design designed, design, designing 
 detection detects, detection, detecting, detected, detect 
 devices device, devices 
 door door, doors 
 entry enter, entry 
 facility facility, facilities 
 fences fence, fences 
 fields field, fields 
 guard guard, guards 
 level level, levels 
 lighting light, lights, lighting 
 measurement measure, measures, measured 
 people people, persons, person, personnel 
 sensor sensor, sensors 
 system systems, system 
 technology technology, technologies 
 threat threat, threats 
 zones zone, zones 
 response response, respond 
 barriers barrier, barriers 
   
   
2 system systems, system 
 CCTV camera, cameras, video, CCTV 
 alarms alarm, alarms 
 threat threat, threats 
 doors door, doors 
 sensors sensor, sensors 
 locks lock, locks 
 facility site, area, facility 
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3 alarms alarm, alarms, alarm systems 
 assessment assess, assessment 
 CCTV camera, cameras, video, CCTV 
 control control, controls 
 design designed, design 
 devices device, devices 
 doors door, doors 
 fence fence, fences, fencing 
 guards guard, guards 
 level level, levels 
 lighting light, lights, lighting, lighted 
 sensor sensor, sensors 
 system systems, system 
 threat threat, threats 
 attack attacks, attack 
 barriers barrier, barriers 
 bolts bolt, bolts 
 building building, buildings 
 costs cost, costs 
 crime crime, crimes 
 criminals criminal, criminals 
 cylinder cylinder, cylinders 
 electrical electrical, electronics, electrics 
 fire fire, fires 
 glass glass, glazing 
 images image, images 
 interior interior, internal 
 lens lens, lenses 
 locks lock, locks 
 network network, networks 
 pins pin, pins 
 protection protect, protection, protecting, protected 
 risk risk, risks 
 safes safe, safes 
 signal signals, signal 
 standards standard, standards 
 tumbler tumbler, tumblers 
 windows window, windows 
 combinations combination, combinations 
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4 alarms alarm, alarms 
 assessment assess, assessment, assessments 
 CCTV camera, camera, CCTV 
 control control, controlled 
 design designed, design, designer 
 detection  detection,   detectors, detector, detect 
 devices device, devices 
 doors door, doors 
 entry enter, entry, entrance, entrances 
 system systems, system 
 sensors sensor, sensors 
 technology technology, technologies 
 threat threat, threats 
 lighting light, lights, lighting 
 fire fire, fires 
 images image, images, imaging 
 locks lock, locks, locking, locked 
 risk risk, risks 
 biometric biometric, biometrics 
 business business, businesses 
 costs cost, costs 
 guards officer, officers, guard, guards 
 identify identify, identification, identified, identity 
 intrusion intrusion, intruder, intruders 
 keys key, keys 
 leadership lead, leader, leadership, leads 
 level level, levels 
 organization Organization, organizational and company 
 planning plan, planning 
 protection protect, protection,  protected 
 visitor visit, visitor, visitors 
 building buildings, building 
   
   
5 intrusion intrusion, intruder, intrusions, intruders 
 alarms alarm, alarms 
 assessment assess, assessment, assessed 
 assets asset, assets 
 attack attacks, attack 
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 barriers barrier, barriers 
 CCTV camera, cameras, CCTV 
 communication communication, communications 
 design designed, design 
 detection detects, detection, detecting, detected, detect 
 doors door, doors 
 facility facility, facilities, facil 
 fences fence, fences 
 lighting light, lights, lighting 
 protection protect, protection, protecting, protected 
 sensors sensor, sensors, sensing 
 adversary adversary, adversaries, adver 
 analysis analysis, analyses, analyst 
 components component, components 
 delay delay, delayed 
 evaluation evaluate, evaluation, evaluating, evaluated 
 maintenance maintain, maintained, maintenance 
 material material, materials 
 reports report, reports, reported 
 response response, responses, respond, responds 
 testing test, testing, tested, tests 
 vulnerability vulnerability, vulnerable, vulnerabilities 
 control control, controlled, controller, controls 
 system system, systems 
   
   
6 assessment assess, assessment 
 design designed, design 
 doors door, doors 
 electrical electrical, electronics, electric 
 evaluation evaluate, evaluation, evaluating 
 identify identify, identification, identified, identity 
 level level, levels 
 lighting light, lights, lighting 
 planning plan, planning, plans 
 protection protect, protection,  protected 
 report report, reports,  reporting 
 response response, responses, respond 
 system systems, system 
 testing test, testing,  tests 
 vulnerability vulnerability, vulnerable, vulnerabilities 
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 cable cable, cables 
 cards cards, card 
 document document, documentation, documented 
 drawings drawing, drawings 
 installation install, installed, installation, installations 
 meeting meeting, meetings 
 monitoring monitor, monitors, monitoring 
 recommendation recommend, recommended, recommendation, 
recommendations 
 requirements requires, requirements, requirement 
 review review, reviews 
 acceptance acceptance, accept, acceptable 
 CCTV camera, cameras, CCTV 
 control control, controlled, controls 
 devices device, devices 
   
   
7 alarms alarm, alarms 
 biometric biometric, biometrics 
 cables cable, cables, cabling, coax 
 CCTV camera, cameras, video, CCTV 
 communication communication, communications, communicate 
 costs cost, costs 
 design designed, design, designing 
 detectors Detector, detectors 
 doors door, doors 
 electrical electrical, electronics, electric, electronic, 
electronically 
 field field, fields 
 level level, levels 
 lighting light,  lighting 
 monitoring monitor,  monitoring 
 protection protect, protection,  protected 
 sensor sensor, sensors 
 standards standard, standards, standardized 
 system systems, system 
 technology technology, technologies 
 testing test, testing, tested 
 applications application, applications 
 automation automation, automatic, automatically 
 badges badge, badges 
 devices device, devices 
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 employees employees, employee 
 functions functions, function 
 installation installation, install, installed, installing 
 location locations, location, located 
 panel panel, panels 
 project project, projects 
   
   
8 alarms alarm, alarms 
 barriers barrier, barriers 
 cards cards, card 
 CCTV camera, cameras, video, CCTV 
 communication communication, communications, communicating 
 control control, controls, controlled, controllers 
 design designed, design, designing 
 detection detection,  Detect 
 devices device, devices 
 doors door, doors 
 drawings drawing, drawings 
 electrical electrical, electronics, electric, electronic 
 guards guard, guards 
 locks lock, locks 
 monitoring monitor, monitors, monitoring, monitored 
 networks network, networks 
 project project, projects 
 system systems, system 
 technology technology, technologies 
 interface interface, interfaced, interfaces, interfacing 
 transmission transmission, transmit 
 contractor contractor, contractors 
 detectors detector, detectors 
   
   
9 analysis analysis, analyses 
 applications application, applications 
 attack attacks, attack, attacking 
 CCTV camera, camera, video, CCYV 
 communication communication, communications, communicate 
 detection detection,  Detect 
 devices device, devices 
 leadership leader, leadership, leading 
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 level level, levels 
 monitoring monitor,  monitoring, monitored 
 networks network, networks, networking 
 protection protect, protection, protecting, protected 
 sensors sensor, sensors 
 standards standard, standards 
 system systems, system 
 technology technology, technologies 
 policy policy, policies 
 server servers, server 
 integration integrate, integrated, integrating, integrator 
 model model, models 
 logical logic, logical 
 environment environment, environments, environmental 
 vendors vendor, vendors 
 computers computer, computers, computing 
 response response, respond 
   
   
10 building building, buildings 
 costs cost, costs 
 level level, levels 
 material material, materials 
 protection protect, protection,  protective 
 risk risk, risks 
 standards standard, standards 
 system systems, system 
 testing test, testing 
 incident incident, incidents 
 training train, training 
   
   
11 alarms alarm, alarms 
 assets asset, assets 
 communication communication, communications, communicate 
 costs cost, costs 
 crime crime, crimes, criminals 
 facility facility, facilities 
 incident incident, incidents 
 level level, levels 
 organization Organization, organizations 
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 planning plan, planning 
 protection protect, protection, protecting, protected, protective 
 report report, reports 
 response response,  respond, responding 
 risk risk, risks 
 system systems, system 
 threat threat, threats 
 training train, training, trained 
 law legal, law 
 prevention prevent, prevention 
 terrorism terrorism, terrorist, terrorists 
 weapons weapon, weapons 
 people people, personnel, staff 
 hazards hazard, hazards 
 detection detection, detect 
   
   
12 alarms alarm, alarms 
 attack attacks, attack 
 building building, buildings 
 cards cards, card 
 control control, controls, controlled 
 costs cost, costs 
 crime crime, crimes, criminal 
 design designed, design 
 devices device, devices 
 doors door, doors 
 internal interior, internal 
 keys key, keys 
 law legal, law, laws 
 lighting light,  lighting 
 locks lock, locks, locking, locked 
 people people, persons, personnel, individuals, employees 
 policy policy, policies 
 prevention prevent, prevention 
 protection protect, protection, protecting, protected, protective 
 reports report, reports, reported, reporting 
 risk risk, risks 
 standards standard, standards 
 terrorism terrorism, terrorist, terrorists, terror 
 loss loss, losses 
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 theft theft, thefts 
 facility facility, facilities 
 planning plan, planning 
 response response, respond, responses 
 threat threats, threat 
 level level, levels 
 surveys survey, surveys 
   
   
13 alarms alarm, alarms 
 application application, applications 
 assets asset, assets 
 attack attacks, attack, attacker 
 barriers barrier, barriers 
 biometric biometric, biometrics 
 control control, controls, controlled 
 costs cost, costs 
 environment environment, environments, environmental, environ 
 evaluation evaluate, evaluation,  evaluated 
 Organization Organization, organizational, Organizations 
 people people,  person 
 planning plan, planning, plans 
 response response,  respond 
 risk risk, risks 
 standards standard, standards 
 system systems, system 
 technology technology, technologies, technological, technical 
 testing test, testing, tested 
 threat threat, threats 
 assessment assess, assessed, assessing, assessment, assessments 
 concepts concepts, concept 
 context context, contexts 
 critical critical, criticality 
 decision decision, decisions 
 principles principle, principles 
 process processing, process, processes 
 resources resource, resources 
 strategy strategy, strategies 
 detection detection, detected, detecting 
 protection protection, protecting, protected 
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14 alarms alarm, alarms 
 assets asset, assets 
 building building, buildings 
 CCTV camera, camera,  CCTV 
 costs cost, costs 
 crime crime, crimes 
 design design, designing, designer 
 environment environment, environments, environmental 
 facility facility, facilities 
 fences fence, fences, fencing 
 lighting light, lights, lighting 
 standards standard, standards 
 system systems, system 
 terrorism terrorism, terrorist 
 vulnerability vulnerability, vulnerabilities 
 zones zone, zones, zoning 
 access access, entry 
 codes code, codes 
 employees employee, employees 
 people people, public 
   
   
15 assets asset, assets 
 bolts bolt, bolts 
 building building, buildings 
 cards cards, card 
 CCTV camera, cameras, video, CCTV 
 crime crime, crimes, criminal, criminals 
 design designed, design, designing 
 detection detection,  detect, detector 
 devices device, devices 
 doors door, doors 
 facility facility, facilities 
 fences fence, fences 
 guard guard, guards 
 interior interior, internal 
 keys key, keys 
 level level, levels 
 lighting light, lights, lighting 
 locks lock, locks, 
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 people people,  personnel, staff 
 planning plan, planning 
 response response,  respond 
 standards standard, standards 
 procedures procedure, procedures, process, processes 
 vehicles vehicle, vehicles 
 alarms alarm, alarms 
 attack attack, attacks 
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Appendix I 
PHASE FOUR PARTICIPANT’S LEARNING OBJECTIVES 
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Appendix J 
PHASE FOUR’S INDEPENDANT NOTE TAKER’S NOTES 
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Appendix K 
PHASE TWO PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT 
 
Michael Coole  _ Braden 
MC: The first table is this one Braden and it is a list of knowledge categories on 
their own, the argument is that any cultural domain, when you look at 
physical security, it is actually a cultural domain, we see it as a profession 
but it actually comes from a cultural domain and that is based on a single 
semantic relationship with a cover term which for us is security. When I did 
the count check analysis it worked out well for me because security came up 
as the top thing. What that means to us as educators is that the first thing we 
have to teach is the concept of security, you have to know what you are 
trying to attain. In terms of say system, a lot of the feedback is that that is 
not so much as functional systems but systems theory, how we integrate 
components together to achieve our objective according to that plan, there is 
no point putting something into the system that is going to be more 
disruptive than good. Is there anything you don’t understand? They are the 
top 49 categories from all the different text. One of the things with this I 
didn’t have control of the raw table that is what comes out of the literature 
extraction. The theory behind that is the experts in the domain are the ones 
who write the text books so what occurs more frequently in the printed text 
it captures that domain space. The other one I’ve got is table 1, this is what 
some of the knowledge concept categories that some of the other experts 
said this is what you are missing. For instance, one of the participants said 
door furniture, hinges locks all that becomes under door furniture for them 
from a project management perspective. Things like understanding 
structural strength, one guy said the concept of surveillance supersedes 
CCTV and CPTED so you need to understand what the surveillance 
objective is and then how do we achieve that. Are there any that you 
disagree with in here? 
BRADEN: Nothing I disagree with , a few of them I would think you would categorise 
in similar things, for example field review lenses to me is CCTV, straight 
away I would be thinking that is under CCTV, they are probably the things, 
like devices again you’ve got senses and devices.  
MC: Yes, one guy said devices should be removed. 
BRADEN: I think categorising these into smaller categories is something that stands 
out.  
MC: One of the things I will do is go through concept reduction, say this is super 
ordinate to this and this is subordinate, and in fact this table that is what we 
have tried to do, the order of this is how they appear in the extracted text so 
where CPTED comes up is where it came up as an numerical count analysis, 
across all the text and that is one of the things, basically this provides a 
matrix of knowledge areas, things like access control, so we know a key 
area of physical security is controlling access and what is interesting is the 
concept of control is one of the things that comes up often, anything to do 
with physical security that’s what we are trying to achieve.  
BRADEN: Nothing I don’t disagree with, more and more I think communications and 
infrastructure will come up more, I think that is what we are seeing come 
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through in the last 5 years or so. 
MC: When you are talking about communication are you talking about the ability 
to communicate with clients both written and that or are you talking about 
communication technology? 
BRADEN: Communication technologies, so infrastructure, networks so sort of the 
merging between your traditional systems, electronic access control, CCTV 
and how they communicate so communication technology, that is definitely 
something that is becoming more and more important especially we are now 
sharing communication technologies with other technologies not only 
security technologies so that is becoming more and more important as well.  
MC: One of the guys said network fundamental is vitally important, would you 
agree with that? 
BRADEN: Definitely. That is the communicat8ion method of how we are actually 
emerging and integrating all these technologies. 
MC: That seems to be coming up and I mean here it has networks and what does 
that really mean, networks keeps coming up and the other thing, one of the 
things that they’ve done at the ECU course is put in an option for a cyber-
security stream within that degree as a major, and that is becoming quite 
popular.  
BRADEN: I do see the two quite separate, the network fundamentals is essential for a 
security consultant and for what we do because we need to understand how 
do networks work and what sort of infrastructure do we need to put in to 
make sure our systems can communicate, the fundamentals is what we need 
to know. Do we need to know about cyber security when we are putting 
those things together – probably not; do we need to understand the 
fundamentals – yeah. 
MC: I did a thing on CCTV Wi-Fi vulnerabilities and it was quite easy to hack a 
lot of the Wi-Fi systems.  
BRADEN: I know a few clients here that basically the hard wire they protect but as 
soon as they put in Wi-Fi hot spots all of a sudden there is a back door into 
getting footage out of the cameras on the site. They are completely oblivious 
until a contractor says “that is how we configure our cameras, we just use 
your Wi-Fi”. 
MC: Do you think there is anything missing then, apart from networks, is there 
anything that you felt you would have been better to be abreast of? One of 
the guys last week said project management. 
BRADEN: I would agree with that because we, generally a client will come to us and 
they want to roll out a security project and then we then become almost the 
project manager for that project. On behalf of the client we go out to tender 
and select contractors, we do an evaluation on behalf of the client and then 
we will recommend what contractor should do the work and then when it is 
being implemented we then manage them and make sure they have a 
program of works that meets the clients expectations and then follow up and 
make sure it is installed as per specifications. 
MC: So then that generally includes contract management as well? 
BRADEN: Yes, contract management, being superintendent. 
MC: A lot of these things, some of them were taught in the old ECU degree and 
some of them have been dropped off and once again this is purely for 
looking at a general education framework so it doesn’t matter if a US 
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university or a Sydney university wants to teach it, it is what are those 
broader knowledge categories that combine to produce someone. Also the 
focus is someone who goes out, one of the things that is becoming clearer is 
– you need to go out as a graduate. You are not going out just because 
you’ve done a degree as this person up here, a lot of people think if I do a 
degree, whereas if you look at medicine, accounting, all these other 
professions – you go into a graduate position, even law you graduate from 
law and you go through that graduate process, in the intelligence domain 
they call it the journey man where it takes you two years to turn you into a 
competent person. 
BRADEN: Definitely. SKM Jacobs they have done that, so when we are employed we 
go through a four year graduate program with all the other engineers, and 
that is all about having that graduate title to say you have done your degree 
but you are a graduate for four years until the senior people in the business 
believe that you are up to the standard of being a security consultant. 
MC: That is good to know actually. What this table has done here and you can 
see the idea is that this table has organised the concepts hierarchically and 
then this figure just flows off. So the argument is all this figure is a heuristic 
that connects the hierarchical table so that is the raw categories just 
organised based on some of those principles. I guess with that do you think 
any of them need to be relocated, do you think that we have captured, some 
of it not all of it is going to be linear, although we are trying to capture that 
relationship. 
BRADEN: CPTED is an interesting one, being under the – if you see that as a 
technology and you’ve got all the technologies down one side, CPTED 
being associated to a technology I think is potentially in the wrong location. 
I wouldn’t say it’s a technology, definitely associated to surveillance but not 
necessarily technology. 
MC: so where would you put it? 
BRADEN: I guess you’ve got defence in depth and situation crime here with 
emergency so potentially under facility procedures, but associated to 
situational crime prevention. I see those two things related.  
MC: That’s a good point. This is one of the hardest things to try and get an 
understanding of how that knowledge is organised, how the hierarchical 
concepts are related. 
BRADEN: I think security surveys and risk are associated to some extent, usually if 
you are doing a survey it is part of the risk processes that you are 
undertaking. I see you have risk up the top that sort of includes everything 
so that is probably right. It all makes sense. 
MC: The idea of that is to produce a heuristic, just a rule of thumb. It’s just about 
having a diagram to represent how knowledge is related or fits together like 
that, do you see any problems with developing that from that table, looking 
at it that way should we probably include it or should it be changed about? 
BRADEN: I think graphically it makes sense. The infrastructure one sort of jumps out a 
little bit that you are including everything under infrastructure, I guess the 
definition of infrastructure is probably the thing that is hardest to define, 
when I see infrastructure I think of network infrastructure probably more 
than anything else, but understand the terminologies would include a lot 
more than that. 
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Sharne & Michael Coole 
SHARNE:  So far in principle I agree with everything that you have said, I’m not sure 
that I totally see this particular model or table here being of much value and 
probably end up asking more question than answers, because some of it 
100% relevant and the rest of it to me stands out in isolation. The principle 
would be rather than doing that I would be looking at categorising those 
things. I suppose a bit about me, I’m a graduate from the ECU course, I 
think I was the second graduating year so quite early in the piece, since 
leaving I’ve been in consulting for 15 years now, so quite limited in terms of 
industry expertise, in only having exposure to consulting engineering and 
the practices we do rather than some others, like my brother qualified in the 
year after me at the same course at the same time, he spent a year or two out 
at security operations as a security manager for Woodside Building, so we 
have similar backgrounds. I don’t know how the course has moved on or 
evolved since Cliff Smith originally put it together and I’m not intending to 
make comparisons except to say the way we were taught seems more 
logical, all the same principles there, it’s been 15 years plus since I’ve 
touched basis with the course and I don’t know how they still do it, but at 
the time it seemed to me to be quite logical and I think back to how I learnt, 
seems a little bit more logical than what I’m seeing here, which is a random 
series of ideas. Just on that, the way they roughly broke it up then and I 
think it is pretty good background for anybody who are looking to come into 
the industry, it was based on a series of categories so you had physical 
security 1, 2, under the physical security 1 it took care of all the absolute 
fundamentals – locks, barriers, keys, all of the principles, physical security 2 
then started to look into some of the slightly more complex elements of 
physical security so you’ve gone beyond safes, vaults, locks, keys and 
started to look how you put those physical barriers together to come up with 
a physical solution. Then I think there was computer security, there was 
security risk management – so a whole bunch of quite logical categories 
which all this stuff fits into. It just seems a little bit more logical, if I look 
back now after the experience, I’ve also employed a lot of graduates and 
worked with a lot of graduates both coming from the course and coming 
from industry, I think one of the good things about the background I got out 
of the course was initially it was very broad, the negative side to that is that 
there wasn’t very much focus post. So they had really good broad 
background knowledge in terms of the subjects they looked at, then in terms 
of security management we had security risk management 1 and 2 and it 
covered all of it broadly, other than that you got a degree in security and you 
had to go and do a minor of business management. So I think if there was a 
more tailored end to it. 
MC: And that is what this is about, trying to get a focus for people. 
SHARNE: If I look at that now I got a minor in business management. I can see 
criminology being relevant if you are interested in that field. A lot of people 
I came across at the time either did the criminology course or went and did 
the minor at criminology at ECU. You mentioned it early when you were 
talking about statistical analysis, that is almost a totally separate issue to 
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what physical security professionals do, there is plenty of people out there 
that do risk analysis on theoretical statistical analysis, wouldn’t know the 
first thing about how to protect something, I would almost say that in itself, 
the whole criminology side, is a totally different stream in itself. But so if 
that is what you are looking at then absolutely I think it would make sense 
to have a degree as a psychical security professional, and then even in what 
we do now, out of some of these categories that you are talking about, as I 
was say within our career and within our team we have got people that come 
from an engineering background you’ve got people like myself that come 
from quite a general background so I’m learning the engineering on the job. 
When you flip that the engineers don’t understand the fundamentals like 
crime prevention, environmental design, defence in depth all those 
principles, they have learnt that on the job. I think the ability to look at the 
market sector that you are considering going into it kind of makes sense that 
you should be able to specialise in risk or specialise in design and 
engineering or specialise in computer security and ICT, cyber security. 
MC: That is the way it is going, a lot of them are doing different minor and major 
sets to support that very notion.  What I’m trying to say is in the physical 
security text so what I’ve done is I’ve going into the security text, 15 of 
them, and I’ve extracted from each text the top  49 security areas, so risk 
and threat things like that and then I combine it as a summation and that is 
what this is pulled out.  Something that has come forward, when I did the 
initial category stuff so you get this category here, some of the experts I 
interviewed earlier said you haven’t got things like door furniture which is 
super-ordinate to locks and hinges so architects talk in terms of door 
furniture; defence in depth is a thing that doesn’t come up very often in 
terms of its saliency, things like surveillance is an overarching concept for 
CCTV, structural strengths – how do we know what the engineer is telling 
us in terms of that so what I’m looking at today in the first part and things 
like that. So what I’m looking at today is to ask are there any of these 
knowledge areas that you don’t think are relevant to physical security or are 
there any that are missing. One of the guys said earlier, I wish I had of learnt 
to read architects plans and I never did.  
SHARNE:  I think that is a valid point as an example, again it becomes a little bit 
confusing around what we are trying to achieve here, are we trying to 
produce graduates that can come out of the course and go into a design 
related type field such as consulting or is that too focused. 
MC: No, what I’m looking at is a security person, could be  Diploma in Physical 
Security or a graduate from a university course, not just Edith Cowan and 
I’m saying someone who is a Protective Security Adviser, so in Federal 
Government they have PSAs, Dept of Defence and ASIO has PSAs, in the 
consulting world we are called consultants, I’m looking not so much 
Security management but how people look at and diagnose a security 
problem and I suppose design a security system to treat that problem but I’m 
looking at a graduate. I’m not saying when you graduate you should be the 
equivalent of someone with 12 years’ experience because it’s not practical. 
If you look at someone in accounting, graduates go to a graduate position, 
nurses go into a graduate position, doctors are the same they become 
interns. A friend of mine who graduated from law was carrying books for a 
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year, all these other professional areas recognise that someone coming out 
of university is a graduate, if you look at psychology you graduate from 
university, you have to do your registration and supervision under that. 
What I’m saying is - what is the knowledge we want someone to graduate 
with that then we can professionally develop them over time. Because one 
of the things that security has done poorly in the past is we believe that we 
are training people that go out there and day one they are running the show 
and it is just not reality, no other profession does that. 
SHARNE: You might want to talk, maybe a phone interview with Lane (my brother), 
he also did his doctorate or thesis, he spent 12 years studying something 
similar around this so maybe he can contribute to what you are doing. 
MC: The other thing I’ve done and you said that before, if you at taxonomy of 
knowledge areas because on its own this means nothing, there’s two ways 
I’m doing this, first of all I’m looking at how we present it to people and 
then how we present it to graduates. One of the arguments they say, when 
they look at a domain such as this it is based on what they call hierarchical 
relationships so some things are subordinate or superordinate to others, this 
comes out of ethnographic research so when they look at a merging domain 
the knowledge categories themselves and then they look at their 
relationships so this led to a final diagram and this is dynamic. One of the 
other guys said some of it isn’t linear and later on I’m doing an MDS 
questionnaire where mathematically I might take 35 of these concepts 
forward and they will all be related to each other so mathematically we will 
get this grid where the summation of everyone’s beliefs are where things are 
related they will sit, the first thing they say is they should have a greater 
understanding of the connection so the hierarchy so the concept of security 
sits above everything else and then imbedded under that is the notion of law 
because security has to comply with the law and that sort of thing so what 
this leads onto and this becomes a heuristic, so we will be able to say to 
students here is a the physical domain, here’s the knowledge categories so 
we learn about threat and risk and systems and CCTV and access control 
and here is how it fit together. It’s the same thing, a lot of graduates don’t 
know how to employ what they learn, they don’t know how to integrate new 
information with pre-existing information, they don’t sometimes understand 
why they are learning something. For instance if someone did four weeks of 
electrical security and they are thinking I’m studying security what am I 
doing electrical security for. Very quickly when you look at something 
heuristic like this you see that electrical fits in with technology and if you 
don’t understand how basic switches and that fit together and operate. 
SHARNE: I think that is an absolutely must from the graduates we see. 
MC: For my thesis I’m looking at what are the knowledge areas or categories so 
do we need to teach threat and as part of that risk do we need to teach 
system design or CPTED, what are the knowledge categories and how do 
they fit together so we can say to people well this is why you need to learn 
this.   
SHARNE: I can give you some practical examples of areas that just come to mind, if I 
compare myself and what I was equipped with coming out of university 
from the degree I did versus some of the engineers and graduates that I work 
with. One of the big gaps I see is, rightly or wrongly because of the structure 
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of the course at ECU, most of it was about report writing so I can write a 
report and I can analyse an issue and I can to a conclusion, I can draw 
something that is grey and come to what I believe is a logical approach. One 
of the whole things around security is, particularly when you are dealing 
with engineers every day, there was that whole debate to is it an engineering 
discipline or is it a science, and I firmly believe it is a science, and one of 
the issues I think engineering firms struggle with is the first thing they come 
to us and say where is the standard that tells me how to do this, and when 
you say there isn’t a standard and the answer is I believe this, they struggle 
with that concept because everything they do comes out of a standard, and 
as long as they are within the guidelines of those standards then they are 
okay which then relates back to what you’ve touched on already in terms of 
if you don’t have the theory behind you in terms of how to analyse risk, how 
to analyse threat, if you don’t have the knowledge of how security 
operations security management work, again you haven’t looked at the risk 
and you can’t analyse a problem then you will never come up with the 
security solution because you can only see from an engineering point of 
view and we come across that daily with some of our engineer graduates 
where literally until it is at design development stage where all the concept 
and scoping have been done and you give them a problem and say right 
here’s the problem this is the solution or come up with a solution to this, not 
a problem. Go away come up with the schematics, come up with a design – 
done. But give them that initial problem without all that background and 
without having solved we believe the solution should be and they just look 
at you and can’t understand what am I designing and another thing they 
cannot write a report. Engineers cannot write a report. So I map all of this 
back to, ironically when I did the degree my background comes more in the 
analysis risk and threat side, I had to learn the engineering, I’ve ended up in 
a role in the job where design and engineering is primarily what I do and I 
had to learn that on the job but I think it works, I can do both, I look at the 
engineers and they come up with a wonderful CCTV design but if you ask 
them why the majority of the time they don’t really know. 
MC: One of the guys in my focus group said is diagnosis, at the end of the day 
we can get an engineer to build a wall or we can get an engineer to design a 
system but if they don’t know what they are designing then they are useless 
in terms of the solution. 
SHARNE:  Absolutely, fundamental to being a physical security practitioner. 
MC: When you talk about engineering design, one of the things we have 
struggled with for example, I believe that students should know the math 
that sits behind it, when you are designing a CCTV it is based on a field of 
view so you need to be able to calculate that field of view. When you look at 
structural resistance to force so if we say the threat is a truck travelling at 80 
kms per hour 2.5 tonnes, we need to understand the structural resistance to 
that in terms of threat. A lot of people say when no that is the engineer’s 
role, what is your position based on your experience? 
SHARNE: I think that comes down to the philosophy of that particular professional or 
practice, we like to think that we do here everything from the risk, threat 
assessment scoping, through to the detailed engineering. Having said that if 
you are talking about vehicle ratings and vehicle penetration testing, I’m not 
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a structural engineering so we would still engage the requirements of a 
structural engineer to do relevance of that but we would like to think the 
security consultant has been involved with and carries the design through all 
the way and doesn’t rely on a structural engineer. So in the designs we put 
forward the security take the lead and they seek input from engineers, 
architects etc. to do that. So I suppose yes is the answer to all of that. Other 
consultants are different, plenty of consultants that are out there and call 
themselves physical security professionals, and in some cases their primary 
role, and a lot of our clients can be that way, they will do the initial risk 
assessment but when it comes to technical design they will get somebody 
else to do it, that is for professional reasons, for commercial business 
reasons for a whole range of skill limitations, there are other consultants that 
will do a design up to concept level and get the contractors to design and do 
all the calculations and all of that. I don’t think that is the right way to go, if 
it is a developing profession which it is we should be setting up training and 
educating our graduates to understand all of that information and to produce 
with all of the calculations they need to do whether it is designing a CCTV 
system or understanding the broad calculations for vehicle and bollard 
protection. But you are right you need to be able to come to the point to 
understand you are not a structural engineer, at some point you expose 
yourself and the client if you believe you are. That was the other point I was 
going to make earlier, there are people who will consider themselves a 
physical security professional but under physical security they are talking in 
the risk threat assessment sphere. So when you use the term physical 
security professional are you also considering those people who do more 
risk work and don’t actually do the design. 
 
WAYNE & Michael Coole 
WG: So all these in your research are a part of the banner of physical security. 
MC: We have the concept of security itself but we also have things like CCTV. 
With systems, what came out of my last phase of the study was that it more 
relates to systems theory and the principles of systems, so different security 
systems, for example a push bike, you can have a very expensive pushbike 
or your Kmart cheap pushbike but they are both systems. So security is the 
same, if you look at the security for a domestic dwelling even a higher level 
domestic dwelling as opposed to a prison, they are completely different. So 
the argument was that the notion of a security system has to sit within the 
principles of systems theory so that systems theory becomes one of those 
categories that we need to teach. Things like keys, barriers so they are sort 
of areas that have emerged that security professionals need to be abreast of 
and one of the things I am trying to work out is, if you look at an alarm 
installer, a security professional doesn’t need to know how to install the 
alarm per say, but he needs to understand it, but his role is not to go there 
and start wiring it up, same as locks, he needs to understand locking systems 
principles but does he need to be a locksmith. 
WG: No, but it is a fine line I’m finding especially, otherwise you can have the 
wool pulled over your eyes to such an extent that you rely on the guys in the 
field, the contractors and if you don’t know exactly shouldn’t those wires by 
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the other way around because you are not doing the monitoring back at the 
system like the system says it can do then I assume it’s doing but it’s not 
really because you haven’t actually done it like that. It’s a very fine line, a 
lot finer that I thought it would be when I first joined if I’m honest. The 
ability to have to know and look in a rack or cabinet and see what it all 
means is a huge learning curve. 
MC: If you look at CCTV it’s a knowledge area in of its own right. And so the 
question is when you start to look at the depth and breadth of just physical 
security, what is it that we need to know and more importantly for education 
what do we need to teach? 
WG: One of the main ones that came to me,  I guess coming from Uni straight 
into, I guess this is my first job, was we never did anything with engineering 
drawings, that was a huge learning curve. 
MC: I think you are spot on there, in fact one of the other participants said things 
like engineering drawings and you will see there that it is not a category that 
is actually on there. 
WG: Yes and while I wouldn’t attribute it to physical security per say I guess we 
have a unique view of physical security, we tend to see that more as your 
barrier type things, things that aren’t electronic essentially. And while we 
see they are a major component of security holistically the management of 
physical and electronic, there would be a whole lot of things in here that if 
asked would you see those as physical security we would probably say not 
particularly no, like CCTV for instance. 
MC: So in terms of that is there any lines that you don’t understand? 
WG: Facility contextualisation, what does that refer to? 
MC: In the American language they use the concept of physical characterisation, 
understanding the facility, so if we look at a prison, well this is Casuarina 
prison it’s a maximum security prison, what are the threats that propose a 
risk, how does it operate. The argument is universities have their own 
characterisation.  In the extracted terms facility characterisation came out 
but all of the other experts that I interviewed, they said you still haven’t 
captured context so the security context sits above everything, so trying to 
understand and trying to get a word or term to actually captures context was 
very very hard. We ended up merging facility characterisation with the 
notion of context so contextualisation so what is this facility, what does it 
do, how does it do it, why does it do it etc. Understanding –if you don’t 
understanding that facility you can’t understand the threats that propose a 
risk and therefore diagnose the problem and look at treatment. It is a sort of 
combination of Australian vernacular and American language because most 
of the books are written in America.  
WG: But otherwise yes. There is nothing on there that I don’t understand 
otherwise. I need to get my head around the fact of when you are talking 
about physical security you are talking about security as such not barriers 
and bollards and walls.  
MC: When we are looking at physical security, if you look at a system device or 
practice of a tangible nature in terms of stopping someone, and I use the 
word control and you see control actually appears there, physical security is 
about control, so you look at a physical protection system for a prison it’s 
about controlling the ingress and egress if you look at the environment even 
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here you still have physical security and what we look at is technical, 
physical and procedural elements as they couple together. That comes out of 
trimbox so it’s a category within the security risk management body of 
knowledge and as I said its separate to security management so security 
management has connotations of management of supervising people so for 
example in your role you wouldn’t be supervising guards, you wouldn’t be 
writing up duty rosters, you wouldn’t be budgeting, that sort of stuff and 
from a jurisdictional boundary that does become the area of security 
management. One of the problems is how do we articulate a course, 
someone says I want to become a ‘security manager’ and I have had to do 
this, I say you need to go to management school and do these three units in 
management theory. What I’ve found is we talk about security professionals 
and it’s become this globalised term and we are finding we are capturing 
people who focus in terrorism, fraud prevention and a lot of them come 
from economic back grounds but are still security professionals per say. I’m 
looking at the diagnosis and treatment of physical access, say you look at a 
supermarket, they might have some physical security and all this is captured 
in it, some people say it is really an engineering degree, but it’s not because 
I’ve got engineers and they say they know nothing about procedures they 
calculate physical resistant to manipulation, stress.   
 So do you agree in principle with most of it or do you have any you don’t 
agree with? 
WG: Coming from the angle you are coming from I don’t think there is anything 
that I don’t. Maybe security surveys actually, where does that fit in from a 
physical security point? 
MC: If you look at a lot of the books on security, once again they are very 
American centric, they talk about security survey conducting an analysis of 
the facility, understanding its threats and vulnerabilities and then reporting 
on those, they talk about security surveys, door locks, are there door locks 
and it is looking at the whole facility so you look at Casuarina and they say 
we want you to do a security survey, and I always believe they are 
contextually, a security survey for someone moving from the inside to the 
out is different from someone moving from the outside to in for assistance 
as different from someone trying to move drugs around internally, they are 
very contextual. The idea is that it’s an inspection of the whole process so 
textual, physical and procedural. One of the guys actually said devices, he 
seemed to think that the word devices because it covers alarms, access 
control, automatic bollards and all that, he said you captured those and 
questioned whether you needed the word devices or whether it is an over-
encompassing term. 
WG: I can see where he is coming from. Couldn’t think of anything else off the 
top of my head that I would put in there additionally, I think most of it is 
well and truly covered. 
MC: Just the one you said before, things like engineering drawings. That is a 
knowledge thing, and one of the questions I will be asking my focus group 
is what do you need to learn prior to graduation of any course and what do 
you get on the job training. I mean at this stage the depth comes from on the 
job. 
WG:  Absolutely, you learn terminology and things like that is mainly what I’ve 
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found coming into it. I’d say the majority of what I’ve done if I looked at it, 
you’ve got some mock up assignments how would you secure this facility or 
how would you do that and when you look at how you would actually do 
that now having been in industry, it is actually quite different to the 
theoretical component of how you would do it, with unlimited budget and 
letting your mind go.  
GARRHETT & Michael Coole 
Michael Coole  _ Garrhett 
MC: What I’ve found is the jurisdictional boundaries, we talk about security 
professionals, no one really has defined that security professional, if you go 
to Australian Bureau of Statistics there is no job listing for a security 
professional, there’s engineers,  there’s alarm installers, locksmiths but no 
and one of the things I’ve found is that knowledge is separate. When I was 
at justice, managing people, that organising, planning, leading, controlling, 
staffing, budgeting they are completely different knowledge skill requisites 
to diagnosing. What I’ve found so far is when we look at the physical 
security professional or consultant, or protective advisor the knowledge is 
based down of this concept of diagnosing the problem, inferring or 
reasoning about it, in terms of understanding it and treatment. That comes 
from medicine, they diagnose, they reason and they work through the 
process of exclusion where they try different things and eventually they will 
have a diagnosis. In security we can’t necessarily exclude, they do that in 
safe manufacturing where as someone beats a control they then adjust it, but 
security we construct the problem, so we diagnose by construction looking 
at threats and such that. What I’ve found is our knowledge is requisite based 
on diagnosing the problem in terms of physical security or access control 
and it’s about that broader concept of control and treating it but not its 
ongoing management that is the area of security management. You are not 
worried about writing staff rosters. I remember I would spend a whole day 
to cover one shift because you ring up five guys and they say they don’t 
want to work. That is security management whereas what you guys do is 
very different. 
Garrhett: Operations and consulting  
MC: It’s funny you said things like policy, this comes to what I’ve been doing, 
policy has never come out of it. One of the arguments is that the experts 
write the text books, and the more something appears in a text the more 
salient it is within that domain space so I reviewed 15 security text books 
and I did a count analysis on every word and then I did kick words, then I 
got the top 49 words from that extracted text, so I did that 15 times and then 
added it all together to get the top  49 of all the extracted text and that 
developed this table here and what this is is a combination of broader 
concepts, some core knowledge such as CPTED and CCTV, and some what 
they call professional skills or enabling skills such as writing reports and 
things like that. Now this is based on the argument that for me physical 
security is a cultural domain and it comes out of ethnographic research and 
they argue that a cultural domain is based on a single semantic relationship 
with its cover term which for us should be security and luckily for me when 
I did the count analysis that is what came up. So these are organised based 
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on how often they came up in extracted text. 
Garrhett: Did you have a look at how they had defined these terms? 
MC: Yes, the synonymous terms was the biggest headache I’ve had in this study 
so far and what I’ve had to do is look at different definitions across different 
text and I went through a synonymous term merging. What I also had to 
accept is that it can’t be perfect, security uses the same words in different 
ways.  
Garrhett: That is something that we do as well, when you say physical security for us 
we are talking about walls and bars and gates because when in an 
engineering context we have got elec technology, we’ve got operational and 
physical, so that is how us as a firm, and we communicate to our clients, I 
think that is quite common in consulting or engineering practice for security 
consultants. Regularly in a proposal we would say we could advise on 
physical security but would have a structural engineering design it for us. 
MC: Yes and if you say protective security people think about policy, procedures 
things like that as well. What I had to defer to was how the text books define 
physical security, so device system or practice of a tangible nature in terms 
and even that, I saw on Linked-in that all these jobs for physical security 
professionals and thought what is that, that is what my thesis is about – what 
is a security professional generally and what is their knowledge and more 
importantly, this is not security thesis it’s an education thesis. 
Garrhett: That was the same as my security research program when I did my 
bachelors, when I did my undergrad I did an education one, the taxonomy of 
education was my underlying theory, that was a while ago so I know where 
you are going from – you are doing it for security but you are in a different 
domain. 
MC: I’m going to get senior guys together at the end and run some focus groups, 
show them this is what we’ve come up with and here are the two different 
knowledge structures. One of the things that the table is based on the 
argument that the knowledge is organised hierarchically but I’m doing a 
mathematical one and multi-dimensional statistical scale – an MDS map and 
that’s because it is not all linear so that will tell us how every concept is 
related to every other concept and so it will be what does this mean for 
education. 
 So what we have here is just those top 49 categories and I guess the first 
question is, is there any that you don’t understand or anything you don’t 
agree with, some of them are concepts like control, the argument is that 
physical security is about control so it’s a broader concept so things like 
defence in depth help us achieve that control. Things like system, in the 
pilot study it came out that when we talk about systems as a concept is 
different to alarm systems, systems theory is the overarching theme that 
people need to know. 
Garrhett: Do you have this defined. 
MC: Some of it is defined, one of the things I’m going to have to do is try and go 
through and do a clear definition, some of it comes from engineering, so if 
you look at structural strength that is an engineering term not a security 
term.  
Garrhett: For me to say yes or no I agree if I have system in here is what you mean by 
system but otherwise I’d say system is not too important, but look it’s come 
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second on the list has it? 
MC: Yes and in fact every text it came up first initially so the notion of systems, 
if you look at Mary Lynne’s books and things like that the physical 
protection system is what they refer to. 
Garrhett: I don’t know if you’ve heard of, It was originally the Kieran triangle and 
that is basically our system when we are talking and when we have added in 
a cost benefit so it is more like a diamond now because we try to sell that to 
the client as well but that is basically our approach, that is our system, so I 
can see where systems would be. 
MC: That is one of the things that I developed, when we took the Kieran triangle, 
we had security risk management up here that was the systems driver and 
then the system you had the technical, your physical, your procedural and 
your management in the middle and what we ended up with was this sort of 
triangle where these are all interrelated, we did this for a critical 
infrastructure text.  So security management sat within here in terms of 
managing the technical, physical and procedural and so you had threat 
sitting above here, so where you had threat and then you had intent and all 
that sort of stuff, this was T4 model, so then this was part of your monitor 
and review and so the idea  was that system was driven top down, these 
were the operational variables but this was relating to decay, but decay in 
the system occurs from the bottom up so the decay at each of the constitutes 
represents a decay and risk treatment. So that was an adjustment of the 
Kieran triangle. 
Garrhett: I think one of the issues that we have in risk management is that it is 
important to say that decisions are based on risk management etc. but it is 
hard to oversell when you have a new client because sometimes it can come 
back to bite you, they might not have a budget for risk management, they 
might not have an appetite to do a risk assessment, even though as security 
professionals we know steps risks need to be taken. You talk to a layman 
and they have a budget to just put in cameras and if our proposals or if our 
approach is so risk based we can actually lose the work. 
MC: That is a hard one because not always the controls, if you look at CCTV it 
doesn’t necessarily reduce risk. 
Garrhett: Yes they’ve just got that in their head. We find that a lot, compared to 
Dubai, I’m finding that more in Perth that we will go to a client who will 
say we want a security concept plan and we have to go in and sell the fact 
that, look you haven’t asked for a risk assessment you obviously don’t have 
a budget for it but as part of our concept we are going to do a brief one for 
you and we have to very careful about not over committing to the risk 
assessment because that can become a huge amount of work and we just 
have to list a couple of things for them. Whereas in Dubai they had a very 
clear process, the guys up above were basically you need to do a risk 
assessment and it was just part and in ground into the whole construction 
process so it is very easy to go in and just do a risk assessment and then base 
your design off it. Out here, I’ve heard guys say risk assessments are a black 
art, it’s like well they are really important they are not really as big in Perth 
as I’ve found in other places. 
MC: People expect you to come and say here’s your problem, now here’s your 
system, they don’t want to pay for that diagnosis. 
P a g e  | 441 
 
Garrhett: Sometimes we get engaged by security managers who already think they 
know, I don’t know if they’ve done an internal risk assessment that they 
don’t show us or they believe they already know how to fix it and they just 
engage us to design it. 
MC: That is part of that overlap, some people say they know what their 
vulnerabilities are. I had that in Laos, I did a job on a gold mine and they 
said we know what’s wrong we just want you to come up and recommend 
some stuff and when I got there I thought you had so far missed the mark 
and they were talking about technology and saying they want this and they 
want that, I was thinking this place is in the middle of the jungle, the 
technology they had was so decrepit it wasn’t working and they couldn’t 
maintain what they had, do you really want more technology. Their biggest 
vulnerability was they had no comms, we said if you want to increase 
security put in a communications tower and increase comms across the site 
and we divided the site up into sectors. When we went back he said that was 
gold. Most of the stuff we recommended was CPTED because they couldn’t 
get the maintainers in the jungle to fix technology. 
Garrhett: I can understand that, is the technology available and maintainable. 
MC: So with this what I’ve had to do, some of it is very operational such as lens, 
the argument is that this knowledge is therefore organised hierarchically so 
some things sit super ordinate or subordinate to others and all this is a way 
of trying to organise knowledge because this is a random matrix based on 
how they came out in the count analysis so I had no control on how this 
table was ordered. This table has tried to order it hierarchal and this leads to 
this graphic heuristic so the argument is this comes from cultural domain 
analysis, what we can have we can show how different knowledge is related 
to other knowledge, so for a student you can ask why am I learning about 
technology, why am I learning about delay, how does response fit in, how 
does risk fit into design and planning, so the idea is that it is just a heuristic 
to say here are the knowledge categories and this is how the domain 
knowledge fits together. What we’ve found is professional practice based on 
diagnosis, inference and treatment in this the diagnosis sits at the top almost 
and the inference and treatment sits coming in under that. My first question 
is, if there isn’t anything that you don’t understand, but also do you think 
that there is anything I’ve missed or shouldn’t be there based on your 
experience as a security consultant?  
Garrhett: I was going to say management in general. 
MC: I actually kicked management out, and the reason for that is in the text 
management related to security management so you’ve got that 
jurisdictional boundary issue so there is a difference between what you guys 
do here as opposed to someone writing management rosters, doing staff 
wages and all that.  
Garrhett: I agree. Project management is definitely, having said that though I guess I 
know the security management masters does touch on a little bit of the 
operational side but I could do the actual research in something completely 
different but to have that security and management thing on my resume is 
huge for a corporation like this. 
MC: What we have been doing now is we say to people what is your focus, for 
instance I have a number of students from the military doing that and I get 
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them to do three units from the management school, from the MDA 
program because they want to be managers. 
Garrhett: Even if I did the masters, completely in a technical side, I’m still going to 
have management, and that is what they are going to see, they are not going 
to know what units I have done, they are not going to know that it was 
completely technical but just being able to have masters in something, 
whatever management that is going to tick boxes for them. 
MC: Funny you should say that, I did the MSc and people don’t understand it, 
well Master of Science what does that mean. 
Garrhett: Well mine will be a Masters of science still. 
MC: No, well it depends, you can either do a Masters of science or Masters of 
security management, there are a lot of units that are similar but a Masters 
of science is like this, you have to go do a thesis, with the masters of 
security management it is course work. At the end of that you do a project. 
Garrhett: Having that management on the end is basically going to  
MC: But you’re no longer a graduate so when you look at this I’m saying what 
does a graduate need, it might be a Tafe course. You are at the stage now 
where you are leading a team. 
Garrhett:  Yes I’m at a higher level yes. 
MC: The next lot are your skills, one of the things that came out, you have sort of 
a triangle, you have graduates here, competent professionals then as you go 
into this stream you become a manager or a senior partner type role and that 
has a new stratum. 
Garrhett: I’m not sure if you know Clinton Flowers but he is our Operations Centre 
Manager and he came through security so he was defence and then he 
worked as a security consultant in the Sydney or Melbourne team and sort 
of went up and now having someone who has come from security, because a 
lot of these managers don’t understand security, but having someone who 
has come from security it is now so much easier to do business and get 
proposals and get some insight into how the business works and applying it 
in a security proposal is so beneficial. 
MC: It is interesting you say that, one of the arguments, this came out in my 
focus group, at the end of the day it must be a degree level outcome so there 
is no reason why graduate security program can’t be a CEO. We are looking 
at developing the same attributes, the core knowledge is different but we are 
looking at developing the same graduate attributes and that is why things 
like report writing is very generic, things like analysis and evaluation. It 
kept coming up in the word extraction and everyone said that is the most 
important thing, if you can’t analyse a problem, if you can’t evaluate it and 
communicate your analysis you are worthless. 
Garrhett: I guess there is a huge amount of things that are cross domain that the 
course still needs to deliver, we are just looking at the course security stuff 
here? 
MC: I’m look at everything, any of the attributes the core knowledge that you 
think is missing from here from your perspective or any professional 
attributes that you think are missing from your perspective because all 
degrees are based on core knowledge and what they call graduate attributes. 
Garrhett: So these standards and network policies are different ones, you’ve got 
standard and networks. 
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MC: Things like standards kept coming up and understanding different standards. 
Things like networks and networking if you look at convergence now it is 
becoming a big issue for physical as well, but things like broader issues 
such as infrastructure. One of my other experts said if you don’t understand 
infrastructure, what I also had was a number of guys say some of the other 
experts talked about things that were missing, things like understanding 
structural strengths, we look at CCTV but a couple of them said things like 
surveillance you need to know the broader concept of surveillance first and 
then the CCTV achieves that. Things like movement control, so electric 
power, situational crime prevention because a lot of physical security really 
is situational crime prevention its context driven stuff. 
Garrhett: I had this discussion with Dave and Jeff before about the graduates we were 
getting in they didn’t actually know what we did and I talked to them about 
writing a module or a minor in specifically tailored around consulting 
because they were coming in with the theories of CPTED and things like 
that but they had no idea of the process that we go through about obviously 
there is the proposal stage but all the way up to commissioning, like writing 
the design brief, doing the detailed design, what are the different stages you 
can do, a concept or a master plan and then you do a 50% design then you 
have a 100% design and then you’ve got reviewing shop drawings from the 
actual installers and then you’ve got commissioning and things like the fac 
test, the factory acceptance test, so all that process is really beneficial to 
already have an understanding of because even if you are not a consultant 
like us but if you are working in a firm you are will be communicating at 
that level, if you are designing a system yourself and then engaging the sub 
contractor yourself, you are still going to go through that process. 
MC: One of your other guys said project management and one said understanding 
the project scope, another said the basic fundamentals but would you see 
that sitting within a broader unit of say project management, the design 
process or would you see it as separate? 
Garrhett:  I think if we use the word project management we are talking about likely 
operational security side, suddenly we are talking about the operational 
project management side, getting the resources, do we have the resources to 
do the project, what are the timings etc. I’m just talking about the process 
and the different processes, there is another one called FEED, which is 
Front End Engineering Design then there is EPCM Engineering 
Procurement Construction Management, and we have to deal with all these 
different processes that do share similarities but also differences and fit in 
our program and what we do into that and what the client wants.  
MC: So where you’ve got that category planning and design, and that is 
represented up here, would you say that that would be able to capture it in 
that broader heading of planning and design. 
Garrhett: I’m not sure, because planning and design for us is when we already have 
the program and we know what we are doing and it’s inputting security into 
the early stages that is what we call it. How the client is planning on 
achieving the project is different I think to that up front planning and design 
because we already know we have a master plan and we are going to be in 
charge of procurement and we are going to be doing x, y, z and now we are 
saying alright guys you are going to need this many pipes or conduit or we 
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are doing a blast analysis and it’s all that really upfront stuff, whereas I 
think having an understanding of the different engineering processes that we 
have to go through could be beneficial. Have you done a EPCM before or a 
FEED? 
MC: Yes, they are completely different. 
Garrhett: And they are different across different industries as well, if you do a FEED 
for resources and power and do a FEED for the built environment they have 
different gates that the project has to go through so they have different 
drivers so I found that really interesting. So you are applying your security 
knowledge and then you’ve got a different industry and they treat the 
process differently. 
MC: How would you capture that as a knowledge area or category, what word 
would you use to describe that? 
Garrhett: I will have to think about it, but is like engineering practices. It is consulting 
processes or practices. It leads to different responsibilities for the security 
professional and EPCM, so we’ve got engineering procurement construction 
management, not only are we doing the design of the facility but we have to 
manage the security of that facility while its being built and now with 
Jacobs who do a lot of EPCMs, they can put in a guard force and manage 
the security after its been built. We are looking at an EPCM in Mongolia, its 
already an existing site and we are doing an add on to it, so we have to 
design the actual physical security, which is all the electronics and 
everything, we have to write policies and procedures to fit in with the 
existing site and then manage the guard force that is going to be there. It’s 
opened up a whole new world of consulting to me, we only really looked at 
from one aspect to it, and now that Jacobs is on board we have opened up a 
whole new brand. It would be interesting I could give you probably more 
information on what our role as consultants would be in a year or two when 
I know myself.  
MC: Yes because managing people is different again, at that operational level. 
Garrhett: We used to sit in a built environment which I don’t know if someone has 
explained to you the structure that we had here but we had water and 
energy, power and resources, buildings and infrastructure, within buildings 
and infrastructure so that was roads and buildings and all that infrastructure 
development.  Buildings and infrastructure was split into infrastructure and 
then built environment and we used to sit with the engineers, we used to sit 
with the mechanical, electrical and hydraulic engineers and we were 
security engineers even though we didn’t have engineering degrees we sat 
with the guys who fit out a building, now we’ve been taken out of that and 
we sit in strategic consulting, so basically we are able to do not only work 
for clients but also internal work for the company, so when they are going 
overseas we can do the risk assessment for their travel plan or their 
accommodation that they are staying in, I’m actually flying to Saudi Arabia 
to do an assessment on accommodation and the office building and give 
them treatment options to upgrade it or whatever my findings are but it’s not 
just become an external resource we are now very much so an internal 
resource as well for these larger EPCM projects. I’m not sure if in the future 
that might mean taking on operational managers as well but if you look at 
consulting as HSSEC – so health, safety, security, environment, community; 
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we are now more and more fitting into that brand and we have internal 
health and safety advisers and they are now also going to be looking 
externally, so when we have one of these EPCM projects, not only are they 
doing the health and safety and policies for Jacobs but they’ll be writing 
them for the client. 
 
DES & Michael Coole 
Michael Coole  _ DES 
MC: You’ve been in the industry and working as a security consultant for a long 
time, what I’m looking at under this concept of the security professional and 
nowadays its physical security professional, so that takes in consultants such 
as engineering companies and in-house security advisers, what is the 
knowledge a graduate needs and how should we teach that, make that 
generalised education. What I’ve done to date is, the first argument is the 
experts write the text books so the knowledge is gathered in the text, what 
I’ve done I’ve gone with 15 of the most common or broadest knowledge 
text for security so I looked at the ASIS body of knowledge etc., the 
argument is the more something occurs in the text the more it’s a salient 
theme in that domain area so I did a count check analysis of all the words 
and terminology in all these text, I did that for each text and then I 
combined it, I ended up with this table here and what this table is a 
combination of broader concepts, such as security as a concept and control 
as a concept, core knowledge areas such as CCTV and things like general 
capability attributes say professional enables such as analysis and evaluation 
the ability to critically evaluate something, communication skills, the ability 
to write a report. So what I’m looking at first is if I can show you the table, 
the first one has the raw knowledge areas and these are not in my order, they 
are in the order that the occurrence occurred, so things like electrical power, 
the concept of interruption so I’m looking at a physical protection system. 
What I’m looking at is if there are any areas you don’t understand but also 
what do you think it has missed? So the text books haven’t covered 
everything, is what I’ve found, so I’m asking people like yourself – here is 
what the text books are saying in a broader sense, but what have we missed? 
DES: So these are words that you’ve basically, these topped the word count? It 
does a pretty good job of picking up a lot of the key points, some of them 
are there because they are common words and probably not as important but 
in order of the others its pretty good. 
MC: Some of the things that some of the guys have said are things like 
engineering drawings or project management are missing. What I also have 
with this table here, these are some of the things that some of other experts 
have said, things like broader understanding of situational crime prevention, 
defence in depth didn’t come up in the word count but I’ve added it, that is 
the basic table and from the basic table I’ve added these ones here, I guess 
what I’m asking now is there anything that you think is missing or shouldn’t 
actually be there. 
DES: I don’t know about things that shouldn’t be there, one thing is infrastructure 
is a very broad term, so certainly from my perspective a couple of things 
that aren’t and knowing where I come from in terms of, I was looking for 
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the word management.  
MC: Management, interestingly enough – Garrhett said the same, I took 
management out of the count check because security management is 
different to what you guys do. If I’m looking at physical security say 
looking at advise system or practice of a tangible nature, say the knowledge 
of someone who is managing security say Royal Perth Hospital or Casuarina 
is different to what you guys need to do, they argue that the knowledge is 
based on three elements of professional practice which is diagnosis, 
inference and treatment. So for us it’s about diagnosing the security problem 
and reasoning about to set the level and actually designing the system but its 
ongoing management in terms of operational sense is the area of security 
management, so in order to bound my study I’ve had to say security 
management is another sub domain. 
DES: When I say management I’m talking about the management, not necessarily 
of the security but maybe the management of, from our point of view, 
management of process and that is management of process in terms of what 
you do, your study, but also management of process in terms of a working 
environment because it becomes quite important to a grad to understand that 
you come in and get given a job and the management and the process of 
delivering that job is something they need to learn. There is a point where a 
task, we write a proposal, we win a job, it lands on someone’s desk it’s the 
management of process of understanding how I get from the point of having 
this to actually achieving the deliverable. 
MC: Garrhett said something similar, one of the things he said he was talking 
about the process from the bid right through to when you get the job and 
then how you design that but that is different to project management in 
terms of project managing is about the operational management of that 
project, how would you capture that as a knowledge area? 
DES: I’m being very careful because I don’t want to wrap, Project management 
becomes a much broader issue than what we are talking about, we have all 
these things in here that talk about technology but if you’re talking about 
teaching someone the education process of how to work in this industry 
there is a general process around, you are going to be working either for a 
business or for a client, you are going to be provided a service in house for 
that business you might be employed by BHP on the security team and you 
are working in there or you are working for someone that is outside 
providing that service to that organisation. Either way at some point you are 
given a project and there is a process and there is a way of managing, I 
suppose it’s almost around time management and understanding how to 
achieve a deliverable, it’s really difficult to put some wording around that. I 
suppose I’m just leaning to you can know and understand all these sorts of 
things, if you don’t know how to, it’s almost like you give someone an 
assignment, how do they plan and managing the delivery and the output of 
that assignment. In itself I think it is something that, it is being able to get 
that context around what it is your being asked to do, understanding from 
the early days of what is the key point, what are the deliverables, you do not 
run off and do what you think needs to be done but actually delivering what 
you have been tasked to do. That in itself, from a security point of view, is 
absolutely, because if you haven’t got the context and don’t understand the 
P a g e  | 447 
 
task we end up, the other word the term I use a lot its around mitigation, 
security is around what we do and have I achieved, we talk about mitigation 
strategy in the end we want to look back and measure and did we actually 
mitigate that risk, did we actually achieve what the client needed done. I put 
it in the context of sometimes people will write a proposal for a job and 
quite often they will write and tell the client, I’m really good at doing this 
and we are good at that, but what they don’t do is they don’t actually look at 
what they’ve been asked to do and address that; actually have we offered to 
do that for that client, have we attributed the correct people and skills and 
management around the process to actually get to an outcome, at the end of 
the day when the job is finished no matter how many gates we go through 
but we’ve actually delivered to them what they’ve asked for.  
MC: So you are looking at what is the objective, do we understand the objective? 
DES: Yes, do we understand the objective, do we know how to plan to achieve 
that objective, do we know how to implement the process to achieve the 
object and do we know how to deliver it. To me that is a really important 
thing coz otherwise you can quite often give a person or client an outcome 
that doesn’t necessarily meet their needs. It’s a bit like, if I have a person 
with a security issue and if you sat down at a table and someone said we 
should start talking about cameras here and access controlling this door and 
I’d sort of go well can we move the plan out of the way, can we talk to you 
about what actually is the problem, it is caused by what risks, what’s your 
threats and risks. So going back to understanding, you get an outcome that 
delivers on that. 
MC: That is going back to those attributes, what they are arguing in any 
profession so whether it is medicine or law, so law they diagnose a legal 
problem and then they understand establish a plan to treat that to argue their 
case. Medicine is the same, they diagnose a medical ailment and then they 
treat that, not the surrounding ailments and so the argument with us is that 
we should be diagnosing a security problem and then treating that problem. 
DES: Its then understanding if the problem has been diagnosed then what’s the 
plan, so your doctor might say well we not going to put you on aspirin 
because your blood is already thin so it’s a matter of how do you interpret, 
its understanding the process that you need to go to, to interpret that 
evaluation and know how to plan the way to get to the point that you have 
got the correct treatment process in place and therefore you get the desired 
outcome. 
MC: And it’s hard to capture that in a category. 
DES: In terms of this it is the sort of thing that throws that together, is that too 
overarching to be useful to what you are looking for. 
MC: Not necessarily. The other argument is, students in terms of how we code 
information, so if you give them all these knowledge as a matrix and say 
learn that, they don’t understand what they are learning and how it fits 
together. This process came out of what they call ethnographic research, 
where you look at how a culture is related and they argue, one of the ways a 
culture is related is hierarchical and what I’ve had to do is develop a 
hierarchical table and then map that to a figure like a graphic, so in theory 
the students should be able to see the knowledge they are learning such as 
crime prevention or understanding risk management and security risk or 
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planning and design and see how it fits in with other knowledge and then 
they can up and down the depth. For instance one of my other guys said 
CCTV, you’ve got it as a knowledge category, he said all security people 
need to understand CCTV but in reality that has its own body of knowledge 
it’s a specialisation in and of itself, you have people that just specialise in 
CCTV and so he said in terms of what is your depth and breadth we don’t 
know, yes you need to know CCTV but you can’t be an expert of all this. 
DES: That is actually a really good point and if you take that example of CCTV, 
do I have the in-depth technical knowledge that an installer would have of 
pics or a digital camera and the way it forms, absolutely you wouldn’t. Are 
there people downstairs in our security team that know more about the 
CCTV performance than me, absolutely, so in each one depending on where 
you are sitting and what you’ve got to do, the depth of the knowledge – I 
think that depth and knowledge is depending on the career path that they go 
to. It’s a point of educating and giving enough information that allows that 
person to understand the whole of the industry and therefore make decisions 
about what they want to do and where they go in terms of a career. Not  
only that it also allows them when they are in that career path to know what 
they don’t know and know how to get access to that knowledge. 
MC: One of the diagrams I’ve come up with is, you’ve got this security 
professional there and underneath that you have locksmiths, alarm installers 
and all these operational people that actually do, they achieve that – you’ve 
got fence installers and stuff like that; and so the role of the security 
professional is to bring that together to achieve the objective that you were 
talking about. An alarm system on its own isn’t going to achieve security 
it’s a physical protection system. So you have this security professional but 
they also have to liaise with other professionals, whether it be engineers and 
stuff like that.  
DES: Let’s just use that as an example, let’s say we are talking about a secure 
fence, I as a security consultant will talk to our client about the type of delay 
we need to achieve by that fence and we will define that in three ways - 
under, through and over, simply as that. So each one of those has to be 
treated, the through bit is, but it still has to be physically strong enough to 
withstand the environmental conditions that it is in, whether that be wind, 
lightning, whatever, so you’ve got your structural engineer and your civil 
engineer, they become critically important to the design of the fence. 
You’ve got your fence manufacturer that has product that you want to use 
and understand that. So what I see, we set a criteria around the performance 
of the fence, I want the face of that fence to be anti-scalable, so I will talk to 
the potential architect or the person that is designing the fence about how we 
achieve that, we know that we want limitation penetration and that is around 
the fence material so we talk to, we know the fence has to stand up and it 
either has to have some sort of cowl or topping so from your civil engineer, 
your structural engineer, your fence manufacturer and your fence installer, 
all of those sorts of people in here, the knowledge that I need to have is not 
only the objective of what I want but who do I need to talk to. So in the 
process I need to be talking to a structural engineer, civil engineer about the 
ground finish, how do we stop the anti-tunnelling, how do we get the water 
away for the longevity of the fence, electrical engineer, we’ve got the 
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lightening protection issues associated with the fence, the manufacturer – 
how do we detail so we get an anti-climb finish on the fence so that nice 
smooth finish and then the installers. In terms of the body of knowledge, I 
suppose what I’m trying to get to is that I have an objective, my way of 
knowing how to get to that objective is quite complex and it needs to 
involve other people so I need to know who I need to involve and at what 
stage of that process to actually achieve the outcome. 
MC: So you need to be able to liaise really effectively. 
DES: You need to be able to communicate effectively and liaise but you need to 
understand, the bit I said before know what you don’t know, I’m not a 
structural engineer I can’t design the footing for that, I don’t know what size 
members of steel that I might need to stand that fence up in that particular 
condition, I don’t know whether, are we going to have a piled footing into 
that post and then put some form of anti-dig barrier either horizontal or 
vertically into that but understanding the process and who I need to involve 
to achieve the outcome; when we get someone that comes to that fence that 
we have got some chance of meeting the time delay for what we need and 
then when we involve the client, if we want to go through a process of 
prototype testing. If that makes sense, that is the sort of process in terms of 
management I’m talking about, it’s not the project management, delivering 
a project because that is a different skill, but it’s the design process, the 
design process becomes really critical because firstly do I have the 
information at hand, has a risk assessment been done, do I actually know 
what the mitigation strategies are, do we know what we have got to do. 
MC: Its funny you should say that because some things when we tested it, we 
didn’t care how easy it was to cut through them because in theory we 
controlled the inner environment from an inward out approach what we 
were looking at was anti-scale. 
DES:  It is knowing what you are trying to achieve.  <tape turned off for job 
example>  Just trying to put that out as an example of what I mean in terms 
of the process and understanding. 
MC: As I said that sort of thing doesn’t come out in your text books. When you 
look at all your text books they write about delay time, they look at 
technology and CCTV, locks and keys, they are the basic things they write 
about, what the text books don’t give you is how it fits together. 
DES: I suppose that is the bit here that I said is that too overarching because it ties 
a lot of this together but it is that understanding of the process so let’s not 
call it management but maybe it is understanding of project delivery, or 
outcome delivery. So you talked about there being three points which was 
analysis and evaluation then you moved on to the treatment. 
MC: So you have your diagnosis, your inference which is your analysis and 
evaluation, treatment, then you have your analysis of the end product as 
well which is what you’re saying, your acceptance to make sure you achieve 
the objective. The other thing is, I’ve organised this hierarchically so that 
flows on so this is just a heuristic so this is something that people can 
recognise, some of this is hierarchical and some of it is, if you look at 
analysis and evaluation that sits across everything from law, because you’ve 
got to understand the legal framework that you are operating in right down 
to your facility procedures sort of captures everything, your security 
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surveys, barriers, ability to analyse, things like report writing sit across 
everything as well, so the only thing that is superordinate to everything is 
the very concept of security, what it is you are trying to achieve. So based 
on what this diagram is, which is really just the organisation aspect of this 
table here, do you think anything is missing or needs rearranging or 
reorganising? 
DES: One line that really stands out as good not as missing is that to me, the fact 
that you’ve got that focus on these different bits. Terrorism, general crime, 
safety and loss drive completely different, under that line they can drive 
completely, they might be the same in some context by how they are applied 
but how they get to the end, they have very different drivers so therefore 
have to be assessed in a completely different way. 
MC: That came out of one of the pilot studies, things like one of the new 
buildings in Singapore, it has to be completely blast proof because they are 
really worried about terrorism for the context of the facility, that is a huge 
additional cost that most facilities. 
DES: I like that you do have safety there. 
MC: One of the UK trained guys, been out here for a while and just gone back, 
he said why is safety there, and I said look it’s not me driving this, my 
process is the text book provide the initial framework and then I go to all the 
experts, and every text book the word safety – you can’t get away from it. 
DES: It is inexorably linked, you can’t talk about one without the other I feel. 
MC: And we talk about assets such as people, information and property; and 
people and safety are entwined. So that is something that just kept coming 
up. Some of the other people said things like project management and where 
they sit, one of the younger guys said understanding network technology, 
networking has become vital now especially for things like understanding 
CCTV, network fundamentals. 
DES: The other one I’d say is understanding application, how you apply or why 
you apply certain selections of materials and things like that to a project. 
Another example of that is and this was in a major international prison and 
we go in and we had gone through four or five security checks to go where 
we are so we were right on the floor where the prisoners were and we were 
standing outside the guard station and one of the guys said to us, and all this 
glazing here it’s all bullet proof, I said why would you go to bullet proof 
when we have gone through metal detectors, search, everything, and he said 
‘oh well if they get a gun’ and there was a guy mopping the floor, he had a 
steel bucket and I said so you have tested this etc.? I said have you tried 
smashing it with that steel bucket full of water which is really really heavy, 
and they said oh no but its bullet proof. The person who had set that criteria 
didn’t understand that vandal proof while it might be bullet proof it could be 
vulnerable to other levels of attack. Bullet proof glazing by itself is not 
necessarily going to withstand something else. So right at the start of 
understanding well if we are going to assess what we need there what are 
we protecting for, so understanding the application, so in terms of this 
application what does it actually need to be protected against. 
MC: When I did the extraction it was actually facility characterisation, that is the 
American terms, one of my Australian guys said it still doesn’t capture 
context, he said when I look at this it’s all great, it was a lot less defined 
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back then it was a number of stages ago, but he said I still don’t see 
anything that truly captures context and I ended up changing the 
characterisation to contextualisation, in the Australian vernacular we 
understand that. But what you are saying is spot on it still doesn’t capture, 
when you look at threat, threat is contextual. 
DES: Making sure that as a student that they understand that process of why do 
you, we say establish the context but how do you do that and how do you 
know in that you are understanding the application of what comes from the 
other side of establishing that context. 
MC:  You are making the point absolutely clear. 
DES: While we talk about CCTV, access control that is all great but people have 
to understand what that is and to a certain degree you have to let go and say 
well the certain applications and those sort of things around the technology 
that we are going to let industry teach you because we don’t have the time, 
actually knowing technically how a camera performs is not as important as 
knowing in your general life in the security industry knowing these other 
wider things. It’s the prioritisation, it’s more important to know the in-depth 
technical application of that camera or understanding the application of a 
security treatment within an area, what do you base it on. 
 
JOHN & Michael Coole 
Michael Coole  _ Pettit 
MC: Have you had a chance to look over that stuff yet? 
PETTIT: I had a quick read of it this morning. So are these 6 questions you wanted 
to ask about. 
MC: I’ve changed number 1 around a little bit because there are too many 
synonymous terms that I merged so I did that over here. What I was going to ask for 
that one when you look at the 49 thematic knowledge categories 
PETTIT: And that is in table 2 is it? 
MC: When I go to the questionnaire here it will be table 2 yes.  
PETTIT: I was trying to work out which table applies to each, you have just got 
the table instead of referring to a table. 
MC: They are different because of the way, trying to fit all this in, the first table is 
what I got out of the interviews from the first round and the argument is that based on 
discussions and knowledge we sort of built. When you look at table 2 the main thing – 
the first question I was going to ask, because I’ve change what that is – any of the 
knowledge categories or concepts that you would like clarified before we begin? An 
interesting one in the pilot study, the concept of systems, it can be so diverse and that is 
a problem with a lot these things is that we don’t have a security dictionary to refer to. 
PETTIT: What about that Australian Standard lexicon of security term. 
MC: Lexicon is okay in terms of things like risk but for example when you look at 
systems, in fact what the pilot study guide said is that in fact relates to understanding the 
systems theory and what a system is. In terms of many of the areas some of them are 
self-explanatory the concept of security, CCTV, the notion of control, when you look at 
physical security what we realise quickly is what we are actually talking about is the 
very concept of control. Controlling access, monitoring the space that we have got 
controller influence over.  Is there any knowledge categories listed in table 2 that you 
want clarification on? 
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PETTIT: Not really, I think they are all pretty self-explanatory. 
MC: I used 15 security text books and based on a word count analysis, I extracted the 
top 49 key security words. Some of them I kicked out such as management because I’m 
not looking at security management I’m looking at physical security or situational crime 
prevention. So what happened for each text I got a table and then I put all those tables 
together and their numerical occurrences and I redid it and then I added it all up. So 
where you had alarms or alarm systems etc., I combined all those like terms, so this is 
the top 49 when you look at knowledge areas of physical security so some of these are 
more concept such as control or security itself, others relate to more physical things 
such as alarms or locks. 
PETTIT: Having a look at table 1, what struck me about table 1 I thought there 
were 3 concepts that were worthy to go in that. They were utility – it is no good having 
a product and putting it away in a safe so no one can use it, if the security level is such 
so no one can use it and there is no utility in the product you may as well not have it. I 
think something when you are looking at physical security the concept of utility; you 
don’t want to have so much security that you can’t, the purpose for which you bought 
this for is no longer. 
MC: That is a good point and that hasn’t come up at all so that is a really good point. 
PETTIT: The problem that we have in the security is that we don’t sit down and 
have these philosophical discussions, and things get raised in this and it gets into normal 
put out there and different people start talking about it, but it’s not an industry that has 
these philosophical discussions we are having and because of that things that appear in 
the text, there are critical things that don’t appear. 
MC: That is what this initial phase here is about, saying okay we have all these things 
that do appear in the text so for instance, well it because oh well that is not a natural 
problem we understand we need to learn that lot but you look at some other and a good 
example is in the last phase, so the focus group, when I did those as a pilot study all the 
participants said your ability to clearly communicate your message is essential, without 
that the rest means nothing but you don’t find that in the text books. 
PETTIT: Certain things are still to be defined, critical elements and I think utility 
is one of them. It does get mentioned discreetly. 
MC: You are right there, when we talk about for instance CCTV comes up all the 
time, so it’s not hard to believe that is the third highest, next to systems and next to 
security itself, utility your right it’s mentioned discreetly it’s not salient, it doesn’t come 
up. 
PETTIT: It’s taken as read but not necessarily, it’s a latent term that is present but 
not really apparent. So I thought that is something I would offer up. The other two that I 
thought was fit for purpose. There is no point giving some lock or some sort of physical 
security thing if it is not fit for purpose. A grill is a grill but it’s got a hole in it 92 inches 
square where you can crawl through. 
MC: Are you looking at the efficacy for the context. When you say fit for purpose, 
are you looking at - because you have two different levels, one of the things that keeps 
coming up is levels, if you go back to the .................. and five levels of security or a 
good example is you can buy your Kmart special or you can buy your top of the line. 
Are you looking at the level of security has to be fit for purpose or are you looking at 
the efficacy of the individual control? 
PETTIT: Probably explain it in this way, yes you can buy safety glasses and they 
have a sign on safety glasses but if they don’t stop chips going through the lens and into 
your eye then they are not fit for purpose. 
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MC: So you are looking at the physical efficacy of the component? 
PETTIT: Yes, I think that is what it is. And I’ve got efficacy as well. 
MC: Do you think efficacy is covered in, what keeps coming up as well if you go to 
table 2, is the notion of standards, you know security standards and it is not just security 
I suppose, you’ve got wiring standards and things like that. Do you think efficacy is 
covered in the standards or is it too hidden? 
PETTIT: I think it is hidden because when you start talking standards people think 
Australian standards or a level, I think it deserved being teased out a bit more in its own 
right. Because it seems to me so many security systems they have in place either 
prevent you from using, take away utility the product all you have bought to use and 
you may as well not have had it or they have got some sort of security product that is 
not fit for purpose, it doesn’t work, yes it’s a security product but it is not really 
satisfactory and it might be putting close circuit TV in a bank rather than have a guard 
on the door. 
MC: Effective comes up in the word count analysis but the problem is because I’m 
only taking the top 49 using a 7 x 7 matrix it did drop off, but in most of the text 
effective as a concept did actually come up every time. 
PETTIT: Sometimes these words are not the right word but we don’t have the right 
word in our vocabulary. 
MC: That’s why I look at effective as efficacy, as efficacious for what it should do. 
The problem with that is you look at the levels of security so you’ve got efficacious 
against a level of threat, so if you have a low level threat ............... high level threat 
obviously it is not you need a more lament system and that is part of the issue in 
physical security because it’s about the right level of control for the concept. Cost is 
another thing that kept coming up. 
PETTIT: Cost is one of those funny things, especially in occupational health and 
safety, the principle is if it is a low or moderate cost but delivers a high result it should 
be adopted. But then again the fact that you don’t have sufficient funds to do something 
is not in itself an argument to say oh well we just didn’t have the funds, we could afford 
the grills on the windows so that was it. The argument is well if you didn’t bring the 
resources necessary to do it safely you shouldn’t have indulged in it in the first place. 
MC: Yes it’s a tricky one that one. In terms of physical security, so if you look at the 
physical security of a home compared to a bank, cost is a big driving factor in the 
difference. 
PETTIT: And banks, even though they are not short of funds, they are loath to 
spent money. 
MC: Well a lot of people are loath to spend money of physical security aren’t they? 
PETTIT: Yes.  
MC: Interestingly enough, we will talk about our figure as well, when you look at 
figure 1, that argument is and this comes from most of the literature. What I’m actually 
doing is undertaking a cultural domain analysis in physical security and a domain is 
organised along a number of properties, what the first property is if they are organised 
hierarchically, and that is where table 3 comes into it, in line with point 9, and the 
argument is this comes from ethnographic research where the argument is that based on 
the notion of similarities and contrast you should be able to organise those key areas or 
key concepts hierarchically. What you actually see here is that the knowledge is based 
on diagnosing the problem and then interrelated in the next ...... section is inference and 
treatment and inference relates to the concept of professional reasoning and when I do 
the multi-dimensional statistical scaling questionnaire and we specifically measure 
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contrast and similarities as you did with the survey before, what I found in my solution 
of that that mathematical map that those elements more related to diagnosis were 
clustered together and those elements more related to treatment were clustered together 
and those that sat in the middle were more on that boundary between and sat within 
those professional concept of inference. So the argument is that all professional 
practices are based around the three principles of diagnosis, inference and treatment of 
the problem, so whether it is law or whether it is medicine etc. like that. You see that 
has actually emerged based on the knowledge table so from table 1 and table 2 I have 
been able to using ethnographic research and analysis tried to organise that 
hierarchically. When we look at 49 extracted concepts and subordinate concepts, do you 
agree with most of these; and if not what knowledge concepts do you think any others 
are missing? 
PETTIT: Security itself seems to be a nebulous term. 
MC: When we look at a cultural domain what they actually argue, the cultural name 
is based on a single semantic relationship with its cover term and that worked out well 
for me, that is the premise that I had to go in the study for, so in order for the rest of the 
study to make sense I had to come up with, I use the cover term security and then using 
my review of literature I broke it down into areas of jurisdictional boundary because I’m 
only looking in areas of physical security, but it still must relate to the cover term, when 
I did the word extraction, security came up in first place, which is refreshing because 
that actually reinforces that the notion of physical security is related to the cover term 
security so although security is a broad and nebulous concept, the thematic concept that 
come out of these, such as protection from threat and control and influence; ........... so 
the very notion of security and the rest of the body of knowledge for physical security 
had to be under that concept of security itself. Which in a way was good, that worked 
out, perhaps where its changed, if you think the broader cover term security underneath 
that, and if you look at table 3 you will see more hierarchically under security because 
security isn’t ........ the very notion of law, when I did the count analysis law was 
actually a fair way down. 
PETTIT: I would expect it would be because we are still in an embryonic situation 
where people are not being held accountable for their actions and negligence. 
MC: That is interesting that you say that and you are probably right but when you 
look at physical security you have to comply with the law. 
PETTIT: For instance you decide to design a man trap in a bank, what is the 
legality of having a man trap in a bank and someone walks into it, even if he is a robber, 
do you have a lawful right to detain that person. What happens if it’s someone else who 
is not a robber? 
MC: I see law as influential with the pursuit of the concept of security. 
PETTIT: Without understanding what the law is and things like, take bouncing for 
instance, there was a case where this bloke/transvestite wanted to go into a female club 
the bouncers wouldn’t let him in, he took them to task on the anti-discrimination and 
won. That is an aspect of law in the application of security, denying people access to a 
premises or not. Things like self-defence, how far, concepts of occupational health and 
safety what does the law say about putting certain requirements on people, controlling 
under the occupation health and safety you have a duty of care to make sure the entry of 
your building is free from risk, if you have a man trap in there is it free from risk. Here 
is an interesting one, Armaguard or someone like that between the cab and truck and 
back where they are carrying the cash, had some sort of man trap and you could only 
open one door at a time and it malfunctioned, one of their employees got squashed in 
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there and killed. Now that is an aspect of the law that has got to be free from, whatever 
your security system has to be free from risk and I think that this is something, Tooma 
is starting to put books out there highlighting 
MC: Rick .............. has been put a few books out there too in relation to law. 
PETTIT: Rick is a bit wishy washy, I think he is missing it. He is on the side of the 
bullseye where as Tooma is dead centre. Actually he is putting out a new book at the 
end of the year sometime, a third addition of security health and safety in environmental 
law. 
MC: Based on that do you think any of the knowledge concepts or principles within 
that table should be removed and why? 
PETTIT: When you talk device, what are you thinking when you mean device? 
MC: Interestingly, the very concept of devices kept coming up and if you look at 
probably what you are talking about, if you look at a security device we talk about 
systems but we also talk about individual devices, we talk about alarms and alarm 
systems but what about access control devices, pop up barrier devices, man traps is a 
sort of security device, I guess when you look at devices and you start to look at where 
the concept or the term device is in the text from the extract, device can be pretty much 
anything when you look at physical security. 
PETTIT: I think it is one of these terms it is probably a throwback, it is there but 
why is it there. It is there enough to put in but not sufficiently specific enough to 
understand what it is. 
MC: And when you look at where it appears, one of the things you look at, where it is 
appearing in the text. Look at pop up bollards, well they’re a device it’s a physical 
security device, they are a barrier, a pop up barrier and I think perhaps we use devices 
as almost a cover term and sitting underneath that you have alarms, barriers, access 
control systems etc. 
PETTIT: I think it seems to be a term that is there but not probably right for this 
table. 
MC: So it’s more a cover term, principle for a range of things like alarms,  
PETTIT: Probably better described specifically as an alarm, bollard or something 
like that rather than device. Then you have standards, that’s fine. Network? 
MC: If you look at the concept of network, concept is what they call conversions in 
physical security so what we are saying now is that physical security professionals of 
the future have to understand networking principles, basic cyber security principles, 
because a lot of these devices like building management systems, control systems, they 
are actually all over internet hub. So the concept of understanding networks is now part 
of understanding how the system is going to fit together. 
PETTIT: I would just add an ‘s’ to that would make it a bit more understandable. 
MC: Actually I thought I did do that because in the count check network and 
networks kept coming out so they become basically a merged term. 
PETTIT: Network on itself means, go and talk to Mick, Dave etc., networks means 
a connection of systems. 
MC: That is how I’ve done it for table 3, if you look at the hierarchically table 
because network sits next to your communication, technology, intrusion. 
PETTIT: In order for network to mean networks you need the context for it. 
MC: That’s right and that is why I had to go back into the text and go where is it 
appearing. 
PETTIT: Property yes, infrastructure, I think glass was an interesting one. 
MC: Interestingly enough when you look at more and more now, security people are 
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having to come to terms with different ranges of glass technology out there, you have 
glass protection, when you look at intrusion detection systems, a lot of them .......... 
specific frequency of the glass that you have, if you look at penetration time in terms of 
glass, some glass will stand a brick for about half a second and other glass will stand 
people sledge hammering it for an hour. What we are seeing physical security people 
have to understand the physical resistance of glass, because glass now, you look at glass 
bricks, I did a number, a few years ago, did ............ on glass bricks delay barrier in a 
prison and they withstood two people sledge hammering them for an hour. We are 
starting to use, especially when we look at the concept of transference security where 
people want the same level of physical security but they want it to be very subtle, we are 
starting to see glass design as a barrier as well as a means of enhancing the 
environment. 
PETTIT: Talking about glass that raises another one that goes with utility, efficacy 
and fit for purpose, and that is aesthetics. 
MC: Interesting that you should say that because we are moving to this notion of 
transference security but aesthetics hasn’t really come up. 
PETTIT: Whilst you want your place to be a prison you don’t want it looking like 
a prison that then flows into things like quality of life. 
MC: What they have actually done, and this probably sits with physical security 
anyway, they are using the use of terminology, some people talk about aesthetics 
..................security, extension of CPTED, but it’s actually not, if you put a CCTV 
camera inside the light pole instead of mounting it on the outside, it looks more 
aesthetically pleasing and it makes the security look a lot more subtle but it makes you 
maintain the field of view output that you wanted in the first place.  
PETTIT: When you have heritage listing buildings where it’s got to sit into a 
context, also you don’t, which you want to be safe and know that someone is watching 
you don’t want that feeling that you have big cameras pointing at you. Having that 
oversight tends to decrease a person’s quality of life.  
MC: That goes back to some of the very principles, if you look at Jamie Jacobs work. 
PETTIT: Yes this is fit for purpose, utility, efficacy, aesthetics, quality of life, it is 
no use living in a safe area where you can’t use what your bought, you’ve protected it 
so much you can’t use this thing anymore, what you did buy for security doesn’t work, 
it makes the place look worse than a wrecking yard or the bad end of town, you just 
don’t feel like wanting to be in that place. There are the sort of things, utility, aesthetics, 
quality of life, they are not the sort of things that come up in the terms of security. 
MC: You’re right and they never came up in the text books. 
PETTIT: But again I think that is one of these things that a failure of the industry 
to have philosophical discussions about this.  
MC: What I’m trying to do now, is say what if, and hopefully I will deal with some of 
this in the focus group, what is it that you need graduates, and I have to be careful with 
the term graduate, people just starting out in the industry after leaving tertiary 
qualification education courses, what is the knowledge that you need them to graduate 
with? So if they don’t understand what a system is, and a lot of people said that in the 
pilot study, this relates to the basic system and theory and you see how the principles of 
physical security comply with the principles of ........ security. CCTV, what came out of 
the pilot study – they need an understanding of CCTV, no they don’t need to be experts, 
because CCTV has its own body of knowledge in of itself and in fact what has come up 
if you look at the notion of planning and design for example. Planning and design, you 
can do a masters in planning. So each one of these knowledge category areas and the 
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concept of security it has its own body of knowledge. 
PETTIT: Even the aspect of CCTV, in NSW pubs and clubs they have laws as to 
how many cameras, where you have to be recording, how many frames a second how 
much data you’ve got to be. This is where a lot of them don’t seem to identify the law, 
how it is relevant, in QLD there is no law against putting up CCTV in the work place, 
places like NSW you have to put up signs saying ‘you are being recorded’ so even for 
CCTV, it seems that law seems to be the overriding factor there, without abiding by the 
law you can’t install anything. 
MC: It is interesting looking at what are we actually trying to draw out. If you look at 
the knowledge table, table 2, then you go to table 3 where I’ve tried to organise it 
hierarchically, the idea of organising it hierarchically was to show how it is connected 
in terms of structure and then that led into figure 1, and figure 1 the idea is that what we 
are actually showing is the local connections, for someone who is just starting out in 
security studies ok and we say okay we are going to learn the concept of risk and they 
stay to understand where risk fits in to diagnosing the problem, if you look at the notion 
of technology so we look at detection and technology they go okay this is why I’m 
learning about technology because technology is a salient aspect of physical security 
now. So if you look at the concept of movement control and these all relate to defence 
in depth and defence in depth goes back to situational crime prevention and stuff like 
that and understanding infrastructure. So if you look at that, do you support the structure 
of the map or do you think that any of the areas should be moved. If you look at table 3 
and figure 1 directly floats and the argument is under ethnographic research is, you do 
the hierarchically table and the figure is just that table as a representative heuristic. 
PETTIT: I think table 3 is fine, I think it sets it out well, one of the things I was 
going to say, when physicists talk about Einstein’s theory of relativity equals MC2 and 
that, they talk about an elegant formula. We don’t have that type of terminology, before 
people start designing, before they even look at what they are going to pick or what they 
are going to do for a space, they should have in their mind set as the greatest criteria is 
what is the utility of this, is it fit for the purpose, is it going to be aesthetics of it, quality 
of life, your framework that everything else sits into. 
MC: If you look at table 3 the hierarchical table where would you see utility in that, 
your concept of utility fits into the table diagram? 
PETTIT: I would think it would have to sit under law. 
MC: Do you think it would sit under law as opposed to looking at utility, some people 
call it characterisation, in the pilot study they said characterisation in the Australian 
language doesn’t fully capture content and they wanted facility contextualisation and 
stuff like that, do you think utility would sit more with infrastructure?  
PETTIT: No I would be putting it below law and quality of life, aesthetics, 
efficacy, all that would sit under law. 
MC: So would it before contextualisation or would it be under contextualisation? 
PETTIT: Where is contextualisation? 
MC: If you look at security you’ve got law and then you’ve got facility 
contextualisation. 
PETTIT: Yes between law and facility contextualisation. I think they are the 
fundamental planning principles that when you are selecting products they are the sort 
of things that you have got to have in mind. 
MC: What about your efficacy or your fit for purpose, where do you think you would 
have that in the table? 
PETTIT: Again, I would have it as a planning principle. 
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MC: So probably planning and design, so down with planning and design, underneath 
that between security theories and principles, you would have fit for purpose. 
PETTIT: Yes. It’s one of these things, it’s a bit like the risk management standard, 
where you go right through the risk management standard and go down to treatment, 
then you have business continuity management, which is only basically the same as the 
risk management standard. 
MC: What about aesthetics then, where would you put aesthetics in relation to this 
organisational structure? 
PETTIT: Again, it could be considered at both levels, just below law and above 
facility contextualisation and planning and design. I think a lot of it could go in both 
areas. 
MC: That gives me something to put to the others as well at this stage. One of the 
things that came out of the pilot study focus groups, when I looked at the table and said 
what do we see, a key thing that came out that we have to keep the science that 
underpins in each of the knowledge categories some areas it would be psychology, 
some would be the science that comes out of physics such as detection and technology, 
maths and geometry, basic principles of reflection and retraction, the physical resistance 
to pressure, the barriers,  so what came out of my focus group is that you have to keep 
the science that underpins the pursuit of each categories objective. So if you look at 
CCTV, basic principles of maths and geometry ........... 
PETTIT: Some of this stuff, I don’t think there is any one place that it should be, it 
may fit in multiple places. 
MC: And that is where the MDS comes into it, in terms of the hierarchical table this 
is what they call a qualitative analysis, when I do the structural strength, where 
structural strength comes out in the MDS, it’s a mathematical relationship, if I have 100 
people respond to the survey it is based on the mean of its location in relation to every 
other concept so what that map gives you is a statistical location in relation to how it is 
similar or it contrasts every other concept. Some of the concepts can go in a number of 
places in the hierarchical map, that’s why I need to use the MDS map as a follow up 
because that then gives a different representation as a graphic. 
PETTIT: A lot of this stuff will be provisional. 
MC: This is just the first iteration, comes from the pilot study and is an iteration of 
this as this is not seen anywhere else. 
PETTIT: Clearly people haven’t thought of aesthetics all this sort of stuff, it’s a bit 
like 1500 years ago they thought the world was flat and they thought the sun revolved 
around the earth now the earth revolves around the sun; they were talking about whether 
the universe was expanding now they are talking about it contracting. These are all 
provisional knowledge, at the time it was considered true but as we understanding 
things more we know that they are no longer true and the new truth comes out and this 
is what I think a lot of these sort of things is it is provisional. Today with the limited 
knowledge of the experts that you have we do have experts that have got limited 
knowledge they are not going to come up with this you beaut stuff yet. 
MC: Interestingly enough when you go to the underlying theory, I don’t know if you 
read the underlying theory stuff I sent over to you in chapter 1,  when you read that it 
will tell you that the fit doesn’t have to be perfect, it just has to be useful. 
PETTIT: The other thing I just thought, another term that comes to find is 
environmental. 
MC: Actually environment believe it or not it actually came up again, it was one of 
those areas or knowledge concepts that did come up a lot in the word count analysis but 
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it didn’t come up enough because I had to draw a line somewhere. 
PETTIT: When you talk about environmental with occupational health and safety, 
you talk about water running off and flowing over from a dam, tailing a dam off 
somewhere else, the release of chemicals. It’s application or its relevance to security, 
you see the spray this foam and suddenly you can’t move, or you’ve got those big fire 
hangers where you squirt in all the foam and you suppress the fire that way or you’ve 
got that smoke cloak where you have all that smoke come out and cloud the whole area 
so they can’t see what to steal. What are the environmental impacts of those products? 
Is it something that we should be mindful of because there is a law now that deals with 
environmental impacts, how is this going to impact on the environment? 
MC: I think when you say environmental, looking at table 3 the hierarchical 
knowledge table, you have environmental but where would you locate it? 
PETTIT: To be honest I don’t know. 
MC: I would put it between infrastructure and security surveys on the left hand side 
there. What do you think about that? Give that some thought because environmental is a 
big influence and if you look at how we establish the footings of a fence, we need to 
know the soil compact. If you are putting in deception technology in the ground, we put 
different technology in the ground for clay or sandy soil. 
PETTIT: Take for instance fire detectors, they have got a radioactive isotope in 
them, now you collect enough of them you can make yourself a bomb with it. There is 
also the aspect as well it is encased in its metal container, it is not a health risk. I’m 
quite sure that at one stage they were using asbestos in safes for fire rating.  
MC: they were for the fire retardant. When you talk about environment, basically that 
goes in two directions, you looking at environmental conditions and other more 
environment factors. 
PETTIT: Environmental law, chemicals in the environment. 
MC: And I guess that would be consumed, if you look at the concept of super 
ordinate, subordinate, environmental law would be consumed within law itself. 
PETTIT: It could be but it is just one of those things that is out there, we know it’s 
out there but no one has thought about where it fits. 
MC: This is one of the problems, how do you teach this to a novice? If I’m teaching 
physical security, how I know that I need to teach you this and how does it fit together. 
How does the student know okay I see why I’m learning that, a good example is 
electrical power, why am I learning electrical power, why am I learning the basic 
principles of electrical power, now electrical power didn’t come up as salient in this, 
when I did the pilot study I only used three texts and electrical power came up as a 
salient issue. When I did it across the 15 text it got dropped down but it was something 
that was carried forward and certainly a lot of the experts in the pilot study said you 
need to understand what power you need to draw. 
PETTIT: Magnetic electronic waves and microwaves and all that, is there a health 
impact here with that. We say there is not but we might find  
MC: There are a number of different articles on the effect of microwave transmission 
systems on people, when you test them you have to walk through the microwave zone. 
PETTIT: So there are aspects here that are latent and are present but we don’t 
understand them yet, not yet apparent. I think you’ve got to have a category of things 
that are present but not yet apparent how they fit, where they fit. 
MC: That is where MDS will come in, what will happen, every item on the MDS map 
is related to every other item mathematically and so what happens is as a group 
summation the group cumulatively locates it for you because some things you can’t put 
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in a digital map, it is a qualitative map, it is a deductive analysis map, some things 
aren’t necessarily, you are not sure they can be in a number of different areas and the 
idea of an MDS map is that based on ratings with every other concept this is where it 
fits. That is why I’m using that for my next phase of the study. What I’ll do is I’ll take 
these concepts and reduce them down to maybe 40 and then put them into a 
questionnaire but I’ll split the questionnaire into three and as each person logs in and 
does it they’ll do a third of the questionnaire and then by the end what we will actually 
have is a mathematical map of where the concepts are related to each other. The only 
problem with that is, it is not as easy to understand as the qualitative maps so you need 
both maps and one will help you interpret the other.  
PETTIT: This table 3 if you had heat maps which would show security as your big 
circle and then little dots of different size as to its relevance in that domain. 
MC: In the pilot and this study, when I’ve put the tables together to make table 2 I 
also had a word cloud that was calculated by Envivo so I can send you that. What it 
does was the most salient terms appeared bigger and in bolder text and as the terms 
dropped off in their occurrence across the texts they become smaller and it does the 
same, it takes probably the top 100 terms and arranges them as a word cloud, so I can 
send you that to have a look at. What was interesting when I did my table calculations 
when I compared it to the word cloud, the two were congruent. 
PETTIT: It would seem to me that some of these will mass together, certain terms 
will mass together. 
MC: And you see that in the word cloud. So what do you think are the three most 
important knowledge concepts of physical security?  
PETTIT: I think you have got to understand context, because context fits into 
things like quality of life, your aesthetics, utility, it all sort of brings that all together.  
MC: Also I guess the level of security. 
PETTIT: That would be the next thing. You would have to understand the level. 
MC: So under context what would you have, what’s the second most important? 
PETTIT: I would say understanding the level; I don’t like the word level. 
MC: It’s a hard one to change though, level is the one that came out and in fact even 
the other experts admit, that is the art they talk about the science of security being 
understanding the physics, the technology they understanding the resistive in terms of 
metallurgy for barriers and things like that, the art comes back to setting the levels. If 
you look at what you do as an expert you are looking at was the level set reasonable. 
PETTIT: I wish I had a better word for categorisation of the security need. 
MC: It is a hard one and in the text they use levels. It’s a hard word to replace, I 
found the same and that is why I left level in there because it is something that just 
keeps coming up, we talk about levels of security. 
PETTIT: The last thing that I think that is important in physical security or in 
indeed any security is review. One of the problems is people treat security as set and 
forget. 
MC: Do you think that review should be in analysis and evaluation. 
PETTIT: It is but it is after the fact, it is revisiting a month or two years later. Next 
theft after the next theft later, we plan a factory, we do our security, we do it to two 
other factories, we assess the risk of who is going to steal the capabilities, the tools they 
will have available to them, so we design it. Two years later we broke into factory A, 
we go out and we have a look at it and say ‘what happened here?’, they came in through 
the back grill, the back window through the toilet’. Now our records show that when we 
built this factory we had grills put on this, where the grills went, they are not there. 
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MC: Are you talking about security decay there? 
PETTIT: Yes, has something changed or, and then you go and talk to the manager 
of the site and the manager said oh yes we had an OHS inspection and we were told to 
take those grills off because it breached the fire code or something like that. Then I’ve 
got to think, if it breached it here I should go and check these other places. So off I go 
and have a look at the other sites and they have been removed too, I’ve got to go and 
think about my physical security again, do I put more sensors in, do I put a bigger fence 
up. So periodic review. 
MC: Interestingly both in this phase of the study and the pilot phase the concept of 
analysis and evaluation was something that was constant, so you analyse, you evaluate 
the law in terms of understanding the legal content, you evaluate the vulnerability of the 
facility in relation to threat, you evaluate the infrastructure needs, you evaluate the 
security needs, you actually evaluate the system once it is conditioned. So would you 
have analysis, evaluation and review? 
PETTIT: Yes, maybe. Because these things are not necessarily linear, review is 
not necessarily at the top of the list but that does not mean that it is not done at the end 
of the process. This is not a one, two, three, four and four is always the last number. 
MC: In the focus group people talked about ‘how do you really separate analysis and 
evaluation and are they one or the same’. One of the participants said you are splitting 
hairs because they are pretty much related. Would you go to perhaps a category of 
evaluation and review or analysis and review as opposed to analysis and evaluation? 
PETTIT: No, you look at it evaluation you work out how, it is part of efficacy isn’t 
it? Then you go back to relook at it. 
MC: Maybe have review after report writing? 
PETTIT: Could be. When Henry Ford first built his first car they didn’t have keys 
in them, you started by pushing the starter, there was no such thing as car theft. Why 
would he have to design a car with a key, no one steals them, the only reason people 
didn’t steal them was a) people didn’t drive and b) they didn’t have cars. Next minute 
he is having to put keys in them. 
MC: So really review for you is another category again. 
PETTIT: Yes. I really think you have got to look at how things change. 
MC: So what would you call it, review, reviewing, reviews? 
PETTIT: I think maybe security review, I don’t know. Things come up for level – 
like proportionate, level of security, proportionate security risk, commensurate.  
MC: Level really captures it doesn’t it? 
PETTIT: Yes, level is commensurate with the risk, it’s part of the sentences it 
can’t be replaced with one word. Let’s look what it says review here, analysis or check 
inspection report, revision, reassessment, maybe reassessment because your risks 
change, one of the things is risks are dynamic. 
MC: If you look at the way I’ve done the diagram say figure 1 and table 3, you see 
things like report writing covers everything from law down to .......... inclusive and 
analysis and evaluation covers everything from facility procedures up to ............ 
security that covers law as well. So you are analysing and evaluating every aspect of 
this it overlaps every single category. 
PETTIT: Report writing is very important and the fact that when police investigate 
a crime they know the elements of the offence, so if someone steals your car the first 
thing they do is get a statement of you to say ‘no I haven’t given anyone permission or 
authority to use my vehicle’. Then all they need is a time, date and place it was taken. 
Offender’s name, this jurisdiction, did use this vehicle, registration and so on without 
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the lawful authority or approval of the owner. So it is important when you write these 
reports that you know what the elements to put in there. This is what I find a lot of 
security people have got no idea of what the elements that they should be ticking off on 
in their reports. You see it at the security guard level, and they get there and they say 
something like ‘he was intoxicated and we used force to remove him’. Well there are 
aspects, where’s your assessment, how did he come to your attention, questions that you 
would be expected to be answering in the witness box you should be putting in those 
reports.  
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Appendix L 
PHASE FOUR FOCUS GROUP TRANSCRIPT EXAMPLE 
 
Focus group: Fraser, Peter, Brad, Garrhett, Clint, Nick, Brian and Michael Coole 
MC: At the start of this what I sent out was a number of maps and tables of 
knowledge areas that either the text books or different people that have 
participated in the studies over the last two years have said this is the area, in 
order to get a clear focus for this, the focus that I’ve taken is only physical 
security, but when I’m looking at physical security a lot of people sees it as 
different. Some people see it as physical barriers and focus on the technology 
or some say operation security is different to what I do in terms of technology. 
What I’ve done is gone from the text definition so physical security is a system 
practice device of a tangible nature so even operational security that forms a 
procedural element of actual physical security and that is probably the best way 
to articulate it, so we do have technical, physical and procedural combined to 
produce an outcome, which is really the focus of this study.  
  
 In terms of knowledge category areas there are a lot of staff that came across as 
core knowledge, other knowledge came across as more enablers to professional 
practice and so what I’m trying to understand is what is the knowledge that a 
graduate security person needs within the practice domain of physical security, 
or the skills sets. You will see with the maps that you have, the first one figure 
1 is a qualitative map that I did and that came from a table you have as well - 
table 2. Table 2 comes out of ethnographic research where we look at a culture 
and look at how things are related to that culture hierarchically, the argument is 
that as things are related in local connections actually starts to give us, not only 
the content of a domain of interest but also how its connected, how it relates to 
other content in that domain. The other map you have, the more confusing one 
is that multidimensional statistical output that is based on the comparisons 
between these concepts from a sample of a survey questionnaire so it’s a 
mathematical analysis of how these sit. What is interesting when we look at the 
two maps, the argument is the dimensions that the knowledge relates to is 
either diagnosing a security problem or treating a problem, where we have a 
less complex problem the diagnosis very quickly leads to treatment or in fact 
we can work backwards, where it is actually a very complex or new problem 
we go through that professional inference which is that core knowledge 
security theories etc.  If we look at some of the clusters on the MDS map do 
correlate with the hierarchical structure which is very pleasing for me that it 
came out like that. So based on these maps and the table of knowledge the first 
thing I want to be looking at in terms of articulating all the formal knowledge 
systems, based on these maps as a group what do you see is the foundational 
knowledge unit requirements to be learnt by security professionals before they 
graduate as officers? 
 
Nick:. When you say graduate are you talking about a basic industry qualification or 
are you talking about a tertiary or.... 
 
MC: The argument with professional literature which is quite interesting is, and it’s 
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a bit confusing in security, the argument professional literatures says if you are 
truly a profession you graduate from a course that teachers the same knowledge 
and then you go out and develop later on so I’m looking at something that 
would graduate from university but that may not necessarily be an under 
graduate, for example – last semester I had an engineer who knew nothing 
about security, he was doing our post grad stuff to learn about security to 
become a security focussed engineer. So he is a novice in security even though 
he has an engineering qualification. So I’m looking at someone who knows 
nothing about security for them to go out as a graduate and be developed - 
what are the knowledge areas? 
 
Garrhett: Once they come out of the degree, the outcome is that they can go into a 
variety of different security fields, so we are not basically talking about coming 
out and saying specifically you have to be a consulting, or coming out and 
saying you have to be a manage a guard force or be able to be a corporate 
security professional. Coming out of this degree should let them be able to do 
all of that, is that right? 
 
MC: What I’m looking at Garrhett is only physical security so if you look at security 
management it has a different knowledge structure to someone who works for 
you, so I’m only looking at, in order to get some sort of bounding for this 
study, so someone who wants to go work in counter terrorism for the Federal 
Government, I’m not looking at that. I’m looking at someone who is going to 
go and diagnose security problems and help design and commission a system 
to mitigate that. That may be in aviation, stadium or casinos but the general 
thing is we have a security problem that is focused on the physical not 
necessarily counter terrorism or anything like that. So while a broader security 
degree may look at all that what I’m saying is what is the knowledge of just the 
physical specialist, consultant adviser. 
 
Garrhett: I think looking at the core foundations I think every security professional 
needs to have an understanding of risk and I think to apply the physical 
security because they are going to have to still apply in the big picture and the 
linkages with the other departments. They are going to have to know the 
security concepts and theories, like defence in depth, crime prevention through 
environmental design, so I’m not saying this needs to be their major the units 
that they do when they leave but I think as the grounding when they first start 
this is like where they should be starting to get an understanding of this base.  
 
MC: When you look at the map, one of the things that came out the other day is that 
the top section of this map actually sits more at that diagnosis, the yellow 
section sits at the reasoning that profession inference, core security theories and 
a lot of the bottom part of the map is more attuned to the designing, the 
treatment solution knowledge, the engineering, the science knowledge etc. 
What you are saying is we look at the top of this map or we look at the 
knowledge clusters in the centre of this map and that is actually what we have 
got. 
 
Garrhett: That’s a good outcome. 
P a g e  | 465 
 
 
Fraser: I always have a big, not a problem, it is very important for someone to have 
that grounding and understanding of risk but one of the things that I always see 
a lot of is someone with that and then no idea or little understanding of the 
technical side so it’s great to do a risk assessment, but unless you understand 
how the systems work and know the practicalities of them, what the challenges 
are with then and installing and how they work and operate, if they don’t 
understand that as well, how can someone say that they need to implement that 
as a mitigation strategy. For example a PDS on a prison, if you don’t 
understand how the micro phonics and how they work them how can you say 
that is what they need. But I think as a first basis at least having an 
understanding and grasping of the concept of risk management and those other 
concepts and theories, you can learn some of the other stuff to a certain level 
but to be a professional looking at the technical side. So someone like Brad, I 
understand technical stuff but I don’t know anywhere near as much as he does, 
particularly if you look at x-ray machines and baggage handling systems, yes I 
understand how they work, I know how they work, I could design a system but 
I’ve got no clue compared to what Brad has or understanding of that, so I think 
you have to look at the different levels but if someone is coming out as a junior 
then they can learn some of those concepts but they have got to have that 
foundation principles. 
 
MC: And that is one of the things we look at and one of the other questions is what 
is the line in the sand, I had a chat to Brad about it the other day, one of the 
reasons why Brad is here is that he is probably  one of the most knowledgeable 
people in the country in terms of that deeper technical stuff but not everyone is 
going to be like Brad, so what is the line in the sand and one of the questions 
I’ll look at later on is what do we need to learn as a  person starting as a novice 
and what is best left  post grad to the professional development later on, so it 
might be the higher technical aspects, what does the group think? Based on the 
depth of experience in this room, how do we draw the lines in the sand? So 
what you are saying is they need that fundamental knowledge of all of it. 
 
Fraser: Yes, I think so, I think a shallow broad brush is probably a good start, but I 
think when you look at, you need the ability to start from first principles and 
look at it from the top down and I agree with Garrhett that every piece of 
technology we implement or every building change or architecture or planning 
or any of it is built to mitigate risk. First of all you need to understand the risks 
you are mitigating then if you look at it from the complete other end of the 
spectrum all you are looking at is the laws of physics. You don’t actually really 
need to know as a security professional how micro phonic cable works, what 
you need to know is that you need to detect vibration on that fence if someone 
is trying to climb it or put a ladder on it or however they are going to breach it, 
so that you can go then and, this is where you have to admit that you don’t 
know what you don’t know, and go and seek out a security technology 
professional and say I need to detect movement or sound on this barrier, how 
do I do it? They go here are the products this is how they work, whilst I 
understand and I would love to see all security consultants have a very very 
good foundation in how the technology actually works I think it is more 
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important that they have the knowledge of what is possible and what is not and 
how to apply it and they can go to someone else to get the information on how 
it works. Because a lot of the guys that understand the technology in detail 
can’t look at from the top down and therefore they don’t get the risk that they 
are trying to mitigate.  
 
Garrhett:  I find that a lot as well, not only in the team I have but in all areas of 
security when I am going to a client or when I was working in the UK. Security 
is a merger of these corporate operational managerial procedures and 
technology and I think as a foundation there is almost two different personality 
types who prefer one or the other. So you’ve got people who just like 
technology and come from a technical side and you’ve got people who prefer 
report writing and writing frameworks and management procedures and it is 
not just in security, it is almost like a different personality or trait of the 
individual and trying to merge them together in to one person, it is very 
difficult to find someone to hire who has both those skills in their personality 
who is willing to do that, in our team we basically will hire technical people 
and we’ll hire report writers and put them into the same team because they 
need to bounce off each other’s skills. I saw that in Home Office as well, we 
actually had technical officers and science officers and management officers 
and it was the combination of all those skills together. It is difficult to find one 
person. 
 
MC: What is the ultimate goal? One of the things I’ve had to come up with and a lot 
of people don’t like the view that I’ve formed today, my view is that there is no 
such thing per say as a security professional in a group phenomena, we are all 
professionals in what we do, we are all professionals in the way we carry 
ourselves but if you compare us to law, law is a recognised profession and 
everyone who is going to work as a lawyer does a general law degree and then 
they go and they may specialise in copyright law or criminal law so there is sub 
division specialities within that, and within those sub-divisions specialities they 
all learn the same, on the job development is individualist to everyone of those 
people but they all learn the same general knowledge. Same with accounting, 
you go into accounting and some people are focussed on stocks and trades, 
which is different to someone who does your taxes for you, but they all came 
from the same basic knowledge structure and then they do their 
subspecialisations and professional development. I understand what you’re 
saying, one of the things in the literature on professions is that profession is 
underpinned by the department of learning or science on which it is based. The 
argument is that professionals should have and that is question 3, it is argued 
that higher education students should learn the science or knowledge of which 
their future domain is built and we are looking at the depth and scope for that, 
so it is interesting that you say that because I think individuals will develop 
their own expertise later on. But what is the base line, at the moment the 
physical security professional, I see it on Linked in jobs advertised, what is it? 
So if we were to idealise what the knowledge would be for you team as a base 
line and then people can develop their own interest, what would that be? 
 
Peter: You would have to be able to have a level of competence to engage in 
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conversation in a meeting, basically if you come out of this degree and whether 
you're a undergrad who has come straight from school, because you have to 
break those two categories up for a start, because there is an expectation that a 
school leaver who has gone into the degree comes out and they are seen as 
being like in a graduate program, so they do get a lot more allowances etc. as 
people don’t expect them to be able to design a facility. If you are a mature age 
student, particularly if you have come from a background working in a security 
industry or other industry there is an expectation that when you speak, when 
you are sitting at the table they think, you are not a graduate you are actually 
somebody who is supposed to have input that is going to drive decision making 
etc. like that. So there is a different kind of pressure there for a start.  I think 
one of the issues that you are going to have is when you try and identify what 
the base line of competence is etc. like that for people are is that you have got a 
lot of information that you are trying to actually deliver to a person or as Brad 
said, all you are going to be able to do is give a very high level overview, so 
somebody can undertake a conversation and know what you are talking about 
but then if they got challenged then they are going to actually get a grilling. If 
somebody from a technical background then challenge them further they are 
not going to be able to answer those questions. 
 
MC: That may be though that deeper knowledge they learn post grad and one of the 
things came out with this knowledge map, when I look at think gee there is a 
lot of knowledge in that area just for physical, forget about security 
management, forget about context areas aviation or maritime, just for a 
physical security person there is actually a lot of knowledge, I mean I wish I 
had a map like this when I started studying because back in those days you 
were trying to fit it together in  your own head and develop your own relations. 
One of the things that I aim to do is develop something that a student can say 
why am I learning project management, how does this fit in? So I guess what 
I’m saying if you look at the different categories what you’re saying is that 
they need a very broad fundamental basis. 
 
Peter: The issue is that you are calling them physical security professional but the 
reality is when you bring all these things together it becomes that definition of 
a security professional because if you applied CCTV and stuff like that, CCTV 
well you’ve got to understand its use for monitoring an area or confirming a 
breach or an alarm or something but it’s also an intelligence gathering 
instrument. I think it is very hard, your definition of a physical security 
professional, it’s good to separate from an IT or a cyber-security, I think people 
get confused quite often when they see those two, they go security professional 
and its someone who works in cyber.  
 
MC: And this is the first attempt, I’ve tried to articulate jurisdictional boundary to be 
honest, because it’s been hard to leave that out. 
 
Peter: I think physical is a good term to do that because, I think what you’ve got to do 
is go away from traditional physical security which is everyone just thinks it’s 
just barriers, locks and stuff like that so I think the use of the name is that is 
pretty much at the end of this degree that is what you would come out as, as a 
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physical security professional. 
 
MC: One of the guys from AECOm said to me, CCTV has its own body of 
knowledge, risk has its own body of knowledge and so what you see, it’s like 
Brad if you look at detection sensors, it’s an existing body of knowledge, 
electrical theory has its own body of knowledge, so when I started putting this 
together I realised there is still a lot of knowledge areas with their own body of 
knowledge so what do we want our graduates from a program like this to come 
out with, and at what level? 
 
Fraser: I think you said something good before, look at legal professional, medical, 
engineering, law – they all have a based on what you do, so you become an 
electrical engineer, you can either go into building services and work on 
Bunnings and stuff or you can do real electrical engineering and do HV stuff, 
work on power stations, generation plans but you still done the same basis, 
same with legal, same with medical, and you specialise and realistically I think 
that is what you are getting at, there needs to be a level of what we  can do with 
security and then move into different areas.  
 
Peter: but how do you do that Fraser, one of the things is you identified there an 
electrical engineer, so they all do their base line theory but then they go and 
specialise because there is courses etc. to deliver that, there isn’t courses to 
deliver. 
 
MC: Not yet because we have not asked for them. Nick you teach security now, 
what is your focus? 
 
Nick: Risk, risk risk risk because that’s where we identify what we have to treat, risk 
assessment and part of it is consultation and mitigation, so I’m talking to 
people like you saying I want to do this how can I do it. So for me risk is the 
most essential thing and I’m not talking a basic level of risk I’m talking about 
risk where you produce a report based upon tangible evidence to tell me what 
is going on or what could go wrong or whatever and how can we treat it. To me 
that is the number one thing I am looking for. They have got to be able to walk 
into a room, sit down at a table and say here is my risk assessment, here is my 
treatment, otherwise what else are we doing. 
 
Peter: One of the things though when you talk about the risk treatment is that very 
thing is that unless you understand what each of these elements is in the 
physical security environment you can’t do efficient treatments because you 
don’t know whether that treatment is going to be in line with what the threat is, 
so it’s got to balance the threat with what you would treat it with. 
 
Nick: Part of a risk assessment is communication consultation and that is why I get 
people to identify the stake holders I need, I say come on help me with the risk, 
this is what I’m thinking, what can you, so I don’t need to be an expert in that, 
I should have some background knowledge as you said, I understand that 
domestic alarm system is not good enough for warehouse, I should understand 
that I can get .... radar, I can go for access control, I can go for,  I need to get 
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your input to say this is going to cost 1 billion dollar, 1 million dollars, 100,000 
dollars. 
 
MC: You are still drawing on, you say like a domestic alarm isn’t good enough for a 
warehouse, so you are still drawing on core technical knowledge to make that 
analysis. For instance a lot of diplomas in security risk management where a lot 
of people go and enrol in them and do them, but when you actually look at 
what they teach, most of it is risk based or a bit of safety or a bit of this but 
there is no core theories of security.  
 
Nick: That’s because you haven’t done ................................ 
 
MC: To be honest what this is about is saying what does a graduate need to do, if 
you go and do, TAFE is still a post graduate from high school environment, if I 
was to do a security diploma I would expect to come out with some security 
core knowledge not just risk. 
 
Nick: We cover risk, we cover in CPTED, we do units on security operations, the 
problem is the diploma we give now a days, if you did a diploma of security its 
equivalent to a diploma of management. It has 12 units, 8 units are business 
units, 4 units are security and we argue this all the time, for security diploma it 
must have security and they say oh no, our colleagues we deliver business units 
it’s easier for us to deliver business units, what is the point of doing a diploma 
if you don’t offer 
 
MC: Part of my study when I say I’m fusing all this, the reality all this knowledge 
exits, I’m fusing it together from text books and experts, but the reality is what 
can we draw on, to show the evidence to say we need this much core security 
knowledge and we need to cover this and that. Question 3 if you see it here, 
look at the scope and the depth which is what we are talking about now, if we 
look at these maps, we are covering off on risk, diagnosis aspect, in terms of 
understanding the security plan and design, those core theories we have that 
professional inference and if you look at the bottom we have the technical 
stuff, technology, physical barriers, what is the core knowledge they need to 
come out with so their core knowledge might relate to diagnosing the risk, it 
may relate to understanding the core theory of security, the core principles of 
delay, the core principles of response and at what level, where do we draw a 
line and say this is professional development? 
 
?Brad?: I think it is hard as well, what you are saying, security risk isn’t like 
engineering risk or other risks where it is tangible, you’ve got all your stats, we 
are looking at qualitative risk assessments most of the time. One of the biggest 
things I’ve found and teaching CIP, you have all the students who are third 
year students who have supposedly done electronic security, risk and they 
come in and they still don’t always have an understanding or a grasp of those 
foundation principles of those things. You sit there and talk about how a lock 
works and one of the students will go - hey we did that in physical security 
don’t you remember that – No! A lot of it comes back to their personalities. 
I’ve employed probably a dozen grads from the degree at SKM, GHD and 
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Worsleys all combined, the good thing about teaching is you can find the 
decent ones and go, hmmm I’ll give you a job or I’ll give you a job. It may not 
mean that they actually have a deeper understanding or a broader knowledge 
base of security but they might have the personality traits that you may need to 
be a consultant. I think there is a bit of a balance act between the two. 
 
Brian Tisdale joined the group and provided details about his background. MC updated 
Brian on the progression of the meeting. 
 
MC: so we are focussing now on what is the core knowledge and a good example is 
say Garrhett, if you get a graduate tomorrow in your section, what is it and 
think about also the number of people here that have graduated from the 
course, think about the knowledge if you thought, I wish I covered this when I 
studied. What from someone who is a graduate from your program but also 
what is the stuff that people think I wish I got taught this before I ended up 
here? 
 
Garrhett: For me going into consulting it was the management of the design, going 
in and not understanding the phases that you have to go through to get to the 
end product or the master planning, concepts, schematic detail design, I didn’t 
have an understanding of that process and how to interact with the clients and 
what information they needed and what the other disciplines needed at the 
different stages to develop and get the final product so I think that was what I 
came into consulting and going oh wow this is what I actually do, which is 
manage designs, not just design something once, I have to manage the process 
from the start to finish and that was the biggest eye opener for me going into 
consulting. I don’t know if you guys have had a similar experience? 
 
MC: None of that came is covered in any of the text books Garrhett, that is one of 
the problems, that came out a lot in my in depth interviews that I did, that was 
a theme that kept coming up and recurring, how you go from the initial idea to 
a detailed process to actually commissioning and testing and end product. 
 
Peter: But that is no different to any other engineering discipline when you look at it 
from that perspective, whether you are consulting on security or whether you 
are the electrical consultant, the lighting or the environmental consultant, the 
process is exactly the same, so whilst I think you could probably cover that off 
in a unit I think that is probably something that needs to come from a general 
engineering degree because that knowledge base is already developed. 
 
Fraser: I think is where things like minors and electives come in, is how you actually 
guide students to pick the right units. 
 
MC: But this is what I’m saying, for someone to understand what to pick, what is 
the knowledge you want them to have, for instance if I wanted to come and 
work in your design team theoretically why would I go and do a minor in 
business necessarily if I had focus on engineering skills initially. 
 
Fraser: One of the biggest things would be if you are consulting, contract management, 
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and understanding of that because that is one of those things that when you are 
talking about managing clients, if you look at organisational behavioural type 
stuff going through it myself is people will come up with this what we want 
they document it, everything goes out, you put it out to tender, oh they change 
their mind and they don’t understand that every time you change something it 
costs money, its extension of time, variation costs etc. like that, so if you have 
an understanding of how people think and that is what I think these minors and 
electives steering people towards the right ones, is that will give you that 
ability to actually develop so I think where you are saying Michael you lead 
with a core body of knowledge and then where you go off and you’ll specialise 
but I think a lot of the things can be delivered at the uni, there is an emphasis 
on the student to work out what they want to do and quite often they won’t 
have a clue what they want to do at the end of it because someone might want 
to go and do OSH as part of it because as we see there is a lot of this 
combining of HSSE and stuff like that so it’s going to be hard to design the 
perfect course for what people want to do. 
 
MC: I am only focussing on an ideal curriculum, so if someone said to me what is 
the ideal curriculum for a physical security professional in the future, because 
it doesn’t exist now as it is anyway, what are the core units, what do we have to 
cover. 
 
Garrhett:  I think you have to cover both, if I can make it basic, the English and the 
maths you have to cover both of those and previously when you come out of 
high school and you think what do I want to do, do I want to do an English or 
maths degree, what am I strong points, and now with these contemporary 
science degrees, there seems to be an amalgamation of these two and you see 
that in sport science where you have got guys who want to do sports and can 
write the reports but now they are doing biomechanics and have to do all the 
maths side and I can see this in the security science program as well and the 
touching point could be risk but the foundation is, you have English units 
where you are writing essays and business cases and you’ve got your maths 
units where you need to learn the technical side and like you said before about 
getting definitions, I think we need to give the students a basis in both these 
fields just so they can communicate with each other, not necessarily specialise 
in either one at this stage but know the terminology, know the principles of 
each side so when you’re talking to a contractor you can talk about the 
technology side, or if you are a technology specialist when you are talking to a 
client or a consultant or an organisational manager you know what his drives 
are and what his goals are, so it’s about defining both the maths and the 
English side so they can communicate. 
 
MC: So with that, when you say the maths and English sides, one of the things with 
all degrees now is they are very focussed, focussed towards the outcome of the 
degree so to the goal or profession. What I’ve tried to do with this map is that 
one had to go through concept reduction so I couldn’t put all 98 concepts that 
sit in this map in this questionnaire because I would have one single ............... 
survey including my own. So what I had to do was reduce it to the hierarchical 
theme so when you talk about the maths or the English and I look at this I think 
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okay someone needs to understand threat so Fraser says talk about the threat it 
always goes back to the threat and risk so if someone needs to understand what 
threat means I do the goal of security or we look at detection came up as a 
salient knowledge area if we look at things like response or delay and barriers, 
these came up as salient knowledge categories, so I guess what I’m saying is 
should we be teaching, do they guide the knowledge categories that we want 
and then we teach the maths or science or English around those? 
 
Fraser: I think it is important to have that definition of understanding upfront, like you 
said threat means different things to different people, depending on their 
background experience, so many variables in it but if there was  a defined 
definition, okay this is what it is for a security professional and then you could 
move forward form there I think. But because it is kind of very subjective it’s 
difficult to actually pinpoint something, saying this is the foundation principle 
we have to start from and then teach the principles and guidelines and 
everything else around it, until that is nutted out and defined I think it is very 
difficult to say. 
 
Nick: But doesn’t it come down to, don’t you need the maths and English before you 
can do a subject. 
 
MC: The trade-off is that the variation of high school leavers is phenomenal these 
days as an educator, it’s hard, some students I get are really good, they could 
be engineering students and others there is no way they will pass high school 
maths. When I look at, a good example here is going off what Fraser is saying, 
if I look at the higher level concept, if you look at treatment in figure 2 and we 
look at the notion of movement and control, so you achieve movement and 
control with barriers and a sub part of barriers is delay so what we are looking 
at there is a broader aspects of the goal so we need to control movement, we 
need delay movement and we do that with barriers. Once we understand the 
role of barriers as you said in your interview, comes down to the mathematics 
of the delay, so what is the physical resistance of that barrier to the threat. So 
we are looking at a vehicle barrier to delay the progress forward so I guess 
what appears to be coming out for me is that we need to teach the goals, so we 
are talking about movement, control and delay and the maths that sits under 
that is that we don’t need to be the engineer we need to know to go to the 
engineer for the structural resistance and understand what he is telling us, same 
as detection, if we look at detection and sensors as a knowledge area is an area 
within itself, we need to understand what we need to detect so what are the 
threats that pose a risk, I need to detect personnel, or contraband material 
which is contained in metal, and then we need to understand in theory how the 
basic principles of the technology work. 
 
Garrhett: Or what its limitations are. 
 
MC: Yes what its limitations, there is a mathematical equation behind the 
probability detection for a sensor technology, if that makes sense. So what I’m 
trying to tease out so what do you think in terms of these two maps, these 
broader knowledge areas and the depths and scope of that. 
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Fraser: I think one of the things you need to do is prioritise this. To me I would look at 
it if you were looking at security I think the way that you are explaining it there 
and this discussion is going, you would need to put systems theory up very 
high on your criteria, because that will give you context, when you start 
looking at, coz as you are explaining there I look at this and then I say okay I 
need to go and talk to this technical professional on this area and then I have to 
consider if you are looking at it from a, if we use the terminology of an English 
perspective so that quantitative qualitative way of looking at risk so I think that 
needs to be one of the things that you need to have a top down approach to this 
because I think it will be a lot easier than the way it is actually formatted here, 
it is sort of a bit disjointed in some ways when you are trying to say what are 
the key elements that need to go in this. I think an easy exercise would be to 
just prioritise and break down because that will actually help you identify what 
those needs are for a security professional at the end of a degree. 
 
MC: And that is one of the problems when you look at develop this and also these 
other maps, it is hard to capture, one person will say this needs to be there and 
then another will say this is more of enabling knowledge base so systems 
theories applies to biomedical science and applies to pretty much everything, 
where do we actually organise. An example is one of my first iterations to this 
map CPTED was located back here with surveillance and access control and it 
was Kerran who said no it is a planning thing, yes it’s a treatment outcome but 
it’s a planning and design element, it needs to sit with that, yes it provides 
access control, it provides a degree of surveillance but it is still a planning and 
design. That is when you look at this, part of the problem is some of the 
knowledge structure won’t sit right, some things are diagnose and treatment in 
the way that you interpret them, some things are, it is not necessary that clear 
separation so it doesn’t matter to a degree as long as we know we need to teach 
systems theory, that is the first thing. 
 
Fraser: Which is probably one of those foundation units, I think if you taught systems 
theory like the structure of the degree you come into it and 101 is systems 
theory, it will help for all these other things to actually fall into place and be 
more readily understood by students, particularly those that don’t have the 
background that they are coming from. 
 
Nick: ..... systems theory is there a big ............... 
 
MC: It has its own body of knowledge,  but I’ve taught the principles in a week. 
 
Fraser:  You can simplify, you can break it down. 
 
MC: As a unit, one of the first  
 
Fraser:  I think you are going to have to combine a lot of these anyway. 
 
MC: That’s right, a lot of these will overlap, but in physical security when I teach it, 
in the first week is systems theory, this is a system, this is the systems theory 
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defined, it comes from this basis of systems science and developed by 
............and then you start getting them to put it together. 
 
Fraser: Then you can go into context because you can then apply it to the context of 
systems theory how it applies to a physical security professional so then you 
have given that broader view of what systems theory is and then you can break 
it down and start guiding the students. 
 
MC: It comes back to the next question, how should the learning units be organised. 
So we look at the broader aspects, we have diagnosis, the professional 
reasoning in terms of security theories and the more engineering knowledge 
that we have that achieves the treatment outcomes, how should the course be 
structure if you look at individuals learning units such as threat, as delay, as 
response, how should we structure that so that it makes sense that it follows 
that system it keeps talking about. 
 
Fraser: I guess that is one of those things when you look at something that has a heavy 
maths or science focus, it might be something that you deliver at a later stage 
ain the degrees, because you build the degree to building their knowledge base 
and confidence so they can apply that maths or science to it so that might be 
one of those ways to do it and then it allows them to identify their weaknesses 
so when someone comes and have a nature affiliation to English but they want 
to do this degree they learn pretty quick they are all pretty much writing 
whether it be an essay or other, even that – I don’t think essays are the right 
way to deliver these things because no one has ever asked me to write them an 
essay on anything, it is all report writing etc. like that. So I think that then you 
need to offer guidance to them as to, if someone needs to pick up their 
knowledge in maths or in a science you can guide them to do that as none of 
this stuff will be able to be all delivered in this degree because it is so 
specialised. I think you need to guide them, if they need to learn about maths or 
something like that they need to go and do their own additional studies. 
 
MC: What needs to be learnt, what is the priority for learning units before 
graduation and what is it that you are happy to develop someone in. If all of 
you were asked to employ a graduate today and you wanted to employ them as 
a consultant, you employ them knowing you need to develop them. What do 
you want them to have now at this time in their life and then what are you 
willing to get them and yourself to push. 
 
Brad: Three things - a very high level and basic understanding of risk; common 
sense; and the ability to use critical and logical reasoning. If you have those 
three you can learn or teach them or teach them to teach themselves anything 
else that is on that piece of paper. 
 
NicK: ..... common sense 
 
Brad: I’m not entirely sure, we have always said and Kerran says it a lot more bluntly 
than I do but if our clients found out that 95% of what we do is common sense 
we would be out of a job tomorrow but they don’t. 
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MC: When you say look at the map and they can teach themselves, one of the 
outcomes or objectives of this study was to develop these maps so that 
someone can go look I don’t know that so now I need to know that I need to 
know that. When a novice looks at any course they are going to do we assume 
a depth of knowledge but in actual fact they have none. They don’t know that 
they need to know risk, they don’t know why they are doing engineering 
mathematics for delay or for pd, if you get a student to sit there and calculate 
the probability of detection based on the statistical output of trials and errors 
they are going why do I need to know this, the objective was to produce a 
heuristic or knowledge map that allows them to locate. So they might not be 
experts in technology, in fact that could be their weak spot but they know it’s 
their weak spot and they know how it fits in with other things and maybe that is 
something they can attune themselves to later on.  A good example is a lot of 
people think because they read families of physical security they know locks, 
Brian will tell you there is a whole body of knowledge, I would never say to 
someone ill design a locking system for your facility, I’ll engage someone like 
Brian because that is what he does, it’s such a specialised field but how do you 
know that it is a specialised field. 
 
Fraser: One of the things I think we are missing the point as well, we seem to be 
getting away from the foundation principles that students need to learn, and I 
think that also comes back to the industries we are working in, like I said 
before, if I’m looking for a student, a long time ago I’d go this is the student I 
want, they need to be able to speak to clients, they have got to have some 
communication skills, be able to manage processes, project management, 
especially from an engineering design process and I try and find a student like 
that and they were good. And then coming back to what Brad said, I went okay 
well, what can I teach them, so what do they need to be able to do and one of 
those things was be able to communicate because especially within an 
engineering function or general business, you have got people who are 
propeller heads, fantastic at sitting behind a desk designing the voltage drop 
between this and this or whatever, but put them in front of a client and if they 
want to be a consultant they are clueless. Not a smart person or anything like 
that it’s just out of their comfort zone. Conversely if I go and sit down with 
brad in a meeting, even some of my meetings at the moment half of it goes 
over my head, but I can put the old tap dancing shoes on get up and 
communicate and find out what I need to know. That is I think if a student has 
the ability to do that all the other stuff can be taught so that they can get that 
through experience. 
 
Garrhett: So maybe the best way to look at these is to say we have three students 
in front of us, they all have great communication skills, common sense, these 
other trait foundations, what separates them, who we are going to pick because 
they have got more knowledge in something in front of us. 
 
Brad: I’d look more at their personality. 
 
Fraser: I’d look at the one who is not afraid to say look I don’t know the answer to that 
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can I get back to you tomorrow. 
 
MC: Sure but what is the desirable knowledge you want them to have? 
 
Garrhett: These are all sort of good attributes. 
 
MC: We often talk about post graduate attributes, but they actually are a sound 
foundation for selection but consider that you have three people that have all 
these attributes and they score high what is the desirable, what would separate 
them in terms of the core knowledge that you would take one over the other. 
One of the guys earlier in my study said he actually hired a security graduate 
following a terrorism program and he said he very quickly learnt the guy could 
communicate but he didn’t know anything about technical security which for 
him, he was in a design consultant engineering firm. 
 
Brad: That was his fault he employed the wrong person 
 
MC: He agreed, one of the things he made comment in the last focus group was the 
learning units need to relate to the objectives of the domain, what do we do. So 
he is designing physical security. 
 
Fraser: That is where you contacts come into it because everyone at this table would 
say a different thing. Particularly if you are doing consulting work because it 
just depends, if you are building a prison as opposed to you’re doing work on a 
piece of critical infrastructure it is going to be different the attributes that you 
want at that time. 
 
MC: The common theme is a risk approach, the common theme is that we need 
detection, we need delay, we need response. 
 
Fraser: Yes but you are going to emphasis different things, again you won’t 
incorporate everything in there, you won’t. 
 
MC: So what do you need to incorporate as core fundamentals? 
 
Peter: Is it possible to combine similar units together? 
 
MC: Yes, absolutely.  So what is the core fundamentals, so you may not learn 
everything about detection technology that Brad knows but do you need to 
know the basic principles of detection and how we achieve it. 
 
Brad: If you break it down like that it might be better. As you said we’ve got risk, 
there’s detection, and then so looking at the concepts of security, I mean we 
already teach CPTED, DRD all those type of things. 
 
MC: So you think they need to learn that? 
 
Brad: Yes. 
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MC: That is what I’m saying, what is the desirable knowledge that someone you’ve 
got has as a fundamental. 
 
Brad: As a broad brush I think it is important to understand all those theories, 
principles whatever you want to call them, because then you can specialise in 
certain areas once you have got that foundation. 
 
MC: So looking at the map, what do you think is core that a person needs to 
understand CPTED, defence in depth, detection, response, you don’t 
necessarily have to understand the legal formalities of response that someone 
with 10 years in the police force does. 
 
Brad: They at least need to know about it. 
 
MC: Yes, and that is what I’m saying or Garrhett is saying, what is the desirable 
have this knowledge, what is the knowledge you want these people the core 
overarching knowledge. 
 
Nick: If you go back to risk the management framework ISO2000??, context it goes 
to identification...... for example context is looking at .....  structure a course, 
you might do a pre-emptive course then phase 1 is we look at context, how the 
context affect security. 
 
MC: that is as that comes as well and a lot of that will overlap. 
 
Nick:  Then the context with most that stuff will then  is looking at the most important 
organisation what is key there, what isn’t key, for example a gas burn, pots 
mean nothing it’s the sulphur removers it’s the cooling systems that mean 
everything. 
 
Brad: Depends on who you talk to, pots can mean the lot 
 
Fraser: If you go to Kwinana those little pipes that aren’t detected, if you take one of 
those pipes out you can shut down operations for up to 3 to 6 months.  
 
Brad: To determine what is critical and what is not. It’s not always the big shiny 
things. 
 
Nick: The stuff I learnt was actually Middle East stuff and it was ....... 
 
Fraser: But that is the different there is so I’ll use that as an example say like Kwinana, 
it is for shared synergies between industries, it is the most intensified in the 
world, they are inter-dependent on each other and those little things that aren’t 
protected, I’ll tell you if you take one out, because it has happened where 
something nearly got taken out by accident, and that was three to six months it 
would have shut down. 
 
Nick: Me walking in not knowing that I’d say do you have pots let’s do this, you 
walk in saying hang on a second, and to me that is context you have got to 
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learn how to talk to people and understand what you are protecting and what 
you want protected. Then you move down to risk identification what risk do we 
have, Australia is different to Middle East, different to England is different to  
..   all this feel causes problems so that comes to identification and risk, things 
that happen to us reasonably in our area. Then treatments are things like your 
CPTED, situation crime prevention, defence in depth, that is how I see it 
anyway. Treatments are offered to the electronics security, physical security, 
going through all that stuff come to treatments, risk acceptance then its project 
management, we’ve got a piece of paper, how do I not take a bit of paper and 
actually take the words off the paper and put it into place, that is how I see the 
structure. 
 
MC: And you think the structure of the curriculum should be based on that 
framework? 
 
Nick: That is what I’d like to see someone walk out of a course with, knowing how to 
apply that and how to apply that in everyday use to a high level that is the goal. 
It seems to my mind that that actually builds upon it. 
 
Brad: I think that is one of the biggest things and dare I say it, this is no disrespect to 
you Mick, academics and Dave said this when he worked for me, I reckon that 
every person in academia needs to go back in the industry to work between 
every 3 to 5 years.  He would sit there and it was great, I’d get the red pen out 
and go to town on the reports and anything else he was writing because it was 
completely different way of doing things and maybe why I’m such a pain as a 
lecturer because I look at things from a client point of view as what do I expect 
to see which is different to what academia may teach. That was certainly the 
case when I was doing the degree, there were probably maybe one or two 
people that actually had any real life understanding the rest were pure 
academics. Trying to get that together and I think that is what you are saying,  
you have got to be able to understand go through that context.  
 
 I’ve just written a few things down here which is pretty much what we’ve 
already spoken about. Some of those foundation principles could be things like 
- systems theory, security concepts and practices, electronic security, security 
risk management, infrastructure protection, project management. I mean I 
know the degree used to have a PM function, I use that term loosely, but I 
don’t know what it is like now but infrastructure protection as well breaking 
that away from CI because something may not be classified CI by the 
government but it is important to that client in their operation so it is still 
critical to them even though it is not classified as CI. So just breaking that 
down to infrastructure projection in general because that brings all of those 
things in together. I know my students, we go through risks, we go through- 
first assignment is a pragmatic and systematic approach required for CIP and 
they all sit there and go I don’t know how to write this, do this or do that, so 
that is why you are here to learn. So trying to bring all of those concepts 
together, I think that is what you are trying to get at – what do we have to have 
so that they come out with all of that understanding of those things, which we 
know when it is so important to understand electronic security, security 
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concept side, CPTED, defence in depth all of those things, it’s imperative to 
understand risks, its important they can communicate, they have a project 
management understanding, and regardless whether they are going to 
consulting or they are go into technical area of expertise or anywhere else they 
still have got to be able to plan themselves in a logical manner in everything 
they do, regardless of what industry or what specialisation they go to. 
 
Garrhett: Looking at the foundation knowledge I know we are trying to identify 
what it is but if I could take a different approach and maybe point out just for 
me what it isn’t and that might mean maybe we can start there so from where I 
am, I’ve boxed out law and this one adversary criminology, now I know having 
an understanding of law and regulations is important but I wouldn’t say on a 
daily basis that knowing how our legal system works and how to enact the law 
is something that I would even look at.  Because there are so many laws and 
regulations just knowing that if I am going into the aviation industry or 
maritime industry, I can have a look at the maritime act and have a look at this 
and see how that affects me but actually knowing law or a law degree 
principles I don’t use at all. 
 
Fraser: Do you think on that one then what would be better about that is the ability to 
interpret legislation, policies etc. and so instead of specifying that law, because 
you do need to know that but you are right as specific laws. 
 
Nick: ........ Law standards, you know Australian Standards. 
 
MC: One of the limitations I guess and why I’ve had to approach this as well, 
extracting all this from text books, they were all subsets of law for instance 
how to interpret legislation, if you do a count analysis that didn’t come up very 
often but law comes up 6000 times. So law becomes an overarching theme, 
cultural domain analysis cover term, but within that cover term we need to 
know what we need to teach in law. So what you are saying is correct, do we 
need to know how a bill is created.  
 
Brad: That depends on where the student is from as well, which legal system is based 
on so if we have international students from the US, the middle east which we 
do they are all in complete different context.  
 
MC: That is spot on that is actually good that you are able to say what don’t we 
want. 
 
Garrhett: The other one I’ve boxed out so far is adversary, so basically I need to 
know what my threats are but I don’t need to know the criminology basis 
behind that, this is sort of like a crime prevention from a policing perspective 
or what motivates them in the geographic in which they are from, I am not 
going to be able to influence that they come from a poor family or they have 
got these other mental problems, I don’t need to know any of that. So from my 
perspective understanding what makes up a threat, their motivation and 
everything, yes I need to know what makes it up but I don’t need to know the 
in-depth of what my adversaries are. Does anyone else agree with that? 
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Brad: I think it is important that any student have a basic understanding that 
understanding the adversary can be important and it is not something they need 
to know about off the bat but I think from a knowledge perspective it really 
needs to be there because they need to be, there will be that time where they 
need to sit down and go I am treating a specific risk against a specific type of 
disaffected nut case and I need to understand exactly the risk I am treating 
because I need to be able to isolate that and not affect the rest of the population 
and so I think from that perspective you don’t need to come out of the degree 
with that sort of knowledge but you need to come out of the degree with that 
little word in the back of your mind so that at some point when you actually 
have to sit down and say I’ve got to get into this persons head you need to 
know that. 
 
Fraser: But that is probably going to get encompassed within if you are teaching about 
threat and under the risk banner etc. like that , that is going to inevitably come 
out, the concept of an adversary. 
 
MC: Adversary is an American terminology as well, one of the limitations we had 
and we have it in a number of professional domains, this concept of ....... 
cultural language, language that means the same across different language and 
it doesn’t, a lot of the text books on physical security that I had to do the initial 
extraction from, they are all American centric, so adversary is their term, some 
people in Australian don’t like the use of adversary because there may be legal 
implications that they read into.  A good example, I was asked to provide 
advice on security for a library and the best thing really was a CPTED 
approach and when I actually sat down and talked to the library manager she 
said to be honest the biggest issue I have is teenagers having sex in the library, 
that came out as their biggest threat, we have book theft and destruction 
covered but we are getting more and more teenagers in here after school 
unsupervised and so what they actually needed was a layout where the natural 
traffic patterns provide the perception of supervision. 
 
Brad: Which is then using security principles for a non security event. 
 
MC: So it is context but it also comes down to that broader thing of, the term 
adversary doesn’t fit that scenario if that makes sense. 
 
Garrhett: I think maybe what I’m trying to say, I don’t need to know why people 
are committing the crime, I don’t need to know the root causes, social 
implications and how we can treat that, I’m not interested in how society can 
treat that, obviously I am individually but as a consultant I’m not trying to 
change societies to help them.  
 
MC: No, and that is important to have that dissection in criminology, some of the 
theories such as situational crime prevention gives us a framework to 
understand how we apply the engineering tools, but do I care about biological 
differences in people and how that leads to offending, as a security person I 
don’t care, as a criminologist it was interesting. 
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Garrhett: I’ve also had a look at ergonomics and ergonomics is really important 
when I’m designing a control room or making someone comfortable but I 
wouldn’t say that more than 10 minutes on it in a lecture is probably too much, 
a waste. 
 
MC: It is something you need to know exists but you don’t have to teach it in depth. 
 
Fraser: Once again that is something that comes later, as a grad you don’t need to 
know. 
 
MC: That is the most important thing, what can come later, what do you want the 
graduate to have and what can come later? 
 
Clint: I think you have to consider what does come later as well though, guys are 
coming out of the course and the post graduate learning isn’t really there. 
Unless you get thrown into one of the graduate programs with the engineering 
firms the guys are coming out of the course knowing not a lot really, this is 
from the technology and industry side, in terms of networking and integration 
and that sort of that, so I’m more looking at the green section there, is that 
learning isn’t there in industry unless you are jumping into where these guys 
are. 
 
MC: That is one of the problems for us we can only teach to a certain degree, if you 
had the perfect course you would be here for seven years, which no one is 
going to spend 7 years studying, engineering’s don’t spend 7 years studying, 
they go into an engineering firm and that is one of the biggest issues coming 
out of security is medicine has a very clear pathway, you graduate, you become 
an intern, accountants get hired as junior accountants, lawyers carry books 
around for a year, security needs to understand exactly what you are saying, 
that learning must come, if someone gets picked up by Garrhett's team they are 
lucky, for the other 50 people what are they going to do, because there is only 
so much, I think Kerran actually said, he said he only has ever used less than 
10% of what he has learnt in his engineering degree but you don’t know what 
they 10% is. So any degree doesn’t matter. Kerran's view is that any degree 
you do - you are going to use less than 10% of the whole degree in your 
professional context but you don’t know what that 10% is. 
 
Brad: I think we are getting ahead a little bit there, if someone goes into a grad 
program its fantastic and having put a few people through that it is great for 
them, they do their four years in the grad program and they have all the stuff 
they need to go through, but for all intents and purposes they are employed by 
Jacobs or whoever as a graduate engineer, so on the books they are a grad 
engineer, they are not a security person or anything else they are a graduate 
engineer. I have seen time and time again there is individuals who work in the 
engineering side who are very very smart, know their stuff, so you’ve got guys 
designing process control systems or comes guys designing elementary 
networks, radio frequency for stuff which you would use for security as well. 
From a security point of view you would go you guys don’t know what you are 
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doing, this is for security this isn’t for that. They do know what they are doing 
they are just not licensed to do it. So I think a lot of the time there is an 
expectation that a grad will come out as an engineer and they will understand 
all these principles that they are supposed to but because we don’t actually 
have like you were saying the same pathway, it is very difficult for them to be 
able to have anything definitive to say, this is what you need as you finish, 
which is hence this whole thing. 
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Appendix M 
Risk Management Body of Knowledge Relationship 
 
 
P a g e  | 484 
 
 
 
 
